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Abstract
This thesis emerges from a general interest in how actors in the field of international 
affairs use the media as a means of power in politics and war. It examines the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) use of its Press and Information (PI) function in 
three peace support missions in the Balkans, and specifically studies how the officers in 
charge of this function strove to achieve the alliance’s political and military ends. 
Departing from six illustrative cases the thesis demonstrates how PI operated to enhance 
NATO member countries’ public support to the alliance as well as its presence and use 
of physical force in the Balkans. Further, it examines how NATO used PI in an effort to 
influence the general behaviour and specific actions of ordinary people and warring 
parties in the Balkans without having to resort to such force.
The thesis does not evaluate whether the PI activities actually influenced people in the 
Balkans and elsewhere, but it provides a conceptual framework to appreciate the kinds 
of influence PI sought to exercise on them. Robert A. Dahl’s notion of power may 
further the understanding of P i’s mode of operation to influence the parties’ specific 
actions. To this end, PI holds the potential of being a non-lethal enforcement measure. 
Michel Foucault’s notion of power adds another dimension by clarifying in a theoretical 
sense how PI may enhance public understanding and support and influence people’s 
general behaviour. Used in this manner, PI may ultimately be a government technique 
applied as a concentration of knowledge in a discursive battlefield.
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List o f key terms
Chief Press and Information Officer (CPIO)
A Chief Press and Information Officer is an officer in charge of co-ordinating all Press 
and Information (see below) activities in a NATO military mission.
Compulsory power
‘Compulsory power’ is applied to encapsulate Robert A. Dahl’s (1957: 203) conception 
of power defined as ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something 
that B  would not otherwise do’ (see further 3.1.1 and 3.2.1).
Discursive force
I shall use the term ‘discursive force’ to refer to dynamic and immaterial elements in 
Foucault’s analytics of power. Discourses consists of discursive forces (see 3.1.3 and 
3.2.3). It should be distinguished from physical force (see below).
Industrial war
Rupert Smith (2005: 16) defines the concept of ‘industrial war’ as ‘conflict between 
states, the manoeuvre of forces en masse, and the total support of the state’s manpower 
and industrial base, at the expense of all other interests, for the purpose of an absolute 
victory’. Arguably this conception compares to how war was largely understood during 
the Cold War, among other places in the field of International Relations (see further 1.1 
and 1.2 respectively). The thesis adopts this term to avoid confusing the broader term 
‘war’ with this particular conception of it.
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Information
The term ‘information’ is here apprehended from the perspective provided by Briggs 
and Burke (2002: 188), who point out that originally in English and French the verb 
inform meant ‘forming the mind’. Unless otherwise specified, it does not refer to digital 
data or other non-processed pieces of information. Rather, information refers to data 
that are organised in a form that makes them understandable to subjects and that 
subjects may consider as forming part of their knowledge. This study deals with the 
cognitive dimension of information that involves perception, sense-making, and the 
understanding of data.
The media
‘The media’ is used as a broad tag implying means of mass communication, primarily 
television, newspaper and radio. It is used interchangeably with the term ‘the press’ and 
those who produce stories to the media, that is, journalists and reporters. It does not 
mean advertisement or entertainment.
Peace support operation
‘Peace support operation’ should be understood along NATO’s (2006:131) definition: 
‘An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, 
normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or 
maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace 
enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian operations.’
People
The term ‘people’ should be construed as the mass adult populations and is used 
interchangeably with the terms ‘public’ and ‘electorates’. Unless otherwise specified
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these terms are used in a global sense, but often they refer to the mass adult populations 
in NATO member states and in the Balkans. Frequently, the thesis refers to these people 
by adapting the CPI Os’ more technical term ‘target groups’. In this context ‘strategic 
targets’ are the electorates in NATO member states and ‘local targets’ are the 
populations in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Physical force
‘Physical force’ refers to the traditional military capability to apply armed, kinetic force 
to human bodies and material objects. This type of force is potentially lethal and 
destructive (see 1.2).
Power
‘Power’ is conceived in a broad generic sense interchangeable with the term influence.
It refers to a social relational phenomenon that changes actors’ thoughts and behaviour 
primarily by means of what is also called coercion, persuasion, and authority. Thus, 
physical force (see above) is one of several means of power. It is not a synonym of the 
much broader term power, however. Human communication, by means of words and 
images used to explain, to persuade, or to dissuade others is also a means of power.
Press and Information (PI)
In this study, ‘Press and Information’ refers to a function within NATO in charge of 
releasing public information as defined below.
Press and Information Officer (PIO)
A PIO is an officer in charge of conducting Press and Information activities.
11
Productive power
‘Productive power’ is here conceived as an ability actors may possess to exploit 
dominating discursive strategies to their advantage in Foucault’s local centres of power- 
knowledge. It is a development from and is compatible with Foucault’s analytical 
framework of power (see the section ‘Productive power and government’ in 3.4.3).
Public information
NATO’s (2006:137) definition of ‘public information’ is used here: ‘Information, which 
is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, 
thereby gaining their understanding and support’.
Public opinion
In this study ‘public opinion’ refers to the interests and ideas of electorates. Some make 
a distinction between media opinion and public opinion, where the former is confined to 
ideas and interests as they are projected in the media (Campbell 1999). Such a 
distinction is not necessary here. Note, however, that NATO primarily seeks the support 
of the people. The media is merely a channel to communicate with people.
Structural power
‘Structural power’ is here construed as the third dimension of Steven Lukes’ conception 
of power (see 3.1.2 and 3.2.2). Elaborating on Dahl’s (1957) and Bachrach and Baratz’s 
(1962) conceptions Steven Lukes (1974: 23) defines it as: ‘A may exercise power over 
B by getting him to do what he does not want to do but he also exercises power over 
him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants’.
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War amongst the people
The notion ‘war amongst the people’ is used in line with Smith who applies it to 
conceptualise contemporary wars on terms that are different from ‘industrial wars’. The 
former describes a kind of war ‘in which the people in the streets and houses and fields 
-  all the people, anywhere -  are the battlefield. Military engagements can take place 
anywhere: in the presence of civilians, against civilians, in defence of civilians. 
Civilians are the targets, objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force’ (Smith 
2005: 3).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the past 44 months, war has left 200,000 people dead or missing, 
and 2 million more homeless. Now, 60,000 NATO troops are beginning to 
fan out across Bosnia to enforce a peace plan . . . O f the three warring 
parties, NATO is expecting most trouble from the Serbs, who during the 
war shot down NATO planes and took UN peacekeepers hostage. . . But 
even in Sarajevo, there was no resistance as French troops bulldozed 
Serb checkpoints on approaches to the west o f  the city. French troops 
were seen sharing beer and plum brandy with the Serbs on the front-line 
Brotherhood and Unity Bridge. ‘There should be more o f  them. Then we 
wouldn’t have to worry,' said Djure Rosie, a man in his 50s (Tony Smith, 
Associated Press, 24 December 1995).
Nearly 100 suspected Albanian guerrillas gave themselves up to NATO- 
led peacekeepers in Kosovo yesterday in response to an amnesty offer. 
NATO’s senior commander in Kosovo, Gen Thorstein Skiaker o f  Norway, 
offered the deal to rebels fighting Serb forces in disputed Presevo valley 
in southern Serbia. Under the terms o f  the amnesty, those who cross back 
into Kosovo unarmed will be screened and freed i f  they have not been 
guilty o f  any serious crime. Gen Skiaker said: 7 appeal to their leaders to 
avoid bloodshed and loss o f  life. There is no dishonour in seeking peace ’ 
(Christian Jennings, Telegraph, 17 May 2001).
Media reports like these have been informed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) Press and Information (PI) activities in the Balkans. This study explores how, 
and for what purposes, PI operated to have the alliance’s version of events broadcasted 
in the media. The thesis is that NATO used its PI function as a means of power to 
achieve political and military ends. The study presents PI Officers’ (PIO) mode of 
operation and applies theoretical notions of power to conceptualise the types of 
influence it sought to exert.
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This research emerges from a general interest in how actors in the field of international 
affairs use the media as a means of power in politics and war. Before embarking on the 
study it is therefore clarifying to specify the empirical concern by situating it in the 
context of war and the media. It is also useful to present the relevance of analysing the 
findings with different notions of power and to explicate how this study relates to the 
infamous term propaganda. Finally, the introduction will illuminate central 
methodological considerations and provide a review of how the specific, as well as the 
general, topic have been scrutinised in the scholarly literature.
1.1 War and the media
The idea that warring parties use the media for military and political purposes is not 
new.1 Yet reflecting on the declining utility of physical force in contemporary 
international affairs, the British General Sir Rupert Smith argues that the media has 
become an increasingly important means to achieve strategic objectives. It has become 
‘the other manner in which we fight’ (Smith 2005: 284). The primary reason is that the 
phenomenon of war has changed. The kind of war he spent most of his 40-year career 
preparing to fight did not match the armed conflicts he was tasked to deal with towards 
the end -  as Force Commander in United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter simply Bosnia) in 1995, then as General Officer 
Commanding in Northern Ireland, and last as NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied
1 For other studies that approach this media-foreign policy nexus from the government’s perspective see 
the section on propaganda (ie section 1.3) and the literature review (ie 1.5). Prominent works that enter 
the interface from the other side notably include the work of Hudson and Stanier (1999), McLaughlin 
(2002), and Knightly (2003).
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Commander Europe during the military campaigns against Serbia in 1999 and 
Afghanistan from 2001.
With a stimulating conceptual take, Smith (2005: 371-72) calls for nothing less than a 
revolution in our thinking about war, arguing that Western armed forces no longer fight 
industrial war but war amongst the people.2 This has strategic implications.3 The 
traditional concern to destroy the adversary’s capacity to wage war has been replaced by 
the overriding aim to win the will o f  the people (Smith 2005: 372, 379). This refers 
partly to people in the West who influence their government’s approach to armed 
conflicts worldwide and who may undermine political will to sustain a military 
campaign.4 It also refers to people directly affected by contemporary conflicts and
2 These terms are explained in the list of definitions. Throughout the text central empirical or theoretical 
formulations and terms will be emphasised in italics the first time they are used. When the formulations 
and terms reoccur in the text they are not emphasised but shall be conceived in the way they were 
introduced.
3 Western political leaders support the view that the kind of war they joined arms to prevent during the 
Cold War no longer exists. For instance, in NATO’s Strategic Concept o f 1991 they stipulate: ‘The threat 
of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO’s European fronts has effectively been removed’ 
(NATO 1991: paragraph 7).
4 According to Taylor (2003: 176) it was during the First World War that ‘sustaining morale became just 
as essential for both sides as sustaining the military effort’. Handel (2001: 11-13) notes that public 
support constituted one of six conditions in Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger’s, Doctrine o f 1984 
to be met before the US should launch a military campaign abroad. In the post-Cold War era this aspect 
of warfare has gained renewed interest. Many writers have taken notice o f governments’ difficulties to 
establish and maintain the electorates’ political support deemed so crucial for the successful conduct of 
their military campaigns abroad (eg Strobel 1997: 225; Lehmann 1999: 1-2). With reference to the 
engagements where 18 American soldiers, among many others, were killed in Mogadishu on 3-4 October 
1993, Avruch et al. (1999: 14) note: ‘After Somalia, the “hearts and minds” to be won over in mounting 
these [peace] operations . . .  included, perhaps predominantly, [those] of the American people and 
Congress’. It also became a cardinal concern during Operation Allied Force, NATO’s air campaign over 
Kosovo in the spring o f 1999, as it appeared that the adversary’s strategy aimed to undermine the 
cohesion of the alliance by using international media to divide its various publics (Freedman 2000: 356-7; 
Posen 2000: 39; Vickers 2000: 58). NATO eventually discovered this and used, among others, its PI 
function to counter Serbia’s strategy (Campbell 1999: 36; Ignatieff 2000: 194; Shea 2001: 209-10; 
Vickers 2000: 55; Clark 2001: 441-43; Brown 2003c: 50; Dixon 2003). With a Clausewitzian term, 
Collins (2000a: 191-93) calls public support Western military campaigns’ ‘centre o f gravity’. Such 
considerations relate to a phenomenon referred to as the Vietnam syndrome (Sobel 1998: 251; Skoco and 
Woodger 2000: 79). That is the idea that wars abroad can be lost on the TV screens at home, regardless of 
military performance in the battlefield (Thrall 2000: 28-29, 51-2; Nacos et al. 2000b: 2). Hallin (1986)
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whose support must be obtained to reduce the adversary’s political significance (Smith 
2005: 278-79, 289-91).5 This aspect is increasingly important, since Western forces 
now confront diffuse opponents who seek concealment amongst people. The new 
adversaries pose a different challenge from the relatively definable and identifiable 
national armed forces of the industrial war era.
Smith also advocates a conceptual change as to the utility of traditional military power; 
that is, the capability to apply physical force. This trademark of Western military forces 
that was quintessential to win industrial wars can no longer deliver the strategic 
objectives of our times. Capturing the will of the people is a political task that primarily 
requires diplomatic, economic and political measures. Armed force is still useful, 
however. It can create a condition that will permit the other levers of power to operate 
efficiently. Yet the military task has become sub-strategic. It is no longer strategic.
The General grants the media a key role in achieving contemporary strategic objectives. 
It is primarily through the media that people form their ideas of what a particular war is 
about; who is involved; what the parties want; what happens; and on this basis 
ultimately develop their allegiance to one side or the other. In the military sphere, he 
holds that ‘commanders and leaders alike need the media in order to . .  . explain their
famously opposes that thesis by showing that it was not media reports from Vietnam that undermined 
public support, but a split in the US political elite on how to deal with war. It was this political division 
the media projected, and which then undermined public support. Powlick and Katz (1998) echo Hailin’s 
argument with a review on more updated studies on the relation between US foreign policy and public 
opinion. While the Vietnam syndrome has been established as common sense among many practitioners 
in the field of international security, Hallin’s counter-position is generally accepted in the academic 
debate (see, for example, Badsey 2000b: xix; Stewart 2000; P. Taylor 2000b: 177-79; Brown 2003a: 166).
5 This carries associations with hearts and minds approaches from counter-insurgency operations as 
presented in works like Carruthers (1995) and notably Thompson (1966). Smith (2005: 277-8) 
emphasises that it is different, however, arguing that hearts and minds campaigns have a more local focus 
and is a means to defeat the main targets -  the insurgents. In war amongst the people, people’s will is not 
a means but an end. People are the strategic targets.
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own version of events. To this extent, the media is a crucially useful element in modem 
conflict for attaining the political objective of winning the will of the people’ (Smith 
2005: 286).6 While he considers this primarily a political task, he maintains that the 
force commander in theatre must act in support of this strategic endeavour (Smith 2005: 
391).
A development that, according to Smith, has increased the significance of the media in 
war is innovations in information and communication technology.7 These have 
transformed the battlefield from a tactical and local sphere to a strategic and global one: 
‘We fight in every living room in the world as well as on the streets and fields of a 
conflict zone’ (Smith 2005: 17).8 Paraphrasing the famous media scholar Marshall 
McLuhan, the General remarks: ‘This is not so much the global village as the global 
theatre of war, with audience participation’ (Smith 2005: 289).9
6 The point that the media plays an increasingly important role for political and military leaders in 
contemporary conflicts is supported by many scholars (see 1.5).
7 Many authors arrive at similar conclusions and stress in particular the speed with which information can 
now be disseminated -  the so-called ‘real time’ quality, at least potentially, of contemporary mass media. 
Such views are found among military ranks (eg Stech 1994; Clifford and Wilton 2000: 17; Duncan 2000: 
118. See further 1.5.2); among journalists (eg Strobel 1997: 76-88; Gowing 2000a: 216-17; McLaughlin 
2002: 24-45); and within the broad discipline of International Relations (eg Hitchcock 1988; Headrick 
1991; Toffler 1993; Adams 1996; deCaro 1996; Gow et al. 1996b: 2-3; Keohane and Nye 1998: 81-85; 
Waltz 1998: 1-10; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999: 7; Campen and Dearth 2000; Handel 2001: 128; Brown 
2002a: 266-67. See further 1.5.2).
8 The same view is reflected in the British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s statement during Operation Allied 
Force: ‘When you fight an action like this in modem politics, in our modem media world, you’re fighting 
it on television’ (cited in Vickers 2000: 60). In the ranks of military commanders similar ideas are voiced 
by, among others, Cordingly (2000) and Rose (2000: 4-5).
9 The idea that the media plays a role in the foreign policy process, particularly with regard to armed 
conflicts, is now generally accepted, although the more specific relation is disputed. A central and 
controversial notion in this debate is the thesis of a CNN effect, which is often described as ‘elite decision 
makers’ loss of policy control to news media’ (Livingston and Eachus 1995: 413). In the initial stage of 
the debate, it concerned the extent to which the media influenced policy, and as such approach the media- 
policy nexus from the opposite side of what this thesis aims to do. It is therefore beyond the scope o f this 
study. Nevertheless, one can hardly examine how the media forms part of contemporary conflicts without 
presenting the debate on the CNN effect. Hence, this brief overview. In its extreme form the CNN effect
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From a different professional perspective, the senior British diplomat Robert Cooper 
arrives at similar conclusions: war is changing and media-relations are a key to succeed. 
His thought-provoking conceptualisation of watersheds and cross-currents in 
contemporary international affairs may represent an unofficial account of his 
government’s foreign policy rationale. As a member of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s 
Cabinet Office, Cooper helped the government shape a new foreign policy. After the 
end of the Cold War, he claims, the world became divided in three eras: a premodem, a 
modem, and a postmodern -  and points to the EU as the example of the latter. Where
thesis claims an almost causal relation where political decision makers merely react to the focus and bias 
of media coverage (Adams 1996: 115). Freedman (2000: 337-41) saw the CNN effect at work in the run­
up to Operation Allied Force in 1999. Hudson and Stanier (1999: 317) made the same observation in the 
case of British military deployments to the UN mission in Bosnia in 1992. Avruch et al. (1999: 158) 
argue that negative media coverage -  culminating with the massacre in Srebrenica July 1995 -  was the 
major reason Western political leaders found that the same mission had reached the end of the line and 
eventually decided to replace it with the NATO-led IFOR. Such a causal understanding o f media reports’ 
impact on foreign policy has been accepted by many practitioners. Among others, it has entered the 
rationale of the US army as reflected in the introduction of their Field Manual 100-5: ‘Dramatic visual 
presentations can rapidly influence public -  and therefore political -  opinion so that the political 
underpinnings of war and operations other than war may suddenly change with no prior indication in the 
field’ (cited in Duncan 2000: 125). The idea of a CNN effect is also reflected in British commanders’ 
experiences from the 1991 Gulf War (Cordingley: 2000: 171-73; Duncan 2000: 120), and in a less 
deterministic manner in Rose’s (2000: 4 ,7 ) reflections as Force Commander of UNPROFOR in 1994-95. 
Generally, these scholars and practitioners argue that in the 1990s the media has entered the 
decisionmaking cycles of the operational military commanders, and hence the conduct of military 
operations to an extent unknown during the Cold War. Adams (1996: 112) and P. Taylor (2000b: 177) 
ascribe a similar appreciation of this phenomenon to statesmen like John Major, Henry Kissinger, and 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Hardly surprisingly, many journalists find the CNN-thesis exaggerated and regard 
the media’s power to influence policy-makers as limited. Reporters like Bell (1995: 147) and Strobel 
(1997: 90) share Gowing’s (1996: 83) view: ‘Real-time pictures . . .  shape the policy agenda but do not 
dictate responses’. They recognise, however, that the media may be more influential when it highlights a 
particular case on which a government has no policy. Many scholars have examined the validity of the 
CNN effect thesis. Some hold that the media’s impact on policy is low when the executive branch policy 
is firm but acknowledge that influence may be high when policy is in flux. They point to the lack of 
studies that have found a convincing link between media reports and policy behaviour, and note that 
studies rather tend to reveal just how resistant policymakers can be to following the lead of the media 
when responding to international crisis (eg Badsey 1996; Strobel 1997; Avruch 1999: 16; Carruthers 
2000: 208-18; Robinson 2002; Western 2002; Gilboa 2005). P. Taylor (2000b: 198) suggests that to the 
extent the CNN effect has an impact on foreign policy, it is as a self-fulfilling prophecy: it works only in 
cases where the political elites believe in it. That is, they react because they assume that the media reflects 
a demand from their electorates to ‘do something’. Herman and Peterson (2000), Stewart (2000), and 
Thussu (2000b) have proposed the antithesis that politicians influence the content o f media reports. This 
overview serves to illustrate that the content and significance of the CNN effect is contested. We may 
gather from this, however, that scholars apprehend media reporting as part of the foreign policy process, 
but rather than dictating policy responses the media may shape them, particularly when policy has not 
been established on an issue.
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war is a way of life in the former, a means of policy in the next, it has become 
something to be avoided in the last (Cooper 2004: 85, 158). These three attitudes to war 
co-exist in the contemporary world; and although they are localised in different regions 
they are also interconnected through globalization.
The challenge for postmodern governments is to know how to operate expediently in 
this strategic landscape. Like Smith, Cooper (2004: 53, 73-4) advises governments to 
pursue their political goals by opting for people’s support. Foreign policy has become a 
function of domestic politics, since people are the source of policy. So any effort to 
have an impact on other postmodern states’ foreign policy has ‘to get under the 
domestic skin’ (Cooper 2004: 86). In the management of conflicts in the non-Westem 
world, the postmodern strategic objective is also to win the will of the people. As 
Cooper (2004: 84) lucidly remarks: ‘Soldiers and diplomats are, in the end, trying to do 
the same thing: to change other people’s minds’. They do that by persuading other 
communities to co-opt the postmodern political culture, based on non-violent conflict- 
resolution. The postmodern approach to external threats is to establish what Cooper 
terms voluntary empire (Cooper 2004: 70-9). To this end, he finds words superior to the 
principal alternatives: money and physical force (Cooper 2004: 115-16). Hence, the 
importance of media-relations.
These two prominent practitioners -  the soldier and the diplomat -  are not alone in their 
view that war is changing and that the media has moved to the centre stage in 
contemporary confrontations. Several scholars from the academic discipline of
25
International Relations concur.10 Among the first to draw attention to this phenomenon 
was the American Professor John Mueller (1989).11 In The Remnants o f  War he asserts 
that ‘the institution of war is clearly in decline’ (Mueller 2004: 1). In 1991 as the Gulf 
War unfolded, the controversial Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld further 
proclaimed that conventional war had come to ‘its last gasp’ and would transform itself 
into low-intensity conflicts (van Creveld 1991: 2, 20-2,205-07). Moreover, in New & 
Old Wars Professor Mary Kaldor provides a conceptualisation of the changing nature of 
war.12 The term new wars comprises a mix of war, organised crime, and large-scale 
violations of human rights, and exists all over the world, although less manifest in the 
West (Kaldor 1999: 1-2).13
Whether they attach the tag industrial, modem, conventional, or old to the notion of 
war, the practitioners and scholars elaborate on largely identical conceptions of armed 
conflicts closely connected to the evolution of the Westphalian system of modem states 
emerging in Europe three to five centuries ago. Moreover, they agree that this form of 
war has ceased to dominate international security at least since the end of the Cold War. 
They perceive wars of the past era in terms coined by the Prussian officer Carl von 
Clausewitz and argue that his concept is at odds with contemporary forms of large-scale 
socially organised violence. Moreover, they share Smith’s most important point that
10 Initial capitals are used when referring to names of academic disciplines, theories and methods, such as 
‘International Relations’, ‘Realism’ and ‘Behaviouralism’.
11 Mueller’s centrality in the debate about the changing nature of war is reflected in other prominent 
scholars’ often critical reference to his works. Those include Lawrence Freedman (1998) and Michael 
Mandelbaum (1998-99).
12 Shaw (2000b) considers her ‘the foremost authority’ on contemporary wars.
13 The view that the ends and means of war is changing is held by several other scholars including 
Keegan (1994: 58-60), Gray (1997), Freedman (1998-99; 2001), Wheeler (2000), Coker (2001; 2005), 
and Frantzen (2005).
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while the practice of war has changed, our conception of war has not followed suit.14 It 
is against this background they offer their respective analyses of current and future 
wars. Smith (2005: 2-3, 16-8), van Creveld (1991: 207), and Kaldor (1999: 31) even 
describe their contribution in Kuhnian paradigmatic terms.
The scholars also concur with Smith’s view that people’s will has become the strategic 
objective of our times. People’s support is arguably the objective in van Creveld’s 
future wars, as he advocates that political communities mobilise the people ‘under the 
banner of some great and powerful idea’ (van Creveld 1991: 214).15 More explicitly, 
Mueller points to people’s support as an imperative to succeed in policing war. Western 
governments will remain reluctant to halt ‘criminal’ war in conflict-ridden areas of the 
world, if  they are not supported by their electorates throughout the duration of such a 
police-military campaign (Mueller 2004: 128, 149-51). People’s support is also 
imperative for Kaldor’s central term cosmopolitan law-enforcement. She argues that 
new wars can be stopped only by ‘a strategy of capturing “hearts and minds’” , and 
continues ‘what is needed is a new form of cosmopolitan political mobilization’ (Kaldor 
1999: 114). This involves people’s support to a cosmopolitan community defined not by 
territorial but by political boundaries and united in opposition to particularist values that 
divide and antagonise people. Kaldor (1999: 147) dissolves the global/local divide by
14 Whether Mueller would support this view may be questioned. Surely, he sees only the remnants o f war 
but at the same time Mueller (2004: 141-160) promotes what he calls ‘policing wars’.
15 Van Creveld does not elaborate on the significance of public support. All the same, he wants to prepare 
modem states for the challenges posed by low-intensity conflicts and reasons along the lines of a 
Hobbesian social contract where the people will remain loyal to their political community only if  this in 
turn provides for their security (van Creveld 1991: 2, 198). It follows that a state must suppress low- 
intensity conflicts to maintain the people’s support or cease to exist.
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pointing to new social relations ‘based on an alliance . . .  between islands of civility . . .  
and transnational institutions’.
Which other means are more expedient than the media for van Creveld’s effort to rally 
people under a powerful idea, for Mueller’s call for domestic support to policing war 
and for Kaldor’s cosmopolitan political mobilization on a global scale than the media? 
While these scholars do not elaborate on the media’s role, Kaldor (1999: 38-40) argues 
that contemporary warring leaders use the media to mobilise people to carry out, among 
other things, campaigns of ethnic cleansing. Moreover, she credits the sustained media 
attention to these atrocities for the ‘very significant innovation in international practice’ 
in dealing with such conflicts since 1991 (Kaldor 1999: 62). Hence, the five major 
works presented above arguably sustain the idea that political and military leaders need 
to cooperate with the media to achieve their strategic objectives.16
Neither of the five practitioners and scholars elaborates on the implications for Western 
governments of their dependence on the media to succeed, however. They do not 
consider, how Western governments, through the media, can communicate their policy 
convincingly to the public at large in order to win their support in armed conflicts; in
16 This view is supported by others. For instance, in the case of the Yugoslav wars o f secession Gow and 
Tilsley (1996: 110) hold that Serbia’s main adversaries, notably Slovenia, understood that ‘rather than 
actually winning a war on the battlefield, what counted was to be seen and understood to be conducting a 
successful campaign.’ In Bosnia, General Rose (2000: 5), UNPROFOR’s Force Commander, experienced 
that negative press coverage undermined the entire operation (see also Avruch et al. 1999: 41, 158). 
Moreover, in the case of NATO’s war against Serbia in 1999, several scholars argue that it was in the 
media rather than on the conventional military battlefield, that NATO eventually won (Ignatieff 2000:
110; Vickers 2000: 69; Dixon: 2003; Brown 2003c: 50). Others are more critical to NATO’s 
achievements in this campaign but use it to sustain the general claim that states must ensure that their 
military campaigns are expediently represented in the media in order to achieve foreign policy goals 
(Campbell 1999: 32; Collins 2000a: 191; Driscoll 2000: 173; Skoco and Woodger 2000).
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other words, how governments produce meaning about events in and, indeed, the field 
of international affairs itself. This is the broad object of study for the present thesis.
It is a subject that in the context of the post-Cold War remains under-explored in the 
literature,17 and an operational asset whose potential tends to have been undervalued 
and, at times, almost ignored.18 At the same time, evidence also exists to suggest that
17 See 1.5.2. Moreover, the utility of studies from the Cold War to understand the subject in our times is 
questionable. Some academic works suggest that the context in which contemporary governments 
endeavour to win the support o f their electorates is very different from the past era. Beside technological 
innovations on which many militarily biased studies have focused, others emphasise the changed political 
context (see 1.5.2). They argue that the perceived existential threat from the Soviet Union framed 
Western political space and foreign policy priorities during the Cold War. Political divergences were 
largely confined to domestic issues, while politicians, the press and the public largely accorded in the area 
of defence. The Realist School in International Relations offered a way to conceptualise a frame of 
reference that became generally accepted. As the Soviet Union disappeared, this frame lost its ability to 
rally people around the central notion ‘national interest’. No other frame has managed to gain comparable 
political support since. Without such normative boundaries, Western political debates extended from the 
domestic to the international realm, which has opened for the media to play an increasingly important role 
also in the field of international politics (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999; Entman 2000: 11-12; Shaw 2000a: 
35; P. Taylor 2000b: 199; Nye and Owens 1996: 22; Brown 2004: 18). International Relations has still to 
account adequately for this new dynamic, according to these scholars who are supported by, among 
others, Lord (1998) and Armistead (2004). Shaw (2000a: 27) for one argues that ‘in so far as 
[International [RJelations fails to understand the media, it also fails to grasp the new shape of world 
politics.’
18 The US government’s failure to value the importance of the media as a foreign policy tool was voiced 
in a series of congressional hearings held in response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. In one 
of those, the chairman of the US Congress Committee on International Relations (2001) opened the 
hearing by stating: ‘It is by now obvious to most observers that the role of public diplomacy in our 
foreign policy has been too long neglected’. Rather amazingly, Armistead (2004: 134) from the US Joint 
Forces Staff College claims that the government initially left it to a private company, the Rendon Group, 
to conduct a strategic media campaign in the wake o f the attacks. The alleged reason was that the 
government itself was unable to perform. In contrast to the findings of this thesis, there is evidence to 
suggest that NATO, too, generally underestimates the role of the media in their military missions. For 
instance, in late 1995 as IFOR prepared its deployment, NATO PI policies and doctrines were adapted to 
a Cold War scenario. Although revisions were in progress, IFOR PI staff had little NATO guidance when 
they developed their plans (Siegel 1997: 170). And while Gowing (1997) believed that IFOR’s media 
campaign would make precedent in future wars, NATO’s attention to PI soon appeared to decrease 
(Clifford and Wilton 2000; Coward 2000: 137; Dearth 2000a: 160; Williamson 2000: 182; Thompson and 
Price 2003: 184). This seems also to have been the case when die war against Serbia began in 1999. 
Allegedly, NATO had planned to win it within two to three days and largely by means of conventional 
military force. This turned out to be a gross miscalculation. The air-campaign lasted 78 days. A media 
plan for the campaign did not exist from the outset and it took a month before a plan came into effect. The 
plan was essential to defend NATO’s centre of gravity (Campbell 1999: 32; Collins 2000a: 194,197-8; 
Vickers 2000: 56-7, 62; Williamson 2000: 183; and Brown 2002b: 44. See also footnote 4). One o f the 
lessons Shea (cited in Skoco and Woodger 2000: 85) draws from this campaign is that ‘the all-intrusive 
nature of press-relations to an alliance conflict is still underplayed and under-exploited in Nato’s crisis
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governments and international organisations have come to appreciate the political 
significance of their press and information activities and to reinforce this asset.19
1.1.1 Empirical question and thesis
The more limited ambition of this thesis is to explore how three PIOs, centrally 
positioned in a NATO operational context, perceive the purpose of their function and 
their mode of operation to achieve it. Thus, the specific object of study is their ideas 
about how PI is practiced, exemplified by their work in NATO peace support operations 
in Bosnia and Kosovo. Both conflicts are referred to by the above mentioned authors as 
typical examples of contemporary wars (for considerations as to the choice of cases see 
1.4.1).20 Against this background and within the methodological limitations stipulated 
below (see 1.4.1 and 1.4.3) the thesis’ empirical question is:
How, and for what purposes, has NATO used its Press and Information function 
in its peace support operations in the Balkans?
management exercises.’ The UN has also been criticised for failing to deal adequately with the media in 
its peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, with the exception of the UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia and the UN Transition Assistant Group in Namibia (Strobel 1997: 231; Lehmann 1999: 11; 
Lindley 2004), a piece of criticism the UN acknowledges (UN 2000: 25). With the exception of NATO, 
most of the other major international organisations had no media strategy when they embarked on the 
implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord (Avruch et al. 1999: 43; Thompson and Price 2003: 184. See 
also 2).
19 A case in point is US President Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 68, entitled International 
Public Information and signed in April 1999, which aimed to co-ordinate the efforts o f the relevant 
governmental departments and agencies (Brown 2002b: 43; Armistead 2004: 5). Moreover, in the 
summer of 2002, the White House established the Office of Global Communication with the aim of 
ensuring on a daily basis that the so-called ‘War on Terror’ was expediently fought in the press (Van Ham 
2003: 436. See also 1.5.2).
20 ‘1.4.1’ refers to the section 1.4.1 in this thesis. This system of referencing to sections in this study will 
be applied throughout the text.
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The empirical thesis stipulates:
NATO used PI as a means of power to achieve political and military ends. P i’s 
mode of operation was guided by a PI policy, stipulating goals and intentions, 
and based on three components: a message strategy, a unity of effort and a 
resolution to maintain credible relations with the press.21
In other words, this study will show how NATO used PI in an effort to win the will of 
the people. This is, according to the above presented authors, the strategic objective of 
the contemporary era.
1.2 Power
Returning for a moment to how war is being transformed, the same practitioners and 
scholars from the field of international affairs are in agreement that traditional armed 
force -  physical force targeting human bodies and material objects -  is an insufficient 
lever of power to win the will of people. ‘The business of the military in war’ is no 
longer as the military historian Professor Geoffrey Parker (1994: 44) has claimed 
‘killing people and breaking things’. This simply does not deliver. Nor can we rely on 
the concentration o f  force and decisive military victories that Clausewitz taught us were 
the principal means and objectives to achieve political ends in war. Since the Second 
World War (WWII), experiences from counter-insurgencies have proven this politico-
21 In this particular formulation of the empirical question and thesis, the term NATO is applied as a 
shorthand to refer to how three NATO PI practitioners at the executive level, within the limitations o f this 
study, used this function (see 1.4). This choice of words is only applied to facilitate reading and should 
not be perceived as an endeavour to make a general claim on the NATO PI function.
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military mindset to be self-defeating time and again. The general lesson is that 
overwhelming force creates resentment and fear.
None of the five authors write off the utility of physical force but they would not find 
comfort in the poet Hilaire Belloc’s jingle that ‘Whatever happens, we have got / The 
Maxim gun and they have not’.22 Postmodern states have come to conceive ‘the use of 
force [as] a failure of policy rather than an instrument of policy’ (Cooper 2004: 85). 
When used, physical force should be applied in a manner that supports the overall 
endeavour to win the will of people. That is, its application should be considered 
legitimate by the people concerned.23 To this end the principle of minimum necessary 
force is instructive.24
From this perspective, the form of power that NATO PI seeks to exert appears more 
adequate to reach strategic objectives in contemporary conflicts, than does traditional 
military force. The empirical findings establish that PI aimed to mobilise legitimacy 
worldwide for NATO’s activities in the Balkans and to persuade people in the region to 
behave in accordance with internationally endorsed peace agreements. In other words, 
PI sought to influence the human dimension in the international peacebuilding efforts in 
a psychological manner and on a geographical scope that the application of physical 
force simply cannot achieve.
22 van Creveld (1991: 24-30, 205-08), Kaldor (1999: 128-29), Cooper (2004: 75-80, 115-20), Mueller 
(2004: 175-76), and Smith (2005: 1-10, 270-71).
23 See Kaldor (1999: 114-15, 126-31, 147-50), Cooper (2004: 119-24), Mueller (2004: 174-81), and 
Smith (2005: 378-83).
24 A recent British peacekeeping manual defines the term as ‘the measured application o f violence or 
coercion, sufficient only to achieve a specific end, demonstrably reasonable, proportionate and 
appropriate; and confined in effect to the specific and legitimate target intended’ (cited in Kaldor 1999: 
128-29).
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Still, however, it is unclear which kinds of power may underpin Pi’s endeavours. There 
is evidence indicating that PI had an impact on their target groups -  that is, different 
groups of people whom NATO wanted to influence in a variety of ways and with 
different effects -  but what notions of power can account for such influence? It is not 
clear, whether these different results can be explained by one understanding of power.
Can, for example, PI create favourable public relations by the same kind of power that it 
applies to influence people’s actions? The answer is not obvious. Public relations 
activities seek to influence people’s perceptions -  how they think. Clarifying a force 
commander’s resolve to people in theatre, for instance what he will not tolerate, aims to 
influence their behaviour -  what they do. While these effects are not necessarily 
disconnected, there are significant differences. The former relates to people’s political 
identities and loyalties, the latter to their actions. Moreover, the relationship between PI 
and their targets is different. Most people in Bosnia and Kosovo have a social 
proximity, a direct contact, a firsthand experience with NATO troops. The opposite is 
true for global public opinion, which has a more distant relation, an indirect contact, a 
mediated experience with NATO. What does that imply for the kind of results PI can 
expect to achieve? PI may be able to have a direct almost mechanistic impact on the 
actions of some people in the Balkans. PI may, for example, deter armed groups from 
doing something by the threat that if  they try, NATO will stop them by means of 
physical force. Such stimuli-effect notions of power are not suitable to describe P i’s 
impact on the public worldwide. Understanding this requires a concept that comprises 
political and opinion forming dimensions.
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1.2.1 Theoretical question and thesis
To clarify our understanding of the different conceptual forms of influence PI seeks to 
exercise, it is useful to consult academic work on power. Thus, the theoretical 
dimension of this thesis is to scrutinise how different theories on power can enhance our 
understanding of P i’s efforts to implement NATO’s policy.
For reasons stipulated in the methodological section (see 1.4.2), three seminal scholars’ 
theoretical notions of power form the analytical framework with which this part of the 
study is conducted. Noting that centrally placed PIOs assume that P i’s mode of 
operation influence its target groups, the theoretical question o f this thesis is:
How can Robert A. Dahl’s, Steven Lukes’, and Michel Foucault’s respective 
notions of power enhance our theoretical understanding of the way the NATO PI 
function may exercise power to achieve political and military ends?
The theoretical thesis is:
Foucault’s notion of power can conceptualise the type of influence NATO Pi’s 
mode of operation seeks to exert in order to enhance public understanding and 
support and to influence the general behaviour of the public. Dahl’s notion of 
power can elucidate P i’s mode of operation to influence people’s specific 
actions. Lukes’ notion of power cannot account for P i’s mode of operation.
Thus, the purpose of the theoretical chapter is not to prove that NATO PI had an effect 
on its target groups, that is, on people, be they specific parties or more general public 
opinion. The purpose is, rather, to show the theoretical possibility of the effort and to 
clarify how theoretical notions can account for the way PI aims to influence people.
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If the initial proposition -  that war is changing, the utility of physical force is declining, 
and the use of the media is becoming increasingly important -  is accepted, then the 
thesis’ findings are important beyond the present case. The study shows how a major 
military actor aims to use the media as a means of power in international affairs. It casts 
light on a military function and its methods, which are different from conventional use 
of armed forces and conceptualises how social communication may serve as a means of 
power in politics and war.
This focus on power makes the thesis relevant for the academic field of International 
Relations. As pointed out by Edward Baldwin (1979: 161): ‘From Niccolo Machiavelli 
and David Hume to E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, power has been an important 
(some would say too important) variable in international political theorizing’. Within 
this scholarly conversation, however, the notion of power has predominantly been 
conceived in traditional military terms supporting Clausewitz’s idea, that in war armed 
force is the decisive means. This is particularly so in Realism, the dominant school of 
the discipline. This branch of International Relations has limited faith in the 
communicative dimensions of power. True, Edward Hallett Carr (1946: 132-45) 
elaborated on this aspect but its importance was toned down by Hans J. Morgenthau two 
years later, and almost disappeared in the works of two later prominent Realist scholars 
Kenneth Waltz and more recently John J. Mearsheimer.25 While Liberalism’s normative
25 This is not to suggest that Realism ignores the communicative dimensions o f power. Morgenthau 
(1960: 28), indeed, defines power as ‘man’s control over the minds and actions of other men’ and devotes 
considerable space to discussing the value o f diplomacy and propaganda. Yet he concludes that the 
efficiency of, among others, such methods to prevent war ‘presuppose[s] the existence of an integrated 
international society, which actually does not exist’ (Morgenthau 1960: 568). Social communication is 
further marginalised as a form of power in Waltz’ (1979: 131-32, 192) understanding of the latter concept 
as capabilities conceived largely in material terms and also by Mearsheimer (1990: 6) who reasons based
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approach to International Relations emphasises the importance of ideas, and implicitly 
therefore communication, as a powerful dynamic in international affairs, it has done so 
largely at a general level. David Held (1995) and Stephen D. Krasner (1983) are cases 
in point that arguably represent different liberal directions that may be called Idealism 
and Regime theory respectively. Moreover, in the 1980s when information was 
reintroduced to International Relations with a linguistic turn induced to the discipline by 
Critical Theorists, Post-Modernists, and Social Constructivists it was in a general 
discursive sense.26 However, information used in the intentional manner to mobilise 
people for a common cause, such as Carr (1946) had in mind, was given much less 
attention.27
There has been an emerging empirical and theoretical interest on this broad topic since 
the mid-1990s (see 1.5). A seminal notion in this endeavour is Joseph S. Nye’s soft 
power, although the theoretical findings of this thesis suggest that the term does not bear 
scrutiny (see 1.4.2, 1.5.3, and 4.2).
Proposing a different conceptual framework to appreciate the way a major military actor 
uses the media as a means of power, this thesis aims to contribute to this emerging
on the assumption that ‘the distribution and character of military power are the root causes of war and 
peace’. Arguably, these influential Realist scholars ultimately conceive power as a capacity to use or 
threaten to use physical force.
26 Representatives of the three theoretical perspectives include respectively Robert Cox (1986), James 
Der Derian (1987), and Alexander Wendt (1999).
27 See Armistead (2004: 10,14) and Brown (2005: 57-59). Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999: 27-34) also point 
to the shortcomings of Realism and Liberalism but believe that social constructivism offers a useful 
theoretical approach. Exceptions to this general shortcoming include, in addition to the four authors just 
mentioned, notably the writings ofNye (1990, 2004), Barnett (1998), Keck and Sikkink (1998), Risse et 
al. (1999), Brown (2002a), and Barnett and Duval (2005).
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academic effort. It offers new perspectives to a key question in International Relations: 
what are the capabilities of the warring parties?
1.3 The relation to propaganda
The subject of this thesis carries associations to propaganda; a concept stained with 
connotations to Nazi Germany’s propaganda minister Josef Goebbels and novelist 
George Orwell’s classical Nineteen Eighty-Four. Both represent nightmare versions of 
political communities, where political leaders manipulate the minds of their citizens in 
order to control their behaviour. My object of study is not to consider whether NATO 
has conducted propaganda. Since this is not an explicit part of the discussion, it appears 
prudent from the outset to briefly clarify my stand on how PI and propaganda relate, 
and where they differ.
Western political and military leaders distance their information activities, including PI, 
from the, infamous notion of propaganda. They insist that they inform people, that they 
do not propagandise.28 Others disagree. In the academic debate, for example, there is a 
multi-disciplinary literature characterising the communication between authorities and
28 Most government administrations will agree that their relations to the media are guided by a political 
agenda. They do not leave it to chance or adversaries’ ability to influence how media portray their 
government and its policies. Governments would insist, however, that their aim is not to ‘muscle’ the 
press or propagandise the public but to ensure that the government’s policy is conveyed to the public in a 
coherent and persuasive manner (Campbell 1999; Muirhead 1999: 38; Beer 2000: 190; Leonard 2002: 8- 
9). Indeed, opinion-forming leadership is a condition for democracy. In the US, the concern not to be 
associated with propaganda derives partly from law that forbids the government to propagandise its own 
population and partly from concerns for legitimacy (Armistead 2004: 132). The influential Stanton report 
from the 1970s stressed the importance of legitimacy and to this end pointed to the need for 
distinguishing between broadcasts disseminated for political purposes and those that had no specific 
political objectives. This distinction aimed to safeguard the credibility of news programmes (Lord 1998). 
The continued relevance of the legal and legitimate aspects of information activities can be found in 
Pentagon’s decision to close its Office of Strategic Influence in February 2002 after the press projected it 
as an instrument to manipulate public opinion (Brown 2002b: 40; Van Ham 2003: 435; Armistead 2004: 
135-7).
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members of political communities as propaganda.29 Some have also attached the label 
propaganda to NATO PI activities.30
A good remedy against prejudice and against tainted biases to the notion of propaganda 
is Phillip Taylor’s (2003) Munitions o f  the Mind: a history ofpropaganda from the 
ancient world to the present day. Propaganda is, as his title conveys, as old as war itself. 
Information can be broadcasted for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ends -  or somewhere in between -  
and is used by all parties in conflict, including the West.31 To examine whether or not
29 With regard to the Balkans, see 1.5.1. For comprehensive accounts, see the annotated bibliography in 
Lasswell et al. (1969) and the bibliographic essay in Taylor (2003: 325-31). More specific studies 
include, for instance, a vivid monograph by Koppes and Black (1987) holding that the Roosevelt 
administration used Hollywood for domestic propaganda purposes during WW II. Further, Bernhard 
(1999), Parry Giles (1996), and Pratkanis and Aronson (1992) argue that, despite claims to the contrary, 
subsequent US administrations expanded this effort to include the US national news media. Lord (1998), 
who served the National Security Council and other high-level decisionmaking bodies during the Reagan 
and Bush administrations on issues related to international broadcasting, presents Radio Free Europe and 
Radio Liberty as CIA’s propaganda instruments targeting foreign audiences since 1945. In a British 
context, Mackenzie (1984) and Carruthers (1995) unfold how the government used media for political 
ends throughout its Empire. More thought-provoking, Pratkanis and Aronson (1992: 47) inform us that 
the novelist George Orwell served the British government by writing ‘pro-British propaganda for 
broadcast to India’ during WW II.
30 Hardly surprising, Serbian authorities denounced NATO PI activities as propaganda during Operation 
Allied Force, while NATO made equivalent claims regarding Serbia’s relation to the media. More 
interestingly, perhaps, Gocic (2000: 90) and Phillips (1999: 47) also use the term propaganda to describe 
the same NATO PI effort, and Goff (1999b: 14) claims that the NATO ‘briefings were sprinkled with lies 
or incorrect information’. Others are equally critical to the same enterprise, although they do not use the 
term propaganda. For example, the international NGO Reporters Sans Frontiers, which promotes 
independent media, finds that the validity o f NATO PI was only ‘scarcely better’ than Serbia’s (cited in 
Collins 2000a: 194-95). US Lt.Col. Collins (2000b: 38), who later served as chief o f SHAPE’S unit for 
Psychological Operations, characterises NATO PI efforts as attempts to ‘manipulate the regional and 
international perception of the struggle’. Finally, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
(2000: 217), financed primarily by the Swedish Government and composed by widely recognised 
scholars, finds that NATO ‘misled’ NATO’s electorates and that ‘even if the distortions of truth were not 
intentional, they have left a bad aftertaste, raising doubts, ex post facto , about the legitimacy of NATO’s 
media operation’.
31 See 1.5. Many would approve o f Allied use o f propaganda as a means to de-Nazify the German nation 
and reintegrate it into Western Europe after WW II (see Taylor 2003: 249). Some would also support the 
British government’s use o f information to induce stability in its colonies after WW II (see Carruthers 
1995). Moreover, Western attempts of managing armed conflicts during the 1990s inspired several 
authors to consider the potential o f information campaigns as a means to terminate these conflicts and 
promote peace (Allard 1996; Cloughly 1996; Nye and Owensl996: 31-32; Siegel 1997, 1998; Lehmann 
1999; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999: xii; Avruch et al. 1999; Curtis 2000; Maureen Taylor 2000; Kiehl
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NATO PI activities in the selected cases were propaganda is beyond the present scope -  
and the conclusion would, I believe, largely be influenced by the analyst’s political 
predispositions.
It is largely a matter of definition, whether NATO’s public information, which PI is 
tasked to disseminate, qualifies for the term propaganda. It is therefore useful to 
commence by stipulating the alliance’s own definition of the term public information: 
‘Information, which is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the 
public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding and supporf (NATO 2006: 
137. Italics added). Compare this with NATO’s (2006: 137) propaganda definition:
‘Any information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals disseminated to influence the 
opinion, emotions, attitudes, or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the 
sponsor either directly or indirectly’ (italics added).
Thus, NATO distinguishes between public information and propaganda by the purpose: 
the former aims to inform, the latter to influence. The validity of this distinction is 
debatable. It is instructive to refer to Briggs and Burke’s (2002: 188) note that originally 
in English and French the verb inform meant ‘forming the mind’. There are also more 
practical reasons to argue that a distinction between information and influence is 
artificial as most deliberate efforts to inform contain at least an implicit intention to 
influence the recipients. Why else would one inform? Moreover, part of NATO’s 
explicit rationale to inform the public is to gain its support, as expressed in the 
definition above, which indicates a desire to influence people’s opinion and behaviour
2001; Merlingen and Mujic 2003). Metzl (1997) and Price and Thompson (2002) employ the term peace 
broadcasting to denote such endeavours, which might be construed as an euphemism for propaganda.
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(see further 2.2.1). For all practical purposes, therefore, NATO’s distinction appears 
semantic and most difficult to maintain in operational activities.
Partly as a consequence of such difficulties to distinguish between influencing and 
informing, most students of propaganda approach their topic in a morally neutral sense, 
analysing it as a persuasive technique in common use (Badsey 2000b: xx-xxi; Driscoll 
2000: 174). Any organisation’s public relations efforts, whether this be called ‘public 
information’ or ‘press/media relations’, is propaganda, according to Taylor (2003: 6). 
Some scholars go further, stipulating that hardly any social communication is 
completely value-free: information influences people. In his much referenced work 
Propaganda: The formations o f men’s attitudes Jacques Ellul (1966) argues that 
political societies, particularly democratic ones, and their citizens need propaganda to 
function. He conceives propaganda as an all-encompassing social phenomenon that 
forms part of politics, religion and education, and as such forms people’s identity and 
facilitates their co-ordinated action.32
Other scholars use the term in a narrower sense, focusing particularly on an actor’s 
deliberate efforts to persuade specific social groups. In an early and seminal work on the 
topic, Harold D. Lasswell (1927: 9) suggested: ‘[Propaganda] refers solely to the 
control of opinion . . .  by social communication’. That the ability to control the opinion 
of others is a defining feature of propaganda has remained potent in popular 
imagination, although many later studies take issue with the claims that public opinion
32 In the same vein, Avruch et al. (1999: 20-1) argue that that some children’s TV shows may well be 
compared with PsyOps, notably those that aim to change children’s attitudes and behaviour such as 
Sesame Street, for instance. This view finds support in Pratkanis and Aronson (1992) who from a 
psychological perspective claim that we live in a world of propaganda.
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can be dictated with any certainty (see for example Morrison 1992; Entman 2000: 19- 
23; Shaw 2000a: 36).
In the academic debate, the feature of control was toned down by Alfred McClung Lee 
and Elizabeth Birant Lee. Their monograph from 1939 focuses on the communicator’s 
intentions and defines propaganda as an ‘expression of opinion or action by individuals 
or groups deliberately designed to influence opinions or actions of other individuals or 
groups with reference to predetermined ends’ (Lee and Lee 1979: 15). This view is 
adopted in many later definitions on the topic.33 If one can accept the point previously 
made, that the difference between informing and influencing is difficult to maintain, 
then Lee and Lee’s definition would categorise NATO PI as a propaganda activity, 
since the latter’s task is to release public information which by definition aims to gain 
public support.
A normative aspect of such an assertion is whether that makes PI undesirable or 
unethical. This debate is beyond the present scope. It is, however, only right to make my 
position clear: I conceive of PI as an integral part o f politics, and as such desirable and 
not unethical. PI is a means to implement policy by clarifying political messages and 
communicating them efficiently. Therefore, the ethical judgement should primarily be 
directed towards the ends of that policy, not the means.
This is not to suggest that the methods PI applies and the policies that guide and limit a 
PI activity are always desirable and ethically acceptable. Notably PI activities’ relation 
to ‘truth’ can be subject to ethical debates. It is precisely on this potential aspect of
33 See for example Jowett and O’Donnell (1999: 6) and Taylor (2003: 6). The definition is also reflected 
in NATO’s definition above.
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propaganda that much opposition to the undertaking rests, and particularly Goebbels’ 
‘big lie’-technique to mislead the public by developing and repeating falsehoods.34
While this aspect is also beyond the present scope, it is appropriate to emphasise that 
during this research I have not discovered examples of lies, big or small, or other 
deceptive techniques. None of the present findings suggest that NATO deliberately 
provided journalists with false information, or that they controlled the thoughts of 
specific journalists or public opinion at large.
Since this issue is at the heart of popular conceptions of propaganda, it deserves some
further clarification. One may compare NATO PI activities with Lee and Lee’s (1979:
15) idea of propaganda:
The propagandist tries to ‘put something across,’ good or bad. The 
scientist does no try to put anything across; he devotes his life to the 
discovery of new facts and principles. The propagandist seldom wants 
careful scrutiny and criticism; his object is to bring about a specific 
action. The scientist, on the other hand, is always prepared for and wants 
the most careful scrutiny and criticism of his facts and ideas. Science 
flourishes on criticism. Dangerous propaganda crumbles before it.
The PIOs in the present field of inquiry are different from both these professions. Most 
information that PI conveys relates to NATO’s policy and intentions, for example 
communicating its responsibilities under the Dayton Peace Accord (see 2). Such 
normative information differs from that of facts conveyed by scientists in the field of 
natural science. But this does not imply that information about policy is more or less
34 Ideas similar to the latter technique may be found in Plato’s cave analogy, in which the shadows on the 
wall are the ‘noble myths’ by which ordinary people live. The myths are disconnected from ‘reality’ and 
created by rulers to maintain society (Bloom 1988: 279; Strauss 1988: 221-22).
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truthful. Moreover, when NATO disseminates information about what they refer to as 
facts on the ground, the alliance’s PI policy instructs its personnel ‘to provide accurate, 
complete, and timely information’ (see 2.2.1). Thus, when PIOs inform the press about, 
for example, the physical circumstances related to an attack on a tram in Sarajevo 
carried out by unknown people, they are only authorised to do so in an accurate, 
complete, and timely manner.35 As such the PIOs’ code of conduct compares to the one 
Lee and Lee attach to the scientist. The PIOs are different from the propagandist who 
crumbles before scrutiny, and who therefore does not want any of it. In the empirical 
scope of this study, NATO’s activities were subject to careful scrutiny and criticism 
from the press but this was seen to enhance Pi’s credibility which again increased the 
efficiency with which it could communicate with reporters (see 2.2.5). So, like science 
properly conducted PI flourishes on criticism.
Still, one may rightly question whether it is ethically defensible to use the media as a 
means of power. Before effectively excluding this dimension from the scope of this 
study, it is useful to illustrate the difficulties involved in taking a stand on these 
normative issues. The idea of independent media as a ‘watch-dog’ that checks the 
government is strong in democratic cultures and forms part of international law.36 Yet, 
this notion raises the question of what the term ‘independent media’ actually means? Is 
it to be understood in, for instance, economic, editorial, or political terms? In societies 
where a host of commercial, civil, political, and maybe violent interest groups try to 
influence media reports, does the idea of independent media imply that the political
35 Details about such an attack figures in a NATO (10/1/1996) press briefing.
36 It emerged from political philosophy in the 18th century and found its initial constitutional expression 
in the first clause of the 1791 US Bill of Rights (Badsey 2000a:xx-xxii).
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authorities should refrain from presenting their case persuasively to the press? Is that 
desirable? Is that to govern? Would this not infringe on most democratic governments’ 
constitutional obligation to inform the public about their activities?
Such considerations relate to the earlier addressed question about how we may 
distinguish between informing and influencing. From the perspective of this thesis such 
distinctions come across as flawed (see 3.4.3). Moreover, in extreme cases, for instance 
when national security is endangered, to what extent do we want the press to be 
independent from governmental influence? These thoughts are not forwarded to engage 
a debate, only to stimulate reflections among those who may hasten to denounce the use 
of social communication as a means of power in politics and war.
Hence, I consider NATO’s overall role in the selected cases politically good, as its 
military missions operated to implement a mandate given by the United Nations 
Security Council and as PI, to the best of my knowledge, did not deceive its target 
audiences.37
Further considerations as to whether or not NATO PI is propaganda is excluded from 
this thesis. Rather, the study should be seen as a broader effort to enhance our 
understanding of the ways in which capable actors may exert power by means of the 
media to shape the societies in which we live.
37 UN Security Council resolutions 1031 and 1244.
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1.4 Methodology
It is necessary to clarify some of the major methodological considerations and 
assumptions upon which this study is based. We shall commence by highlighting those 
that address the empirical research, and then proceed to considerations involved in 
undertaking the theoretical analysis, before limiting the scope of the thesis.
1.4.1 Methodological concerns on the empirical dimension of 
the thesis
The empirical question of this study is, as will be recalled, to explore how, and for what 
purposes, NATO has used its PI function in its peace support operations in the Balkans. 
‘How’ is, as Foucault (1982: 786) remarks, ‘the little question . . .  flat and empirical’.
This question is addressed in the next chapter. Departing from the empirical is different 
from most International Relations-theses, which often aim to disprove or improve 
existing theories. To do this, they usually commence with a theoretical part that 
establishes a perspective guiding the proceeding empirical research. The present 
purpose is different, and consequently so is the method. From the outset of this 
investigation I was interested in how an actor may use the media as a means of power in 
armed conflicts. For reasons stipulated in the next section, the cases examined here 
appeared appropriate to this end. While not permitted, a presentation of NATO’s PI- 
documents could have presented general policies and doctrines but not how these were 
practiced. Yet, I wanted to learn how NATO conducts PI at the tactical level to achieve 
broader objectives; that is, neither how PI practitioners should operate, nor how they 
behave or what they achieve, but which ideas inform their practice. This was an 
empirical task, however, not a theoretical.
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Since the object of study is ideas, a hermeneutic method was required using interviews 
as primary sources to gather information. I interviewed centrally positioned PI 
practitioners to leam how they perceived their tasks and sought to implement them in an 
actual operation. For reasons soon to be presented, the Chief Press and Information 
Officer (CPIO) -  that is, the officer in charge of co-ordinating all Press and Information 
activities in a NATO military mission -  appeared the most relevant practitioners to 
approach. Departing from the simple questions: ‘how do you do PI?’, and ‘for what 
purpose do you do PI?’, they answered by referring to illustrative cases of their own 
choosing. The CPIOs’ accounts provided insights into their daily routines and allowed 
the identification of common purposes, means and methods. Comparing these with 
existing literature (see 1.5.1) provided grounds for formulating hypotheses about P i’s 
mode of operation -  propositions the CPIOs qualified during follow-up interviews.
In order to preserve this unique empirical account in this final presentation, I decided to 
commence with an empirical chapter. Beginning with a theoretical perspective would 
have imposed a theoretical straightjacket that would necessarily reduce the breadth of 
the empirical outline.
This methodology is different from comparative empirical studies aiming at identifying 
policy or behavioural change. They often commence by establishing a base-line case 
and compare additional cases against this in order to elucidate differences. My research 
interest, however, was never to argue that NATO PI has changed. It has been to identify 
P i’s mode of operation to understand how PI may serve as a means of power.
Some may devalue the methodological choice to use interviews as offering little more 
than anecdotes. I do not agree. The research proceeded along this methodological path 
to explore what cannot be understood by mere observation and the study of policy
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documents. It did so in the spirit of the verse by an anonymous, and slightly annoyed, 
poet:
In modem thought, (if not in fact)
Nothing is that doesn’t act,
So that is reckoned wisdom which 
Describes the scratch but not the itch.38
In this study, the effort to present the ideas that informed the practice of PI is an effort 
to describe the ‘itch’. It does so ‘not in the hope of proving anything but rather in the 
hope of learning something’, which Eysenck holds should be the attitude scholars in the 
social sciences adopt when conducting research.39 Based on this fundamental 
understanding, the thesis scrutinises commonalities and varieties in the CPIOs’ accounts 
about P i’s purposes and methods. Used in this manner, in-depth interviews provide 
more than anecdotes. They allow a conceptualisation of an aspect of warfare that is still 
scarcely accounted for in the field of International Relations, namely, how information 
is used as a means of power at the tactical level embedded in a broader strategic effort 
(see 1.5).
Hermeneutic approaches are by necessity subjective.40 The aim of this thesis, however, 
was never to provide an ‘objective’ account of NATO PI activities, which, I believe, is 
not possible. Nor was the purpose to provide a ‘balanced’ presentation of the topic, 
which could have been attempted by drawing from a broad scope of non-NATO 
sources, such as governments outside the alliance, journalists, and scholars. Rather, the
38 Cited in McLuhan (2001:10).
39 Cited in Flyvbjerg (1992: 144).
40 See, for instance, Hollis and Smith (1990: 71-3).
47
object of study is to approach NATO’s institutionalised ideas about the practice of PL 
That is, not the PI policies and manuals but the practice of these policies and manuals. 
The hermeneutic approach to three CPIOs allows this. It provides an inter-subjective 
understanding of the purposes and methods of the NATO PI function. The method 
purports to examine the alliance’s PI mindset or, one may say, to give an ‘inside’ view.
Three persons may appear as a very limited scope of primary sources. It is a cardinal 
assumption of this study, however, that this is a valid methodological choice. Important 
measures and reservations have been taken to sustain this assumption.
First, the study does not explore the ideas that informed the practice of any PIO, but of 
CPIOs. These primary sources were involved at the highest executive level in their 
respective military missions. They were, as mentioned, in charge of co-ordinating all 
mission-relevant PI activities and directly linked in the chain of command to their 
respective force commanders. The position they held represented NATO’s overall PI 
endeavour in the actual military operation in the Balkans. Thus, they are extra-ordinarily 
well-informed about NATO’s rationale for using PI and its mode of operation in those 
particular missions (further considerations on this topic are presented in the next 
section). Second, the CPIO’s accounts have been evaluated against other primary 
NATO sources on the topic. This includes the few publicly accessible NATO 
documents on its PI function and numerous transcripts from its press briefings in the 
relevant cases (see the section ‘Sources’ below). Third, the CPIOs’ information is 
compared with that of works and articles produced on the topic of this thesis (see 1.5.1). 
Scholars’ points of view appear in footnotes throughout the thesis, when corresponding 
or diverging from those of the CPIOs. The three just mentioned measures aim to 
strengthen the validity of the conclusions and to move the presentation beyond a mere 
anecdotal level.
Still, basing the study primarily on interviews with three persons provides no ground for 
general conclusions about NATO’s media relations in the Balkans and not even in the 
three examined military missions. The thesis does not claim, therefore, that the views of 
the three CPIOs are shared by all other PIOs in the missions, not to mention by NATO. 
The method simply does not allow for such generalisation. On the other hand, if a 
criterion of general validity were to determine whether a study is academically valid, 
then it would be futile to conduct qualitative research. We would not gain, and certainly 
not be able to use, such insights to improve the academic field’s understanding of a 
broad scope of issues in international affairs. With respect to the present topic, we 
would not be able learn how a major military actor aims to use in actual practice the 
media as a means to achieve military and political ends.
Cases
The empirical study comprises three military missions, in order to allow comparison 
and extend the validity of the thesis beyond a single case. As the point of departure was 
an empirical interest, the cases were not chosen from theoretically deduced criteria.
They emerged out of practical considerations.
Trying to establish my considerations retrospectively, it should be mentioned that I 
wanted the cases to be representative of the post-Cold War era. In the autumn of 2001 
when the research commenced, the terrorist attacks in the United States of America 
(US) on 11 September were so recent that their significance for the international 
security agenda remained uncertain. Therefore, it seemed prudent to opt for cases that 
defined the field during the 1990s. A second criterion was that the cases should 
represent the PI activities of a major international military actor, thus excluding minor 
military powers like Norway and otherwise relevant resistance movements like the
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Zapatistas in Mexico. A third criterion was that the cases should provide new empirical 
findings on the practice of PI, therefore primary sources had to be accessible and 
valuable. I doubted the extent to which advanced actors in the area of concern, in 
particular the US and the United Kingdom, would facilitate access to relevant sources 
for an outsider.
NATO, however, fulfils these criteria. As an employee of the Norwegian Armed Forces, 
it seemed likely that I would be able to access relevant individuals. During the 1990s, 
NATO was the major military alliance, second to none. It had been involved in dozens 
of major PI tasks, from long-term public information efforts vis-a-vis its member 
nations’ populations, political missions such as the Russia-NATO cooperation and more 
acute crisis management as in Macedonia in 2001.41 To make the research task 
manageable, it was deemed prudent to explore only a few cases.
The choice was NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
missions, that is, its peace support operation in Bosnia and Kosovo, respectively. The 
reason is that these compare to conventional military operations more than most 
alternatives -  Operation Allied Force and the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) being the exceptions. The armed conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo are generally 
considered defining cases of the 1990s international security agenda and, as such, have 
shaped institutional responses in the foreseeable future.42 Moreover, the value of the
41 Other NATO PI activities are related to, among others, the alliance’s enlargement process, Partnership 
for Peace, and the Mediterranean Dialogue.
42 Among others, the authors’ presented in the introduction share this view. Smith (2005: 332-70) points 
to the international military involvement in Bosnia since 1992 and Kosovo since 1999 as examples o f his 
new paradigm: war amongst the people. In fact, Bosnia constitutes his prime example. Cooper (2004: 59, 
66, 71) refers to the international community’s politico-military engagement in Bosnia, Kosovo and the
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Bosnian case in the present context is suggested by former BBC reporter Martin Bell’s 
(1995: 137) comment that ‘no other war -  not even the Gulf War, which took on the 
character of a made-for-television CNN special event -  has been fought so much in 
public, under the eye of the camera’. James Gow et al. (1996b: 3) concur, describing the 
Bosnian conflict as ‘the most comprehensively media-documented war ever. This made 
it the first true television war’.
In the Kosovo case, KFOR is arguably more relevant to the present inquiry than 
NATO’s preceding air campaign. The reason is not only that of the two, KFOR 
compares more to IFOR since the two were both peace support operations. PI was 
conducted at a tactical level in KFOR, but at a headquarters level and with much 
interference from NATO member governments in the air campaign. It is also 
questionable how representative NATO PI activities during the latter campaign were for 
that function in general. Many, including PI staff who were directly involved, claim that 
within the broader politico-military crisis, NATO PI activities were in themselves a 
crisis to be managed (see footnote 18). Thus, IFOR and KFOR provide representative 
and more comparable cases.
NATO’s peace support operations in Bosnia and Kosovo consist of several consecutive 
military missions of six to 12 months duration. The first contingents to each operation 
have been examined here because the first mission constitutes the critical PI phase. In 
this initial phase, the politico-military situation is often volatile, and NATO’s ability to
Balkans at large, as an example of his concepts o f postmodern war and voluntary empire. Kaldor (1999: 
31, 154) points to Bosnia and Kosovo as ‘the archetypal example’ of her new war concept. Further, 
Mueller (2004: 88-94, 145-48) elaborates on the Bosnia conflict as his crown example of what he calls 
the remnants of war. Even van Creveld (1991: 224), who wrote before large-scale violence erupted in 
Bosnia, refers to Southeastern Europe as one of three potential regions from where his future wars would 
spread to the Western world.
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impose stability is still to be proved. The alliance’s role and utility in the specific 
context remains undefined to people both in the conflict zone and worldwide. As the 
conflict de-escalates, media attention will often wane, and public understanding of 
NATO’s contribution tends to remain stable. This is likely to remain the case until 
something extra-ordinary catches the attention of reporters. In addition, the fifth 
contingent in KFOR is explored because it is instructive to see how Pi’s mode of 
operation adapts to a situation that already has all the major features NATO PI strove to 
achieve from the outset.
Since the research explores the ideas that inform how PI is practiced, the narrow object 
of study is the practitioners of PI. Having chosen a hermeneutic approach with in-depth 
interviews of a few persons, it was necessary to interview NATO PI practitioners that 
had been directly involved in the aforementioned cases. To permit in-depth studies of 
the overall principles in a PI campaign and avoid balancing multiple accounts of how PI 
‘actually’ operated in specific situations, I chose to interview a small rather than a large 
amount of sources. In addition, the sources had to be representative for the broad PI 
endeavour in order to extend the validity of the empirical propositions (see the section 
above). For these reasons, the person in charge of the respective PI functions in each 
case -  that is, the CPIO -  has been interviewed.
The CPIO is the most senior PI position at the tactical level. In the military chain of 
command he has direct access to the force commander, who is the highest commanding 
officer in theatre. On PI matters, the CPIO is the NATO headquarters’ and capitals’ 
point of contact in theatre and gives instructions and guidance to the PIOs further down 
the level of command. The CPIO is on the ground at the level where most events 
projected in the media actually occur. He meets the press daily. At the same time, he is 
the linchpin between PIOs who conduct PI activities, the operational commanders,
and the guidance from NATO PI policies and operational doctrines. An analysis of the 
practice of PI at a higher level in the organisation would have excluded the hands-on 
experiences of dealing with journalists covering facts on the ground in a military 
mission, while an analysis at a lower level more possibly would be disconnected from 
the strategic dimensions of the activity. Moreover, since the PIOs at lower levels in the 
specific cases formed part of the national contingents to the peace support operations, 
their professional mindset are more likely to reflect national modes of operations, than 
the CPIOs who operated at headquarters level in theatre and therefore were embedded 
in NATO’s mode of operation. Further, the CPIOs are often more experienced than 
lower-level PIOs and therefore more disposed to reflect the alliance’s institutionalised 
PI mindset. Against this background, I find the CPIO the most relevant level within 
NATO at which to explore the thesis’ empirical question.
At first sight, the number of cases may appear confusing. The study departs from the PI 
activity of one organisation -  NATO; in two peace support operation -  IFOR and 
KFOR; of which three contingents are examined -  IFOR, the first Kosovo Force 
mission (KFOR 1) and the fifth mission (KFOR 5). In addition, the study provides six 
illustrative cases. It is clarifying to conceive the research as based on three cases, since 
the narrow object of study is how three CPIOs conceive the PI endeavour in three 
respective contingents. Less correct I also refer to them in a general sense as one case 
by the term NATO PI -  among other places, in the research questions and theses (see 
1.1.1 and 1.2.1). This formulation is only applied to facilitate reading and should not be 
perceived as an endeavour to conduct a general inquiry or to make a general claim.
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Content analysis of press briefings
Section 2.3 presents two content analyses of NATO press briefings during the first 40 
days of IFOR and KFOR 1 respectively.43 It is necessary to clarify the methodological 
considerations upon which these analyses rest. The purpose o f that section is to consider 
to what extent the accounts of the CPIOs, notably with regard to the use of master 
messages (see 2.2.3), are reflected in the transcripts from this central arena for NATO’s 
relation with the press.
There are many ways to conduct content analysis.44 I have chosen a simple method 
since my primary purpose is limited to the identification of NATO’s most profiled 
messages. The examined texts are transcripts from press briefing as they appear on 
NATO’s website.45 The sample of briefings included in this analysis is from the first 40 
days of each mission. Compared to the 365 days that IFOR lasted, a sample of 40 days 
is reasonable in terms of time available to finalise the study. The first 40 days, rather 
than a random period, is a valuable sample based on the assumption that it is primarily 
in the early phase of a mission that public perception is being shaped. The press 
briefings were undertaken daily. Not all transcripts are available on the website, 
however. In IFOR 23 and in KFOR 24 transcripts exist from respectively 20 December
43 NATO’s terminology on this activity is not consistent. Here, we shall use the term ‘press briefing’ by 
which it is normally referred. At other times, however, the same activity is called ‘morning briefing’, 
‘press conference’, ‘press statement’, or ‘news conference’. All refer to a situation where NATO PI 
personnel have invited the press for to bring across information about current events and to answer 
questions from the journalist. The briefing may be conducted by either NATO PIOs, commanders or, 
occasionally by the Secretary General. In IFOR and KFOR 1, these were normally held in the CPIC and 
undertaken on a daily basis. During KFOR 5 press briefings occurred only bi-weekly. ‘News updates’ are 
not included in the sample since they are often concerned with a single issue and do not involve an instant 
dialogue between PIOs and reporters.
44 See, for example, Bauer’s (2000) presentation of a variety of analytical approaches in this domain.
45 http://www.nato.int.
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1995 to 30 January 1996 and 12 June to 21 July 1999. In the case of KFOR, three days 
present transcripts from two different press briefings. On 18 June, for example, NATO 
headquarters’ Office of Information and Press holds its last recorded morning briefing 
in the sample. The same day, KFOR 1 holds its first recorded press briefing from 
Pristina. Both transcripts from the days with two press briefings are included here since 
both disseminate messages to the press corps.
The transcripts can be interpreted in many ways, which leads to an element of 
judgement in the actual research. From the outset, I allowed the CPIO’s formulated 
master messages to establish the kind of messages -  the codes -  to be identified in the 
content analysis. These gave only initial directions, however. Along the guidelines 
provided by Bauer (2000), recurring themes in the actual transcripts eventually defined 
the coding frame. Deciding what constitutes a recurring theme is no straight-forward 
task, however. IFOR’s master message -  ‘IFOR is the new Nato working with new 
partners for noble ends’ -  can be found in every transcript depending on how one 
defines the code. One may argue that it encompasses all the codes in the frame. This is 
hardly surprising considering that the messages are developed to sustain each other in a 
strategy (see 2.2.3). To make the messages distinguishable, however, I chose to define 
the message in question more narrowly as comprising information about ‘new partners’, 
such as Russia and civilian organisations, and about ‘noble ends’ understood in abstract 
terms like ‘human rights’. In the respective summaries, consideration is then given to 
whether and how the identified messages correspond to those stipulated by the CPIOs. 
So while the CPIOs’ information on messages offered guidance, and sometimes were 
found to be useful codes, they did not overduely bias the findings. Alternative codes 
were explored.
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Once established, the coding frame served as a measure to reduce the amount of 
interpretations and the level of judgement. At this stage the task was primarily to 
quantify the number of days in which each message was stated.
As a point of clarification, it should be mentioned that the messages are retrieved from 
NATO personnel’s statements in the entire transcript of a briefing, which includes both 
introductory remarks and answers to reporters’ questions. Moreover, a message is only 
counted once a day, irrespective of whether it is mentioned one single time or many 
more times during a briefing.
Sources
The empirical question is explored almost exclusively by means of primary NATO 
sources. These fall into three categories: interviews with and written accounts by three 
NATO CPIOs involved at the executive level in military missions; the limited 
declassified NATO information that exists on its PI activity; and publicly accessible 
transcripts from relevant NATO press briefings. It is only right to introduce the three 
CPIOs.
Captain Mark A. Van Dyke, from the US Navy, was IFOR’s CPIO throughout its 12- 
month duration. Van Dyke has operated as a PIO since 1980, among others positions as 
the CPIO at the US Strategic Command and at Allied Forces Southern Europe 
(AFSOUTH).
Colonel Robin L. C. Clifford was KFOR 1 ’s CPIO. He is a British Army officer and 
during several years the CPIO in the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), including
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deployments to IFOR, to Macedonia from March to 11 June 1999, and to the first 
KFOR mission.46
Lieutenant Colonel Tore Idsoe was the CPIO in KFOR 5. Idsoe, a Norwegian Army 
officer, inherited the PI campaign initiated by Clifford and at the time established for 
two years. He has extensive PI experience, among others as the CPIO at NATO’s North 
Joint Headquarters, and was in charge of the rear Press and Information Centre (PIC) in 
Macedonia, when KFOR 1 entered Kosovo.
The value of a thesis based to a large extent on interviews of three individuals may be 
questioned. Besides the possibility that the interviewed persons have deliberately misled 
me -  which I consider highly unlikely -  they may have done so unintentionally. First, 
there is a time-span of from one to nine years from the interviews were conducted to the 
activity in question. How correct can the account be? Not only may the persons have 
forgotten essential information, they may also reinterpret the information and their 
decisions in light of the outcome, rather than as they appeared when the activities were 
conducted. To reduce such risks, I conducted the interviews separately and was able to 
confirm the information retrieved against relevant non-classified NATO documents, 
including transcripts from press briefings of the time. Moreover, the CPIOs’ accounts 
are compared to secondary sources, as mentioned in the introductory methodological 
concerns above.
46 While the internationally recognised name is the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, often 
abbreviated to FYROM, this study shall refer to the state as Macedonia. This solely because the latter 
term reads more facile in the text.
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1.4.2 Methodological concerns on the theoretical dimension of 
the thesis
Having clarified the major methodological considerations related to the empirical part 
o f this research, we may move the focus to the theoretical task, which is to 
conceptualise the forms of power PI sought to exert on people. More specifically, the 
theoretical question is: how can Robert A. Dahl’s, Steven Lukes’, and Michel 
Foucault’s respective notions of power enhance our theoretical understanding of the 
way the NATO PI function may exercise power to achieve political and military ends?
Chapter 3 departs from the understanding established at that point in the thesis that the 
CPIOs try to influence the way people perceive NATO’s role in the Balkans. Their task 
is to enhance public support to NATO. The forms of influence they apparently exercise 
vary, however. The relationships between PI and their targets are different, as are the 
contexts, the objectives, the forms of interactions, the PI tactics and the means applied. 
Moreover, the CPIOs refer to their task in a variety of broad terms, such as enhance 
understanding, gain public support, and deter. Clearly, they see the PI function as an 
additional means of power available to a force commander to reach his objectives, but 
the kinds of power that the officers try to exercise appear diverse and are difficult to 
grasp.
The purpose of chapter 3 is partly to apply theoretical notions to clarify this aspect. In 
addition, this theoretical chapter aims to further the understanding of the empirical 
findings beyond what has been possible by the methodology applied in the previous 
chapter.
To this end, the empirical findings will be scrutinised by means of three different 
notions on power. This compares to Graham Allison’s (1971) methodology in his
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seminal study on the Cuban Missile Crisis, in the sense that he applies different theories 
to extract different stories from the same case. While his purpose was to make a 
theoretical point, mine is primarily to improve the conceptual understanding of P i’s 
modes of influence. In broad terms, this research seeks to enhance the understanding of 
the forms of power that military operations may set in motion and can make expedient 
use of. Moreover, while Allison used different theoretical approaches to explain why the 
Cuban missile crisis developed as it did, I provide no such ‘evidence’. This thesis does 
not claim that PI managed to influence its audiences but it does hold that different 
theoretical concepts of power can provide different answers to how PI may have exerted 
influence.
This methodological approach makes it possible to identify the CPIOs’ assumptions 
about their influence, and consider whether theoretical work can account for these 
assumptions. It clarifies constraints but also theoretical connections that validate their 
ideas. Importantly, this method indicates for which ends and in which ways PI is likely 
to be a useful means of power in military operations.
Criteria for power theories
Power is, indeed, an ‘essentially contested concept’ as W.B. Gallie (1962) has famously 
argued. It comes in many guises and is conceived in multiple ways, not all of which suit 
the present purpose. The notions of power applied here were selected partly by a 
concern to make the research task manageable, and partly along criteria imposed by the 
cases. With regard to the former, I decided to limit myself to three theoretical concepts 
-  a number that sufficed to fulfil the theoretical purpose while permitting in-depth 
elaboration. With regard to the latter, the decision was based on the following criteria:
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First, the notions of power must accommodate subjects. The empirical study departs 
from an actor -  the CPIO and his staff who seek to influence a number of targets. Thus, 
the theoretical notion must approach power as a social phenomenon intentionally 
exercised by actors. This excludes, for example, Louis Althusser’s (1965) structural as 
well as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s (1985) semantic approaches to power in 
which respectively structural forces and discourses deal with social groups as objects of 
power, not as subjects.
Second, the notions of power must comprise targets of power. The CPIOs want to 
influence a variety of social groups. Thus, the concepts must be able to deal with at least 
some of these, from specific armed groups to more diffuse targets like world public 
opinion. Third, the notions must be able to accommodate information as a means of 
power, since the CPIOs’ relations to their targets are primarily communicative. A final 
and more general concern was that the notions should form part of the mainstream 
theoretical debate within the field of Political Science. This, because I wanted to place 
the study in the broader scholarly conversation on power.
From these criteria I have selected the works of Yale-professor Robert A. Dahl, 
Professor Steven Lukes from New York University, and College de France-professor 
Michel Foucault. Commencing with the fourth criterion, these are arguably the most 
seminal authors in the debate and represent three of what Peter Digeser (1992) has 
called the four faces ofpower*1 This is a categorisation of dominant approaches to
47 The ‘face’ excluded from this study is that provided by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1962) in 
their influential article ‘Two Faces of Power’. Their contribution to the debate is to point to that power 
may be exercised as non-decisionmaking (Bachrach and Baratz 1963: 632). Their focus is primarily on 
decisionmaking processes within well-established organisations and political communities, which is why
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social power that with various labels have gained general acceptance in the academic 
debate.48 This omits other relevant approaches to power, such as those provided by 
Elmer E. Schattschneider (1960) and Jurgen Habermas (1986), and those who 
contemplate the concept in the specific context of International Relations such as 
Baldwin (1971; 1979).
Dahl’s notion of power certainly fulfils the first case criterion. As the main title of his 
major work on power illustrates, Who Governs?, he assumes that someone has power. 
This locus of power is referred to as A in his definition. The latter also stipulates a By 
that is a target of power, and therefore satisfies my second criterion.49 As for the last 
criterion, some may argue that information is not comprised in the Dahlian notion, thus 
stressing his emphasis on the physical dimensions of power. I disagree. Dahl’s notion 
has a communicative aspect. He regards the material dimension of power, such as ‘the 
war potential of nations’, as inert in itself. Its impact is conditioned by the 
communication of, for example, threats to activate this material dimension. To him, 
such communication is a means of power (Dahl 1957: 203).
Lukes too, fulfils the first and second criterion. Like Dahl, he identifies power in 
situations where A affects B. Although he takes a structural approach to the social 
sciences, he refers to A as subjects that have the ‘power to act differently’ (Lukes 1974: 
55, emphasis in original). Compared to Dahl, Lukes is more apt to deal with public 
opinion as B , since his area of concern is how an elite manipulates the majority to
it is inappropriate in an armed conflict, where such socio-political ties are more diffuse and volatile. 
Hence, my decision to exclude their notion.
48 See, for instance, Hay (1997), Hayward (2000), and Barnett and Duvall (2005). Clegg (1989) implicitly 
support this view, although at the time Digeser (1992) was still to nominate Foucault as the fourth face.
49 Throughout this study, when A and B is typed in italics they refer to an actor (see 3.1).
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believe that the extant states of affairs is in the latter’s interest. Perceiving power as, 
among other things, thought control exercised through the media, Lukes (1974: 23) has 
no difficulties passing the third criterion. His notion seems particularly suited to account 
for propaganda efforts of the infamous kind. As I have sought to distance NATO PI 
activities from such endeavours (see 1.3), some may question why this theoretical 
perspective forms part of the study. It is included, however, to shed light on the 
analytical difficulties involved in classifying information activities as thought control 
and to highlight the dubious assumptions that such contempt of PI efforts rest upon.
To include Foucault in this study is more debatable. Some may find it ironic that he is 
used to represent an influential conception of power, since he explicitly rejects that he 
has developed a theory of power. Nonetheless, he also acknowledges that he ‘became 
quite involved with the question of power’ (Foucault 1982: 777-78) and his work has 
been seminal, indeed, in the social science debate on this particular phenomenon. Others 
may forward that he does not fulfil the first case criterion. True, in one of his four 
central methodological prescriptions for a case study he explicitly discourages the 
search for a locus of power (Foucault 1998: 99). His point of view is, however, that 
power cannot adequately be understood as a one-way causal relation between two 
subjects. Foucault (1998: 93) explains: ‘Power is everywhere; not because it embraces 
everything, but because it comes from everywhere’. This does not prevent people from 
being a source of power in his analytical framework. Actors’ influence are surely much 
more indirect and diffuse than the one Dahl ascribes to A, but Foucault’s micropolitical 
understanding o f power certainly accommodates individuals: ‘Power comes from 
below;. . .  the machinery of production, in families, limited groups, and institutions, are 
the basis for wide-ranging effects . . .  Major dominations are the hegemonic effects that 
are sustained by all these confrontations’ (Foucault 1998: 94). Thus, Foucault’s
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notion does conform to the first criterion. Equally, it conforms to the second. Not only 
does power influence people’s behaviour, it creates them as subjects (Foucault 1982: 
781). The third criterion makes Foucault’s concept particularly relevant to this study, 
since he links power to knowledge (see 3.1.3 and 3.2.3).
Thus, Dahl’s, Lukes’, and Foucault’s notions of power fulfil the four established 
criteria. The scholars are prominent in the debate, their notions can account for different 
forms of power that are exercised by a subject, such as NATO, over another, such as 
NATO’s targets; and they conceive information as a means of power (see further 3.1- 
3.3).
It is useful to highlight an earlier point, because it clarifies the purpose of this research. 
Dahl and Lukes use their notions of power for different ends than the present. Their aim 
is to develop a theoretical notion allowing researchers to find out ‘who has power’ in a 
given context (see 3.1.1 and 3.2.2).
This research does not purport to ‘prove’ such A-B  relations. The theoretical inquiry 
addresses A ’s perception about such relations. That is, it does not aim to find out 
whether the CPIOs have power over their targets, but rather to clarify the different ways 
in which the CPIOs may theoretically have influenced their targets. In other words, the 
study identifies theoretical notions of power that may shed new light on Pi’s mode of 
operation. This difference in theoretical purpose does not imply that Dahl and Lukes are 
inapplicable to this study, however. Their notions hold promise to be useful analytical 
instruments to address the theoretical concern of this thesis.
It is necessary from the outset to spell out why I do not intend to use a concept of power 
that has become widely accepted to describe precisely the forms of dynamics this thesis
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aims to conceptualise.50 This is the already mentioned notion of soft power introduced
by Nye in 1990 (see 1.2) and defined as:
The ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through 
attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow, or 
getting them to agree to norms and institutions that produce the desired 
behaviour. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one’s ideas or the ability 
to set the agenda in ways that shape the preferences of others. If a state 
can make its power legitimate in the perception of others and establish 
international institutions that encourage them to channel or limit their 
activities, it may not need to expend as many of its costly traditional 
economic or military resources (Nye and Owens 1996: 21).
The utility of soft power is that the notion is easy to grasp, a quality that is useful for 
practitioners. The difficulty is that besides the differentiation from hard power, 
understood as economic and military coercion (Nye 2004: 5-6), it is uncertain what one 
has grasped. This is a conceptual quality that is problematic for scholars. Nye (2004: 5) 
explicitly bases his notion on the theoretical work of Bachrach and Baratz. With 
reference to the definition above, however, Robin Brown has shown how soft power 
casually but effectively incorporates at least two different theoretical ideas: one which 
involves ‘the ability to structure decision making processes in a way that produces the 
desired outcomes’; and one that concerns the restructuring of other actors’ ideas ‘in 
ways that make them share American preferences and values’ (Brown 2004: 23). These 
are the notions that derives from respectively Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and Lukes 
(1974) and that the present study finds inadequate to account for the forms of influence
50 Soft power is used in some policy circles (see Brown 2004: 22; Cooper 2004: 180) and among scholars 
such as Dearth (2000a: 158-9), Herd (2000: 77), Leonard (2002: 4), Taylor (2002: 322-23), Van Ham 
(2003: 441), Armistead (2004: 11, 125) to the extent that it figures in the title o f his work, Vickers (2004: 
184) and Fukuyama (2006: 149-54).
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NATO’s information activities seek to exert in international conflicts. Moreover, Brown 
(2004: 23) criticises Nye for failing to explain ‘how and why’ soft power works. The 
present findings suggest that the notion is unable to do this because Nye has constructed 
it on untenable grounds. I shall argue that Dahl and Foucault can provide the conceptual 
and theoretical understanding of how and why information is power to put it simply at 
this initial stage.51
1.4.3 Limitation of scope
The scope of this research has already been limited in the considerations related to 
methodology (see 1.4-1.4.2) and propaganda (see 1.3). It is appropriate, however, to 
make explicit some of the more important limitations.
Three cases
This study analyses the operational mind-sets of three CPIOs in three NATO peace 
support operation missions: IFOR from 20 December 1995 to 19 December 1996; 
KFOR 1 from 12 June 1999 to 8 October 1999; and KFOR 5 from 6 April 2001 to 3 
October 2001.52 Six illustrative cases illuminate the three CPIOs’ understanding of their 
mode of operation.
51 It shall be mentioned that Brown’s (2002a; 2004) adaptations of Schattschneider’s conception of power 
to the broad theoretical concern of this thesis appears a fruitful analytical approach. To the same end, he 
suggests that the analytical avenues provided by Thomas Risse, Frank Schimmelfenig, and Alastair Ian 
Johnson can be useful. The primary reason neither of these is applied in the present study is that their 
conceptions o f power are arguably less prominent in the theoretical debate than the three selected for this 
study.
52 In this thesis, these three missions shall sometimes be referred to simply as NATO. This is a shorthand 
to facilitate reading. For two reasons this use of terms is not entirely correct. First, NATO has undertaken 
multiple PI campaigns (see methodology 1.4.1). The study and its conclusion, however, are limited to a 
mode of operation within the three above mentioned cases. Second, both IFOR and KFOR are multi­
national forces with troop contributions also from non-NATO members. Referring to the mission by the 
common term NATO can be justified, however, since the three missions were NATO-led, and all other
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PI — not Information Operations
The study exclusively addresses the NATO PI function. Other NATO communication 
assets do not form part of this thesis. Notably Information Operations, which comprises, 
among others functions, Psychological Operations (PsyOps), Electronic Warfare, and 
Computer Network Operations, is beyond the present scope, although they are 
mentioned in discussions of P i’s relations to these assets.53 This excludes much 
literature on the technical aspects of information that often conceived information as 
data, not as social communication which is what PI deals with -  although obviously the 
two understandings of information are related (see footnote 65). Information operations 
are primarily confined to a conventional military realm, while PI is also directed to the 
broader and changing political context of war.
The practice -  not the effect -  o f PI
The study presents the ideas that informed the practice of PI primarily as perceived by 
CPIOs within a NATO operational framework. It does not examine Pi’s impact. This 
has several implications. The study explores and conceptualises the types of influence 
the CPIOs endeavoured to exert on their targets, but it does not evaluate the extent to 
which the CPIOs succeeded to this end. Moreover, the study applies a simple content 
analysis on NATO press briefings to identify the messages PI sought to promote, but 
makes no similar examination of media reports, since it is beyond the present scope to
national contingents, episodically with Russia as an exception, formed an integral part of NATO’s 
command structures.
53 The US Armed Forces defines Information Operations as ‘those actions taken to affect an adversary’s 
information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems’ 
(cited in Armistead 2004: 17). NATO (2006: 137) defines PsyOps as: ‘Planned psychological activities 
designed to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military 
objectives’.
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analyse how NATO PI activities were projected in the media.54 Nor is it within the 
present area of concern to learn how Pi’s targets have been influenced for example by 
means of opinion polls.55
The practice — not the ethics — o f PI
Ethical, moral, and legal considerations on NATO PI activities lie beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Rather, the study purports to deal with PI on neutral terms, as a mode of 
operation. This is not to suggest that the study is value-free, which is why my normative 
position is already stated in section 1.3.
The television, radio and newspaper media -  not the internet
This study explores how the CPIOs relate to journalists and photographers from 
television, newspapers and radio. The CPIOs regarded these media representatives as 
their immediate targets since they were their most important points of contact to the 
media, their major channels to reach their primary target groups, which were both the 
general public and specific groups such as the parties in the conflicts.
Some argue that the dominant role of the traditional broadcasting institutions is 
challenged by innovations in information and communication technology, notably by 
the internet, which can accumulate and disseminate information from personal 
computers, mobile telephones, digital cameras, and other low-cost and widely available 
equipment (eg Gowing 2000b). Indeed, the air campaign over Kosovo in 1999 is often
54 Numerous content analyses of how Western media reported the Yugoslav wars o f secession are 
provided in the edited volumes of Gow et al. (1996a), Goff (1999a), Hammond and Herman (2000), and a 
special issue of European Journal of Communication volume 15 number 3.
55 Sobel (1998) is an example of a study that applies this approach.
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highlighted as an example of the significance of the internet in times of war. Brigitte L. 
Nacos et al. (2000b: 2), for example, has called it the ‘first Internet war’ (see also 
Collins 2000a: 193; Denning 1999: 102).
Nonetheless, P. Taylor’s (2000a: 297) and Brown’s (2004: 18) argument that traditional 
media, such as television, remain the principal channel to reach the public is welcomed 
as a justification for eliminating the internet from the present scope. Another, but more 
locally confined, reason for excluding such cutting-edge technological communication 
platforms is that PI only paid marginal attention to them in the cases. Lt.Col. Tore Idsoe 
(26/3/2004), who was CPIO in KFOR 5, holds that by and large, his major target 
audience, the Kosovars, did not have access to the internet in 2001.56
1.5 Literature review
Before we return to the particular argument of this study, it is enlightening to take a 
look at how the present topic of concern has been dealt with in the academic literature in 
order to clarify in which way and to what extent this research makes a distinct 
contribution to Anglophone and Scandinavian scholarship.57 The review primarily
56 This referencing system will be used throughout the thesis to refer to information gathered by means of 
interviews. In the text the name of the CPIO and the date he was interviewed is stipulated -  in this case it 
refers to an interview I conducted with Idsoe on 26 March 2004. In the bibliography, information is added 
on how and where the CPIOs were interviewed.
57 The broad issues are addressed in other languages as well. See Thompson’s (1999: 343-53) 
presentation of some ten relevant works in Serbo-Croatian. Searches on library databases have identified 
works on the general topic in German and also, though less numerous, in French. Due to my linguistic 
shortcomings these bodies of research do not form part of this review. Moreover, the review does not 
cover the vast amount of unpublished reports and papers that circulates in the military establishment on 
these issues.
68
addresses literature in the field of International Relations, not media studies, although 
on this topic the two academic disciplines inevitably cross-fertilise.
While it may appear slightly long, the review sets out to convey that the specific 
empirical and theoretical questions of this thesis have, with few important exceptions, 
hardly received academic attention. Moreover, the broader empirical concern has 
largely been dealt with in a relatively general and policy-oriented manner and there are 
only embryonic efforts to enhance the broader theoretical understanding this study 
directs itself to elucidate.
1.5.1 The specific empirical topic
The present study’s empirical concern is to explore how, and for what purposes, NATO 
has used its PI function in IFOR and KFOR (see 1.1.1). Hence, the first task of this 
review is to present academic studies that have addressed this particular topic.58 
Because this addresses NATO Pi’s mode of operation, a first distinction to be made is 
between studies primarily based on NATO sources, ie those concerned with NATO’s 
ideas about its PI activities, and studies that approach the activity from different 
perspectives. The latter encompasses works that primarily draw from other than NATO 
sources, for example media reports. This thesis belongs to the first methodological 
category.
58 This limitation of the review’s scope to NATO’s media relations excludes scholarship that scrutinises 
the way political parties in the Balkans have used the media in their conflicts during the 1990s. Some of 
the most cited works on how the political and warring parties, notably Serbia and Croatia, have used the 
media for their own purposes prior to and during the break-up of the former federal state o f Yugoslavia 
include Thompson (1999), an anthology edited by Gow et al. (1996a), and MacDonald (2002). On the 
same subject but less influential are articles by Jacobsen (1993), Radojkovic (1994), Zupanov (1995), 
Oberschall (2000), and Byford and Billig (2001). Particularly Serbian, but also Croatian, efforts to 
influence public perception via the media of the international community’s role in Balkan wars have been 
examined by Malesic (1998), Hrvatin and Trampuz (2000), deCaro (2000), and Gocic (2000).
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On the present empirical concern, only a handful of studies explore NATO Pi’s 
rationale and mode of operation. Among those, by far the most important work has been 
undertaken by Pascale Combelles Siegel, who conducted two observation missions in 
Bosnia in October 1996 and March-April 1997. As member of a NATO Joint Analysis 
Team, she interviewed almost 100 key international press and information staff from 
IFOR, the Stabilization Force (SFOR), the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe (SHAPE), and civilian international organisations such as the Office of the High 
Representative, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs). Her findings are presented in an excellent monograph (Siegel 
1998) and as chapters in two separate works. The first is a chapter in Larry K. Wentz 
(1997a). The other appears in a co-authored work where she, together with Kevin 
Avruch, is credited as the primary authors on the chapter that covers NATO’s 
information campaign in Bosnia (Avruch et al. 1999: 100).
With respect to the present concern, the most relevant is her 1998 work which 
elaborates on the utility, co-ordination, and effectiveness of IFOR and SFOR’s 
information campaigns implemented by means of NATO’s three communication 
functions, that is PI, PsyOps, and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) (Siegel 1998).59 
These findings are also presented in her 1997 chapter (Siegel 1997). In the 1999-chapter 
she expands the scope and presents the information campaign conducted by the broader
59 NATO (2006: 59) defines CIMIC as: ‘The coordination and cooperation, in support o f the mission, 
between NATO commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as 
well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.’
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international community in Bosnia and considers its relevance in the general field of 
peace operations (Avruch et ah 1999: 31-108).
The value of Siegel’s work notwithstanding it has a broader scope than the present 
thesis in several senses. First, Siegel (1997; 1998) explores three communication 
functions, while I exclusively examine PI. Second, Siegel’s 1999-chapter covers PI 
activities conducted by a broad scope of actors including NATO, the United Nations 
(UN), the OSCE, and NGOs, while I focus exclusively on the first of these. Third, she 
discusses the effectiveness of NATO’s three communication functions and their broader 
application in the general field of peace support operations (Avruch 1999: 31-108), 
aspects that are both beyond the scope of the present thesis (see 1.4.3). Siegel’s broader 
scope prevents her from elaborating at length on the specific empirical question of this 
thesis. In fact, only some 26 pages in her major work are devoted to this particular 
topic.60 Moreover, in terms of cases Siegel’s scope is also different. She has examined 
only one of the three cases examined here; that is IFOR.
Another useful article that addresses a research question closely related to the present is 
Robin Clifford and T.J. Wilton (2000). The former was the CPIO in KFOR 1 and is one 
of the primary sources here. The article deals with their experiences in IFOR, where 
both co-authors were centrally positioned PIOs and have firsthand experiences from that 
mission as well. They present how IFOR’s land component, the ARRC, operated vis-a- 
vis the media to gain public support in Bosnia and in NATO member countries. While 
the article highlights critical PI issues, its scope, in terms of cases, and their elaborations
60 Siegel (1998: 40-66). Largely the same findings occur in Siegel (1997) and some in Avruch et al. 
(1999: 41-43).
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on the matters at hand is necessarily more limited than those of this thesis. In addition, 
another of my primary source has also produced a most relevant academic paper. Mark 
Van Dyke (2003) applies a rhetorical method to examine how IFOR PI changed 
NATO’s identity. This basic argument forms part of the present thesis, in which it is 
presented in a broader context from a different theoretical perspective.
Moreover, Mark Thompson and Dan De Luce (2002) outline the political and legal 
context in which IFOR PI was conducted, but at the level of implementation they focus 
on SFOR. In addition, the British G.R. Coward (2000) compares his experiences as a 
Military Spokesman in UNPROFOR from 1994-95 with IFOR PI activities in an 
anecdotal ‘lessons learned’ approach.
No other academic work has addressed the present empirical question with regard to 
KFOR 1 and 5. The most closely related study is authored by Julie Mertus and Mark 
Thompson (2002). They do not examine NATO Pi’s mode of operation, however, but 
present the broader international endeavour to regulate Kosovo’s media space in the 
post-conflict peacebuilding effort, and identify the concerns and in-fighting between 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the OSCE, and 
NATO on this matter.
Hence, it may be concluded that very few authors have addressed the specific empirical 
questions of this thesis based on NATO sources and that these have done so in a manner 
different from mine. While some, notably Siegel, have explored the IFOR PI function, 
no comparable study exists with regard to KFOR 1 and 5. Against this background, it is 
useful to extend the scope of the review beyond the limitations of this study and present 
literature that based on NATO-sources addresses related NATO-activities in the
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Balkans. This includes different PI activities and other communication functions, 
notably PsyOps.
Related NATO activities in the Balkans
Compared to the present cases, much more scholarly attention has been devoted to 
NATO PI activities during Operation Allied Force. Among those who portray NATO’s 
information campaign based on practical experiences working within its PI function are 
Alastair Campbell (1999), who was Prime Minister Blair’s Press Secretary and was sent 
to NATO headquarters to bolster its Office of Press and Information; Director of that 
office Jamie Shea (2001); and Steven Collins (2000a; 2000b), a US Lt.Col. with 
extensive NATO PsyOps experience. Three scholars, Rhiannon Vickers (2000),
Kristina Riegert (2002) and Brown (2003a; 2003c), have similarly elaborated on this 
concern with reference to NATO sources. They address a number of features that are 
central also in this thesis, for instance the vital importance of public support, credibility 
and coordination.
Beyond mere PI activities, NATO applied a broader scope of communication assets -  
such as Information Operations and PsyOps (see 2.2.1 and 2.2.4) -  in the three relevant 
cases. Their use has also been presented in the academic literature. Three authors who 
were actively engaged in NATO’s Information Operations in IFOR are US Col. Allard 
(1996; 1997) who addresses general issues facing the implementation of such activities 
at division level; Collins (1999) who presents the general PsyOps endeavour; and 
Jacobsen (1997) who exemplifies how IFOR PsyOps operated at his tactical level with 
the US Armored Division. In the same vein but out of scope in terms o f cases, Dearth 
(2000a: 158-9) presents how PsyOps, civil affairs, media campaigns and political 
intervention was applied in an effort to achieve SFOR’s mission objectives. Based
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primarily on NATO sources, Taylor (2002) also mentions some of KFOR’s PsyOps 
activities. Collins (2000a) and Dixon (2003) assess NATO’s use of PsyOps during 
Operation Allied Force. Thomas (2000) and Armistead (2004: 201-07) from the US 
Joint Staff College assess the broader information operations in the same campaign. 
Moreover, a US Department of State employee, Kiehl (2001), as well as Lindley (2004), 
present several examples from the UN and NATO’s general information campaign in 
the Balkans. The two latter are not academic studies, however, but advocacies for 
strengthening the Information Operations capability in the US and the UN.
Thus, other studies exist that based on NATO sources and firsthand experiences 
elaborate on how NATO conducts information campaigns. These and the literature 
mentioned in the previous section have been instructive throughout the present study in 
formulating hypotheses. Their positions when corresponding or diverging from those 
made here are presented in footnotes.
Related research
Other scholars have used different methodological approaches to explore concerns 
related to the empirical topic o f this thesis. A primary difference is that they do not rely 
on NATO sources. Instead, many explore how the media portrayed NATO’s activities 
in the Balkans. Most attention has been devoted to Operation Allied Force, while media 
representations of IFOR and of KFOR 1 and 5 are yet to be surveyed.
A high-profiled example is Noam Chomsky’s (1999: 79) linguistic approach to undercut 
the media’s portrayal of Operation Allied Force as a humanitarian intervention: ‘“the 
new interventionism” is simply “the old interventionism”.’ In the same spirit more than 
20 authors have gathered in Degraded capability: the media and the Kosovo crisis 
edited by Hammond and Herman (2000) to cast a critical light on NATO’s and its
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member states’ media relations during the same air camping. Using media content 
analysis, Herman and Peterson (2000: 120), for example, argue that CNN ‘served as 
Nato’s de facto public information arm’. Goff (1999a) collects reflections on the media 
coverage of the air campaign from more than 70 journalists and scholars. Other studies 
of Western media’s portrayal of Operation Allied Force appear in a 2000-issue of the 
European Journal o f  Communication .61
Summing up, scholarly literature on this thesis’ specific empirical question is scarce. 
What exists has informed the present research and those studies that remain relevant to 
this final version appear throughout the text wherever it is deemed appropriate.
1.5.2 The general empirical interest
As mentioned on the very first pages, the thesis’ specific empirical question is 
embedded in a broader academic concern about how Western political authorities in the 
field of international affairs use the media as a means of power in politics and war. It is 
with ambiguity that I now cast the net wider in this review. Doing so is useful because it 
positions the thesis vis-a-vis existing scholarship on the general empirical interest and 
shows how the present findings may contribute to this field of inquiry. My reservations 
derive from the immense task of presenting the extensive literature in the field, 
compared to the time available to finalise this study.
Balancing these considerations, it is deemed prudent to present only studies that I have 
come across, sketching out how they have approached the area of concern by
61 Volume 15 number 3, the title of this special issue is ‘The media and the Kosovo conflict’. On the 
same topic see also Nohrstedt et al. (2002), Ottosen (2002), and Riegert (2003).
75
highlighting some of their common concerns and concepts and by identifying the main 
authors they refer to. Thus, this review makes no pretension of being exhaustive. In 
addition, the particular contributions of the authors mentioned are not given justice in 
this brief review. They are grouped in bulks to remain at a general level and to reserve 
space for the primary purposes of this thesis.
With these cautious remarks in mind, the review suggests that while academic work on 
the general topic is vast, it largely examines the issues and dynamics at a general level. 
Relatively limited scholarly attention has been directed to the question the present thesis 
engages with: how actors actually use the media as a means of power in the conduct of 
war and foreign policy. Moreover, with a few exceptions the literature offers few 
analytical tools to conceptualise and study the dynamic processes involved in this field 
of inquiry.
Extensive literature exists on the interface between the media and political authorities. 
Much of it approaches the issues either from the media’s side of the interface (eg 
Hudson and Stainer 1999; McLaughlin 2002; Knightly 2003) or from a more general 
perspective (eg McLuhan 2001; Briggs and Burke 2002). The interest of this review is 
different. It aims to sketch out research on how governments deal with the media.
Governments have at their disposal a variety of means to communicate with their 
audiences. These they use, among other things, to define what international affairs is all 
about, how particular events should be understood, and to mobilise support for the 
government’s official policy line. Former US peace broker in the Balkans and 
ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, makes the point. Joining the debate about a 
politic US’ grand strategic response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, he 
claims:
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Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological ware, or -  if 
you really want to be blunt -  propaganda. But whatever it is called, 
defining what this war is really about in the minds of the 1 billon Muslims 
in the world will be of decisive and historical importance.62
To conceptualise such activities John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt from the RAND 
corporation have proposed the term Noopolitik. This is another relatively well- 
established term in the academic debate and has profiled itself in opposition to 
Realpolitik which is commonly acknowledged to have dominated the Cold War period. 
Where the latter’s primary concern was whose armed forces would win, to put it simply, 
‘noopolitik may ultimately be about whose story wins’ (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999:
53). Noopolitik aims to influence, or to shape, the noosphere, described as a ‘global- 
girdling realm of the mind’, by means of ideas, values, and norms.63
The major advantage of the concept noopolitik is that, like soft power (see 1.4.2), both 
communicate well to lay audiences. One of their disadvantages is that they are loosely 
defined terms that tend to ignore existing scholarship on how governments have used 
and use the media as a means of power, and present the concern as novel. This is far 
from the case.
In order to convey how the literature has treated this general issue it is useful to apply 
Brown’s (2003b) categorisation of governments’ ‘communications armoury’ as they
62 Holbrooke cited in Van Ham (2003: 427). The statement figured in The Washington Post on 28 
October 2001.
63 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999: 4). They define noosphere as encompassing ‘cyberspace and the 
infosphere and has its own technological, organizational, and ideational levels. It relates to an 
organizational theme that has constantly figured in our own work about the information revolution: the 
rise of network forms of organization that strengthen civil-society actors’ (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999: 
14).
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unfold in different professions: the military, the diplomatic and the political 
establishments. This is not to suggest that scholars necessarily study information 
activities within one or the other profession. Still, the division along professions 
provides a useful starting point to approach the general concern, and research tends to 
analyse and explore it with distinctive concepts in each realm. The outline that follows 
will treat scholarship in the military realm more extensively -  not repeating the 
contributions from already mentioned authors -  while the overviews of the diplomatic 
and political spheres are mere sketches. We shall commence with the military 
establishment.
The military establishment’s media relations
A major part of the early literature on how armed forces dealt with the media examines 
policies and practices, notably with respect to the US and Britain. Badsey (2000a) is an 
edited volume addressing challenges in the military-media interface in the late 1990s. 
Prior to that the Glasgow University Media Group has made important contributions to 
the field on British media policy during the Falklands’ war (eg Broadbent et al. 1985). 
Magnusson (1996) and, more interestingly, Thrall (2000) present how US armed forces’ 
press policies have been applied in different wars since Vietnam, Siegel (1996) since 
Grenada, while Katz (1992) and Taylor (1992) focus on the 1991 Gulf War. A common 
issue in these works is the tension between military censorship and many publics’ 
constitutional right to be informed about their government’s undertakings. Few studies 
explore the empirical concern from the perspective of this thesis, however, which is
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how military press and information officers actually operated -  although exceptions 
exist.64
Military press and information activities form part of a broader academic concern about 
the role information plays in armed conflicts. This involves both technological and 
perceptional aspects. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999: x) propose that we conceive these 
aspects as two poles -  ‘opposite ends of a spectrum of security concerns’ -  around 
which information strategies in conflict and war emerge.
In the first years after the end of the 1991 Gulf War, analytical work primarily evolved 
around the technical pole. These technically biased studies explored ways to achieve 
information dominance over the enemy in a conventional battle in order to increase the 
enemy’s ‘fog of war’, while reducing one’s own level of uncertainty. Such studies often 
conceived information as data not as social communication, which is what PI deals 
with.65
64 Thompson (1966) and Hughes (1992) are cases in point.
65 Particularly in the US, civilian and military research communities such as the RAND corporation, the 
Joint Forces Staff College, and the National Defence University generated a host o f competing coinages, 
such as information warfare, cyber war, information operation, etc. These terms were used to explore and 
conceptualise the development of computer-based surveillance and guiding technologies, and refinements 
of command and control warfare which was ascribed a major role in the overwhelming Allied military 
victory over Iraq in 1991. It inspired many in these analytical communities when the Tofflers (1993) 
argued that Western society was moving from an industrial to an information age, in which information 
and communication technology was becoming vitally important to sustain the civilian and governmental 
infrastructure o f a nation. Information technology came to be seen as an increasingly important means 
and target in war (see Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1993, 1997; Libicki 1995, 1996, 1998). Schwartau (1994) 
and Adams (1998) outline popularised scenarios of how such wars may unfold. More academic accounts 
are the two first in a series o f three volumes edited by Campen et al. (1996; 1998) which gather 
contributions from many of the key authors on the issues. Other analytical contributions are found in the 
works of Alberts (1996), Waltz (1998), Denning (1999), and the reports o f respectively Molander et al. 
(1996; 1998), Stein and Szafranski (1996), and Khalilzad et al. (1999). In addition, the debate involves a 
host o f articles, including those of Berkowitz (1995; 2000), Devost et al. (1997), Bosch (2000), Thayer 
(2000), and Rawnsley (2005).
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Hence, in the context of this thesis, it is clearly the perceptional pole that is the most 
relevant, which is why more technically biased studies will not be presented any further 
here. The perceptional pole refers to a variety of endeavours -  in the span between 
propaganda and press and information activities -  applied to influence the hearts and 
minds of people, its ultimate aim being to protect one’s own and undermine the enemy’s 
will to fight. While it is controversial, indeed, in the practice of PI to group this function 
among the broad scope of apparently related activities, this is not the case in the 
academic literature.
A commonly addressed issue is the politically delicate co-ordination between PI and 
PsyOps (see 2.2.1, 2.2.4 and footnote 53). The latter is an old and well-established 
military measure that aims to influence the perceptions of others. It can be applied at the 
tactical level against enemy forces on the battlefield, for example, or at the strategic 
level where it interacts with the political realm. The major part of the academic 
literature explores the latter level and often refers to it as propaganda (see 1.3).
A full account of this field is beyond the present purpose. But at the level of 
implementation, Thompson (1966) is particularly interesting due to his key role in 
Britain’s PsyOps campaign during the Malayan Emergency, generally considered to be 
one of the most successful hearts and minds campaigns in recent history. At a more 
general level, Carruthers (1995) describes this and three other hearts and minds 
campaigns in British colonies from 1944-60. With clear parallels to these campaigns, 
several scholars have examined the UN’s use of information to achieve its objectives in 
a number of its 1990s peacekeeping missions. This includes Lehmann (1995; 1999), 
who for several years worked with UN press and information activities in peacekeeping 
operations in the field and from the Secretariat in New York. Heininger (1994),
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Maureen Taylor (2000), Curtis (2000), Wimhurst (2002), and Thompson and Price
(2003) study the same UN function.
Since the mid-1990s scholars have stressed that innovations in information and 
communication technology create new opportunities to influence the perceptions of 
other people (see footnote 7). A term that has gained currency in this debate is 
perception management.66 Its role in international conflict is elaborated on by, among 
others, Dearth (2000a) and Driscoll (2000). The latter is a psychologist working with 
intelligence-related matters in the British Ministry of Defence. Col. Williamson (2000), 
who had a life-long career with the US Air Force and worked among others at 
Pentagon, presents perception management as a tool that may be applied to a variety of 
target audiences including allies in order to promote the national interest. As defined by 
the US armed forces perception management bears clear resemblance to PsyOps, 
although the former involves a broader scope of government agencies.
The literature on perception management partly emerges from and has merged with the 
study of technological aspects of information in armed conflicts.67 While the early 
1990s technology-dominated studies focused on the role of information in the conduct 
of operations during war, later studies have embraced more long-term strategies that 
includes crisis and even periods of peace and involves cooperation with civilian
66 The US Armed Forces’ Dictionary o f Military Terms defines perception management as: ‘Actions to 
convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, 
motives and objective reasoning; and to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official 
estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator’s 
objective’ (cited in Dearth 2000a: 153). Scholars that study along this notion include, in addition to those 
mentioned in the body text, Denning (1999: 101-123), Collins (2000a; 2000b), Brown (2002b), Nincic
(2003), and Armistead (2004).
67 See, for example, Baumard (1996), Kuehl (1996), Nye and Owens (1996: 23-28), Petersen (1996), 
Denning (1999), Campen and Dearth (2000), Der Derian (2001), and Taylor (2002).
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counterparts. Information Operations has emerged as a term to describe such 
endeavours and as a name of the function within NATO responsible for conducting such 
tasks.68
Hence, much research exist on the military establishment’s media relations. Scholars 
often refer to these efforts with terms like propaganda, censorship, and more recently 
perception management and information operations. The vast majority of these studies 
have addressed general political and conceptual issues, while few have explored how 
those policies and concepts are actually implemented.
The diplomatic establishment’s media relations
In the diplomatic realm, the communication activities that deal with the media is often 
called public diplomacy. Apparently the term was introduced in the early 1960s by 
Edward Murrow, Director of US Information Agency (Leonard et al. 2002: 1; Brown 
2004: 15). While it has been used to describe numerous activities between governments 
and between people, Manheim (1994) reserves the term for govemment-to-people 
contact. In the same vein, the US State Department defines public diplomacy as 
‘government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in 
other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural
68 A milestone in this process is the publication o f the US Armed Forces’ Joint Doctrine on Information 
Operations in 1998. A forerunner is found in the US Army Field Manual 100-6 1996. In the academic 
literature the term has been embraced by Rathmell (2000), Siegel (1998), Price (2000), Thomas (2000), 
Brown (2002b), and Armistead (2004). Thomas (1997; 1998) and Herd (2000; 2002) add a Russian 
dimension to this topic, while McKinney (2002) and Lindley (2004) elaborate on information operations 
in a UN context.
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exchanges, radio and television’.69 While its purpose compares to that of the NATO PI 
function, its means of communication are different. Public diplomacy partly owns its 
channels of communications with the public, notably the broadcasting media. PI does 
not. In this sense, public diplomacy compares to military PsyOps.
Hitchcock (1988), among others, points to early post-WW II activities in the field of 
information that served public diplomacy purposes. Taylor (2003: 256-62) tags 
Hollywood’s role in this endeavour as a ‘Marshall plan of ideas’ that aimed to 
homogenise global values along American standards. It included Fulbright programmes 
to win the understanding of future leaders, and radio-stations, as the Voice of America, 
to disseminate US policy and biased coverage of current events.
According to Lord (1998), public diplomacy, as a political tool and as an academic 
concern, has had its ebbs and flows. It formed part of a psychological war against 
communist governments up until the Hungarian uprising and again during the Reagan 
administration’s ideological attacks on the Soviet Union.70 In between and since the late 
1980s, public diplomacy received less political and financial support (Laquer 1994). 11 
September 2001 changed this. The potentials of public diplomacy, compared to military 
force, as a means to combat terrorism gained new political and academic interest.71
At least since 1956, with the failed Hungarian revolt, a political divergence has existed 
in the US between those favouring public diplomacy as an instrument to promote
69 US Department of State’s Dictionary o f International Relations Terms (cited in Edelstein and Krebs 
2005: 101).
70 On the early endeavours see Soley (1989), Parry Giles (1996), and Nelson and Walesa (1997).
71 See, for example, Leonard et al. (2002: 2), Peterson (2002), Ross (2002), Brown (2003b), Snow
(2004), Van Ham (2003), Nelles (2004), and Edelstein and Krebs (2005).
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specific foreign policy objectives, and those who see it as a more long-term endeavour 
to promote national interests abroad by creating a favourable image of the US (Lord 
1998; Smyth 2001). Such differences appear less pertinent now. Brown (2004) and 
Vickers (2004) argue that a ‘new public diplomacy’ has emerged that tends to blur 
distinctions between traditional public diplomacy endeavours and spin, between 
international and domestic information activities, and between public and traditional 
diplomacy.
This account suggests that scholarship on public diplomacy largely explores the 
conceptual and political levels and use examples from actual undertakings primarily to 
sustain their broader claims. Although some authors, such as Lord (1998) and Snow
(2004), have worked as public diplomacy employees, and Hitchcock (1988) as 
Associated Director of the US Information Agency, I have not come across studies that 
scrutinise the actual practice of public diplomacy at the level of implementation.
The political establishment’s media relations
Finally, we shall see how some research has addressed the way politicians deal with the 
media. Since the First World War social scientists became increasingly interested in the 
role the media could play in political leaders’ relations to their electorates. Their field of 
inquiry was often referred to as propaganda (see 1.3), ‘political communication’ 
(Chaffee and Hochheimer 1982), ‘news management’ (Cook 1998), or ‘spin’ (Maltese 
1992).
The term spin is often exemplified with explicit reference to President Clinton’s and 
Prime Minister Blair’s respective media relations (Jones 1995; Kurtz 1998). Brown 
(2003a: 156) describes spin as ‘the process by which [political] agents struggle to define 
the meaning of reality for others’. It is different from earlier forms of political
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communication because societal and technological changes have given the media an 
increasingly important role in the relation between political leaders and their national 
and, more recently, international target audiences.72
With respect to this thesis, few have shed light on how governments conducted spin in 
relation to IFOR and KFOR although illustrative examples can be found in Jones (1999: 
294-5, 301-12) and Smith (2005: 392). More lengthy studies exist on how NATO’s 
member states used spin during the Kosovo air campaign in 1999. Because these 
endeavours were closely connected to the military PI activity they have already been 
presented (see footnote 30). The importance many scholars attach to such activities is 
captured by Ignatieff s (2000: 196) statement that ‘Virtual war is won by being spun’.
In sum, this review has given a general, but far from complete, description of the 
academic literature on how the media has been used to promote aims of policy by 
respectively the military, the diplomatic and the political communities. It shows that 
while these concerns are not new, contemporary scholars also argue that technological, 
political and societal developments have altered the role and implications of press and 
information activities in international affairs. This suggests that earlier studies may not 
be fully useful to understand the role of information as a means of power in 
contemporary international affairs.
In addition, the review has placed the present thesis in a broader context, which 
suggests that the study’s methodological approach to investigate how PI is actually 
practised is different from most other studies. Hence, it may therefore be o f value also
72 Hitchcock (1988), Rosenau (1990), Gowing (2000b), Vickers (2004: 183-84), and Shaw (2000a).
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beyond the particular empirical topic. While the review does not comprise all relevant 
literature, it indicates that previous research has largely focused on general dynamics 
and political and conceptual issues. With a few exceptions, mentioned above, I am not 
aware of other studies that systematically uncover the mode of operations that have 
informed and the techniques that have been used in the military, diplomatic or political 
establishments’ public relations activities to influence actors in the international realm.
Moreover, it seems that also the theoretical concern of this thesis has received little 
scholarly attention (see 1.4.2 and 1.5.3). While controversies exist as to how the media 
influences international politics, it is generally accepted that the media can influence 
politics and war (see CNN effect footnote 9). Many of the above-mentioned scholars 
would subscribe to Nye’s (1999: 22) claim that ‘an information revolution has 
transformed the nature of power’. Hence, power constitutes a cardinal assumption in 
this broad empirical area of concern. Nevertheless, only few scholars have analysed this 
assumption in a theoretical sense. Those who have will now be introduced.
1.5.3 The three notions o f power
The theoretical part of this thesis holds that Dahl’s and Foucault’s theoretical works can 
conceptualise different forms of power PI may have exercised. The utility of Lukes’ 
notion of power to this end is also considered but declined. Interestingly, the literature 
has barely applied these cardinal notions of power to the broad empirical concern of this 
study, although exceptions exist.
Dahl’s notion of power is explicitly mentioned by Nye (1990: 26; 2004: 2) as a 
theoretical basis for his term hard power that stands in contrast to his key concept soft 
power (see 1.4.2 ). Others, it may be argued, implicitly draw from Dahl when they 
along similar lines of reasoning explain how coercive measures are different from
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information as a means of power.73 Armistead (2004: 10), for instance, paraphrases 
Dahl when he defines power as ‘the ability of A to get B to do something that B  would 
not otherwise do’ (italics added). By remaining confined to this understanding of power, 
however, the present study would suggest that these scholars prevent themselves from 
discovering other more important modes of influence inherent in information activities. 
Although these authors refer to Dahl’s concept, they do not exploit its potentials to 
clarify in an elaborate theoretical sense how information may be used by political 
leaders, foreign offices or armed forces as a means of compulsion in international 
affairs. The present research aims to do that.
I am not aware of studies that explicitly explore the theoretical utility, or indeed 
validity, of Lukes’ notion of power on our broad empirical concern. Arguably his notion 
forms part of soft power (see 1.4.2) and also underpins much of the above mentioned 
literature that conceive press relations, perception management, public diplomacy, spin 
and related terms, as manipulation of other people’s minds.74 From Lukes’ theoretical 
perspective such governmental communication endeavours tend to come across as 
dishonourable and illegitimate. The epistemological and ethical assumptions upon 
which such views are based are questioned when this study attempts to apply Lukes’ 
notion in an actual analysis.
73 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999: 27-32,47), Herd (2000: 77), Leonard (2002: 4), and Vickers (2004: 184) 
are cases in point.
74 In broad sweeping terms this includes Koppes and Black (1987), Herman and Chomsky (1988), Jowett 
and O’Donnell (1999), Pratkanis and Aronson (1992), Jacobsen (1993), Kurtz (1998), Bernhard (1999), 
Chomsky (1999), Pinsdorf (1999), and several authors in the anthology edited by Hammond and Herman 
(2000), Nohrstedt et al. (2000), Herd (2002), Nelles (2004), Altheide and Grimes (2005), and Western 
(2005). See also 1.3 and 1.5.1.
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Some scholars have applied Foucault’s notion of power to explain how the media 
influences the international realm. Generally, these studies examine global normative 
structures arguing that they create relations of domination and define what is to be 
conceived legitimate and illegitimate international practice.75 Others who apply 
Foucault’s theoretical perspective enter the theoretical concern from the perspective of 
actors, but they do not use it to explore how an actor practices information activities to 
exert power in the realm of international affairs.76
Milliken (1999) has criticised discursive studies in International Relations on this 
particular point. In an article widely noticed among scholars in this field she encourages 
research to move beyond this structural focus. She maps out unexplored potentials in 
the discursive approach and specifically calls for studies at the level of implementation. 
In other words, rather than continue to identify and examine the implications of 
normative structures, ie o f ‘common sense’ as it exists in international life, research 
should scrutinise how such structures are produced (Milliken 1999: 238). With a direct 
reference to Foucault she argues: ‘Analysing how policies are implemented (and not 
just formulated) means studying the operationalization of discursive categories in the 
activities of governments and international organizations . . .  Discourse studies which 
include the implementation of policy practices can . . .  expose readers to the “micro­
physics of power” in International Relations’ (Milliken 1999: 241). The present thesis 
purports to do this.
75 For example, Gray (1997), Luke and Otuathail (1997: 724), Lamer and Walters (2004), Lipschutz’s
(2005), and Zanotti (2005).
76 Sending and Neumann (2006), for example, examine how evidence of govemmentality in world 
politics can be found in new forms of cooperation between governments and NGOs. They do not examine 
how these actors actually manoeuvred to pursue their ends.
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This review finds that only few scholars have explored the utility of Dahl’s, Lukes’ and 
Foucault’s respective notions of power to enhance the theoretical understanding of the 
kinds of influence actors exert, or rather assume they exert, when they use the media to 
influence international affairs. Further, the scholars, who do apply these concepts, do so 
in a more general manner, than does this study.
In addition, to the best of my knowledge few studies have presented other analytical or 
conceptual frameworks that allow us to understand the dynamic processes assumed in 
the general empirical area of interest (see 1.4.2). That this observation may characterise 
the general field is suggested by Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s (1999: 3) call for a concept of 
power that can be used ‘as a basis for information strategy’ and to deal with a variety of 
information activities ‘as a coherent whole’.77 They offer their elaborations on soft 
power in the context of noopolitik as a contribution to this end. This thesis holds that the 
respective notions of Dahl and Foucault are more useful in this respect.
Having stipulated the present empirical and theoretical questions, clarified how these 
are situated in the interface between the phenomena of war, power, and the media, and 
presented how the questions have received relatively scarce attention in the academic 
literature, we can now embark on the arguments.
77 Driscoll (2000: 171) and Brown (2004; 2005) point to the same shortcoming in the literature.
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Chapter 2
NATO P ress  and Information activities in the 
Balkans
This chapter addresses the thesis’ empirical question. It examines how, and for what 
purposes, NATO has used its PI function in its peace support operations in the Balkans 
(for methodological considerations, see 1.4.1). It shall be argued that the alliance used 
PI as a means of power to achieve NATO’s political and military objectives.
First, the practice of PI is demonstrated (see 2.1) before the operational framework (see 
2.2), the goals (see 2.2.1), and intentions (see 2.2.2) that guided P i’s mode of operation 
are presented. Then the chapter explicates P i’s mode of operation to promote a few 
messages to relevant audiences through the media (see 2.2.3); to co-ordinate NATO 
assets that explicitly or implicitly disseminated messages in order to achieve a unity of 
effort (see 2.2.4); and to maintain credible relations with the media (see 2.2.5). It is only 
when these findings are analysed from the perspective of the three notions of power (see 
3), however, that the utility of PI as means to influence the field of international affairs 
may be fully appreciated.
Before addressing these issues it necessary to sketch out the context in which the PI 
activities were conducted. For this reason, the section below will give a general account 
of the political background and objectives of the relevant military missions.
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The IFOR and KFOR missions
The PI campaigns were conducted as part of NATO’s peace support operations within 
broader internationally endorsed peace and reconciliation efforts under the auspices of 
the UN. The NATO PI function aimed to support the alliance’s strategic goals and to 
help the force commanders achieve their missions.
In Bosnia, the international community transferred the authority of the international 
military presence from UNPROFOR to IFOR on 20 December 1995. NATO provided 
the core of this force’s 60,000 troops and led the operation that lasted a year until SFOR 
took over the responsibility. IFOR’s presence and mandate in Bosnia was based on the 
Dayton Peace Accord signed by the former warring parties and representatives of the 
international community on 10 November 1995.78 The military mission’s legality and 
international legitimacy is supported by the UN Security Council resolution 1031 of 15 
December the same year. IFOR formed part of a larger international endeavour to 
oversee the implementation of this peace agreement, and cooperated primarily with the 
UN, the OSCE, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to 
this end.79 The international community’s overall political goal was and remains a 
Bosnia that is peaceful, democratic and integrated into Euro-Atlantic political structures, 
but IFOR’s immediate objectives were to bring the hostilities to an end and separate the 
warring factions (UN Security Council resolution 1031; NATO 2000). In this broad
78 Legally, it is more correct to refer to the General Framework Agreement for Peace signed in Paris on 
14 December (see, for instance, UN Security Council resolution 1031). Nonetheless, in order to facilitate 
reading this study shall refer to it as the Dayton Peace Accord, since it is by this term this Bosnian 
political settlement is known in public parlance.
79 On further details of IFOR PI political and legal context see Wentz (1997b: 9-34), Siegel (1998: 9-34), 
and Thompson and De Luce (2002).
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context, the number of PI billets allocated to IFOR’s own staff was less than 200. In 
addition, some national contingents brought their own PIOs.
On 12 June 1999, KFOR entered the Serbian province of Kosovo, after the conclusion 
of NATO’s air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter simply 
Yugoslavia or Serbia). KFOR’s presence was based on the Military Technical 
Agreement between Yugoslav and NATO Commanders on 9 June and UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 the following day. NATO provided the major part of the 
46,000 KFOR troops and was in charge of the mission. KFOR formed part of a broader 
international reconciliation effort led by the UN and tasked to facilitate a process that is 
to determine Kosovo’s political future -  basically how politically independent the 
province shall be vis-a-vis Yugoslavia. Until that is settled, KFOR’s primary objective 
is to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo (UN Security Council 
resolution 1244).80 In 2001, KFOR PI staff amounted to approximately 100 (Idsoe 
18/2/2004).
IFOR and KFOR are thus NATO’s primary means to contribute to the accomplishment 
of international goals in Bosnia and Kosovo respectively. These military missions are 
under the command of a force commander. IFOR’s Force Commander (COMIFOR) 
was first the American Admiral Leighton Smith and later Admiral Lopez. The Force 
Commander in the first KFOR mission (COMKFOR 1) was the British General 
Jackson, while the Norwegian Lieutenant General Torstein Skiaker held the position as 
COMKFOR 5.
80 On the legal and inter-organisational context o f KFOR PI activities see Mertus and Thompson (2002).
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To carry out their tasks force commanders have a variety of functions. Generally, the 
most important military functions are seen to be the land, air and sea operations.81 In 
addition, they possess a broad variety of assets, including PI. The subsequent six 
illustrative cases aim to demonstrate how NATO used PI in the Balkans. These will 
serve as a source of empirical examples used for analytical purposes in the remainder of 
the study.
2.1 Six illustrative cases
The presentation commences with two cases from IFOR -  one is IFOR’s general PI 
mission, the other is a specific PI campaign in the run-up to Bosnia’s national elections. 
Then follow two PI undertakings during KFOR 1. The first occurs during a chaotic 
entry phase, the second is a measure to deter Serbia and reassure Kosovars. Finally, two 
cases from KFOR 5 show how PI was used respectively to facilitate Serbia’s peaceful 
re-entry into the Presevo valley and to convince Macedonia’s public that KFOR allowed 
no armed groups to enter their country.
It follows from the cases that PI operated in a common operational framework and 
applied similar methods to achieve their objectives. This common mode of operation is 
explored afterwards. At the cost of slowing the flow of the presentation initially but 
with the benefit of clarifying points made and reducing repetitions at a later stage,
81 In this thesis, these assets will be referred to by the common term Operations. This is spelled with 
initial capital to indicate that it is the appellation of a military function and not to be confused with the 
more common use o f the term referring to an activity. Following the same logic, all other NATO 
functions, for instance PsyOps, and job titles, for instance Political Advisor, will have initial capitals.
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reference is made in the text to relevant issues that are elaborated on below. We can 
now embark on the first case.
2.1.1 Case 1: IFOR -  The PI mission
According to Van Dyke, who was IFOR’s CPIO, this NATO missions’ operational plan 
(see 2.2) to influence the Bosnian peace process was divided into five phases:
1. Preparation.
2. Entry.
3. Implementation.
4. Transition to peace.
5. Exit.
The PI plan was synchronised to these phases and aimed at reinforcing the desired force 
posture in each of them (Van Dyke 2003: 17). For instance, in the initial preparatory 
phase NATO was concerned that the populations of all member states should favour 
IFOR’s deployment to Bosnia. Since this was meant to be a NATO-led coalition force 
and since NATO’s decisionmaking process is based on consensus, it was of crucial 
importance to ensure that all allied governments supported the operation. Otherwise, 
NATO would be unable to lead IFOR.
Early in the planning, IFOR PI therefore identified states where public support could 
not be taken for granted. Van Dyke recalls, for instance, that in late 1995 ‘many people 
in the US didn’t see what was in the national interest of the US to deploy’ (Van Dyke 
13/4/2004).82 So PI considered how they could contribute to the US public’s
82 Sobel (1998) disagrees on this point, arguing that it was the media, not the US public, that was 
generally reluctant to deploy US troops to Bosnia. He points to opinion polls suggesting that the 
American people approved President Clinton’s policy to send troops to IFOR. This concern is directly
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understanding o f its administration’s Bosnia policy.83 Much more controversial,
however, was Germany’s deployment to IFOR. The country had not engaged its
military forces abroad since WWII:
So the political leaders in Germany with the help of NATO had to inform 
the German citizens of what that mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
about and how the German nation would contribute. And hopefully make 
them understand, which would then result in support and cooperation 
(Van Dyke 13/4/2004).
The reluctance of some NATO member governments to deploy troops derived from fear
that they might become a party in the conflict.
So they wanted to portray us as a peaceful force. We are helpers. We are 
not the enemy. We are not an occupation force. We are leaders in that we 
have a leading part in this operation. We are helping them reconstructing 
their nation but only helping. We are not rebuilding the nation for them 
(Van Dyke 13/4/2004).
With this political guidance COMIFOR entered the second phase, that is, the 
deployment phase. He did not want to use physical force unless absolutely necessary. 
Rather, he wanted to deter violence by demonstrating IFOR’s military capabilities and 
his willingness to use them if need be to ensure the provision of the Dayton Peace 
Accord. So COMIFOR set out to shape the operational environment, among other 
things, by making the Bosnian population as receptive to IFOR as possible. He wanted
connected to Western governments’ alleged sensitivity to a so-called Vietnam syndrome and to safeguard 
that they have the political support of their electorates to conduct military campaigns to a successful end- 
state (see footnote 4).
83 Strobel (1997: 214-16) describes President Clinton’s general efforts to mobilise public support for this 
issue.
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to reduce the risk that the warring parties or the local population should challenge IFOR 
based on misunderstandings of the latter’s intentions and mission.
To this end, Dayton was cardinal. This peace agreement formed an ethical and political 
framework for Bosnia’s reconstruction and assigned legal roles to international 
organisations such as NATO. It was only when the agreement was properly understood 
by the people concerned, however, that international bodies could use it as a point of 
reference to achieve people’s cooperation and compliance (Van Dyke 13/4/2004). 
COMIFOR did not leave it to the various Bosnian parties to inform others about their 
achievements at Dayton but made it a task for his PI function. He used PI as a 
pedagogical tool in an overall strategy with the specific goal to make good relations 
with the public. ‘We had to inform them [the local population] about who IFOR was 
and what the peace agreement was all about, so we would teach them by 
communicating through the news media to the publics’ (Van Dyke 30/3/04). Thus, PI 
spelled out that Balkan’s political leaders had given NATO the task of ensuring the 
implementation of the military provisions of the agreement, by which, for example, 
certain types of weapons had to be put into NATO-supervised storage. Moreover, 
within the first days of the second phase, PI had the agreement translated into the local 
languages and distributed throughout Bosnia (Van Dyke 13/4/2004).
Further, as a measure of deterrence COMIFOR wanted the parties to perceive the 
incoming troops as extra-ordinarily forceful compared to the previous international 
military presence in the country -  UNPROFOR. This UN peacekeeping force had a 
reputation of being weak and inefficient, ‘so we had to do things that turned that around
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to show that NATO was a different force, it was the right force for the future, and for 
that kind of operation’ (Van Dyke 30/3/04).84
Although the war had reached a diplomatic end when IFOR deployed, peace had not 
returned to Bosnia. Criminal and violent acts were still committed by all parties. So 
during the entry phase, IFOR did a variety of things ‘to ensure compliance’ with the 
Dayton Peace Accord as stipulated in the UN Security Council resolution 1031 (see 2). 
PI used these opportunities to convince the parties that IFOR was an overwhelming 
force. This included dividing the former warring factions, disarming them, dismantling 
checkpoints to provide freedom of movement, and a broad range of other activities that 
aimed to send the message that IFOR was different from UNPROFOR (Van Dyke 
17/3/04).
At this early stage PI was basically trying to multiply the effect of Operations’
undertakings by exposing them in the media. It did not posses the detailed Pi-planning
that characterised later undertakings. The destruction of checkpoint Sierra is a case in
point. As Van Dyke (30/3/04) explains:
We realised checkpoint Sierra was a problem and within a day or two we 
realised that we needed to knock this down; and let’s invite the journalist 
to come and cover it. So this was not a long-range plan. It was one o f the 
fairly spontaneous things that we did to demonstrate IFOR’s capability.
This is not to suggest that the PI effort was arbitrary. It is to stress, however, that it was 
not yet formalised. The CPIO had, in his own words, ‘a fairly good idea’ about what PI 
should do. Prior to deployment he and COMIFOR had identified certain symbols of
84 Avruch et al. (1999: 43) make the same point.
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power that the former warring parties had used to incite conflict such as politically 
controlled media, police forces, checkpoints, etc. Allegedly, it was a dream of many a 
Bosnian Serb boy to get a checkpoint. IFOR wanted to eliminate such symbols o f war 
and replace them with symbols of peace to show people that the conflict was a past 
stage and that now they could rebuild their country.
PI addressed the problem of politically controlled journalists by opening IFOR PICs 
around the country, and by bringing in journalists to workshops teaching them Western 
style journalism. The International Police Task Force trained the local police forces in 
the conduct of democratic policing. By bulldozering checkpoints IFOR troops showed 
in actual practice, on the ground, that the general public now enjoyed freedom of 
movement. The task of PI in all this was primarily to expose this multitude of 
endeavours in the media, to reinforce their impact beyond those directly experiencing 
IFOR’s activities (Van Dyke 30/3/04). As IFOR gained de facto control in Bosnia the 
entry phase reached its end.
The next phase -  the implementation phase -  addressed the provisions of the long-term 
elements in the peace agreement. That is, the establishment of peaceful and democratic 
political institutions. This was a civilian rather than a military task. IFOR’s role was to 
prevent violent groups from undermining this democratic process, while the 
responsibility of international civilian agencies was to assist Bosnians in building their 
own democratic structures. Consequently, the Office of the High Representative, the 
UN and the OSCE took charge of the overall responsibility for the international effort to 
bring peace to Bosnia. PI sought to convey this strategic change by directing the 
media’s attention to the civilian agencies and by toning down IFOR’s role in the peace 
process.
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In practice, this was reflected, to take one example, in the conduct of the daily press 
briefings. Since the very early stage PI proposed that the major international 
organisations should hold common briefings to signal broad unity in the peacebuilding 
effort. The organisations agreed. Initially, IFOR hosted and chaired these meetings with 
the press. As they entered this third phase the civilian organisations took the chair, 
conveying the subliminal message that now the civilian reconstruction was in focus and 
that from now on they were spearheading the international effort in Bosnia. IFOR’s 
spokesperson consequently took a subordinate role (Van Dyke 17/3/04).
Thus, the PI campaign targeted three audiences -  NATO’s publics, the Bosnian 
population and the warring parties -  with three overall objectives. First, PI should use 
IFOR as a show case to make the international publics appreciate that NATO had 
adapted to the new security context emerging after the end of the Cold War. Quoting 
NATO’s planning documents, Van Dyke (2003: 18) holds that PI should project IFOR 
as ‘the political personification of “NATO’s new attributes’” -  that is with “‘effective, 
functional” and adaptive capabilities’ -  and as a new NATO working ‘with new 
“partners for noble ends’” .85 Second, the PI campaign should distinguish IFOR from 
failed peace missions of the past and present IFOR as ‘the right instrument’ to give 
peace a chance in Bosnia (Van Dyke 2003: 18). This required balancing IFOR’s identity 
between two potentially conflicting characteristics: peaceful and forceful. Third, PI 
should project IFOR as a ‘helper and a leader’. It should help the parties to establish a 
democratic state and it should lead when they failed (Van Dyke 2003: 19).
85 In broad terms these ideas can be found in NATO’s (1991) Strategic Concept. See also Cooper (2004: 
57) and Frantzen (2005: 58-82). Further, Sandberg and Windmar (1998: 4) present IFOR as an element in 
a broader strategic effort to create a new identity for NATO and emphasise the significance o f NATO’s 
cooperation with Russia to the general state of international affairs.
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To achieve this PI engaged the rhetorical constraints of the term ‘military’, that 
according to Van Dyke is biased in public perception by connotations to authoritarian 
bureaucracies, untrustworthy and averse to publicity. This had to be changed to achieve 
IFOR’s objectives in Bosnia, so ‘NATO sought to construct the image of a large 
military force that would cooperate with civilian institutions, allow their activities to be 
seen and reported publicly, and strive to earn public trust and confidence’ (Van Dyke 
2003: 17).
Sustaining his point with elements from the operational plan and press briefings from 
the time, Van Dyke holds that PI succeeded in this task: ‘The news media contributed to 
the construction of a credible IFOR. However, NATO records demonstrate that IFOR 
employed a carefully planned public information strategy to influence this construction’ 
(Van Dyke 2003: 14).“
2.1.2 Case 2: IFOR -  Bosnia's national elections
The next case demonstrates PI activities prior to Bosnia’s national elections, which took 
place in IFOR’s fourth phase (see 2.1.1). It shows a slightly different PI approach from 
the previous case. The overall purpose remained the same, but experiences gained 
allowed PI to refine its mode of operation. Notably, P i’s synchronisation with other 
IFOR functions became more standardised (see 2.2.1). Van Dyke (30/3/04) remarks: 
‘We kind of invented something as we went along’.
86 Siegel (1998: 144) and Badsey (2000b: xxv) have also characterised IFOR’s information campaign as 
successful. Note that several elements from IFOR’s PI plan were broadcasted in the media report that 
figures in the introduction’s initial paragraph (see 1).
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IFOR realised early on that the national elections would be a very significant milestone 
in the peace process. It was the first parliamentary elections ever for this young and 
conflict-ridden state. The OSCE, on behalf of the international community, was in 
charge of preparing the conduct of the actual election process, but IFOR was 
responsible for providing a secure environment in which the election could take place. 
Many, including the media, questioned whether the force could deliver security. Would 
people dare travel to the ballot boxes? Would armed groups try to jeopardise the 
elections? In response, IFOR launched a PI campaign to facilitate the election process.
IFOR troops were confident they could secure the physical safety of the political
candidates, the voters, the voting places and the main roads leading to the voting places.
This confidence, however, would not automatically make people feel secure. Hence,
people had to be convinced that it was safe to vote if this political milestone event was
to be achieved. From this understanding, COMIFOR gave his operational assets the task
of providing safety and PI the task of ensuring that the Bosnians actually felt secure.
Van Dyke (17/3/04) recalls:
We needed to convey a sense across the country that it was safe for the 
people to come to the polling places. And we needed to convey another 
message to the different audiences that no one should try to interfere with 
the democratic process. So there were literally two approaches. One was 
to dissuade any activist from obstructing the process; the other to 
persuade people to come out to vote.
Two to three months in advance of Election Day, PI began preparations to shape the 
civilian environment in a favourable manner. It developed a plan spelling out the 
objectives of the operational undertaking and the tactics to achieve the objective. This 
comprised a matrix that stipulated the messages PI should stress, and the activities to 
communicate them. The purpose, content and timing of these activities were
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synchronised with Operations and with IFOR’s other information outlets through the 
Joint Information Co-ordinating Committee (Van Dyke 17/3/04. See further 2.2.1 and 
2.2.4).
This specific undertaking had three phases: the deployment phase, Election Day, and 
post-election coverage. The first phase commenced two weeks prior to Election Day. 
Normally, IFOR had its forces consolidated in certain regions. Two weeks prior to 
elections, that is during the first phase in this limited campaign, IFOR spread its troops 
to a much wider territory. The task of providing a secure environment throughout 
Bosnia demanded IFOR’s presence also in remote areas. In the same period PIOs from 
around the theatre deployed to ground units as well as to headquarters. Their task was to 
organise media opportunities (see 2.2.5) where reporters gained firsthand experiences 
from these operational activities to be convinced of the ‘message that IFOR would 
provide a safe, secure environment but at the same time we also send a message that 
local authorities were responsible for maintaining the civilian law and order’ (Van Dyke 
17/3/04). For instance, PI invited the media to cover IFOR troops patrolling the roads, 
transporting ballot boxes, and manning traffic checkpoints. Reporters met a very robust 
and well-armed force. Soldiers and commanders were available for interviews and the 
media got an opportunity to spend time with them, much in line with what has been 
labelled an ‘embedded’ approach in the 2003 Gulf War (Van Dyke 17/3/04).
The second phase of this campaign was Election Day. As the conduct of the actual 
elections was the responsibility of civilian agencies, Pi’s task was to give IFOR a less 
visible role than the civilians and to project the military force more as a ‘helper’ than a 
‘leader’. Now it was the High Representative, the Head of the OSCE mission and other 
civilian agencies that moved to the forefront, chaired the press briefings and had the 
primary initiative vis-a-vis the press (Van Dyke 17/3/04). A new round of media
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opportunities was created to visit the voting places, and IFOR helicopters serving as 
aerial observation posts offered reporters a seat to get an overview of the situation on 
the ground. The media could also visit the inter-agency command centre established in 
Sarajevo for the specific purpose of facilitating a successful outcome of that particular 
day. This centre gathered representatives from the civilian agencies and IFOR to 
monitor, co-ordinate and provide guidance to their organisations on a theatre-wide and 
minute-by-minute basis. These media opportunities aimed to spread the message that 
the situation was calm and that people could vote in safety.
As Election Day was well over, with practically no occurrences of violent incidents and 
with a higher voter turnout than anticipated, the second phase was concluded.87 The 
final phase was partly a contingency plan for how do deal with violent episodes, should 
they occur, and partly a plan for the expected successful outcome. Thus, the latter plan 
was adopted, which basically consisted in handing the responsibility for post-election 
coverage to the civilian agencies. From then on it was the head of the OSCE and the 
High Representative that featured in the media to inform the public about election 
results and what they meant for the future of Bosnia, and elaborate on other relevant 
aspects of the outcome (Van Dyke 17/3/04).
PI conducted a media content analysis of 500 international and local media’s coverage 
of the Bosnian election. The study commenced well in advance of Election Day and 
ended some days after. The purpose was to identify changes in the media’s bias both 
towards IFOR and towards whether elections would be conducted as intended by
87 Thompson and De Luce (2002: 207) criticise the election process. They do not mention the security 
dimension of the undertaking, however, but hold that the OSCE should have shaped the content of the 
political campaigning prior to elections to avoid that nationalist parties would win.
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Bosnian and international authorities. The analysis showed that in the weeks running up 
to elections there was a marked increase in positive stories both about elections and 
NATO. Remarkably, the change correlated with the beginning of the IFOR PI campaign 
(Van Dyke 17/3/04).
2.1.3 Case 3: KFOR 1 -  KFOR is in control
KFOR entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999 after the conclusion of NATO’s air campaign 
against Yugoslavia. KFOR’s first phase lasted a week and aimed at supervising the 
separation of Yugoslav armed forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) inside 
Kosovo and ensuring that all the former’s forces withdrew to the Serbian side of the 
zone of separation.88 Once that was achieved and KFOR had de facto control in 
Kosovo, it would hand over the overall responsibility for the international endeavour to 
UNMIK and move to phase two. The present case outlines how KFOR’s PI mission 
supported COMKFOR to achieve this.
As in IFOR, also the KFOR PI function generally followed the mission’s overall phases. 
Consequently, while COMKFOR instructed his operational assets to ensure de facto 
control in Kosovo, he gave Clifford, his CPIO and personal spokesman, the main 
responsibility to convey exactly that message. Thus, during the first week P i’s task was 
to convince people that KFOR controlled the security situation in Kosovo and that 
NATO was subordinated to the UN mission in the province. Clifford (27/4/2004)
88 The Military Technical Agreement article 1.3.e. denotes this as the Ground Safety Zone. Referring to 
the same geographical space this study applies the term the zone o f separation since it better conveys the 
zone’s function. This was a five kilometres wide demilitarised strip of land separating the Province of 
Kosovo from the rest of Serbia and installed to reduce the risk of clashes between the armed forces of 
Yugoslavia and KFOR. It was part o f the agreement that Serbian authorities would regain de facto control 
over the zone once the North Atlantic Council deemed this feasible.
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explicitly presents KFOR’s master messages during this initial phase as ‘KFOR is not 
an invader; KFOR is not a liberator’, ‘KFOR is in control’, and ‘KFOR is subordinated 
to UNMIK’.89
KFOR’s PI plan focused primarily on gaining the support of the Kosovo Serbs and the 
Kosovo Albanians, including the refugees, but aimed at the populations in Macedonia 
and Serbia as well. The CPIO identifies the publics of NATO nations and troop- 
contributing countries as the strategic targets but sees the task of enhancing their 
understanding and support as belonging to the NATO nations themselves and its Office 
of Information and Press in NATO headquarters. Positioned at theatre level, he 
considered this task beyond his domain. Rather, KFOR operated with the tacit 
understanding that strategic success would be most difficult to achieve without success 
at the tactical level. This demanded the cooperation of the people in Kosovo, an 
achievement to which PI was a key, according to the CPIO. So although KFOR P i’s 
primary attention was towards the local population in Kosovo, it always approached 
these targets in a manner that would sustain, not undermine, efforts at the strategic level 
of NATO (Clifford 27/4/2004).
Prior to entering Kosovo, one of the major challenges PI faced was how it could 
dominate media reports to the extent NATO had done throughout the air campaign. In 
the previous months the media’s access to the province had been severely limited and 
their reports relied to a large extent on NATO sources. This would change once KFOR 
entered Kosovo since it would be joined by the thousands of international reporters who
89 Prior to 12 June, the message had been: ‘Serbs troop out; NATO troops in; refugees back’ according to 
Campbell (1999: 31), Shea (2001: 202), and Clifford (27/4/2004) who were all key figures in this 
endeavour. See also Halberstam (2002: 476).
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would see for themselves and report their firsthand experiences to a worldwide 
audience. In this situation the task for KFOR’s CPIO was in his own words to ‘regain 
the initiative’ (Clifford 27/4/2004).
KFOR’s PI plan identified primarily reporters from the independent media as conveyors 
of the messages to NATO’s target audiences. In order to regain the initiative with regard 
to how international news portrayed KFOR’s role in Kosovo, the plan envisaged, 
among others, the following undertakings: hourly updates in the Skopje PIC, free and 
open access to Kosovo to all journalists, PIOs in media focal points, CPIO-updates to 
the Skopje PIC, COMKFOR press conference at Pristina airport on 12 June, KFOR/UN 
press conference in Pristina press centre on 14 June, and a formal hand-over from 
KFOR to UNMIK as soon as possible (Clifford 27/4/2004). The next paragraphs outline 
the implementation of each of the envisaged tasks stipulated above.
Hourly updates in Skopje PIC
On 11 June 1999, some 3,500 international journalists had registered with NATO to 
enter Kosovo. However, PI preferred these journalists to remain in Skopje for a few 
days to allow KFOR to enter Kosovo alone. PI tried to achieve this by running KFOR’s 
primary media updates from Skopje. KFOR did not know what they would face when 
entering the war zone but thought that being accompanied by various categories of 
civilian international actors could complicate matters. Although the Military Technical 
Agreement was signed and Serbian forces were withdrawing from Kosovo, they were 
still in the province and their tensions with KLA remained. Moreover, there is only one 
main road from Macedonia into Kosovo. Moving KFOR together with journalists and 
other international actors to Pristina on that same road and at the same time was 
expected to add to the logistical difficulties.
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Hence, PI planned for and informed reporters that most of the initial briefings was going 
to be conducted in Skopje. Moving into Kosovo the CPIO would on a regular basis 
telephonically update the Skopje PIC. He would tell them, for example, whether the 
plan of disengaging KLA and Serbian forces was running according to schedule, and 
how the Serbs were managing their withdrawal. This idea did not work. According to 
the CPIO (Clifford 27/4/2004), no one wanted to remain in Skopje: ‘All the journalists 
wanted to be where the action was".
Free and open access to Kosovo to all journalists with no constraints apart from  
information that could put in jeopardy troop safety and operational security
In line with the 4th and 5th PI goal the media had free access to Kosovo (see 2.2.1).
There were no NATO pooling system of journalists -  with one exception, which will be 
mentioned in the quote below. However, nations were free to offer pools and journalists 
were free to accept the offer.
Combining this policy with the desire to reduce logistical obstacles, KFOR included in
their military movement plan the broad scope of international actors with interests in
Kosovo -  from KFOR, to international organisations, NGOs and the media. This did not
produce the desired result. According to the CPIO (Clifford 27/4/2004):
Trying to explain this to journalists who are by nature anarchic was 
impossible. I said: ‘Look, if  you turn up there at these four road junctions, 
as the package moves forward there will be a place for you to slot in 
behind’. Of course it all fell to pieces. They all tried to be in the same 
place, which was in the front, at the same time. They were all fighting 
each other. And I remember there was one interview being done with a 
chap who had been sitting at the Belacevac crossroad for about six hours 
saying: ‘We have still got nowhere further forward. There has obviously 
been a hold-up and the whole advance has stalled’. Which of course was 
absolutely rubbish. It just meant that there was a traffic jam at Belacevac up
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country . . .  One thing we did do was having small media pools 
specifically for this event where journalists couldn’t get there themselves.
And we flew them in by helicopter to front line troops, or as far as we 
could get to the front line troops bearing in mind that we still weren’t sure 
we were going to be caught up in somebody else’s battle. So we flew 
people up, which helped. So the people at the front said: ‘No it is all 
going very well’.
PIOs in media focal points
The PI plan envisaged the positioning of PIOs in places of media focus. National 
spokespersons for each o f the troop-contributing nations should be allocated at the 
Skopje PIC to answer questions from their national media or questions with regard to 
their troops. The major reason was that national contingents should be responsible for 
their national journalists. KFOR PIOs could speak only on KFOR’s behalf, not on 
behalf of other nations. In the same vein, the plan stipulated that each national 
contingent going into Kosovo should have their own PIOs. In addition, to have someone 
to speak for NATO in each of the four multinational brigades that constituted its 
mission in Kosovo KFOR should have its own PI team in each brigade. This 
arrangement was supposed to allow a journalist following the French company coming 
in from Kumanovo, for example, to speak not only with France but also with NATO.
This plan did not work, however, because PI resources were not allocated in time. The 
reason was primarily political. Presenting those difficulties gives a sense of the context 
in which such military missions are conducted.
In legal terms, KFOR only existed as of 10 June 1999. That is two days prior to its 
arrival in Kosovo. The international military presence in Macedonia deployed for the 
situation in Kosovo was not in a formal sense a NATO force. Rather, it was a group of 
various contingents from NATO nations each with a bilateral arrangement with the
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host government. This was a result of NATO restrictions on establishing a force without 
authorisation from the North Atlantic Council by means o f an activation order. The 
North Atlantic Council was not willing to give that order prior to a UN Security Council 
resolution. The UN Security Council in turn could not agree on a resolution without 
consent from the Yugoslav government, and that consent, in a legal sense, only came 
with the Military Technical Agreement on 9 June. The bottom line for PI was that they 
got resources from NATO only right before KFOR moved into the Kosovo.
This was too late, however, to allow arriving PIOs to catch up with the task and be of 
much use in KFOR’s initial phase. So for all practical purposes, KFOR’s PI staff 
consisted of seven officers from the ARRC, which were the CPIO, three majors and 
three senior staff. The various national PIOs that had supported PI during the months in 
Macedonia left to run their own national media campaigns as soon as KFOR was to 
enter Kosovo. So personnel were not available to fill the positions stipulated in the PI 
plan.
Trying to ensure that the various KFOR contingents disseminated similar messages, the 
CPIO gave the national PIOs a set of master messages and talking points (see 2.2.3). He 
could only urge them to include the messages in their national PI plans, since he was in 
no position to give them instructions. The nations had beforehand refused to submit 
their PI campaigns to NATO command. The result was that some PIOs used the 
messages while, in Clifford’s (27/4/2004) own words, ‘others completely ignored it and 
some [communicated] almost contradictory’.
CPIO should provide continual telephone updates and interviews
The PI plan envisaged to keep journalists in Skopje constantly updated via telephone by 
the CPIO in Kosovo. As a result of NATO’s above-mentioned inability to provide
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resources PI did not have the necessary equipment to keep themselves informed, which
severely hampered their efforts to keep others informed. During the first phase, the
CPIO and his small staff lived in tents in a bombed-out factory just south of Pristina
with only one telephone link to NATO headquarters. Clifford (27/4/2004) recalls the
first days of the phase:
I was completely blind from when we ‘pulled the cork out of the bottle’ 
and they all went off. I had no idea what was going on. I had no 
communications. The only thing I saw, I had one television se t . . .  it was 
rather like . . .  rugby. You tie the ball up. You make all your preparations.
You know where you are trying to make it land. You take into account the 
wind, the rain, other factors, low flying birds, and you kick it. Once you 
have kicked it you have no further control of where it is going to land. It 
was rather like the same thing. Once we had gone, I had absolutely no 
control for about 48 hours as to what was happening. I just hoped that 
people knew what to say and do. And then we would try and make some 
sense of it.
The master messages of this first phase was: ‘KFOR is in control’. But PI made no 
attempt to deny that difficulties and incidents occurred throughout the phase. Often, 
however, they were not informed. So when approached by journalists with specific 
questions the CPIO would simply refer them to the relevant PICs. Still, he tried to 
reassure reporters that KFOR was in charge. Although at this very early stage unable to 
prevent incidents, the CPIO could convey a sense of KFOR dealing with events as they 
arose.
COMKFOR press conference at Pristina airport
In order to establish credibility around the master message ‘KFOR is in control’, PI had 
announced in advance that COMKFOR should hold a Press Conference at Pristina
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Airport the same day as KFOR moved into the province. The intention was to 
communicate: ‘We are here. We are in charge. That’s it’ (Clifford 27/4/2004).
The CPIO ordered an American major to go to Pristina airport with a small PI team and
organise COMKFOR’s press conference:
And I don’t know how he did it. He was in the front in his little white car 
with his pistol and his loudspeaker system, and his press stuff, with a . . .  
broadcast van that we had commandeered because we said: ‘Look we will 
get you to these three places’. It was a hub so all the journalists could 
plug into this. The idea was that while the Pl-team organised the 
conference, the van should provide the technical facilities allowing 
journalist to send their story back home.
KFOR had not reckoned with Russian forces taking over control of Pristina airport the 
day prior to KFOR’s arrival, however. Yet, Russia exploited a window of opportunity 
that arose, when NATO accepted Yugoslavia’s demand not to enter Kosovo the first 24 
hours after the signing of the Military Technical Agreement.90 The Russian contingent 
was part of NATO’s SFOR mission in Bosnia and simply painted the letter K over the S 
on all labels on their vehicles before entering Kosovo through the Bosnian entity 
Rpublica Srbska. This created initial confusion and tension between NATO and Russia.
From a PI perspective it was a challenge to efficiently communicate on the one hand 
that NATO did not want Russia to go it alone in Kosovo, while on the other hand 
emphasising that NATO wanted Russia to be part of KFOR. At the tactical level the
90 It is questionable how co-ordinated the decision to take control over Pristina airport was within the 
Russian government. Levitin (2000: 138), who is a research fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies, 
King’s College, and who worked with Balkan-related issues within the Russian Ministry o f Foreign 
Affairs from 1990 to 1999, argues that the decision was taken by the military general staff without 
consulting the foreign ministry.
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unexpected Russian presence at the airport created an immediate problem for the 
American PI major and his team. They had to get through, not only the Serbian but also 
the Russian military lines to carry out their assigned task. By means unknown to the 
CPIO they managed.
Other factors added to the difficulties of conveying the master message. Although the PI 
team was now in the airport the Russians did not support the idea of COMKFOR’s press 
conference taking place in an area they claimed to control. For this reason the Russians 
prevented journalists from entering the airport. So most of the attending journalists had 
been helicoptered in by KFOR. Those who were present, however, had a hard time 
hearing COMKFOR since the Russians were driving their vehicles at full speed to 
drown every word he pronounced. Moreover, essential PI press conference equipment, 
such as the loud speaker system, could not be used because the generator did not work. 
Even the weather worked against KFOR. It was a rainstorm and freezing cold.
Considering the content of the master message PI aimed to convey, the CPIO concludes 
displeased: ‘We did it, but it was not a success. It didn’t come over quite that, 
unfortunately’.
KFOR/UNpress conference in Pristina press centre
The other master message PI was tasked to convey was that ‘KFOR is subordinated to 
UNMIK’. The tactics applied to accomplish this was to stage a full press conference 
with COMKFOR and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in 
Pristina on KFOR’s third day in Kosovo. The purpose was to show a rapid and 
complete integration between the international military and civilian authorities in the 
province. A formal hand-over from KFOR to UNMIK was scheduled to take place
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within a few days, so this press conference was a first step to project the subliminal 
message that in a democracy the military is subordinated to civilian authority.
Again the CPIO had delegated to one of his staff to carry out this event. The first task 
was to set up a proper press centre with power, lights, the kind of equipment journalist 
and photographers need to operate and to be connected with their editorial desks in the 
national capitals. The idea, according to the CPIO, was that KFOR/UNMIK’s press 
conference should send the subliminal message that ‘We are here. We are in control.
We are in charge. It is a properly joint-up, integrated operation’. He continues: ‘There 
are times . . .  [when you do your press conferences] being rugged, covered in 
camouflage, sitting in a bunker, in a bush, and there are times to be doing it properly’ 
(Clifford 27/4/2004). This was one of the latter occasions.
The PIO in charge of this undertaking drove by car to Pristina with another small team. 
Assisted by the owners of the Continental Hotel in Skopje, the PIO hired the best place 
they found in Pristina -  a location at the Grand Hotel. With scarce resources PI installed 
the necessary facilities, including a NATO ‘backdrop’ behind the podium.91 All was 
ready to invite reporters and convince them that the security forces, KFOR, and the 
nation-rebuilding infrastructure, UNMIK, operated jointly from the very beginning.
Just before the journalists arrived the Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General, Sergio de Mello, who was in charge of UNMIK, entered the room. His first 
comment was: ‘I can’t sit there. The UN cannot sit under NATO flag’. With no time left 
to change the backdrop, COMKFOR had to meet the press alone. After the conference
91 Backdrop is a term the CPIOs use to describe the background that figures behind the persons or objects 
portrayed in media images either on the television screen or a still photo.
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PI hurriedly changed the backdrop to two flags -  the UN’s and NATO’s side by side.
On this podium KFOR and UNMIK undertook many later press conferences.
As mentioned, KFOR’s major task in this phase remained to ensure the withdrawal of 
Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. Once that was verified, COMKFOR reported up his 
chain of command that the military phase of the operation was concluded and that the 
civilian organisations could take over. That same message PI conveyed to reporters, 
hoping to establish a broad understanding that KFOR was not setting up a military 
dictatorship.
This concluded KFOR’s first phase and called off the air campaign. The second phase 
began, with UNMIK taking over the responsibility of the international endeavour in 
Kosovo.
2.1.4 Case 4: KFOR 1 -  Show of force
KFOR 1 ’s third milestone event was scheduled to September 1999. That was the 
transformation of KLA to the Kosovo Protection Corps. The international community 
demanded that the military organisation KLA be disbanded. Kosovars, particularly 
those within or sympathising with KLA, opposed this position. In this delicate political 
situation, Serbia increased the military activity on its side of the zone of separation and 
Serbian hardliners uttered their wish to reinvade Kosovo. Anxiety rose among the 
Kosovo Albanians about Serbia’s intentions. Kosovo Albanian hardliners exploited this 
feeling as an argument to reinforce, rather than disband, the KLA as Kosovo’s Army.
To forestall an escalation of the situation, KFOR organised a military exercise on the 
Kosovo side of the zone of separation. This was a show of physical force that had two 
purposes. It should deter Serbian authorities from any attempt to re-enter Kosovo;
114
and it should reassure Kosovars that NATO protected them. Thus, Kosovo needed no 
proper army. To achieve this, PI identified two compatible messages, one to each target 
group. To the Serbs the message was ‘Don’t do it’. To the Kosovars it was ‘You are 
safe’.
In an effort to reach the Serbian audiences, PI organised a series of media opportunities 
on NATO’s side of the zone of separation hoping that media reports would reach the 
targets. KFOR communicated its messages to journalists by giving them first hand 
experiences with NATO troops training and tanks manoeuvring along the boundary 
line.
This also served to convince the local population in Kosovo of KFOR’s messages and 
to reassure those along the boundary line that what they were now experiencing in their 
neighbourhood was a military exercise, not war mobilisation. The major part of such 
communications with local population was undertaken by PsyOps who have their own 
means and methods to inform people (see 2.2.4).
One reason for this joint approach was that at the time PI had no reliable means to 
broadcast messages to the wider parts of Kosovo, since NATO’s air campaign had taken 
out all radio transmitters and television stations a few months earlier. The state of 
Kosovo’s media was still too feeble to be counted on as a channel of message delivery. 
NATO had begun to re-establish newspapers and broadcasters some of which belonged 
to the PsyOps troops and PI used them to disseminate their messages. PI would simply 
tape press conferences or statements from COMKFOR and other relevant officials, fly 
the tape to PsyOps radio-stations throughout Kosovo and ask them to play it (Clifford 
27/4/2004).
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The show of physical force happened to coincide with NATO fighter planes flying into 
Kosovo for the first time since the air campaign. This was a long scheduled exercise to 
train KFOR troops in target identification. Since the two exercises were conducted 
simultaneously, and because the fighter planes only reinforced KFOR’s messages, PI 
drew reporters’ attention to both (Clifford 27/4/2004).
Although not evidence that PI made the difference, it can be noted that Serbia did not 
invade Kosovo and that KFOR and KLA’s leadership reached the compromise to 
disarm the KLA and transform it into a civilian organisation named the Kosovo 
Protection Corps. So in that sense, P i’s objectives were achieved.
2.1.5 Case 5: KFOR 5 -  Presevo valley
In April 2001, as COMKFOR 5, Lt.Gen. Skiaker, arrived in Kosovo a major issue 
awaited him on KFOR’s agenda: to facilitate Serbian armed forces’ return to the 
Presevo valley. This officially de-militarised valley was used as a safe haven for armed 
groups. Violent clashes were expected between these and Serbian forces once the latter 
would enter. Idsoe (18/2/2004), who served as his CPIO, informs that COMKFOR used 
PI as means to solve that task.
The Presevo valley was situated within the zone of separation. The zone was divided in 
several sectors. In agreement with the North Atlantic Council, Serbian forces had 
already entered most of these sectors. But two remained. The most controversial was the 
Presevo valley. Many Kosovo Albanians lived in this sector, which was also occupied 
by Ethnic Albanian Armed Groups (EAAGs) who had commenced violent assaults 
inside Serbia.
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COMKFOR initiated the planning process to facilitate the Serbian take-over which he 
wanted to carry through in a non-violent manner. This posed a double challenge. The 
most immediate concern was that the EAAGs should refuse to leave and choose to 
defend themselves with arms. A more general concern was how the broader Kosovo 
Albanian population would react. COMKFOR had only a vague idea about the extent of 
popular support the EAAGs enjoyed and wanted to prevent massive demonstrations.
The Force Commander considered PI his most relevant asset both to coerce the EAAGs 
to leave voluntarily and to achieve public acceptance to Serbia’s redeployment to the 
zone of separation (Idsoe 18/3/2004). His four main objectives with the undertaking 
were to coerce the EAAGs to leave the Presevo valley without resistance; to enhance 
the Kosovo Albanian public’s understanding of KFOR’s policy on this matter; to 
communicate KFOR’s resolve; and to deter attacks on KFOR troops.
In line with KFOR’s overall PI message (see 2.2.3) and in cooperation with COMKFOR 
and his command group, PI developed subordinate messages designed to achieve these 
tactical objectives. PI chose an active policy (see 2.2.2). The immediate task was to 
inform the parties directly concerned. So the target groups were primarily the EAAGs 
and the Kosovo Albanian population. The international public remained important but 
only as a secondary target.
PI synchronised its activities with Operations, which envisioned dealing with the task in 
three phases. These will be presented in turn, but very briefly, the first aimed to prepare 
the primary target groups as to what was going to take place, when and why. The 
second phase concerned the EAAGs’ vacation of the sector, and the final phase should 
transfer authority over the sector to the Serbs and deal with any incidents that might 
arise as a consequence. The plan focused its resources on activities needed to achieve
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the result, but also planned for eventualities in an effort to avoid having the situation 
develop in undesired directions.
Within this framework, P i’s task was to reinforce the effect of each phase by 
highlighting to reporters KFOR’s intentions. PI developed the messages that 
underscored the idea of the operation and the planned activities. It timed the 
dissemination of these messages with the planned phases (Idsoe 18/3/2004). To fulfil 
this task, PI used a variety of techniques including media opportunities, background 
briefings conducted by high-level commanders, and press statements by COMKFOR 
(see further 2.2.5).
The first phase commenced with PI disseminating a news release to Kosovo Albanian 
and international media. The intention was to use the media as a channel to inform the 
target groups about what was going to happen in the next days ahead. Particularly 
important was to send the EAAGs two messages: ‘Demobilise and leave the Presevo 
valley as free men’ and ‘If not, you will be imprisoned’ (Idsoe 18/3/2004).
To ensure that reporters properly understood KFOR’s intentions with the undertaking 
before these were disseminated in the media, PI invited reporters to attend background 
briefings. Journalist were informed that they could use the information but neither quote 
nor refer to their sources. Here, COMKFOR’s deputy and Political Advisor explained to 
journalist in detail what was going to happen, why it should happen, and which 
agreements regulated the North Atlantic Council’s decision to allow Serbian authorities 
to re-enter Presevo valley. Moreover, they emphasised the general interests of the 
Kosovo Albanians in this arrangement (Idsoe 18/2/2004).
It so happened that President Milosevic had been dethroned as Head of State in 
Yugoslavia just weeks prior to this operation. The new political situation allowed
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NATO to liaise with Serbian authorities for the first time since they had terminated the 
war on 9 June 1999. On 20 May 2001 COMKFOR could therefore meet his Serbian 
counterpart, Lt.Gen. Krstic, in a tent on the border between Kosovo and Serbia to 
discuss, among other things, Yugoslavia’s takeover of the remaining sectors of the zone 
of separation (NATO 21/5/2001). After the meeting they issued a joint press 
statement.92 The mere fact that they were able to convene and even issue a joint 
announcement sent a message not only to the EAAGs and the Kosovars but to the entire 
international community that the political situation in the region had significantly 
changed.
Another way to get KFOR’s messages into the media was to organise media 
opportunities. Part of the plan for this undertaking entailed building reception camps for 
those o f the EAAGs that would leave the sector voluntarily, and prisons for anyone 
arrested after COMKFOR’s deadline. PI invited the press to see the construction of 
those sites and the crossing points where KFOR wanted the EAAGs to enter Kosovo. 
Reporters saw the places where the former combatants would be received and screened 
for weapons and uniforms and were reminded of COMKFOR’s promise that the 
EAAGs could leave as free men once they had signed an agreement that they would 
refrain from taking up arms again. The media also inspected the prisons constructed for 
this specific operation (Idsoe 18/3/2004). In this way PI strove to have reporters project 
KFOR’s two messages in their respective media, hoping that these would reach the 
EAAGs in one way or another.
92 It was joint in the sense that COMKFOR and Lt.Gen. Krstic agreed on a press statement but they did 
not arrange a joint press conference. When the Serb General delivered the statement to Yugoslav media, 
he left out some sentences, whereas COMKFOR presented it in its entirety.
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The most important element of the PI campaign was COMKFOR’s statement that 
concluded the first phase. It was drafted by his Military Assistant and Political Advisor 
and carefully adjusted by a number of staff members including PI, PsyOps, and 
Information Operations. Some days before it was to be delivered the draft statement was 
sent up the chain of command for comments. So much importance was attached to the 
statement that NATO’s regional headquarters in Naples called the CPIO as COMKFOR 
was going down the stairs to meet the press and instructed him to make some revisions. 
Receiving Naples’ inputs, the CPIO replied: ‘We do not stop this because you want to 
change three words. If this is refusal to follow orders, so be it’ (Idsoe 18/2/2004).
Beyond the words, the images were also carefully selected. Against which backdrop 
should COMKFOR appear on the TV screens? The press centre or any other rooms 
were deemed too dull. The CPIO wanted the circumstances to communicate resolve. He 
concluded that a determined COMKFOR, in combat uniform, in a hurry, in front of two 
helicopters, and outside KFOR’s headquarters would give the statement the desired 
weight and bias (Idsoe 18/2/2004).
Thus, COMKFOR met 40-50 reporters next to the headquarters’ helicopter site. He 
opened by saying that he only had a few minutes but wanted to address the media on the 
matter of the Presevo valley. He acknowledged that the implementation of this part of 
the Military Technical Agreement might be difficult to understand for the Albanians, 
before he placed the decision in a broader perspective and explained why Serbia had to 
re-enter the sector. He moved on to deterring anyone from opposing what was going to 
happen anyway, and warned that should anyone threaten the safety of his soldiers they 
were instructed to respond with overwhelming physical force. He concluded the 
statement by giving the EAAGs the two previously stressed options. They could leave 
the valley as free men, if they voluntarily came to KFOR’s reception centres,
demobilised and signed an agreement with KFOR. Alternatively they would be arrested 
(NATO 16/5/2001).
After this statement, COMKFOR made himself available for no more than three 
questions from the press. In a normal press conference, he would answer practically any 
question that might come, but this press gathering intended to convey the Force 
Commander’s impatience to fulfil the task. The three questions were prepared, in the 
sense that PI had told three capable journalists that they would get COMKFOR’s 
attention if they had a question for him. The CPIO stresses, however, that the journalists 
formulated their questions themselves (Idsoe 18/2/2004). Having replied, COMKFOR 
left by helicopters offering cameramen good images. The media broadcasted parts of his 
four minutes speech worldwide and presented it as an ultimatum to the EAAGs. This 
terminated the first phase (Idsoe 18/2/2004).
The second phase lasted for three days and aimed at receiving those EAAGs that were 
willing to lay down arms. Some 550 arrived in the reception centres, which was just a 
bit over the expected number. They were screened for military equipment, some arrived 
with truckloads of arms, handed in their uniforms, signed the agreement that they would 
refrain from fighting in the future, and were released. Again, PI used this as a media 
opportunity to convey to the EAAGs still in the sector, to Kosovars and to the broader 
public that COMKFOR kept his promise. PI hoped this would encourage remaining 
EAAGs to leave voluntarily. Journalists covered how the EAAGs were well received 
and allowed to leave. They also projected images of piles of weapons and uniforms 
being burned (Idsoe 18/3/2004).
The third phase, which commenced after the issued deadline, was designed to deal with 
potential uprisings inside Presevo valley and more widely in Kosovo. This became
superfluous since practically all the EAAGs had left and Serbian forces entered the 
sector. One EAAG leader had been killed but allegedly by mistake. Hence, this PI 
activity was concluded by stories broadcasted worldwide of Albanian guerrillas that 
gave themselves up and images of their burning weapons, as illustrated by one of the 
media reports that opened this thesis (see 1). They aimed to convey to the Kosovars and 
the international community that KFOR remained determined to and capable of 
promoting peace and reconciliation in Kosovo and in the region in general. Moreover, 
KFOR had achieved this particular tactical result without firing a single shot (Idsoe 
18/3/2004).
2.1.6 Case 6: KFOR 5 -  Border control
The last illustrative case to be presented here occurred simultaneously with KFOR’s 
handling of the EAAGs in the zone of separation. It was a response to an escalating 
rebellion within Macedonia and their authorities’ accusations that KFOR allowed 
Albanian resistance groups to cross the border with military supplies to the rebels. 
Although KFOR had deployed substantial troops to avoid such and other illegal border 
crossings, this effort remained unknown to Macedonia’s politicians and public. So 
KFOR’s PI function organised a campaign to spread the message that ‘KFOR controls 
the border’ and eventually managed to deflate the criticism.
This campaign was more improvised than case 5 above. When KFOR Operations 
developed their military plans to patrol the border it foresaw no particular PI 
involvement. It was the Political Advisor that brought to COMKFOR’s attention the 
need to alter Macedonia’s increasingly negative perception of KFOR.
In an effort to change this negative trend PI designed a plan with the objective to project 
KFOR’s actual undertakings along the border. The primary target group was
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Macedonia’s politicians and public, and the secondary target was people in Kosovo and 
worldwide. The plan was not synthesised with Operations in the same manner as had 
been the case of the Presevo valley, since their plans were already in effect. Catching up 
with Operations, PI simply aimed to show what KFOR’s border patrols were already 
doing.
Hence, PI organised media opportunities along the border for reporters from Skopje, 
Macedonia’s capital, and the press corps in Pristina to allow them to see for themselves 
what KFOR was actually doing. This, however, did not suffice to change the negative 
KFOR-bias in Macedonia’s media.
The Political Advisor suggested that a high-level press statement, like the one 
COMKFOR delivered in case 5, might be more efficient. Trying this approach, PI 
developed a statement that should convey KFOR’s message. They also prepared several 
pages of questions and answers for any possible question PI imagined reporters might 
ask. Under normal circumstances, COMKFOR would have delivered such a statement. 
His schedule prohibited this, however, and his deputy, Maj.Gen. Filiberto Cecchi 
received the task. He, on the other hand, was uncomfortable with meeting the press. 
Therefore, starting a week in advance, people with background in the media prepared 
him on how to argue KFOR’s case convincingly.
Again, the CPIO wanted to find a suitable place for delivering such a statement; a spot 
conveying the message. A wall would not do as background image on the TV screens. 
So the press conference room was out of the question. He deemed that in order to 
convince the audience, the statement had to be delivered where the action was, where 
border patrols were undertaken. The CPIO took four days to find a satisfactory spot. It 
was a 1000 meter hill just on the Kosovo side of the border to Macedonia. On a
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clear day, reporters would be able to see the Macedonian town of Tetovo, the centre of 
upheaval, in the southwestern direction. At the bottom of the hill, they would see the 
border and the border-crossing station on the main road leading from Kosovo to Tetovo. 
On Macedonia’s hillsides, they would see several military positions overlooking the 
border.
PI organised a media opportunity on that hill. It invited the same press corps and 
facilitated their transport by bus and 4-wheel drive vehicles. The height was in the area 
of responsibility of KFOR’s Polish battalion, who had manned their position there for 
that particular day. As reporters arrived, the Poles served them food and beverage. It 
was a bright day with a beautiful view of the places PI had hoped reporters should be 
able to see. Looking down they saw by chance several of KFOR’s patrols and a 
helicopter doing reconnaissance. The CPIO insists that except for the Polish troop on 
the hill, no other tactical undertakings were conducted upon P i’s request. All were part 
of daily routines.
Once the press corps was well installed, PI called Deputy COMKFOR who arrived by 
helicopter within 10 minutes. His touchdown just 30-40 meter behind the cameramen 
gave them good images. He delivered his statement that included the message: ‘I appeal 
to those who have chosen the road of violence: it is a road which leads nowhere, the use 
of violence must end’ (NATO 8/6/2001). Thereafter, he made himself available for 
three questions but only got one. Having answered that he took off and returned to 
headquarters. The Commander of the Polish battalion then gave the press corps a 
briefing about the way his battalion controlled the border.
The following morning, P i’s media analysis section found a change from earlier weeks 
in Macedonia’s media reports on KFOR. Journalists now commenced to present the
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message PI strove to disseminate and turned the trend of negative bias towards KFOR 
in a more positive direction (Idsoe 18/2/2004; 18/3/2004).
The PI campaign continued. It arranged a background briefing conducted by Deputy 
COMKFOR, who provided reporters with in-depth and off-the-record information about 
KFOR’s operational activities along the border to Macedonia. Further, PI invited 
reporters to additional media opportunities with the border patrols. This time, journalists 
experienced KFOR’s night operations and were, for instance, introduced to its night- 
vision equipment and light rockets. Journalists also witnessed KFOR arresting and 
confiscating weapons from people trying to cross the border illegally (Idsoe 18/2/2004). 
By mid-June 2001, that is two weeks after this PI campaign began, criticism of KFOR 
subsided in Macedonia’s media (Idsoe 18/3/2004).
2.2 Press and Information’s  mode of operation
These six illustrative cases serve to demonstrate the actual practice of PI in NATO 
missions. Among other things, this empirical account has shown that PI pursued a 
variety of political and military ends. At one end of the scale it sought to alter NATO’s 
image in the eyes of people worldwide (see case 1), at the other extreme PI was used to 
demobilise a small armed group (see case 5). We shall now present NATO’s mode of 
operation to fulfil these objectives. First, the plan work that gave PIOs their overall 
instructions is introduced. This was guided in a general sense by a set of PI goals (see 
2.2.1) and intentions (see 2.2.2). The CPIOs’ mode of operation also shares other 
common features. All CPIOs were concerned to have consistent messages (see 2.2.3) 
and to create unity of effort among troops and international organisations in order to 
achieve common objectives (see 2.2.4). In addition, they used largely identical ways to
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maintain credible relations with the media (see 2.2.5). In Idsoe’s (26/3/2004) 
formulation: ‘Everything we do is guided by a plan. It tells you what to do’. This 
chapter presents the general features of such plans.
Operational plan
NATO refers to these as operational plans. Idsoe (18/3/2004) describes them as script- 
books, while Van Dyke (13/4/2004) sees them more as organisational manuals. Both 
agree, however, that at a mission level an operational plan presents the mission, its 
goals, and, among others, the strategies, phases and tactics to deliver the desired results. 
It assigns responsibilities to the mission’s various assets. That is notably the traditional 
military functions such as air, ground and sea operations. These line functions form the 
core of a broader category of assets and are traditionally seen as the force commander’s 
instrument to apply lethal force (see 1.1). Moreover, the plan gives guidance to, what is 
termed, support functions such as logistics and medical assistance (see further 2.2.4). PI 
is generally regarded as a support function, a view the study at hand challenges.
Van Dyke (13/4/2004) adds that an operational plan is also a legal document. It gives a 
military organisation authority to conduct a mission and stipulates the rules of 
engagement, which limit the mission’s scope and clarify, among many other things, 
restrictions on the use of physical force.
Within such overall plans IFOR and KFOR had more specific PI plans that identified 
the audiences whose support NATO desired, the messages it wanted the audiences to 
understand, the media channels to reach these audiences, and potential problems as well 
as milestones along the way to public support. Van Dyke (2003: 8) describes these 
subordinated plans as ‘carefully coordinated strategic information plan[s]’ to achieve 
mission objectives.
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The plans were guided in a general sense by PI goals and the commanders’ intentions 
with his PI asset. These two features of the military plan work shall now be brought to 
the forth.
2.2.1 Press and Information goals
The CPIOs present Pi’s mode of operation as guided by eight PI goals (Idsoe 
26/3/2004; Van Dyke 13/4/2004; Clifford 27/4/2004). Some have already been referred 
to above and we shall return to these goals throughout the thesis. Here, each is briefly 
presented and its rationale explained.
1st PI Goal: Enhance public understanding of and support to NATO’s policies
Pi’s primary goal was to enhance public understanding of and support to NATO’s
policies. It therefore holds a cardinal position in the present study that aims to explore
the purpose of PI. It may be seen as P i’s raison d'etre, deriving from NATO’s idea that:
All NATO governments recognise both the democratic right of their 
peoples to be informed about the international structures which provide 
the basis for their security, and the importance of maintaining public 
understanding and support for their countries’ security policies (NATO 
2001: 164. Italics added).
From this point of departure, NATO stipulates:
The overall objectives of the Alliance’s press and information policies are 
to contribute to public knowledge of the facts relating to security and to 
promote public involvement in a well informed and constructive debate 
on the security issues of the day as well as the objectives of future policy 
(NATO 2001: 165).
Thus, Pi’s primary goal is to inform the public partly because people have a right to 
know and partly because this shall enhance public support which NATO considers vital. 
The latter task points to an overall aim for the PI function that is expressed by
127
former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen. Joulwan: ‘NATO is exceptionally 
dependent upon positive public opinion. Political will to perform any task can never be 
expected unless the publics are clearly informed and sympathetic to our endeavours’ 
(cited in Clifford and Wilton 2000: 11). In other words, NATO’s activities, if  not its 
existence, is conditioned by the support of the electorates within the alliance. From this 
understanding, P i’s primary task becomes to enhance the support of these peoples. As 
will be shown, this idea formed the rationale of the three CPIOs mode of operation.93
At times, their lines of reasoning follow a logic based on social causation: P i’s task was
to influence media reports, because media reports influence public opinion, which
influences political will to sustain a NATO mission (Clifford and Wilton 2000: 13, 20;
Idsoe 26/3/2004; Van Dyke 13/4/2004). This understanding of the PI function’s purpose
has bearings on the CNN-effect (see footnote 9), which is clearly expressed in Idsoe’s
(26/3/2004) formulation that ‘it is their [the media’s] projections that enter people’s
minds’. He continues: ‘If it hadn’t been for the media, NATO would probably never
have been in Bosnia and Kosovo. It was the way it portrayed the wars and the horrible
images that influenced politicians to decide to deploy NATO forces’ (Idsoe
26/3/2004).94 Van Dyke (13/4/2004) adds:
It is logical to assume that in order for a nation to supply the deployment 
of its military forces the public has to support whatever policies the 
political leaderships have adopted. Otherwise you can undermine a 
nation’s will to deploy those military troops.
93 Siegel (1998: 2) accords with reference to the cases of IFOR and its proceeding mission. More 
generally, the importance of public support for Western governments’ ability to sustain military 
campaigns is widely supported in the academic literature (see footnote 4 and 1.5).
94 Conversely, Vickers (2000: 56) and Collins (2000b: 42) argue that policy-makers used such images to 
mobilise public support for the bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999.
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In the same vein, Clifford asserts:
The aim of [NATO’s] information campaign was to seize and maintain 
the initiative by imparting timely and effective information . . .  It was 
based on the principle that information was a major lever. . .  and that it 
was to defend IFOR’s “centre of gravity”, which was deemed to be world 
opinion and the outcome of the IFOR mission (Clifford and Wilton 2000:
14).
This idea of public opinion as NATO’s ‘centre of gravity’ is further reflected in Idsoe’s 
(26/3/2004) statement: ‘PI must show what NATO does. A few years ago, some argued 
that NATO should adapt to the new challenges or cease to exist’.
The other important audience is the public in theatre - the local targets, as they are
termed in this thesis. These were deemed capable of affecting operational success or
failure on the ground, which again could have a spill-over to the strategic level. Clifford
(27/4/2004) explains:
Tactical success or failure is the people on the ground -  the locals, the 
insurgents. We want people to work with us not against us . . .  Occupying 
armies throughout history has wasted huge amounts of manpower against 
the local population. We needed to work with the local populations. They 
wouldn’t blow apart bridges. They wouldn’t put roadblocks in front of 
our gates. They wouldn’t put parcel bombs or car bombs . .  . We didn’t 
want that to happen. So the key target audience was the local ones, at my 
level.
In other words, the 1st PI goal did not only refer to people in NATO member states, 
although these were Pi’s strategic concern. It encompassed the local peoples in the 
Balkans whose support to, or at least compliance with, the missions was an equally 
important concern in Pi’s daily duties. Keeping them on NATO’s side was a necessity 
to ensure the force commanders’ freedom of action in their area of responsibility 
(Clifford and Wilton 2000: 20).
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Based on this understanding, PI aimed to make these targets understand and support the 
military missions’ legitimacy and purpose (Clifford and Wilton 2000: 11; Idsoe 
26/3/2004; Van Dyke 13/4/2004). This included endeavours to alter media portrayals 
that ran counter to NATO’s messages (see case 6).
2nd PI goal: Provide accurate, complete, and timely information
This goal basically instructs PI to be truthful and is seen as a condition to establish and 
maintain credible relations with the press (Idsoe 8/6/2004. See 2.2.5).95 Van Dyke 
(13/4/2004) adds ‘we had to maintain our credibility with the press, otherwise we would 
lose that channel of communication and then it would become much more difficult to 
communicate with the audiences’. In other words, PI could not achieve its 1st goal 
without having the trust o f reporters. The importance of being truthful is reflected in 
Clifford’s (27/4/2004) statement with regard to NATO’s PsyOps function: ‘If they are 
caught with lying then their messages loses credibility. So we are all conveyers of 
information -  not disinformation’.
3rd PI Goal: Co-ordinate with PsyOps and CIMIC
NATO had three functions which primarily used information to communicate with its 
targets: PI, PsyOps, and CIMIC. In order to have NATO speaking with one voice and 
avoid that its various assets disseminated different or, even worse, contradictory 
information, this goal envisaged a co-ordination of the three activities (Van Dyke 
13/4/2004; Clifford 27/4/2004; Idsoe 26/3/2004. See further 2.2.4).96
95 Siegel (1997: 170) confirms the importance NATO attaches to this goal. More generally, the crucial 
significance of this goal is supported by Pickup (2000: 160) and Armistead (2004: 203).
96 Again, the validity of this goal in NATO’s mode o f operation is confirmed by Siegel (1998: 115-142).
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While agreeing on the need of co-ordinating an operation’s information assets, the three 
CPIOs disagree on the level of co-ordination. Practical demands of efficient 
communication spur Clifford (27/4/2004) to favour a close co-ordination between the 
three functions’ outlets of information. Idsoe (26/3/2004) and Van Dyke (13/4/2004) are 
cautious that this not compromise the 2nd PI goal. They argue that in public imagination 
PsyOps connotes manipulation and deception, and if PI is not clearly separated from 
PsyOps they believe, reporters would increasingly seek information from other sources. 
As a consequence, a force commander would lose his most important means to achieve 
the 1st PI goal.
f h4 PI goal: Establish a free and open press reporting policy; use press pools only 
when necessary
The 4th goal that guided Pi’s activities aims to maintain credible relations with the press, 
deemed of cardinal importance to accomplish the 1st goal. It is an invitation to allow the 
media to evaluate without restrictions the missions’ achievements; to show that NATO 
had no hidden agenda in the Balkans and worked, as it said, to create a safe environment 
for people in Bosnia and Kosovo (Idsoe 8/6/2004).
All CPIOs refer to the open media policy as a result o f the lessons learned from the 
1991 Gulf War, and particularly the controversial media pools.97 Moreover, a restrictive
97 The policy on media pools generally limited journalists’ freedom of movement, demanding that they be 
accompanied by military escorts, and sustained a stereotypical perception of military organisations as 
secret and manipulative. Van Dyke, who himself was involved in censoring reporters’ pool products 
during the 1991 Gulf War, explains: ‘It is part of the right to belong to a pool, that you have to submit 
your pool products to a military officer for review. And after we had reviewed the products we would 
determine if there was anything classified that might be reported. If so, then it had to go through a process 
of remission, where you had to try to convince the reporter to take the stuff out o f the story. If media 
disagreed we needed to refer the issue to the US Department of Defence, so they would make a decision 
about what to release. And again this was all viewed by the media as just a way to control and to censor
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media policy would stand out in contrast to the democratic ideals the international 
community strove to promote in the Balkans (Van Dyke 13/4/2004).
5th PI goal: Grant the media access to all operational activities and release all 
information, within the limits of operational security and troop safety
t f iThe 5 goal is closely linked to the one just presented and likewise aimed to create 
credible relations with the press. However, it added one restriction, the policy should 
not put into jeopardy the security of the troops or the conduct of future operations (Van 
Dyke 17/3/04; Idsoe 8/6/2004).
t h6 PI goal: Exert no control/censorship over press; adopt a policy o f ‘security at the 
source*
In the same vein, the 6th goal aimed at protecting the troops and the operation in the 
context of the free and open media policy. This goal did not refer to the dissemination 
of information, however, but to preventing reporters from getting access to classified 
information. This so-called ‘security at the source’-policy aimed to eliminate the need 
for the kind of censorship the media often associate with and dislike about military 
operations.
their products. So it was not a popular tactic’ (Van Dyke 13/4/2004, Idsoe 8/6/2004). Not all officers 
convey similar negative experiences with the media with regard to the pool policy in the 1991 Gulf War 
(Duncan 2000: 128-9). Scholars from media studies, on the other hand, generally accord that the policy 
was unpopular among reporters (Ottosen 1994: 25-34; Knightley 2003: 490-93). Adding to this view, 
Strobel (1997: 44) holds that contrary to the press corps’ attitudes the pool policy generally enjoyed 
popular support. P. Taylor (2000b: 187-89) accepts that the media was critical to pools, but notes that for 
all practical purposes most reporters went along with the policy. With regard to the present empirical 
scope, it was only on exceptional occasions that NATO organised media pools, and then as a facilitative 
rather than a restrictive measure. For example, when IFOR and KFOR conducted operations in remote 
areas and the press had difficulties getting there by their own means or in time, NATO could designate, 
for instance, a helicopter to the press (Van Dyke 13/4/2004; Clifford 27/4/2004; Idsoe 8/6/2004).
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In practice, the three CPIOs applied the 4th, 5th, and 6th PI goal by encouraging troops to 
talk to reporters but without revealing classified information. PI trained everyone from 
the highest to the lowest level to deal with the media. Among other things, each soldier 
received a pocket-card stipulating that they could talk within their area of responsibility 
with reporters, but that they should not speculate, not talk about future operations, not 
give classified information, nor specific locations of troops (Clifford and Wilton 2000: 
27-28; Idsoe 26/3/2004; Van Dyke 13/4/2004).
7 PI goal: Use internal information to inform troops
This goal aimed to qualify ordinary troops to be ‘unofficial spokespersons’ and to keep 
them motivated, capable and efficient (Van Dyke 13/4/2004; Idsoe 8/6/2004).
8th PI goal: Synchronise and harmonise PI with Operations, Intelligence, Logistics, 
PsyOps, Political Advisor, etc.
The 3rd PI goal was to co-ordinate with PsyOps and CIMIC. But the 8th PI goal extends 
co-ordination to include a range of other assets available to a force commander, notably 
Operations.98 The three CPIOs characterise this as an operational innovation, and refer 
to IFOR as the first time it was applied, at least in a NATO context. Van Dyke 
(30/3/2004) holds that this idea turned PI into an operational function readily available 
to force commanders to influence conflicts and as such constituted a revolution in the 
field of PI. Clifford calls it a ‘turning-point in military-media relationships, [that] 
sparked a radical rethink of PI and operational media handling in NATO and in many of 
its member nations’ (Clifford and Wilton 2000: 13). In the same vein, Idsoe (26/3/2004)
98 Siegel (1998: 118-22) concurs. Vickers (2000: 62) and Brown (2002b: 43) show how diplomatic and 
political establishments also direct themselves to co-ordinate their PI campaigns.
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asserts that these experiences later became part of NATO’s doctrines and henceforth 
formed part of all Pi-planning.
2 . 2.2 Commander's intentions
The above-mentioned eight goals provided general guidance to the PI function within 
NATO. In addition, the CPIOs refer to more mission-specific PI instructions from their 
superior. In the present cases, the directions to the CPIOs were largely identical. Two 
intentions from their force commanders are particularly relevant here.
Commander’s 1st intention: Develop a proactive PI campaign
NATO basically used two PI policies on the dissemination of information an active and 
a passive." When PI was active it should do its utmost to get reporters’ attention and 
convince them of NATO’s message (Idsoe 18/3/2004). According to Van Dyke 
(30/3/2004), this proactive policy entailed that: ‘We set our public agenda, instead of 
waiting for someone else to set the agenda for us and force us to react in a defensive 
manner to the press corps. We needed these active information efforts to promote the 
public understanding and achieve the broad public support required by NATO’. The 
proactive policy was also a way to implement the 2nd PI goal of providing reporters with 
timely information. It facilitated that authority to release information to a large extent 
was delegated to the local PI and avoided unnecessary delays in processing information 
to the media. In both operations the PI policy was generally active, as Idsoe (26/3/2004) 
notes: ‘In KFOR 5 we were active, very active, to get our messages out’.
"  Siegel (1998: 40-2) confirms this position. From a more general perspective the experienced reporter 
Strobel (1997: 228-29) strongly recommends that military campaigns should be proactive ‘not just 
defensive. Once on the defensive, it is exponentially more difficult for commanders (or anyone else) to 
make their case’.
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A passive policy implied that PI held a low profile. The posture was more reactive and 
restricted to answering questions when asked. To ensure consistency of message PI 
prepared lists with questions and answers in advance. So ‘passive’ does not reflect the 
level of activity but describes Pi’s level of initiative in its relation with the press (Idsoe 
18/3/2004).
Commander’s 2nd intention: Maintain credible relations with the press
Presenting the 2nd PI goal, emphasis was given to the cardinal importance attached to 
maintain credible relations with the press (see 2.2.1).100 The CPIOs perceive this as P i’s 
Achilles’ heel. PI could not use the media as a channel to reach its final targets, and thus 
to accomplish its 1st PI goal, if it did not maintain credible relations with the press.
Idsoe (26/3/2004) asserts: ‘If you lose your credibility, you may just as well return
home. The media will not believe you and choose other sources of information’.
Journalists that covered the war in Bosnia had multiple sources, often with competing
objectives and agendas, on which the journalists could base their stories.101 IFOR could
not take for granted that the media would turn to their troops for information. Nor could
NATO take for granted that journalists would believe the alliance’s version of events.
Van Dyke (13/4/2004) elaborates:
[Credibility] is . . .  the most important aspect of communication in today’s 
modem age. Because we have so many channels of communication, 
people can select from different channels of communication. They can get 
on the Internet and have endless sources of information to choose from.
100 Siegel (1997: 170) sustains this assertion and Avruch et al. (1999: 43) point to the high priority force 
commanders gave this matter.
101 Strobel (1997: 227-30) and Gow et al. (1996b: 7) support this view.
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Studies have shown people generally gather news and information from 
the sources that they trust and deem to be most credible. So if we want to 
have our information used; if we want to have people to receive 
information and to use information, the information has to be credible.
Once we lose credibility, then our audiences would go to other sources ..
. on information about what we are doing. And those sources of 
information may not be as trustworthy, they may be antagonist, they may 
be critical, let’s say, about the policy to deploy troops to a country. So we 
have to maintain credible relations with the press. Credibility is vital. . .  
because if  you lose credibility then you can’t communicate.
In sum, together with the eight PI goals (see 2.2.1), the commander’s intentions defined 
P i’s political and operational framework. Above, the six cases have showed in a general 
sense how these policies were practised in actual operational activities (see 2.1). Now 
follows an examination of how these guidelines influenced P i’s mode of operation.
The primordial importance the CPIOs attach to the commander’s 2nd intention warrants 
a more detailed presentation of how they performed to maintain credible relations with 
the press, thus this is explored at length in a separate section (see 2.2.5). The CPIOs’ 
modes of operation also share other features. As will be shown, it was guided by the just 
outlined policies and intentions (see 2.2.1 and 2.2.2) to have consistent messages (see 
2.2.3) and a unity of effort among troops and international organisations to achieve 
NATO’s political and military ends (see 2.2.4).
2 . 2.3 Message strategy
In order to achieve the vital 1st PI goal (see 2.2.1) NATO formulated a few cardinal 
messages and gave PI the task of ensuring that relevant target groups understood and 
supported their content. As the cases illustrate, PI disseminated a myriad of messages 
adapted to the accomplishment of specific operational tasks, yet these were co­
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ordinated in a message strategy that promoted NATO’s overall policy.102 This section 
addresses how PI organised messages to keep them consistent, in an effort to enhance 
public understanding of NATO’s information and policy.
The CPIOs apply the term message to stipulate what NATO wanted the media to 
convey about an issue. Although NATO had no formal structure for their message (Van 
Dyke 13/4/2004), the CPIOs refer to the structure in comparable manners but using 
slightly different terms. Idsoe’s three categories of messages are useful to clarity this 
structure; this shows how the messages were divided and delimits areas of 
responsibility.103 The first category was master messages. These derived from the North 
Atlantic Council and were of a general and relatively long-term nature. The overall 
master message stipulated the political visions of the missions and reflected how 
decision-makers wanted to portray the alliance (Van Dyke 13/4/2004). An example is 
‘KFOR provides a secure and safe environment for all the people in Kosovo’ (Idsoe 
26/3/2004). Another category of messages was the subordinate messages. They 
supported the content of the visions but addressed more specific military issues. To take 
one example, case 5 illustrates how COMKFOR dealt with armed groups that 
challenged the master messages. He wanted the relevant EAAGs to understand two
102 The importance of disseminating coherent messages is emphasised by a number of practitioners and 
scholars. With regard to the IFOR case, Siegel (1998: 115) makes this point although she primarily 
elaborates on the co-ordinating activities necessary to achieve it. The centrality of messages in NATO PI 
campaign during Operation Allied Force features in Campbell (1999: 31-2), Muirhead (1999), Shea 
(2001: 202), and Vickers (2000: 61-2). Beyond a NATO context, Leonard et al. (2002: 14-18) and Brown 
(2004: 21) present the importance diplomatic communities attach to message strategies in their PI 
campaigns.
103 Van Dyke (13/4/2004) follows a similar logic but applies a slightly different categorisation. He uses 
the term ‘theme’ much like Idsoe uses master messages, describing a broader issue-area that contains 
several subordinated messages. To Van Dyke, messages can be directly presented to the media. Idsoe 
refers to such formulations as talking points. Idsoe’s categorisation will be used here.
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messages: a) ‘Demobilise and leave the Presevo valley as free men’ and b) ‘if  not, you 
will be imprisoned’. It was the responsibility of the CPIOs to formulate such 
subordinated messages. At the lowest level in the message strategies were the so-called 
talking points. They aimed to promote the higher-ranking but rather general messages 
and were specifically formulated to be directly used in interviews, press statements and 
conversations (Idsoe 18/02/2003; 26/3/2004).
The messages from these three categories formed part of a message strategy that with a 
variety of formulations promoted a few fundamental ideas. Master messages, 
subordinate messages and talking points were connected in a system, much like the 
roots of a tree, all coming together to support one overall master message, one may say 
-  with the risk of taking the analogy too far -  to give ‘the tree’s trunk’ extensive 
support. In sum, this provided NATO troops with a pool of talking points, a common 
platform from which they could project messages that were consistent and conveyed 
resolution. In short, it allowed NATO to speak with one voice. The categories -  master 
messages, messages, and talking points -  will now be described in more detail.
IFOR had more than a dozen master messages. Van Dyke (2003: 17-19) presents the 
most important ones as:
• NATO works with new partners for noble ends.
• IFOR is the right instrument to support the Bosnian peace process.
• IF OR is a helper and a leader.104
KFOR’s master message has already been introduced. Clifford (27/4/2004) presents the 
very initial messages in the following terms:
104 NATO (2000) also projects these messages.
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• KFOR is not an invader; KFOR is not a liberator.
• KFOR is in control.105
• KFOR is subordinated to UNMIK.
These eventually developed, and at the time when Idsoe (26/3/2004) was KFOR’s CPIO 
the master messages were:
• KFOR provides a secure and safe environment for all the people in 
Kosovo.
• Violence has significantly decreased since KFOR has arrived.106
Although the CPIOs present their master messages in different ways, they basically
communicate the same message: IFOR and KFOR provide a safe environment in their 
area of responsibility. The main difference relates to the different political visions for 
the peace operations. In Bosnia, NATO’s political objective is a democratic state; in 
Kosovo this issue is not addressed. The reason is that the international community, 
represented by the UN Security Council, remained undetermined about Kosovo’s 
political status. Legally Kosovo remains a province in Yugoslavia, although most 
Kosovo Albanians hope it eventually shall gain status as a sovereign state.107 PI had to 
balance its messages to maintain the local population’s support without supporting their 
demand of a ‘free and sovereign state of Kosovo’ (Clifford 27/4/2004).
The concern to portray NATO in a consistent manner did not stop at the point of 
disseminating messages. PI had media analysis groups that evaluated all local and 
opinion leading international media. In KFOR 5, this team consisted of 10 people that
105 This master message was supported by, among others messages, ‘KFOR is militarily capable but non­
offensive’.
106 NATO (2005) confirms these two messages.
107 On this matter see the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000: 259-79).
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daily evaluated whether P i’s messages were projected in the media as intended. Based 
on their analysis the CPIOs would decide whether these projections were satisfactory. If 
not, new efforts -  possibly with slightly refined talking points or with different tactics -  
would be carried out. This undertaking would be routinely repeated for as long as need 
be (Idsoe 26/3/2004).
Further, it is interesting to note that the CPIOs did not only convey messages in a verbal 
manner. Non-verbal communication was equally important. The Special Representative 
of the UN Secretary-General’s reluctance in case 3 to sit under a NATO banner 
illustrates the importance skilled communicators attach to what Clifford (27/4/2004) 
consistently refers to as subliminal messages. By this he means information conveyed to 
an audience in a manner that the latter does not pay conscious attention to.
The CPIOs provide several examples of how they used this feature of social 
communication. Van Dyke (17/3/2004), for example, explains the choice of IFOR’s 
Coalition Press and Information Centre (CPIC) in the casino of Sarajevo’s major hotel -  
the Holiday Inn -  with the interest in having a ‘first rate press centre’ to communicate 
the high quality of IFOR and promote the idea that the situation in Bosnia was returning 
to normalcy. Clifford argues in an identical manner for the choice of the Grand Hotel in 
Pristina as KFOR’s CPIC (see case 3).
Based on the same assumptions, Idsoe took pains to find convenient spots to conduct 
press conferences: ‘It is so important where it is said’ (18/3/2004. His verbal emphasis). 
Important meetings with the press were organised to take place in a physical context 
that conveyed NATO’s message. For example, it was no coincidence in case 5 that the 
CPIO arranged for his Force Commander to be ‘on his way’ as he delivered a quick 
statement outside the headquarters before taking off in one of two helicopters placed
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just behind him. The undertaking aimed to portray COMKFOR 5’s resolution and 
capability in the eyes of reporters. He explicitly opened his statement by informing the 
crowd that he only had a few minutes with the press before he had to go on. To 
cameramen the helicopters provided, according to Idsoe, an irresistible backdrop to the 
image of COMKFOR giving a forceful statement. Idsoe explains that the same 
statement in a conference room would have been less convincing. Obviously 
photographers could have avoided the helicopters in their image but the CPIO explains 
that cameramen want such backgrounds in their images, simply because it helps them 
deliver a ‘good’ story to their editorial desk. After answering three questions 
COMKFOR went right to the helicopter and left in order ‘to give a little extra show’ in 
the words of Idsoe (26/3/2004). It was all arranged by PI for the sole purpose of 
reinforcing KFOR’s message to the armed groups and Kosovo’s population.
In this manner the message strategy organised numerous explicit and subliminal 
messages in a unified and consistent strategy to promote a few master messages that 
supported NATO’s political goals. Moreover, the strategy endeavoured to clarify the 
alliance’s policy, to establish facts as NATO troops saw them, and to ensure that the 
media perceived certain basics and the general situations in the same way as NATO 
did.108 This included countering disinformation.109 These messages were then 
disseminated from multiple NATO sources in a co-ordinated manner. P i’s mode of
108 The term facts is emphasised here to underline that it shall be used in a subjective, rather than an 
objective, sense in the remainder of the thesis.
109 For instance, at some point a local newspaper published a trailer stipulating that next day’s edition 
would reveal KFOR’s plans to construct a wall at the bridge in the town of Mitrovica in Kosovo. The 
bridge was a sensitive political issue at the time. COMKFOR 5’s immediate public announcement stating: 
‘I have no intention to build a wall’ deflated the ‘news’ before the story was ever published (Idsoe 
26/3/2004).
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operation to co-ordinate its information activities in order to achieve a unity of effort is 
the topic of the next section.110
2 . 2.4 Unity o f effort
Here, the first part shall address PFs rationale for and form of co-ordination with other 
NATO-assets and external actors -  that is PFs horizontal co-ordination. Then follows a 
presentation of PFs vertical co-ordination among PI staff down the chain of 
communication to the brigades, as well as up to NATO headquarters and relevant 
ministries of defence.
Horizontal co-ordination
The horizontal co-ordination derives directly from the 3rd and 8th PI goals’ instruction to 
synchronise PI with other functions. The CPIOs regard this as a novelty introduced to 
NATO during IFOR (see 2.2.1).
Previously, PI was seen as a support function along with logistics and administrative 
assistance. In general terms, this delimited PFs task to informing journalists about what
110 Unity of effort is a NATO term, according to Siegel (1998: 127). In the field of UN peacekeeping the 
assumption that co-ordination at the highest level is a condition for an expedient PI campaign is similarly 
shared in the major evaluation o f such operations during the 1990s (UN 2000: 25). Cloughly (1996: 59) 
and Kiehl (2001: 136) echo this view. Pointing to the experience from NATO’s Operation Allied Force, 
Campbell (1999: 33) and Brown (2002b: 44) convey the same point. Referring to the same operation 
Freedman (2000: 340) comments: ‘A situation in which every military move must first be checked with a 
focus group is a caricature but not so much that it can readily be dismissed’. Did Freedman know that PI 
staff was involved in choosing the bombing targets, as Vickers (2000) observes? Extending the scope of 
PI activities to the realm o f public diplomacy mentioned in the literature review, Lord (1998) identifies 
the lack of co-ordination as a major challenge for practitioners. Brown (2003b) comments that a sustained 
effort to co-ordinate PI activities in a military coalition at the political level of coalition members’ 
capitals, was new when Alastair Campbell introduced it in the War on Terror in 2001. Nonetheless, it 
resembles endeavours undertaken during IFOR and KFOR. Further, an ambitious co-ordination initiative 
is found in the 1999 US Presidential Decision Directive 68 that established the International Public 
Information Co-ordinating Group to ensure unity of effort in the PI activities of the National Security 
Council, Pentagon, US Information Agency, the US Agency for International Development, and related 
governmental agencies (Brown 2002b: 43; Armistead 2004: 5).
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other functions were doing. In the present cases, however, all three Force Commanders 
used PI as a line function. They moved PI from the ‘tail’ to the ‘teeth’ to use the army 
command of language -  or in more correct military terms to the line functions; that is, to 
the operational capacities with which armed forces traditionally have delivered strategic 
results and which has been regarded as the exclusive domain of those who apply lethal 
force (see 1.1). With this new operational take, the Force Commanders included PI in 
the Command group, that is, in the circles of the operational decision-makers, and used 
PI along with traditional line functions to achieve operational objectives (Idsoe 
26/3/2004; Clifford 27/4/2004; Van Dyke 30/3/04).111
To illustrate this point, Van Dyke quotes a media report on a staff meeting chaired by
Commander of IFOR’s Multi-National Division North, Major General Bill Nash:
Immediately behind Nash are two rows of staff officers. In wartime, the 
first row would be operational staff providing instant updates on fire 
support, air support, armour movements, intelligence, and logistics. But 
this isn’t w a r . . .  Sitting behind Nash instead is a staff more familiar to a 
big-city mayor: a POLAD [Political Advisor], an expert on civilian 
relations, representatives of two joint commissions, a public affairs 
specialist, and a staff lawyer. Traditional war fighters are relegated to the 
back bench.112
PI was also closely co-ordinated with Operations in KFOR (Idsoe 26/3/04). Clifford 
(27/4/2004) points out that at times the two assets were synchronised to the extent that
111 Siegel (1997: 180-82) supports this view.
112 Cited in Siegel (1998: 48).
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they should be conceived as perception operations, by which he means the coherent 
application of words, images and action to influence target groups’ perceptions.113
In practice, the actual synchronisation of activities was implemented in a variety of 
ways. As Clifford (27/4/2004) remarks: ‘It is difficult to template it. You could have a 
template on what you ought to try to achieve but how you actually gonna do that differs 
in time and space and with different personalities’. Still, the three CPIOs share a 
common understanding of the way they co-ordinated with others. The most important 
features of this understanding are now set forth, including P i’s controversial co­
ordination with PsyOps.
The cardinal role of a force commander in a military operation made the CPIOs’ 
relation to him particularly important for the way PI was used in the overall missions. 
All three CPIOs describe this particular relation in professional and cordial terms. They 
had free access to their respective force commanders throughout the day but made use 
of somewhat different routines to ensure that their function sustained his endeavours.
Idsoe’s and Van Dyke’s arrangements were largely similar. The former’s description of 
the routines is instructive. It commenced each morning with a 15-30 minutes 
‘COMKFOR’s media meeting’ that gathered COMKFOR, the CPIO, the spokesperson 
and the Political Advisor. The standard agenda was a brief on media reports followed by 
the CPIO’s proposals for talking points of the day. These were discussed and decided 
upon. The meetings helped COMKFOR to prepare his talking points, which he would 
use when meeting with people throughout the day. It also gave PI directions, which the
113 This resembles what in the literature is referred to as perception management (see footnote 66).
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CPIO would incorporate in the day’s PI guidance as ‘fresh’ talking points. This 
guidance would then be distributed to other PIOs up and down the chain of 
communication (see next section). The guidance would also go to other high-level 
officers in different headquarters functions who frequently used the talking points when 
carrying out their respective duties (Idsoe 26/3/2004).114
In addition, PI co-ordinated horizontally with various other functions, notably with 
Operations and Intelligence. At the highest level this was done in the Command Group. 
It was here that approaches to up-coming tasks were decided upon. Case 2 ,4  and 5 
show how the CPIOs were involved in discussions on how to achieve the best tactical 
results. It allowed PI to ensure that Commanders considered how their operational 
activities might be perceived by different target groups and to suggest how PI might 
contribute to deliver the desired outcome.
The other dimension of the horizontal co-ordination went beyond the planning process 
and continued into the actual implementation. The cases show how PI reinforced other 
functions’ impact on targets and achieved tactical results without the application of 
physical force. In the two first cases, for example, PI and Operations deterred the 
warring parties from challenging IFOR’s troops and the democratic process by 
clarifying COMIFOR’s intentions and exposing his military capability and, if  need be, 
readiness to use it. PI invited reporters to cover, for instance, how Operations 
dismantled checkpoint Sierra (case 1) and ensured public security prior to Election Day 
(case 2). In case 4, COMKFOR 1 used PI to deter Serbia from reinvading Kosovo by
114 Van Dyke (30/3/2004) had a largely similar arrangement with his Force Commander, while Clifford 
(27/4/2004) used informal exchanges o f views when the need arose.
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ensuring that the media covered NATO’s robust military exercise in Serbia’s vicinity. 
Further, COMKFOR 5 used PI to convey NATO’s decision to allow Serbian forces to 
re-enter the Presevo valley and his resolve to suppress any resistance to that decision 
(case 5). Allegedly, the Force Commanders achieved these objectives by efficient use of 
their PI function. Since potentially lethal force was not applied to targets in these cases, 
we may say that PI operated as a non-lethal enforcement measure J 15
This feature of PI was particularly useful in IFOR and KFOR that were tasked to 
facilitate peace processes. Had NATO relied on traditional military means, ie physical 
force, to achieve its military objectives, they could have undermined the overall 
international effort to build peace in Bosnia and Kosovo that is based on the idea that 
political struggles shall be fought by non-violent means. As case 1 suggests, NATO 
governments’ reluctance to apply physical force in Bosnia limited the Force 
Commander’s room of manoeuvre. It restricted commanders from using their weapons 
directly to achieve operational tasks and spurred them to use information instead. This 
led to a situation where IFOR’s ground forces were, in Clifford’s (27/4/2004) 
formulation, not given ‘the rules of engagement to use any of its tanks or its guns or its 
bullets. So the only tool really that the Force Commander had was information’. Van 
Dyke adds that nor could leaders of former warring factions who sought international 
acceptance use physical force. As a consequence, they often chose press events over 
military force to achieve their objectives.
115 Note that others have described information activities as non-lethal weapons. This includes Kuehl 
(1996: 185), Schwartau (1996: 244), and Siegel (1998: 146-49).
146
Another novel aspect of P i’s role at the level of implementation was that in all three 
missions PI had a desk in the Joint Operations Centre. This may be seen as the 
operational ‘nerve centre’ that receives information from all forces in theatre and is, 
within certain limitations, authorised to react immediately upon it. The PI desk was 
manned around the clock with two representatives and gave PI access to the most 
‘accurate, correct, and timely information’ available within IFOR, which facilitated the 
accomplishment of the 2nd PI goal subject to the security of the troops and future 
operations (see 2.2.1).
The third aspect of the horizontal co-ordination to be mentioned here relates to a force 
commander’s three primary means of communication with audiences outside his chain 
of command, namely PI, CIMIC, and Information Operations. The latter function 
comprises PsyOps.
CIMIC is a function NATO uses to liaise with civilians in theatre. CIMIC is involved in 
a multitude of projects to help the local population rebuild their countries, for example, 
by restoring essential public services such as water, power and public transport. IFOR 
and KFOR regarded these undertakings as a source of potential goodwill that could help 
NATO accomplish its 1st PI goal. Thus, PI drew reporters’ attention to CIMIC-activities 
as means to disseminate NATO’s messages (Van Dyke 13/4/2004; Idsoe 18/2/2004).
It is Pi’s relation to PsyOps which is a prominent source of controversies.116 The latter 
term is an ancient military asset which by means of social communication, including
116 Traditionally, NATO distinguishes between PsyOps and PI, in that the former can be authorised to 
disseminate false information, while the latter may only release truthful information. Moreover, the 
former’s targets are limited to within the theatre and often to very specific groups, while the latter aims at
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deception and manipulation, aims at undermining the will of an enemy. It has 
increasingly been used to influence the attitudes and loyalties of a broader scope of 
actors that may influence the outcome of a military operation.1,7 The CPIOs concur that 
there are obvious advantages of close co-ordination between PI and PsyOps, since it 
enhances the consistency of messages and the unity of effort. Their approach to this 
cooperation differed, however. Clifford (27/4/2004) took the integration furthest to what 
he characterises as the ‘melting of PsyOps, CIMIC and PF, while both Idsoe 
(26/3/2004) and Van Dyke (13/4/2004) advocate the functions be kept clearly separated. 
Their concern is that in some missions PsyOps may for operational imperatives be 
authorised to disseminate less than truthful, if  not directly false, information, which is 
likely to jeopardise the credibility they deem vital to achieve the 1st PI goal (see 2.2.1). 
In none of the three relevant missions, however, did the CPIOs find this to be the case. 
Both functions were open and transparent and used the same political-military guidance 
and messages. In other words, also PsyOps was truthful (Van Dyke 13/4/2004; Idsoe 
26/3/2004; Clifford 27/4/2004).118
informing the general public in theatre and worldwide. In addition, PsyOps communicates to its targets 
through channels it controls, like hand bill programs, PsyOps radio-stations, and advertisements in 
television and newspapers. PI does not own such channels but communicates through the independent 
press over which PI exerts no control (Clifford 27/4/2004). This distinction is increasingly blurred, since 
PI targets specific groups when used as a line function. Moreover, the validity o f the idea that PI does not 
control its channels of communication can be questioned when many local media uncritically 
disseminated Pi’s information from weekly columns in major local newspapers to unedited transmission 
of PI video cassettes on Kosovo’s TV-stations. In addition, the same idea is challenged when PI 
increasingly uses the internet as a direct platform of communication to its targets. It even created a 
situation whereby many Kosovo Albanian newspapers would take KFOR’s daily updates from the 
internet and publish them unedited (Idsoe 18/2/2004; Clifford 27/4/2004).
117 Many believe such measures are highly relevant in the War on Terror (see 1.5.2). Seen from the 
adversary’s perspective, Armistead (2004: 3), among others, suggests that the attacks in the US on 11 
September 2001 are best understood as a strategic PsyOps campaign.
118 The notion that IFOR’s PsyOps function disseminated accurate information concurs with Siegel’s 
(1997: 169) findings during two extensive field trips to the mission in Bosnia.
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Clifford is convinced that the concern about disseminating accurate information is 
higher within than outside military ranks. He observes that civilian organisations do not 
distinguish between their means of communication. Where NATO operates with three 
different functions, civilians, like UNHCR, basket them in one task and give the overall 
responsibility to one person. Clifford (27/4/2004) argues: ‘Every big corporation and 
every government does it. So why should we be any different? . . .  The OSCE don’t see 
any difficulties with all of this and they simply don’t see any difference. They think we 
are barking mad to try and differentiate’.119
IFOR took a different approach. It kept the functions separate and instituted the Joint 
Information Co-ordinating Committee to ensure unity of effort. This was a weekly 
meeting that synchronised the three functions’ messages and did matrix planning to 
decide who would disseminate what and when. This committee played a crucial role in 
information campaigns, among other activities, during case 2 (Van Dyke 17/3/04). 
KFOR 5’s co-ordination of its means of communication was much more limited. It was 
reduced to PI passing its messages to Information Operations and took place only at a 
general level, more specifically in the forum of the Joint Operation Planning Group 
comprising a broader scope of operational functions (Idsoe 26/3/2004).
Horizontal co-ordination was important not only to achieve specific objectives but also 
to enhance NATO’s credibility and avoid uncertainty about its intentions. It was a daily 
challenge to ensure consistent and unequivocal messages. Still, it occasionally happened 
that troops unknowingly disseminated divergent information to reporters leaving the
119 Avruch et al. (1999: 10) support this point.
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latter to question whether NATO had control, or whether it tried to withhold 
information or mislead the public (Clifford and Wilton 2000: 22-23).
An incident related to case 5 demonstrates this point. Despite all PI staff acting with the 
best of intentions the result was negative. During its first phase a PI spokesperson called 
local journalists and told them that two Russian soldiers had been killed in the Presevo 
valley. At the same time a KFOR staffer working inside the valley informed Serbian 
media that ‘someone’ had killed one KFOR-soldier. The stories were projected in the 
media and journalists called the CPIC for clarification: how many KFOR soldiers had 
been killed? And who had killed them? The PIOs did not know for sure and had 
prepared no talking points. It turned out that it was one Russian soldier whose body had 
been counted twice, first at the American hospital where he was initially brought, then 
at the Russian hospital where his body was transferred after he died. The two NATO 
staff that initially released the information had paid tribute to the 2nd PI goal’s 
stipulation that journalists should have timely information. They failed to deliver 
accurate information as the same goal also instructs. As a result, the PI staff that now 
insisted on giving accurate information was unable to do so at a pace that satisfied 
journalists. The press raised questions about whether NATO was trying to withhold 
information and created a situation that negatively affected the mission’s credibility 
(Idsoe 26/3/2004).
The CPIOs’ struggle to establish unity of effort extended well beyond NATO’s own 
ranks and aimed to establish the perception of a united international effort to the peace
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processes in Bosnia and Kosovo.] 20 Their main vehicle to this end became the daily 
press briefings at the CPIC. Van Dyke (17/3/04) elaborates: ‘I found it strange that 
IFOR would do their briefing, then the UN would do theirs, then the High 
Representative would do his. I proposed early on that we would do a joint briefing. We 
could get authority with a joint approach to this’. The major civilian organisations 
agreed. So spokespersons from the major international organisations shared the briefing 
stage and in turn presented their statements and answered questions from the floor.
The briefings were not only a valuable source of information for reporters. During the 
official exchange of questions and answers and in less formal conversations PI also 
learned what was on the minds and agendas of the media and civilian agencies. This 
information was collected and communicated to NATO’s political and military 
leaders.121
Pi’s co-ordination with international organisations’ went beyond sharing the stage 
during the daily press briefings. It included the harmonisation of messages. Throughout 
IFOR’s existence the respective spokespersons met for a 30-minute pre-briefing 
meeting. Here they exchanged the messages they planned to convey to reporters that 
day and identified possible disagreements and conflicting messages.
120 Siegel (1998: 176) confirms this point with respect to IFOR’s external co-ordination with other 
international organisation in Bosnia, such as OSCE, Office of the High Representative, UNHCR, and the 
World Bank. Williamson (2000: 182-83) holds that NATO member countries cooperated at a strategic 
level on the PI tasks related to IFOR. Moreover, PI in NATO headquarters co-ordinate with member 
countries’ governments, embassies, policy and research institutions, NGO’s etc. (NATO Handbook 2001: 
166-7).
121 Van Dyke (13/4/2004). KFOR 1 used a similar arrangement (Clifford 27/4/2004). At the time Idsoe 
(26/3/2004) was CPIO, however, media interest had waned, which reduced the press briefings to a bi­
weekly event and with much reduced KFOR participation simply because it had little information that 
would interest reporters.
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The pre-briefing meetings aimed at harmonising the views of the international 
organisations, but acknowledging that their mandates and structures for funding were 
different, IFOR could not and would not oppose the projection of divergent messages. 
IFOR’s mandate was to provide peace and stability, while UNHCR’s mandate, for 
instance, was to solve the problems related to millions of refugees and internally 
displaced persons. While IFOR’s contingents were financially sustained directly by the 
troop-contributing ministries of defence, UNHCR funding was much less predictable 
relying on voluntary contributions from governments and private donors. Hence, 
UNHCR needed to appeal in an emotional way to contributors in order to accomplish its 
task in Bosnia. Often, the result was conflicting messages. Van Dyke (17/3/04) recalls: 
‘So we might be out there one day saying “everything is peaceful” or it is not as bad as 
media say. And then the UNHCR Spokesperson would say: “Everything is terrible. We 
are at the verge of chaos”.’
For such reasons, PI did not always succeed in harmonising its messages with the other 
international actors. Yet, they would agree to disagree. This approach still maintained a 
sense of unity of effort and enhanced each organisation’s credibility. The daily press 
briefings served to signal a joint international approach to the peace process in the 
Balkans and to give the missions some time to adjust its own messages in light of those 
of the other international organisations.
Vertical co-ordination
Pi’s mode of operation to accomplish a unity of effort with other NATO functions and 
non-NATO actors has been described above. This section will depict how PI worked to 
achieve the same goal within their own function among the PIOs up and down, what
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Clifford calls, the chain o f  communication. He makes the point, when recalling the
initial days of KFOR’s existence:
I was speaking on my mobile telephone with Jamie Shea, Alastair 
Campbell, and the other people in the United States, and their equivalents 
in other capitals. We were trying to work out, what was the message. We 
were going to make sure that the messages were being co-ordinated. And 
there was simply not enough time to go down the torturous military chain 
of command. And so one of the things that it shows was that you have to 
have a parallel chain of communication. You got to have a chain of 
command but also a parallel chain of communication (Clifford 
27/4/2004).
All CPIOs used such a two-way line of communication up and down the PI levels, from 
NATO headquarters to the battalion PIOs.122 Moreover, both Clifford and Van Dyke 
(30/3/2004) operated in close contact with their PI colleagues in NATO members’ 
capitals in the early days of KFOR and IFOR, respectively. At the time of KFOR 5 such 
contact was unusual (Idsoe 26/3/2004).
For all practical purposes, the linchpin of NATO PI activities in the three missions was 
the CPIO position (see 1.4.1). That is true for target groups in the Balkans and beyond. 
The CPIOs was at the highest PI command level in theatre and ideally best positioned to 
be informed about the situation in Bosnia and Kosovo and also about how force 
commanders wanted to deal with it. That information was available neither in the 
missions’ brigades nor in NATO’s member states. In other words, crucial information 
for tactical and strategic success was gathered from the theatre level. How the CPIOs
122 Siegel (1998: 49-55) refers to this as the ‘information chain’.
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co-ordinated vertically in the organisation varied slightly but IFOR’s procedures are 
illustrative.
The above mentioned daily CPIC press briefings undertaken in cooperation with other 
major international actors was normally the major daily PI event (see also 2.2.5). 
Preparing for that, the CPIO would call SHAPE’S PI desk to synchronise the daily 
messages facilitating that Brussels and Sarajevo spoke with one voice. Following up on 
yesterday’s PI report, the CPIO would give SHAPE the main findings from the 
morning’s media analysis and if need be inform SHAPE about recent incidents. SHAPE 
on their side would give IFOR a summary of decisions and views aired during their 
morning staff meeting. SHAPE’S and IFOR’s PIOs would then co-ordinate their 
messages, and IFOR would incorporate that information in the planning of the daily 
press briefing (Van Dyke 30/3/04).
After the press briefings PI began to prepare for the PI report to be finalised and 
disseminated by the evening. So they recollected the questions journalists had posed, 
and continued to analyse media reports to see which issues were projected. In addition, 
PI was in contact with SHAPE and NATO headquarters by phone or email throughout 
the day and received their guidance. The media analysis section provided PI with 
evaluations of how and to which extent IFOR’s messages were being disseminated. This 
assisted the CPIO in his effort to formulate relevant PI guidance for the next day. In 
addition, the analysis served to identify emerging strategic issues and allowed PI to 
meet them in an expedient manner. P i’s conclusions were then presented in the evening 
report and disseminated up and down the chain of communication. As a result, every
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level shared the same strategic PI guidance and was able to speak with the same voice 
(Van Dyke 30/3/04).123
IFOR’s PI had, as one would expect, no authority to instruct PI personnel outside of its 
own ranks. But NATO headquarters had established a mechanism that offered a 
possibility to ensure consistency in messages from IFOR and the national ministries of 
defence with contingents in the mission. IFOR PI used this channel to keep ministries 
informed in a timely manner (Van Dyke 13/4/2004).124
Obviously, the idea of disseminating guidance was that the PIOs, at least down the 
chain of command, would follow it. But as case 3 clearly illustrates the command and 
control that COMKFOR enjoyed over the coalition forces varied. He did not have the 
direct and sole control over KFOR’s contingents that an ideal type command-structure 
stipulates.125 As a consequence, the PICs were largely under the control of different 
national contingents. In some brigades the PIOs had to refer back to their national 
authorities, while in others they were authorised to make decisions on their own. So the 
CPIO had to reconcile the different PI approaches from the national contingents with 
that of NATO and he could only urge the PIOs to follow his guidance. Two years into 
KFOR’s existence the brigades still worked rather autonomously. Initially, their PIOs 
disseminated their own messages rather than those of KFOR. This practice caused the
123 Idsoe (18/2/2004; 26/3/2004) co-ordinated vertically in largely the same manner, the major difference 
being that he disseminated two reports a day -  a PI situation report in the evening and guidance in the 
morning. Clifford’s (27/4/2004) mode of co-ordination compares to the two others but appears slightly 
more autonomous since he operated more independently from his Force Commander and co-ordinated 
directly with the Director of the NATO Office of Information and Press, who holds the highest position 
within the NATO PI function.
124 The efficiency with which this arrangement worked is questioned by Kiehl (2001: 140).
125 Kiehl (2001: 142) takes notice that US PIOs in KFOR, to take one example, were linked to their 
national PI efforts but not to those of KFOR or to other nations’ contingents in the mission.
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dissemination of inconsistent messages that threatened to hamper KFOR’s credibility 
(Idsoe 18/2/2004; Clifford 27/4/2004).
2 . 2.5  Maintain credible relations with the press
The study has now outlined Pi’s message strategy (see 2.2.3) and its efforts to promote 
a unity of effort in the information activities (see 2.2.4) but as Idsoe (18/3/2004) 
remarks: ‘It does not suffice to formulate messages. You have to get them into the 
media’. Presenting the CPIOs’ mode of operation to accomplish the latter task is the 
purpose of this section.
To this end, the Commander’s 2nd PI intention -  maintain credible relations with the 
press -  is instructive. CPIOs’ understanding that credibility is P i’s Achilles’ heel 
illustrates the primordial importance they ascribe to this guideline (see 2.2.2). The 
present section shall explain how the CPIOs proceeded to reach this desired state of 
affairs, by addressing in turn each of the intention’s components. First, it presents the 
press, that is, the channels available to the CPIOs to enhance public understanding and 
support. Second, it elaborates on the PIOs’ relations with the press, before the section 
concludes by describing the way the CPIOs strove to maintain its Credibility vis-a-vis 
the press.
The press
In an actual mission, the press as a term refers to a broad category of reporters all 
engaged in projecting stories to a wider audience through the media. In the three 
missions journalists were employed either directly by newspapers, TV- or radio stations, 
or at a press agency such as Reuters. Others were so-called ‘stringers’, meaning 
freelancers and often locals with limited experience and variable connections in the
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industry. Among the journalists were highly qualified senior defence correspondents 
from agenda-setting media, like the BBC, CNN, and Sky, as well as reporters with little 
relevant background knowledge.
The press corps with which PI worked varied greatly both in quantity and quality 
according to the general media interest in the missions. It was high when IFOR arrived 
in December 1995. 1,100 international and domestic journalists were in Bosnia to cover - 
this deployment, which was particularly controversial in the US and Germany (see case 
1). This rapidly changed when IFOR’s arrival met no significant resistance and seemed 
to achieve its designated task. Then, the media’s interest waned. After some months 
often only a handful of reporters would attend the CPIC press briefings (Van Dyke 
13/4/2004). Similarly, in KFOR 3,500 reporters were accredited to cover the entry into 
Kosovo (see case 1). Four months later most international reporters had left the 
province and were replaced by the just mentioned stringers. One and a half years later 
the press corps in Kosovo totalled some 40-50 reporters. Except for one BBC reporter, 
they were all Albanians (Idsoe 18/02/03; 26/3/2004).126
Media interests may soon increase, however. On the day of Bosnia’s national elections 
in September 1996, for example, some 400 journalists were crowded in the CPIC 
briefing room, the highest number ever during IFOR (Van Dyke 13/4/2004). Although 
outside the scope of the present study, it is informative to draw attention to an incident 
that suddenly created renewed media interest in KFOR. By mid-March 2004 escalating
126 An important reason for this phenomenon may be found in the high-profiled BBC correspondent Kate 
Adie’s (2000: 55) assertion that ‘television news is fascinated by war’. Successful peace support 
operations and slowly progressing nation-building efforts rarely provide the kind o f stories that attracts 
editorial desks’ attention. See also Gowing (2000a: 213-15).
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tensions between different groups particularly around the town of Mitrovica led 
international media to question NATO’s well-established message that ‘KFOR provides 
a secure and safe environment for all the people in Kosovo’. Among other incidents, a 
Norwegian soldier killed a Kosovo Albanian that tried to break through a line of 
separation and NATO sent reinforcements to KFOR. After years of low media interest, 
the situation in Kosovo re-emerged as a main story in international media. Idsoe, now 
serving as the CPIO at NATO’s North Joint Headquarters, was on the telephone for 48 
hours and at least 4 Norwegian reporters flew to Kosovo to cover the situation (Idsoe 
26/3/2004).
Relations
Pi’s relation with the media can be mutually beneficial. PI is interested in reporters as a 
channel to convey their messages to the public. Journalists, on their side, are interested 
in PI as a means to get the kind of stories they can sell.127 This section elaborates on 
three different techniques PI used to deliver information to reporters, which are called 
meeting points, press availabilities and media opportunities. The 2nd, 4th, 5th, and 6th PI 
goals (see 2.2.1) and the commander’s 1st intentions (see 2.2.2) guided these activities.
All CPIOs facilitated a continuous relation with the press by establishing permanent 
meeting points -  the so-called PICs. Initially, IFOR had 10 PICs in Bosnia, Croatia and 
Hungary. The largest was the CPIC established in Sarajevo on the very first day IFOR 
assumed responsibility for Bosnia’s overall security situation. It was here that IFOR 
conducted the by now well-known daily briefings (see 2.2.4). In the same vein, one of
127 An interest which is voiced from the side of the media in Hudson and Stainer (1999: xii), Adie (2000: 
52), Gowing (2000a: 212-13), and Knightley (2003: 44).
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Clifford’s priorities was to establish a CPIC in Pristina within KFOR’s very first days of 
existence (see case 3). Other PICs were soon installed in each of KFOR’s four 
multinational brigades in addition to one in Albania and the one established in Skopje 
during NATO’s air campaign (Clifford 27/4/2004). These PICs facilitated the 
achievement of the 2nd PI goal as well as access to the press.
When media interest is low meeting points is an insufficient technique to achieve the 1st 
PI goal, however. The missions’ active policy (see 2.2.2) spurred PI to apply other 
techniques to disseminate messages. The challenge was to identify stories sufficiently 
interesting to attract reporters’ attention; stories that could serve as ‘a parcel’ to deliver 
P i’s messages to target groups. The CPIOs used two major techniques to get the 
media’s attention: press availability and media opportunity.
Generally, journalists are interested in basing their stories on high-level military sources 
but do not enjoy free access to these. So the CPIOs organised settings that made 
commanders available to the press, such as receptions where they could mingle with 
reporters. These so-called press availabilities might also take the form of an exclusive 
interview with the Force Commander (Idsoe 18/2/2004). Prior to such interviews, the 
CPIO would normally brief COMKFOR about the reporter, her area of interests and her 
take on stories, and propose the kind of talking points that he could communicate (Idsoe 
26/3/2004).
Media opportunities were another PI technique to increase reporters’ interest in the 
missions and to, in Idsoe’s (18/2/2004) term, ‘sell’ messages. The technique sustained 
the 5 PI goal by inviting journalists to a situation, often in the field, that potentially 
constituted a story to be disseminated in the media while at the same time conveying 
some of NATO’s messages. Their advantage, compared to press briefings and press
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availabilities, was that journalists got first hand impressions of the story (Idsoe 
26/3/2004).
All CPIOs frequently used media opportunities as the cases illustrate. To convince the 
electorates in case 2 that it was safe to vote, for example, PI invited the press to see for 
itself a broad variety of robust IFOR-activities to ensure public security. It strove to 
reassure reporters that IFOR was ubiquitous and capable of enforcing the military 
provisions of the Dayton Peace Accord. Moreover, to deter Yugoslav armed forces from 
invading Kosovo and reassure Kosovars that they were safe, case 4 describes how PI 
organised media opportunities at spectacular NATO exercises in order to convince 
reporters that KFOR troops were lethal and ready but non-offensive. Idsoe (18/2/2004) 
provides additional examples of more ordinary media opportunities to enhance public 
support to NATO’s activities. He could, to take one example, invite reporters to cover a 
CIMIC-promoted disarmament project and tell them that COMKFOR would throw the 
first weapon into ovens installed to destroy the superfluous amount of small arms 
circulating in Kosovo. In the same vein, he would invite reporters to the official 
openings of KFOR-sponsored bridges. He found that this technique generally generated 
more NATO-favourable media reports than those based on briefings.
Clifford (27/4/2004) adds that media opportunities were a pedagogical tool: ‘We spent a 
lot of time educating the journalists’. Defence correspondents were often in shortage, so 
it became a PI task to ensure that newcomers to the field of military affairs understood 
not only the stories but also the context in a manner that NATO conceived as correct. 
The same technique was useful also when experienced and high profiled correspondents 
came to the missions, since it allowed them to become more familiar with the specific 
circumstances on the ground in theatre.
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Credibility
Finally, this section shall address credibility, which was a vital aspect of P i’s mode of 
operation. For no matter what PI does, the press is unlikely to project P i’s messages if  it 
does not believe in them. We shall now turn how the CPIOs’ related to reporters in 
order to establish credibility.
Van Dyke’s (17/3/04) policy was to be available, open, honest, and cooperative. 
Coupled with consistent messages (see 2.2.3) and unity of effort (see 2.2.4) this, he 
believes, increased Pi’s credibility (Van Dyke 13/4/2004). Clifford stresses that the 
PIOs should always be truthful, open, and factual and provide information in real time. 
Prior to entering Kosovo he informed the press corps: ‘The policy here is open access to 
everyone. . .  We are entirely transparent to everyone’ (Clifford 27/4/2004). Idsoe 
(26/3/2004) concurs: ‘It is important to release information, be frank and tell the truth’. 
He underlines that establishing credibility is a long-term project but when reporters 
repeatedly experience that NATO’s information is trustworthy they increasingly rely on 
NATO as a source. Case 5 illustrates this point. PI conducted background briefings 
informing journalists why Serbia had to enter the Presevo valley; why the EAAGs had 
to leave; and how KFOR would ensure that this happened. PI organised media 
opportunities at the reception centres where the EAAGs were going to be screened and 
released. When the operation commenced, journalists were again invited to see for 
themselves as events unfolded. Idsoe (26/3/2004) felt that KFOR’s credibility in the 
eyes of the journalists was reinforced when the operation went exactly as PI had 
informed them it would.
The open press policy entailed a readiness to be frank about mistakes, which Van Dyke 
believes contributed to journalists’ confidence in NATO. Although information
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unfavourable to the mission could cast a negative light over NATO, this would only be 
short-term if released immediately. On the contrary, efforts to withhold information that 
reporters were likely to get anyway could have a long-term negative impact, not because 
of the story but because NATO would have been less than truthful. Van Dyke 
concludes: ‘We needed to be able to release the good news with the bad news. And that, 
hopefully, would also enhance our credibility’ (Van Dyke 17/3/04).
The CPIOs used a variety of techniques to enhance credibility. One was simply to make 
themselves available to journalists; for example, at the above mentioned meeting points, 
press availabilities, and media opportunities (see 2.2.5). Idsoe (18/2/2004) used them as 
an opportunity for informal talks irrespective of whether he had particular messages to 
deliver, and Clifford saw them as useful occasions for journalists to become familiar 
with KFOR (Clifford and Wilton 2000: 21).
Beyond simple contact, the CPIOs tried to create affinity with journalists by helping 
them along. The night before KFOR entered Kosovo, for example, PI invited the media 
to a briefing in one of the cinema halls in Macedonia’s capital. The hall was packed 
with journalists. Rather than an ordinary brief about the political situation and 
restrictions, the PIOs stressed the reporters’ personal safety, informed them about mine 
danger and told them how they could reduce their personal risks upon entry (Idsoe 
26/3/2004). Further, PI in advance facilitated the press’ return to Macedonia. KFOR 
foresaw that once in Kosovo journalists could face difficulties when trying to return 
home via Macedonia. To prevent this PI issued them with NATO-‘passports’. Such 
undertakings impressed reporters and improved Pi’s relations with them (Idsoe 
18/2/2004).
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A third technique to enhance credibility was to establish personal contact between the 
press and high-level officials. Both Idsoe (26/3/2004) and Van Dyke prepared informal 
gatherings adapted to suit the character of the officials in question. Admiral Smith, for 
instance, who was IFOR’s first Force Commander, was animated and at ease with the 
press. So PI facilitated the contact simply by frequently inviting half a dozen journalists 
to meet COMIFOR at his headquarters -  to so-called press availabilities (see 2.2.5). 
They would sit down and exchange views over a cup of coffee and some donuts. The 
second Force Commander, Admiral Lopez, had a different personality, subtler and 
initially less comfortable with the media. To establish trust PI organised off-the-record 
meetings -  often a meal at the headquarters with Force Commander and one or three 
journalists. As he experienced that journalists respected off-the-record restrictions, he 
became increasingly comfortable about sharing his thoughts with them. Van Dyke 
(17/3/04) summaries: ‘So we used a variety of these techniques to again establish close 
relations with the press. Let them know what was on our mind. Tell them the good with 
the bad.’
Background briefings was another, more formal, method the CPIOs generally used to 
enhance their credibility among journalists (see case 2 and 6). It was also a useful 
manner to communicate NATO’s views on delicate issues. When need be the CPIOs 
would approach authoritative members of the press corps and share sensitive 
information with them although this could threaten operational security. The 
transformation of the KLA to the Kosovo Protection Corps, which occurred 
simultaneously with case 4, serves as an example. This milestone event in Kosovo’s 
peace process caused problems in the capitals of NATO’s member states and in 
international organisations since media reports were largely influenced by Albanian 
sources who wanted to maintain KLA and establish it as Kosovo’s armed forces.
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Balancing the risks with the potential benefits, the CPIO chose to release sensitive
information in an effort to change the media’s portrayal of KLA’s transformation. He
identified three key journalists -  one American, one French, and one British -  whom he
had not dealt with prior to KFOR:
I got them on the side and I said ‘Look guys, if  I tell you what is going 
on. That will help me because you will be able to write from a position of 
knowledge. But I will need your confidence, that you will not either quote 
me or report on the detail of all of this. Just use it as background 
information. And we could then work that up to our mutual advantage.
You’ll get the proper story and I will make sure you are writing about the 
right things. But break that and all is off, and I will never talk to you 
again about anything’. And they said: ‘Yes’ (Clifford 27/4/2004).
On this basis Clifford gave the three journalists a series of detailed background 
briefings. He maintains that he achieved the desired result.
Finally, the CPIOs used subliminal techniques to establish credibility. Clifford saw to 
that he was always near COMKFOR when the latter appeared in public. This, he 
believes, combined with the fact that he had been Gen. Jackson’s personal spokesman 
for several years, sent the subliminal message that if reporters could not get information 
from COMKFOR himself, their next best choice would be the CPIO who they assumed 
was well informed and spoke with the Commander’s authority. In addition, the CPIOs 
were cautious to have CPICs that conveyed the subliminal messages to reporters that 
IFOR and KFOR were professional and high-quality forces. Both CPICs, in Sarajevo 
and Pristina, were most fashionable considering the general context in which they were 
situated. The standard of the technicalities reporters need -  that is, power, sockets for
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their plugs, satellite links to their desks, etc. -  should also reinforce reporters’ 
credibility to NATO.128
These considerations conclude the presentation of P i’s mode of operation, which we 
shall summarise below. Before concluding the empirical chapter, however, it is 
illuminating to present the practice of PI in the sense of how the PIOs communicate 
their messages to reporters. The section below purports to do this in the form of two 
simple content analysis of IFOR’s and KFOR’s official and initial press briefings.
2.3 Content analysis of NATO press briefings
Beginning with a content analysis of available transcripts from NATO press briefings in 
IFOR during the first 40 days -  that is, from 20 December 1995 to 30 January 1996 -  
this section outlines the content of the four most recurrent messages conveyed by the 
PIOs to reporters. Then follows a similar account on the case of KFOR (for 
methodological considerations see 1.4.1).
Besides identifying the most frequently disseminated messages, the purpose is also to 
exemplify how messages are conveyed and to evaluate the validity of the information 
obtained from the three primary sources upon which this empirical account have largely 
drawn. The quotations transmit a ‘hands-on’ feeling of the general topic of concern. In 
this spirit, and to be accurate, spelling mistakes that occur in the transcripts shall not be 
corrected.
128 Van Dyke (13/4/2004 ) and Clifford (27/04/05). See also case 1 and 3.
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2.3.1 Master messages in IFOR’s initial press briefings
In the 23 publicly accessible transcripts from the 40-day sample period, NATO’s 
personnel convey the message ‘IFOR improves the situation in Bosnia’ in 21 briefings, 
‘IFOR is robust’ in 20, ‘The parties comply’ in 12, and ‘NATO cooperates with new 
partners for noble ends’ in nine briefings. The content of these four messages will now 
be described in turn.
IFOR improves the situation in Bosnia
The most repeated message in the examined period is that the overall security situation 
in Bosnia has significantly improved since IFOR arrived. Except for two days in the 
sample the PIOs who briefed reporters point to facts on the ground indicating that the 
war in Bosnia has ceased and that peace is returning.129 Often IFOR is mentioned as a 
major cause of those improvements. This reflects the importance PI attaches to 
portraying IFOR as a guarantor of peace in Bosnia.
The first available transcript conveys that message. The PIO, Lt.Col. Rayner, states: 
‘Everyone here has reported for the last two weeks how much freedom of movement 
there has been, how many more people are travelling around the country, and how great 
the feeling of security is now’ (NATO 1/1/1996). The phrase ‘a quiet day’ figures in 14 
of 23 transcripts and frequently in the opening statement of the press briefings. This is 
the case on 5 January, to take one example, where it is followed up by the second most 
important message: ‘Good morning ladies and gentlemen. It was generally a quiet day
129 The two exceptions are NATO (9/1/1996; 23/1/1996). The formulation ‘facts on the ground’ appears 
in italics here to draw attention to its subjective use in the remainder of the thesis.
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across the area. The force is continuing to flow in and routine patrolling and liaison is 
progressing well at all levels’ (NATO 5/1/1996).
The PIOs present IFOR as a major cause of the improved security situation: ‘NATO is
removing all military threat from this country, and that is going extremely well’ (NATO
8/1/1996). When a reporter questions whether there are any differences between the
achievements of IFOR and UNPROFOR -  the peacekeeping force that preceded IFOR
and that had a reputation of being incapable of halting atrocities -  the PIO replies:
To see the difference go along the zones of separation, see the forces, see 
brigades moving out of the zone of separation, see tanks and guns 
returning to their barracks, see mine fields being cleared, being marked.
You will see . . .  a huge difference between the previous operation and the 
IFOR operation. There is still some crime and shooting going on in 
Sarajevo. There is no doubt about that. But the difference between what is 
happening now and what has been happening in the last 3 or 4 years is 
enormous (NATO 10/1/1996).
Later, PI presents the same message in different wording:
We are providing the military security in which the authorities and the 
parties , can carry out their job . . .  i think that is very apparent. The fact 
that people are driving around so much at the moment, the fact that you 
see so much happening in this city at the moment, it think we have 
witnessed to what has been achieved at the moment. I think it gets better 
every day. We continue to provide that security (NATO 19/1/1996).
As a further sign of Bosnia’s demilitarisation, the PIOs commence informing reporters 
that IFOR is destroying the parties’ ammunition stocks.130 To stress the message PI
130 NATO (24/1996; 26/1/1996; 27/1/1996; 28/1/1996; 29/1/1996).
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invites reporters to media opportunities facilitating that they experience the actual 
destruction themselves.
IFOR is robust
That IFOR is an overwhelming and lethal force against whom the parties will stand no 
chance in a military confrontation, is the second most re-occurring message that the 
PIOs convey to reporters during this period. In 20 briefings do the PIOs portray IFOR 
as ‘well-led, well-trained, and well-equipped to respond to any challenge’, as Van Dyke 
(13/4/2004) holds.131
PIOs project IFOR as fully capable of ensuring the implementation of the military 
aspects of Dayton. During 12 briefings they reinforce the message that IFOR is well- 
equipped, for instance by referring to the continual deployment of forces. The first 
recorded press briefing refers to IFOR’s forces crossing the river between Bosnia and 
Croatia in the following manner: ‘The pontoon bridge across the Sava river was 
completed yesterday during the morning, and was open all day, allowing approximately 
150 [IFOR] vehicles to cross. The crossing will continue today’ (NATO 1/1/1996). The 
PIOs generally refer to the deployment as the ‘flow of forces’: ‘The flow of forces 
across river Sava continues . . .  Challenger tanks will arrive in Kupres today’ (NATO 
10/1/1996).132 The idea of an overwhelming force is emphasised when they inform the 
press that 32,500 troops are deployed to IFOR’s land component on 14 January. The 
number increases to 41,500 within the next week (NATO 21/1/1996).
131 The exceptions are NATO (9/1/1996; 13/1/1996; 29/1/1996).
132 See also NATO (5/1/1996; 7/1/1996; 8/1/1996).
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The PIOs also portray IFOR as well-led. As Lt.Col. Rayner formulates it: ‘We have a
very clear chain of command. Our orders come from IFOR, from SHAPE and NATO
from the North Atlantic Council. That’s the beauty and strength of NATO’ (NATO
10/1/1996).133 In a major press briefing evaluating IFOR’s first 30 days in Bosnia,
COMIFOR sums up:
This organisation [IFOR]. . .  consists of a lot of forces from a lot of 
countries . . .  And I want to publicly tell you that M.Walker [Commander 
of IFOR’s land component] and M.Ryan [Commander of IFOR’s air 
component] and the others involved in this, have been extraordinary 
talented in making, pulling all of this together. Just think about what has 
happened in the first 30 days. It is pretty impressive (NATO 20/1/1996).
In the almost 200 pages of transcripts in the sample, only one sentence from a NATO 
PIO may be interpreted as contradicting this master message. The anomaly follows an 
announcement of four IFOR casualties caused by mines and traffic accidents: ‘All of 
these incidents remind us of what a dangerous and unpredictable place this is, and what 
a challenging task we have ahead to work together to bring about a lasting peace’ 
(NATO 29/1/1996). However, neither the rest of that particular briefing nor any other 
briefing leaves any doubt that NATO is capable of providing military security and 
prevent anyone from derailing the peace process.
The parties comply
Sustaining the first message, the third most important message is that the parties comply 
with the part of the peace agreement for which IFOR is responsible, that is, military 
security as outlined in Annex 1 (see 2). In 12 of the 23 transcripts the PIOs stress that
133 See also NATO (7/1/1996).
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the parties have ceased fire and are withdrawing their armed forces and heavy weapons 
from the zones of separation agreed upon at Dayton. Further, they are moving certain 
categories of weapons into IFOR-recognised sites. This endeavour shall be finalised 
prior to 19 January, which is a month after IFOR’s arrival.
From the first recorded briefing the PIOs mobilise support to that message: ‘There 
continues to be encouraging signs of compliance within the peace agreement on both 
sides of the border’ (NATO 1/1/1996). It takes another week before the same point is 
made: ‘It was reported yesterday that the 1st Krajina corps are moving troops back . . .  
This compliance by the erstwhile warring factions is common throughout the area and is 
a very encouraging indication of progress in the military aspects of the peace 
agreement’ (NATO 8/1/1996). From 11 January and till deadline this message is 
intensified. Now the PIOs daily announce that the parties are complying. As of 14 
January, reporters are informed that at least 70 percent of the parties’ forces have been 
withdrawn from the zone of separation.
After the deadline 35 heavy weapons remain in that zone. IFOR downplays this 
information, maintaining that the parties have substantially complied (NATO 
20/1/1996). On 27 January, the PIOs inform that IFOR has commenced destroying the 
remaining heavy weapons and three days later that there are no more heavy weapons in 
the zone of separation (NATO 30/1/1996).
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NATO cooperates with new partners for noble ends
Van Dyke (2003) points out that NATO strove to portray IFOR as working with new 
partners for noble ends. The press briefings sustain this point. In the present coding it 
figures as the fourth most important message.134 In nine transcripts the PIOs present 
IFOR as a force deployed not for reasons of Realpolitik but to help others implement 
their own peace agreement.135 Its deployment is projected as being in the interest of 
civilian Bosnians and of human dignity, rather than in the interest of NATO. It is 
presented as a force that helps humanitarian organisations to get on with their jobs. 
IFOR is not in charge. It works alongside the parties and international agencies to see 
the agreements from Dayton materialise on the ground in Bosnia. The collective effort 
is projected as a ‘joint endeavour’, which is indeed the name of the military mission.
NATO’s history taken into account, as a bulwark against Soviet military might, it is 
remarkable when the PIO in the first briefing from the sample is able to announce: ‘We 
expect that the lead elements of the Russian force contribution will arrive around about 
the 16th of January, and will be fully operational by the end of the month’ (NATO 
1/1/1996). Two weeks later the PIOs inform that the Russian contingents has arrived 
and have started to conduct reconnaissance (NATO 15/1/1996; 19/1/1996).
In addition, the PIOs stress the close cooperation with the civilian agencies. The 
cooperative atmosphere is reflected in the already mentioned fact that IFOR and
134 The message is coded in a narrow sense to encompass only references to new operational partners, 
such as former Warsaw Pact members and civilian agencies, and abstract humanitarian ends (see 1.4.1).
135 For example: ‘The IFOR was not driving the Peace Agreement, the Peace Agreement was established 
at Dayton and was signed by all parties, and IFOR has obligations under the military parts o f the Peace 
Agreement’ (NATO 5/1/1996). The other transcripts are NATO (1/1/1996; 9/1/1996; 13/1/1996; 
14/1/1996; 22/1/1996; 23/1/1996; 26/1/1996; and 27/1/1996).
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civilians meet the press together every day (see 2.2.4). Further, the PIOs emphasise the 
cordial relations between, for example, COMIFOR and the High Representative Mr 
Bildt (NATO 13/1/1996) and between COMIFOR and ICTY’s Justice Goldstone 
(NATO 20/1/1996). Generally, the PIOs portray IFOR as helping the international 
agencies: ‘We are here to provide the overall secure environment in terms of military 
forces to allow the civilian infrastructure to get on with the job’ (NATO 3/1/1996). 
There are also very practical examples of cooperation as when a PIO stipulates: ‘An 
arrangement has been made whereby the UNHCR can use the bridge over the river Sava 
forthwith to bring in humanitarian supplies’ (NATO 10/1/1996). Moreover, an 
atmosphere of a joint endeavour is subliminally conveyed when the CPIO, Van Dyke, 
announces: ‘This week we have a couple of special features coming up. Wednesday the 
World Bank will be briefing on some of their reconstruction loans and re-building 
programs’ (NATO 23/1/1996).
Reviewing the first month in Bosnia, the COMIFOR conveys all four above mentioned
messages in his introductory comments:
In the first 30 days of our operation for this Peace Agreement. . .  the 
parties have shown the spirit of compliance and cooperation that we had 
only dreamed of and not fully expected but we’re glad we saw. There has 
been no resumption of full-scale fighting in this country. The military 
forces have been separated along the lines and along the Zones set by the 
agreement, and they are honouring that. Our troops have had total 
freedom of movement, and I will tell you that dozens, more like hundreds 
of convoys have moved through this country and I have been told, though 
I don’t have specific figures to prove it for you today that in fact, more 
humanitarian aid has been distributed subsequent to IFOR’s arrival than 
prior. Now that is not a slap at UNPROFOR but I must tell you that we 
were concerned that with the amount of road traffic that would be 
involved in bringing this force that we would disrupt the flow of
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humanitarian aid. The fact is that I understand it is going even better.
There have been hundreds of flights into and out of Sarajevo, Tuzla and 
now Mostar’s up and flowing so we will see more traffic out of there 
(NATO 20/1/1996).
IFOR’s master messages -  a summary
Van Dyke holds that the overall purpose of IFOR’s PI campaign was to show that 
NATO had adapted to the post-Cold War era. It should do so by portraying IFOR as a 
NATO mission working with ‘new partners for noble ends’; as ‘the right instrument’ to 
give the Bosnian peace process a chance; and as a ‘helper and a leader’ (see case 1 and 
2.2.3).
The most frequently pronounced messages found in this content analysis support Van 
Dyke’s description of IFOR’s message strategy. The reliability of this analysis should 
not be overestimated as little more than half of the potential transcripts are accessible. 
Still, the findings do suggest that the three most re-occurring messages sustain the idea 
that IFOR is ‘the right instrument’. In fact, they address different sides of the balance 
between being peaceful and forceful at the same time, which Van Dyke (2003: 18) 
argues was crucial for this message to be accepted by the public. ‘IFOR improves the 
situation in Bosnia’ and ‘The parties comply’ convey that IFOR has brought peace to 
Bosnia. ‘IFOR is robust’ presents it as capable of suppressing any opponent. Moreover, 
even in the narrow coding of the message ‘NATO cooperates with new partners for 
noble ends’ it appears among the frequently disseminated messages.136 Had a broader
136 The fact that this message only figures as the fourth most important is due to the narrow definition I 
used on this code (see 1.4.1). One may well argue that ‘noble ends’ should include ‘Better with IFOR’. 
Such a broad definition would lift it from the fourth to the first most repeated message.
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coding frame been adopted, the same message could have featured as the most projected 
message (see 1.4.1).
2 . 3.2 Master messages in KFOR’s initial press briefings
The content analysis of press briefings from KFOR’s first 40 days -  from 12 June to 20 
August 1999 -  is based on 24 transcripts. The mission’s four most frequently mentioned 
messages are almost similar to IFOR’s. The highest ranking is ‘KFOR improves the 
situation in Kosovo’; then follows ‘KFOR is robust’, which is mentioned in 19 
briefings; ‘The parties comply’ in 16; and ‘KFOR works with civilian organisations’, 
which figures in 11 transcripts. Below, the content of these messages is elaborated on.
KFOR improves the situation in Kosovo
Except in one of the available transcripts the PIOs convey to reporters that ‘KFOR 
improves the situation in Kosovo’.137 The PIOs repeatedly assert that KFOR makes an 
actual and desired difference in the area of security and humanitarian assistance in 
Kosovo.
The provision of security is strongly presented for the first time the day after the Serbian 
forces have left Kosovo on 21 June: ‘KFOR is now the security presence here in 
Kosovo and it is now time for us to look forward to the safe return of the refugees of all 
ethnic groups and to build a better future for all the inhabitants of Kosovo’ (NATO
137 The exception is NATO (19/6/1999).
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22/6/1999).138 This message is aired in 19 of the 24 transcripts. The PIOs highlight facts 
on the ground as evidence that KFOR protects people and their properties: ‘You all 
have seen Kfo vehicles and soldiers on the ground and helicopters in the air throughout 
the province. Kfor forces are stepping up their street patrols . . .  providing a visible 
reminder and a physical guarantee of our extensive security presence’ (NATO 
18/6/1999b).
In the same vein, quantitative results of KFOR’s police endeavours in terms of arrests
are announced. 2 July appears as a particularly busy day:
In Vitina, 13 people were arrested by members of MNB [Multi National 
Brigade] east after a US apache helicopter filmed them looting. Another 
15 civilians were also arrested by 9 parachute sqn re in Lipljan for 
looting. Around midnight last night, in MNB [Multi National Brigade]
South, a Dutch patrol in Orahovac, arrested 6 Serbs who were in 
possession of weapons and computer equipment. . .  In a raid in Dakovica,
Ital MPs [Military Police] arrested 3 former KLA members in uniform 
and confiscated a number of weapons. Others were arrested under 
suspicion of arson (NATO 2/7/1999).139
On 9 July, the PIOs announce that KFOR has arrested over 250 people. The PIOs also 
point to cases where KFOR stops assaults on the spot: ‘Yesterday, a patrol detained 6 
personnel suspected of kidnapping and assault, after investigating suspicious activity at 
a house in Urosevac. The quick reactions of this patrol undoubtedly stopped further 
suffering for the nine victims that were also in the building’ (NATO 9/7/1999). Beyond
138 This message is obviously sustained by information that Serbian forces comply and that the KLA will 
be demilitarised. But evidence of this message is dealt with in a separate section below, see ‘The parties 
comply’.
139 Similar examples can be found in NATO (22/6/1999; 12/7/1999; 14/7/1999; 22/7/1999).
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police work, KFOR is also portrayed as generally caring for people, as when journalists 
are informed that a platoon saved an elderly couple from a burning house in Pec (NATO 
2/7/1999).
The other aspect of the message that ‘KFOR improves the situation in Kosovo’ 
addresses humanitarian issues beyond mere survival. The very day KFOR enters the 
province, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Clark, informs the 
press that: ‘KFOR are going to do everything they can when they arrive to help provide 
and meet urgent humanitarian needs both for food, medical assistance and that sort of 
thing and they are well-equipped and well-prepared to do that’ (NATO 12/7/1999a).
The next day Jamie Shea, NATO’s much-profiled Spokesperson who also ran KFOR’s 
initial press briefings, underscores this messages by pointing to media reports: ‘You saw 
the images in Pristina yesterday of people emerging, going back to cafes where they 
hadn’t dared go to show their face for many months now, normal life returning, people 
breathing the air of freedom for a long, long time. And believe me that I believe is what 
we have achieved so far’ (NATO 14/6/1999).
Further, KFOR’s contribution to the humanitarian assistance is projected from the very 
first day (NATO 12/6/1999a). Two days later the PIO tells the press that ‘NATO forces 
. . .  are already allowing humanitarian relief to get in [to Kosovo]’ (NATO 14/6/1999b). 
Every day the first week, the PIOs reinforce the message that KFOR has a positive 
humanitarian impact. On the fourth day, for example, the PIO states that there is ‘still 
about half a million internally-displaced persons inside Kosovo . . .  the aid continues to 
flow now that there is a force on the ground. A second UNHCR humanitarian aid 
convoy arrived in Pristina yesterday, two more are scheduled for today’ (NATO 
15/6/1999). Two days later he announces that the figure of refugees in the neighbouring 
countries is going down (NATO 17/6/1999).
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NATO’s Secretary General, Mr Solana, boosts the message on his first visit to KFOR:
‘Let me tell you the operation on the ground has already been a tremendous success.
NATO’s member countries have responded to the challenge to bring peace and stability
to Kosovo’ (NATO 24/6/1999). He then gives the message a human face:
I am today . . .  delighted to be here after having been in the camps with 
refugees and seeing the faces of the people suffering, to meet them here 
on the streets, some of them that I met in the camps are here already, to 
see them crying really when they saw me here (NATO 24/6/1999).
Later, in a brief review, a PIO draws KFOR’s contribution to the region in equally 
positive terms:
Only three weeks ago KFOR had entered a turbulent situation in Kosovo. 
Looking at the situation now, the Yugoslav forces have withdrawn, the 
KLA is demilitarising and its members are gradually returning to work in 
their homes and villages. And, hundreds of thousands of refugees have 
returned to their home (NATO 7/7/1999).
The same master message is also promoted with reference to KFOR’s participation in 
the civil reconstruction. Within the first week of KFOR’s entry into Kosovo, a PIO 
states: ‘Yesterday British military engineers restored the water supply to Prisitna’ 
(NATO 18/6/1999a). Another PIO picks up on the same note: ‘KFOR engineers 
continue to help local staff get vital utilities back up and running. Members of 21 
engineer regiment are helping at both Kosovo A and B power stations, where 40 local 
workers have been employed’ (NATO 2/7/1999). A week later they can announce that 
one of the power stations is operational (NATO 9/7/1999). Assistance in coal 
production and freshwater supplies are also presented as ‘just one example of how 
KFOR soldiers are improving the infrastructure of Kosovo, and thus quality of live for 
every one’ (NATO 12/7/1999).
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KFOR is robust
KFOR P i’s second most repeated message is that ‘KFOR is robust’. In 19 of the 23 
transcripts the PIOs portray KFOR as a militarily capable force that will project 
overwhelming power against any military challenge.
KFOR, like IFOR, is pictured as a well-led, well-trained and well-equipped force. From 
the outset the PIO set the tone. Having mentioned that 20,500 troops including French 
and British have been deployed so far, he adds: ‘This is a simultaneous . . .  deployment 
of the German heavy armoured units into south-west Kosovo and US and Italian forces 
also crossing the border into Kosovo’ (NATO 12/6/1999a). Two days later he reinforces 
that image: ‘This is an operation which is going ahead of schedule, NATO forces are 
pouring in, they are assuming full control of Kosovo . . .  The main story is that every 
hour 100-200 more NATO forces go in and get on with the job’ (NATO 14/6/1999a). 
Continuous updates underline that troops are ‘pouring in’. On the third day, the figure is 
14,300 increasing to 29,000 by 5 July and with a total of 55,000 scheduled to arrive 
(24/6/1999). Four days into the operation, the PIO reassures: ‘As the deployment goes 
on and as we establish a robust, effective security presence throughout Kosovo, let there 
be no doubt there will not be any "No Go" areas, KFOR will be in charge and will have 
all of the means to assert its authority if  need be’.140
Once KFOR is established, the conduct of NATO’s official KFOR press briefings is 
transferred to Kosovo. Here the CPIO, Lt.Col. Clifford, follows up on the established 
message in his first briefing: ‘Kfor is advancing as the Yugoslavs are withdrawing and
140 NATO (15/6/1999). The same point is made in NATO (13/6/1999).
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we are ahead of schedule’ (NATO 18/6/1999b). 21 June is the Military Technical 
Agreement’s deadline for Yugoslav armed forces to withdraw from Kosovo. The day 
before, the PIO projects KFOR’s self-confidence as the unrivalled military force in the 
area by warning that any armed groups ‘who remain in Kosovo after midnight tonight 
will be subject to robust KFOR enforcement’ (NATO 20/6/1999).
On 22 June, when Serbian forces were out of Kosovo, the first phase concluded and the 
next ‘Entry into Force’ began. KFOR was now the de facto security presence in 
Kosovo. From that point in time, the PIOs increasingly profile KFOR not only as a 
traditional military force but also as a capable police force. In this respect, KFOR’s 
Provost Marshal stipulates: ‘KFOR is absolutely determined that irrespective of ethnic 
background our response to criminal activity will be prompt, firm but always fair’ 
(NATO 20/6/1999). Later the PIOs reinforce that message with reference to IFOR’s 
patrols: ‘The soldiers on the street are working extremely hard in our efforts to provide 
a secure and stable environment. These soldiers will continue to patrol their areas 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week’ (NATO 9/7/1999).
Only in half a sentence in the examined period do the PIOs deviate slightly from that 
message, that is, on the day KFOR entered Kosovo: ‘We have had one or two hiccups 
which is inevitable in any military operation’, but then he returns to the master message: 
‘The deployments are on schedule and operations are continuing smoothly’ (NATO 
13/6/1999). Thereafter, KFOR briefers remain on the message that KFOR is a robust 
force capable o f providing military security and establish law and order.
The parties comply
The third most profiled PI message is that the parties are complying with the provisions 
of the Military Technical Agreement. Serbs are withdrawing as agreed upon and the
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KLA leadership fulfils the demands of the relevant UN Security Council resolution.
This is projected in 16 available transcripts of the press briefings in the sample.
A quick series of announcements made during the initial 10 days shows an impressive 
record on the ‘Serbs are complying’-message. On KFOR’s first day, the PIO comments: 
‘We are pleased to note that the pace of the Serb withdrawal is gathering momentum . . .  
about 10,000 Serb personnel were assessed to have left Kosovo into Serbia together 
with tanks, surface-to-air missile systems and other heavy equipment; at the same time,
11 MiG-21 s left Pristina airfield for Batanica just outside Belgrade’ (NATO 
12/6/1999a). Six days later, the PIO informs: ‘The Yugoslavs are withdrawing . . .  by 
midnight on 20 June that is Sunday, the Yugoslav forces will be gone’ (NATO 
18/6/1999b). As the deadline approaches, the PIO concludes: ‘The withdrawal of the 
uniformed Yugoslav personnel has been completed approximately 12 hours ahead of the 
schedule set in the military-technical agreement’ (NATO 20/6/1999). Issue settled.
The message on the demilitarisation of KLA is not as clear-cut. One of the reasons may 
be that no plan for this existed when KFOR deployed. The UN Security Council had 
demanded that KLA demilitarise but how and on which conditions KLA was to 
conform with this decree was a pending matter (NATO 21/6/1999). In other words, 
where KFOR’s relation to Yugoslav authorities was guided by the Military Technical 
Agreement, KFOR had no equivalent agreement with the KLA. The first indication of a 
message in this regard is rather vague but sets an optimistic tone: ‘The demilitarisation 
of Kosovo is moving ahead at the same time. As the Serb forces withdraw from 
Kosovo, the KLA is handing over their weapons’ (NATO 18/6/1999b). Four days later 
the message has developed a step further: ‘The KLA has undertaken to renounce the use 
of force’ (NATO 22/6/1999). NATO’s Secretary General consolidates this two days 
later: ‘An important milestone in the process of building peace was the signing early
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on Monday morning by Mr Taci, Commander in Chief of the KLA, of an undertaking to 
demilitarise and to cooperate fully with NATO forces . . .  I met with Mr Taci just a few 
moments ago and he assured me of his commitment to demilitarise the KLA’ (NATO 
24/6/1999). And after three weeks in Kosovo, the PIOs can point to KLA honouring in 
practical terms the demands of the UN Security Council resolution 1244: ‘There has 
been broad compliance throughout Kosovo by the KLA. In one area seven truckloads of 
weapons have been collected from the KLA. At Orahovac, 136 more weapons were 
handed in yesterday with the local KLA commander claiming that 100% of KLA 
weapons in that area are in KFOR hands’ (NATO 2/7/1999). Some days later the PIOs 
follow up: ‘The success of the demilitarisation is the absence of the KLA members on 
the streets, in uniform and carrying weapons’ (NATO 7/7/1999).
KFOR works with civilian organisations
Figuring in 11 out of 24 transcripts the message that ‘KFOR works with civilian 
organisations’ becomes the fourth most pronounced. This is interwoven with the 
humanitarian aspect of the second most voiced message that ‘KFOR improves the 
situation in Kosovo’ but refers specifically to practical cooperation. On 14 June, for 
example: ‘Yesterday a 52 vehicle humanitarian convoy . . .  was able to arrive in Pristina 
. . .  the Fourth Brigade of the U.K. Army in Pristina is providing assistance to the 
UNHCR in storing that food’. The message is reinforced the following day when the 
PIO informs, that liaison mechanisms between KFOR, civilian counterparts and the 
NGOs are now being established in Pristina (NATO 15/6/1999).
It may be noted that KFOR’s cooperation with UNMIK is communicated subliminally 
by the UN’s Special Representative of the Secretary General and COMKFOR meeting 
reporters together during the press briefing on 21 June (see case 3). Moreover,
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UNMIK’s and KFOR’s spokespersons appear together on the podium during 
subsequent press briefings.
KFOR’s master messages -  a summary
The most frequently repeated KFOR messages identified in this sample from the 
mission’s first 40 days are largely identical to those of IFOR.141 They deviate partly 
from those KFOR 1 CPIO puts forward as the master messages, while they correspond 
fully with KFOR 5 CPIO’s information (see 2.2.3). The reliability of this conclusion 
must be weighed against the fact that transcripts are available from only about half of 
the press briefings. On the other hand, one may assume that NATO would disseminate 
high-ranking messages as early as possible. Yet, two of the messages conveyed by the 
CPIO of KFOR 1 during the interviews in the present research do not appear in the 
records from the first 11 days’ press briefings, which are all accessible.
It is difficult to interpret the sample of transcripts as communicating that ‘KFOR is not 
an invader; KFOR is not a liberator’, as the CPIO stipulates. True, in seven briefings the 
PIOs do mention the Military Technical Agreement, which in technical legal terms 
invites NATO to enter Kosovo.142 It is not this aspect of the agreement the PIOs 
convey, however. Rather, they use it to communicate that Serbia complies with the
141 The reason that ‘new partners’ is not included in the fourth KFOR message is that cooperating with 
civilian organisations and former Warsaw Pact countries cannot be called ‘new’ after three years of 
cooperation in Bosnia. In addition, initial uncertainty existed about whether Russia was cooperating with 
NATO until a formal agreement was settled on 18 June. Thereafter, Russian contingents formed part of 
KFOR.
142 NATO (12/6/1999a; 13/6/1999; 14/6/1999; 15/6/1999; 16/6/1999; 18/6/1999a; 18/6/1999b).
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terms in the agreement.143 No mention is made of NATO not being a liberator in the 
sample.
Nor do the PIOs explicitly pronounce that ‘KFOR is subordinated to UNMIK’. KFOR’s 
relation to UNMIK or the UN organisation above the level of specialised agencies is 
mentioned only in five press briefings and reflected in common UN-NATO press 
briefings at least since early July.144 On these occasions the relation appears more as a 
cooperation with than a subordination to UNMIK.145
Ample evidence exists, however, to sustain the last master message presented by the 
CPIO that ‘KFOR is in control’. This corresponds to the two highest ranking messages 
identified in the content analysis. It may also be noted that the messages put forward by 
KFOR 5’s CPIO compares with the three highest ranking messages from the present 
analysis (see 2.2.3).
2.4 Summary
Against this background, it can be concluded that NATO used PI as a means of power 
to achieve political and military ends. P i’s mode of operation was guided by a PI policy, 
stipulating goals and intentions, and based on three components: a message strategy, a 
unity of effort and a resolution to maintain credible relations with the press.
143 For example: ‘[The Serbs] are making a serious effort to comply with the Military Technical 
Agreement’ (NATO 16/6/1999).
144 A relation is mentioned in NATO (15/6/1999; 20/6/1999; 21/6/1999; 24/6/1999; 7/7/1999).
145 The closest indication in the sample of KFOR’s subordination to UNMIK presents itself on 21 June. 
Sharing the press briefing podium with the UN Secretary General Special Representative in charge of 
UNMIK, COMKFOR states: ‘Senor de Mello and myself will continue to co-operate closely as required 
by the Security Council resolution as we pass from this first phase o f KFOR’s operation to the next’ 
(NATO 21/6/1999).
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The six illustrative cases, the elaborations on P i’s mode of operations and the content 
analysis show that NATO’s political and military leaders applied their PI function to 
enhance member countries’ public support to, and thereby political legitimacy for, the 
alliance’s raison d ’etre as well as its presence and use of physical force in the Balkans. 
Further, NATO used PI in an effort to achieve specific military objectives in the 
Balkans, particularly to influence the parties’ and people’s general behaviour and 
specific actions without having to resort to physical force. PI provided NATO with a 
non-lethal means of power which allegedly often sufficed to promote stability, deter 
crises and resolve conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Van Dyke (30/7/2004), for example, appreciates PI as one of four main elements of 
power used by the international community to influence the Bosnian peace process -  the 
other elements being political, economic, and military. Idsoe (26/3/2004) agrees with 
the qualification that information was also involved when the other three elements of 
power were applied. Clifford sees PI as a means and argues that with rules of 
engagement based on the use of minimum necessary force ‘the only tool really that the 
Force Commander had was information’ (Clifford 27/4/2004. See further footnote 24 
and section 2.2). In the same vein Idsoe (26/3/2004) stipulates: ‘I consider PI a tool, just 
like Operations’. Acknowledging that his view was not necessarily shared by other 
functions, Idsoe (18/2/2004) holds that PI was conceived in such terms at the executive 
level: ‘I will claim, as does Skiaker [COMKFOR 5] that the way we dealt with the 
media, was the way we solved the conflict’.
PI operated strategically and in co-ordination with principal NATO assets to influence 
the media’s projections of the alliance and its activities. PI assisted the highest level of 
command in developing operational plans and was used to implement the same plans.
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PI communicated NATO’s intentions, stressed its resolve and sought to multiply the 
parties’ and people’s perceptions of NATO’s might.
To function as a means of power the CPIOs had a largely common approach. Their 
mode of operation was guided by a policy framework giving their function general 
direction and, among other things, prohibiting it from being untruthful. Their final target 
groups were generally a variety of publics which they tried to influence through the 
media. It was a condition, then, that reporters relied on PI as a trustworthy source for 
their media stories, which is why the CPIOs strove to maintain credible relations with 
the press. Further, they developed a message strategy promoting, as the content analysis 
reflects, a few messages they wanted the publics to support. In an effort to increase the 
consistency of NATO’s messages and avoid public uncertainty about its intentions, the 
CPIOs strove to support a sense of unity of effort in the dissemination of messages.
They co-ordinated both vertically, that is, within the PI function from the lowest to the 
highest level of command, and horizontally with other functions with respect to both 
planning and implementation.
The latter, the CPIOs claim, was a novelty within NATO. PI assisted the Command 
Group in identifying appropriate responses to up-coming events and, at times, PI was 
used as a line function to implement the same plans. In this role PI served along with 
traditional operational functions, such as air power and artillery. NATO governments’ 
unwillingness to use physical force in the peace processes, the rules of engagement’s 
restrictions on the missions to use only minimum necessary force, and the non-lethal 
feature of PI, spurred the force commanders to rely increasingly on PI. In this context 
the CPIOs communicated their respective Force Commander’s intentions, his lethal 
capabilities to achieve them, and his resolve to use them against violent opposition. PI
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was used as an enforcement measure, well short of lethal force, to deter and coerce 
targets into a desired course of action.
At least 14 relations between PI and its target groups can be identified from the cases. 
The findings suggest that PI influenced its targets in several ways that may be classified 
in three main categories: PI coerced the EAAGs to take the course of action NATO had 
set out for them (see case 5); it deterred the warring parties (see case 1 and 2) and Serbia 
(see case 4) from taking a course of action against NATO’s interest; and it shaped the 
understanding and opinions of the publics in NATO member states (see case 1,3, and 5) 
as well as in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia (see all cases).
From these findings an important question emerges: what kind of influence does PI 
exercise? The CPIOs’ views on this matter remain vague. Yet, the question is valid. It 
can further our understanding not only of the way the CPIOs assume they influenced 
their targets but more broadly of the forms of power international actors may exert to 
direct events in the field of international affairs.
The answers are still unclear, however. Did PI use the same form of power when it 
changed its targets’ minds at gun point (see case 4), as when it informed the Kosovars 
why the EAAGS had to leave the Presevo valley (case 5), or persuaded NATO’s public 
that supporting IFOR was a worthy cause (case 1)? Moreover, is it an exercise of power 
to inform the publics, for example, about the content of their peace agreement (case 1), 
to counter disinformation, and to establish the facts as one sees them (eg case 6)?
One’s answers to such questions clearly depend, on the definition of power along which 
one reasons. Hence, the value of scrutinising the empirical findings from different 
theoretical perspectives in the following chapter.
186
Chapter 3
Three notions of power applied to NATO 
P ress  and Information activities
This chapter explores the thesis’ theoretical question: How can Robert A. Dahl’s,
Steven Lukes’, and Michel Foucault’s respective notions of power enhance our 
theoretical understanding of the way the NATO PI function may exercise power to 
achieve political and military ends?
Chapter 2 argued that NATO used PI as a means of power to influence people’s specific 
actions and general behaviour and to enhance public support to NATO, that is, to win 
what in broad terms are the strategic objectives of our times (see 1.1). Against this 
background, chapter 3 aims to conceptualise the type of influence PI activities may 
exert when pursuing these goals. It applies different theoretical perspectives to identify 
different forms of power in the CPIOs’ explanations of the way they influence their 
targets. Chapter 3 does not aim to prove that PI exercised one or the other form of 
power. Rather, it aims to further our appreciation of the Pi-target relations and the 
dynamics of power involved. Of more general interest, this endeavour provides a 
conceptual framework that can further our understanding of how actors can exploit 
social communication as a means of power in politics and war (methodological 
considerations have been presented in 1.4.2).
187
3.1 The three notions of power
The chapter commences with an introduction to the three selected notions of power 
before applying them in an analysis. Each of the three theories is elaborated on in three 
turns: first, their respective unique features are introduced, which represent one of four 
faces of power in the academic debate (see 1.4.2); second, their conceptual differences 
are highlighted; and third, their different methodological approaches to the study of 
social power are outlined. It is useful to begin with the concept that appeals to common 
sense.
3.1.1 Robert A .  Dahl -  compulsory power
When Robert A. Dahl (1957: 202-03) first stipulated that ‘A has power over B  to the 
extent that he can get B to do something that B  would not otherwise do’, he framed 
debates on the notion of power for decades.146 Arguably, that sentence remains the 
predominant definition of this cardinal social phenomenon in the academic fields of 
Political Science and International Relations.147 Despite numerous critiques of Dahl’s 
concept and theoretical efforts to move the debate beyond this definition, it remains an
146 This definition derives from his first most cited article on power -  ‘The Concept of Power’ from 1957. 
Dahl’s reference to the theoretical actors in italics and capital letters -  A and B -  will be adopted in the 
remainder of this thesis. Dahl has written extensively on power. In addition to the works and articles used 
in this study his ideas figure notably in Modem Political Analysis (Dahl 1964) and his article from 1965 
entitled ‘Cause and Effect in the Study o f Politics’. The two later writings do not add to the present 
analysis, however, which is why they are not included here.
147 For its influence in the field of International Relations see for example works o f references in the 
discipline such as Griffiths and O’Callaghan (2002: 253) and Evans and Newnham (1998: 447-8). Dahl’s 
notion is compatible with the conception of power that sustains the work of key authors in what has been 
called the Realist school of International Relations (see 1.2.1). For instance, Waltz (1979: 192) sails close 
into the winds o f Dahl when the former adopts the view that ‘an agent is powerful to the extent that he 
affects others more than they affect him’ and adds that this conception compares to a ‘common American 
definition o f power’. Specific reference to Dahl’s notion is made in the works of Baldwin (1971: 20), 
Rothgreb (1993: 98), Nye (2004: 2), and Barnett and Duvall (2005: 49-51).
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almost indispensable point of reference in the work of any scholar who wants to be 
taken seriously on this academic exchange of views. Until the late 1970s, mainstream 
studies of power offered different approaches to answering Dahl’s questions: ‘what is 
power?’ and ‘who has power?’ Still, it was from his questions they departed.148
Dahl perceives the notion of power as including a broad range of human relations, 
which may also be described by terms like influence, compulsion, and force.149 He 
often uses the words interchangeably but in his classical study on power Who governs? 
Democracy and Power in an American City from 1961, he generally uses the term 
‘influence’ rather than ‘power’.150
Here, Dahl sets out to learn who has power in the east coast city of New Haven. At the 
time, the dominant scholarly view was that a power-elite controlled American 
politics.151 In contrast, Dahl (1961: 86) finds that, in the course of two centuries ‘an 
elite no longer rules New Haven’. Different people have power in different sectors, and 
the professional politicians are sensitive to their electorates’ interests. Hence, a pluralist 
political community has replaced the oligarchs.
Dahl (1968: 407) elaborates on power primarily in terms of compulsion but does 
mention that persuasion and inducement also form part of his conception. Power is
148 Hayward (2000: 11, 17-19). Lukes (1974: 11, 23) and Baldwin (1971: 19, 23) are among the scholars 
in this field of inquiry that accept Dahl’s general perspective.
149 The latter term should be conceived in the sense o f what the present thesis refers to as physical force.
150 Dahl’s 1961 work is divided into six books of which two apply the term ‘influence’ in their titles. In 
the index he makes no reference to the term ‘power’ but nine references to ‘influence’, and four to 
‘legitimacy’. In other works he uses the words interchangeably, see for example Dahl (1957: 202; 1968: 
407).
151 Notably among so-called ‘Elitist’ such as Laswell and Kaplan (1950).
189
intentionally exercised. It has to do with who can impose one’s will, and who is 
confined to accepting that will.152 Along this line of reasoning Dahl’s notion of power 
shall be referred to as compulsory power in the present thesis.153
This concept is clearly relevant in the field of International Relations and war, and thus 
for the broad concern of the present study.154 Compulsory power’s focus on behaviour -  
‘get B to do’ -  makes it particularly relevant to explain the kind of tasks that armed 
forces have traditionally performed. In the introduction Cooper tags such traditional 
conceptions of war as modem, and the power of conventional armed forces was 
characterised by its potential ability to, as Parker laconically puts it, kill people and 
break things (see 1.2). At the same time, however, the notion does not hold sufficient 
explanatory power to account for the majority of the relations between the NATO PI 
function and its targets, which aimed to influence the latter’s’ perceptions. To this end, 
the third face of power appears more useful.
3.1.2 Steven Lukes -  structural power
Steven Lukes offers a conception of power that essentially pulls Dahl’s notion to its 
limits, a feature he conveys in the title of his primary work on the topic -  Power: a
152 Thus, Dahl (1968: 406) subscribes to a Weberian conception of the term and notes that so does 
Morgenthau (1960).
153 This term derives from Barnett and Duvall’s (2005: 49) framework to categorise the four faces of 
power. When Lukes’ notion is later labelled structural power and Foucault’s productive power these 
terms derive from the same source.
154 There is a striking similarity between Dahl’s conception o f power and Clausewitz’s (1976: 75) 
definition of war as ‘an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will’.
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radical view.155 Lukes (1974: 23) holds: may exercise power over B by getting him
to do what he does not want to do but he also exercises power over him by influencing, 
shaping or determining his very wants’.
Lukes expands the notion to encompass manipulative forms of power, including subtle
kinds of thought control that are exercised possibly without the deceived ever noticing.
As pointed out by Lukes (1974: 23):
Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to 
have the desires you want them to have -  that is, to secure their 
compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? One does not have 
to go to the lengths of talking about Brave new World, or the world of B.
F. Skinner, to see this: thought control takes many less total and more 
mundane forms, through the control of information, through the mass 
media and through the processes of socialisation.156
Where Dahl individualises power and focuses on observable conflicts of interests,
Lukes draws attention to the hegemonic social structures that influence ordinary 
people’s lives without necessarily being questioned. Sometimes the structures are not 
even realised. As this may well be the most effective use of power, he proposes a ‘three- 
dimensional view’ of power to account for the multiple covert and often unconscious 
ways in which such latent conflicts are suppressed within society (Lukes 1974: 21-25).
155 Lukes’ academic work on power is not extensive. Beside this title, his ideas on the topic figure in a 
volume with several other contributions and a very brief reply to a critic (respectively Lukes 1986; 1976). 
From the point o f view of the present thesis, his third dimension of power does not become clearer in his 
late writings that are often left out when his perspective is presented, see for instance Barnett and Duvall 
(2005).
156 Lukes’ notion o f power thus appears suitable to conceptualise Morgenthau’s (1960: 28) earlier 
mentioned understanding of power as ‘man’s control over the minds and actions o f other men’ (see 1.2.1).
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Referring to Antonio Gramsci and Althusser, among others, Lukes (1974: 47, 52) 
argues that third-dimensional power allows political systems to control the political 
agenda and to prevent the interests of B from becoming political issues. His theoretical 
leanings inspire to dub Lukes’ concept structural power. As examples of such relations 
he points to the capitalist class’ influence over ordinary people and the Soviet Union’s 
influence over Eastern Europe during the Cold War (Lukes 1974: 45, 48).
The political inclination aside, Lukes’ view is considered radical because it extends the 
scope of power relations into the diffuse. His concept aims to account for power not 
only in overt and covert conflicts, as do the first and second dimension of power 
respectively, but also in latent conflicts, which is the third dimension he adds (Lukes 
1974: 32). In this thesis, however, it is only the latter dimension of Lukes’ concept 
which is considered, when reference is made to his work, this in order to distinguish it 
from Dahl’s elaboration on the first dimension.
Lukes sees latent conflicts in social relations where subjects’ real interests are thwarted 
without the suppressed being aware of it or with them giving higher priority to interests 
that are not genuinely theirs. For as he argues: ‘men’s wants may themselves be a 
product of a system which works against their interests, and, in such cases, relates the 
latter to what they would want and prefer, were they able to make the choice’ (Lukes 
1974: 34). By assuming that real interests exist Lukes introduces a contested assumption 
to the academic debate on power (Bradshaw 1976).
Illustrating his concept at work, Lukes points to a study by Matthew Crenson (1971) on 
air pollution in US cities showing that this health hazard was hardly raised as a political 
issue in cities where industrial and political power was centralised. In contrast, in cities 
where power was more diversified, air pollution was dealt with politically. Lukes
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(1974: 41-45) concludes that in the former cases structural power successfully excluded 
citizens’ real interests from the political agenda.
In the context of this study, Lukes’ idea of structural power offers a notion that aims to 
expand the scope of analysis from Dahl’s narrow focus on behaviour to including 
perceptions. It thus holds promise to conceptualise how PI may influence public 
understanding (see 1st PI goal in 2.2.1). In addition, the notion’s features of 
manipulation and thought control make it suitable, it would seem, to account for 
propaganda efforts, and arguably informs the understanding of influence that underlies 
much of the criticism raised against PI (see 1.3 and footnote 74). While the latter is 
outside the scope of this study, the considerations with respect to Lukes’ applicability in 
the present context still question the grounds on which propaganda accusations against 
NATO is based.
3.1.3 Michel Foucault -  productive power
Michel Foucault offers a different approach to explore how people’s perceptions and 
behaviour are influenced.157 He approaches the phenomenon of power in a more 
historical and less positivistic manner than the two other scholars. He accepts with Dahl 
that power influences people’s behaviour by means of sanctioning them. Yet theorising 
within the framework of states he argues that this form of power, which he refers to as a 
Right o f  Death, was dominant only in premodem times before it was transformed into a
157 A philosopher of profession, Foucault’s scholarship extends to multiple academic disciplines 
including linguistics and sociology. Foucault (1982: 777) considers power an implicit theme in some of 
his earlier works but the particular notion of power which co-exists with knowledge, here termed 
productive power, was first presented in Discipline and Punish: the birth o f  the prison (Foucault 1979) 
from 1975 and was developed in The Will to Knowledge. The History o f Sexuality: I (Foucault 1998) a 
year later. See further Lindgren (2003: 327, 334).
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Power over Life sometime between the 17th and 18th century (Foucault 1998: 131-59).
In the former period sovereigns maintained internal cohesion of political communities 
by enforcing law, but otherwise did not interfere in people’s life. People were objects of 
power.
This changed when demands of industrialisation and modem society along with an 
emerging scientific concern for the performance of the body linked power to 
knowledge. Power began to manage life. Power shaped life to meet demands of the 
time. People became subjects of power. To this end, knowledge was useful. The title of 
Foucault’s 1976 [1998] work, The Will to Knowledge, subtly conveys his thesis that 
knowledge linked up with ‘The will to power’ that Nietzsche had explored a century 
earlier. A whole range of human affairs hitherto confined to the private sphere and 
existing primarily in a material sense, as for example illness and human reproduction, 
began to exist in a discursive form as well, as respectively health and sexuality. 
Authoritative understandings of such aspects of life emerged in scientific disciplines, as 
medicine and psychology. Knowledge objectified features of human existence by 
dividing information about reality in terms of binary opposition, that is in conceptual 
pairs such as sound/ill and normal/abnormal (Foucault 1979: 199).
Crucially, this organisation of information, this ‘scientificity’ as he calls it, constructed 
systems o f legitimate knowledge (Foucault 1998: 72), which in turn created the 
formation of special knowledge (Foucault 1998: 106). It established the norms that 
shaped people’s perceptions of what was and what was not, for instance, sound and 
normal. It was a technique that induced dividing practices, as Foucault (1982: 777-78) 
labels them, by which ‘the subject is either divided inside himself or divided from 
others’. From this perspective, knowledge became a means to standardise, to 
homogenise, people’s mindsets and behaviour. Knowledge exerts a ‘power of
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normalization, in the arrangement of a power-knowledge over individuals’ (Foucault 
1979: 296). People’s inclination to be on the generally accepted side of dividing 
normative lines disciplines people to fit the norm.158 ‘A normalizing society is the 
historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life’ (Foucault 1998:144).
This form of power did not primarily express itself in legal terms but in a broader 
normative sense:
Law cannot help but be armed, and its arm, par excellence, is death . . .
The law always refers to the sword. But a power whose task is to take 
charge of life needs continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms. It 
is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty 
but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility . . .  it 
effects distribution around the norm (Foucault 1998: 144).
From this perspective the most pervasive form of power is discursive, in which power 
joins arms with knowledge, a phenomenon he generally refers to with the notion power- 
knowledge. This discursive form of power has penetrated practically all aspects of 
people’s existence and continues to shape our way of perceiving, of making sense, of 
thinking, and therefore of behaving (Foucault 1998: 142-3; 1982: 781). Foucault (1998: 
97) explains:
It is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze the 
mechanisms of power. In this way we will escape from the system of 
Law-and-Sovereign which has captivated political thought for such a long 
time. And if it is true that Machiavelli was among the few -  and this no 
doubt was the scandal of his ‘cynicism’ -  who conceived the power of the 
Prince in terms of force relationships, perhaps we need to go one step
158 Foucault (1998: 143-44) refers to this dimension of power-knowledge as ‘bio-power’. Although this is 
a central term in his perspective, bio-power is not presented here for fear that it may confuse, rather than 
clarify the use o f Foucault in this study.
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further, do without the persona of the Prince, and decipher power 
mechanisms on the basis of a strategy that is immanent in force 
relationships.159
From this discursive approach to power -  or, analytical framework of power -  the 
present study shall apply an interpretation of power-knowledge departing from 
Foucault’s (1998: 94) idea that ‘power comes from below’, that is, from subjects. It 
shall be referred to as productive power which can briefly be described as an ability 
subjects apply when they exploit the Foucauldian power mechanisms inherent in 
discursive strategies (see 3.4.3).
Foucault is primarily interested in the productive effects of power. He offers an example 
from a child’s upbringing to illustrate this dimension of power-knowledge at work. 
Discourses on sexuality influence and is being influenced, he argues, by ‘the body of 
the child, under surveillance, surrounded in his cradle, his bed, or his room by an entire 
watch-crew of parents, nurses, servants, educators, and doctors, all attentive to the least 
manifestations of his sex’ (Foucault 1998: 98). The ideas and behaviour of this ‘watch- 
crew’ is produced by discursive strategies on sexuality, that is, by systems of legitimate 
knowledge, by a particular medico-sexual regime (Foucault 1998: 42). The relatives and 
professionals influence the child, and each other. But they also add value to, and thereby 
influence, the discursive systems of meaning and signification. They reinforce or 
produce variations to already existing themes. In other words, the subjects that relate to 
the child are influenced by dominant discourses but they also, in ever so minor ways,
159 Note that Foucault uses the term ‘force’ in a discursive sense, often by referring to it as ‘force 
relations’ or ‘field of forces’. This term we shall dub discursive force in order to distinguish it from what 
elsewhere in the thesis is called ‘physical force’. The latter refers to force as a conventional military 
capacity to apply armed force that is potentially lethal.
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change the identity of the same discourses, and this with implications for future 
discursive effects.
This serves to introduce the productive dimensions of Foucault’s concept, which will 
soon be elaborated on. But for now it suffices to note that his work offers to the present 
study a notion of power that allows us to understand how PI may have influenced the 
ideas and behaviour of target groups so distant and diffuse as NATO’s publics.160
3.2 Conceptual differences
After this brief introduction to each of the three prominent notions of power, it is useful 
to compare them in order to decipher their dissimilarities more explicitly. This will 
clarify their particular utility in the following analysis. The examination shall first shed 
light on their conceptual differences and in a proceeding section emphasise their 
distinctive methodological approaches. For the former purpose the main differences 
may be summarised in this table:
160 It may be noticed that the contribution of Foucault’s understanding of power to this broad area of 
concern resembles approaches in communication studies, such as ‘indexing’ (eg Benet 1990) and ‘issue 
framing’ (eg Entman 1993). The latter explicates, for example, ‘to frame is to select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ 
(Entman 1993:52). Among others, Myers et al. (1996) use such an approach to argue that different media 
frames resulted in different international responses to the civil wars in Bosnia and Rwanda.
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Dahl and Lukes Foucault
Power comes from someone, somewhere everywhere
Power is negative, it sanctions positive, it produces
Power as possessional, a capacity exercised, an ability *
Power influences causally mutually
Power must be explained interpreted
Truth and moral has an essence is produced by power
Table 1: Dahl’s and Lukes’ versus Foucault’s notions of power. The table is inspired by Stewart 
Cleeg (1989: 182).
*) Foucault does not present the mechanisms of power as an ability but as an analytical framework. 
Presenting power as an ability is a methodological take specifically developed for the purpose o f the 
present thesis, which is labelled productive power. This notion is compatible with the dynamics of 
Foucault’s analytical framework but specifically enters the framework from the perspective o f subjects.
It may appear peculiar that Dahl’s and Lukes’ notions of power are grouped together in 
the left column of table 1, given the dissimilarities presented in the previous section (see
3.1). Notably, the former concept does not share the latter’s focus on structural power 
that operates in latent conflicts. Further investigation into the theoretical constructions 
will reveal, however, that Lukes’ notion at a more profound level shares Dahl’s 
assumptions about how we are to understand social power. Foucault’s approach to the 
same phenomenon, on the other hand, differs radically from the two others’ 
understanding.
Each of the notions will now be scrutinised in turn to briefly elucidate the major 
conceptual cleavages between Dahl/Lukes and Foucault, as well as the internal 
resemblances and differences between Dahl’s and Lukes’ respective notions.
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3.2.1 Conceptual features of Dahl's notion o f power
The title of Dahl’s major work, Who Governs?, projects his central assumption that 
someone has power. Power has a locus. Consequently, Dahl’s research task becomes to 
find out who has power in New Haven. Power has several sources, however. In line 
with ideas sustaining a pluralist political community, different people have power in 
different sectors and the political stratum is accountable to its electorates. Still, within a 
given sector and on a specific issue area it is possible to find out who is the most 
powerful, according to Dahl (1961: 336).
Moreover, he conceives power in negative terms. Dahl’s (1957: 203) definition that A 
‘can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ clearly shows that he sees 
power as restricting the free will of others to act, or conversely limiting one’s own 
actions. Power may be a means to sanction others.
This compulsory power is conceived in possessional terms, as a capacity that A has
more or less of in comparison to B, which leads Dahl to an instrumental conception of
power. Power is a means to influence others. Power is a capacity an actor possesses and
applies in his relations to others. It ‘consists of all the resources -  opportunities, acts,
objects -  that he can exploit in order to affect the behaviour of another’ (Dahl 1957:
203). This is what Dahl (1957: 203) refers to as the base o f power and which could be
studied as ‘the war potential of nations’. The base itself is inert. A only has power if he
demonstrates his willingness to use it:
The base . . .  must be exploited in some fashion if the behaviour of others 
is to be altered. The means or instruments of such exploitation are 
numerous; often they involve threats or promises to employ the base in 
some way and they may involve actual use of the base . . .  Thus the means 
is a mediating activity by A between A ’s base and B 's responses (Dahl 
1957: 203, emphasis in original).
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It follows from this that Dahl regards power as intentionally exercised. Power is a 
deliberate action to affect another actor. This intentional and instrumental feature of 
compulsory power will be particularly useful in the analysis to advance the 
understanding of PFs mode of operation to influence its targets.
Another characteristic feature is that Dahl understands the phenomenon of social power 
in terms of ‘power over’ someone; as a relation between two actors where A makes B 
do. This is a causal perception of social relations where power goes one way: from A to 
B. Against this background, Dahl’s compulsory power may be described as a capacity 
that someone can exploit to compel others to do something.
3 . 2.2 Conceptual features of Lukes' notion o f power
It has already been shown how Lukes’ notion of power differs from Dahl’s by 
extending the scope of analysis to include not only how power may influence behaviour 
but also perceptions (see 3.1.3). Lukes thus offers a conception that purports to identify 
relations of power that are not only sustained by means of compulsion but also of 
manipulation. A feature that appears useful in the present context.
In many other respects, however, Lukes continues along the conceptual road that Dahl 
has pointed out. First of all both scholars conceive power as a relation between two 
actors. Power derives from a source. As Lukes (1974: 56) metaphorically explains, it 
‘flow[s] from the action, or inaction, of certain specifiable agents’. Although he takes a 
broader view on who may constitute A, expanding the actor to collective forces and 
social hegemonies, he maintains the idea that power has a locus (Lukes 1974: 22).
Lukes is also concerned with the negative and prohibitory dimension of power. His 
research task is ‘to find out what the exercise of power prevents people from doing,
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and sometimes even thinking’ (Lukes 1974: 48). Moreover, Lukes (1974: 34), like 
Dahl, explicitly describes A 's relation to B as power over. He criticises Hannah Arendt 
and Talcott Parsons for conceiving power as an ability, rather than a relation between 
agents. Lukes explains that their ‘power to’ approach is mistaken because ‘the 
conflictual aspect of power -  the fact that it is exercised over people -  disappears 
altogether from this understanding. And along with it disappears the central interest in 
studying power relations in the first place -  an interest in the (attempted or successful) 
securing of people’s compliance by overcoming or averting their opposition’ (Lukes 
1974:31).
Further, while Lukes offers a very new answer to Dahl’s basic question: ‘who has 
power?’, he still departs from that question and thus automatically adopts Dahl’s 
assumption about social causality. Power goes one way, from A to B, a relational 
assumption that Lukes (1974: 26) spells out: ‘The absolutely basic common core to . .  . 
all talk of power is the notion that A in some way affects B \  One of the major 
methodological challenges which he contemplates is how to empirically identify the 
mechanism of an exercise of structural power. He remains optimistic, however: ‘There 
seems to be no impossibility in principle of establishing a causal nexus here’ (Lukes 
1974: 51). The purpose of Lukes’ conception of power is to develop an analytical tool 
to prove that someone suppresses the majority.
Where Dahl (1968: 406) claims to explore the phenomenon of power in a normative 
neutral manner, Lukes (1974: 24) takes an essentialist stand on the moral aspects of 
power. Real and false interests exist exterior to subjects’ conscience. Consensus can be 
false or manipulated. He recognises that this position is ethically controversial but 
shares Crenson’s view that problematising such aspects in cases involving the 
degradation of public health ultimately rests on ‘the opinion of the observer
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concerning the value of human life’.161 Against this background Cleeg (1989: 182) has 
termed Lukes’ approach ‘an ethics of power’.
Lukes’ stand to analyse fair and square ffom the perspective of basic human rights is 
contestable. Nonetheless, it serves as a privileged ethical position from which one can 
choose to conduct research. Given that ethical considerations are beyond the scope of 
the present thesis, this matter shall not be investigated further at this stage (see 1.4.3). 
Later and for practical purposes related to the conduct of analysis ffom the perspective 
of structural power, the validity of Lukes’ moral stand as a methodological assumption 
will be critically assessed.
This should suffice to show that despite clearly different features in their notions of 
power mentioned above and methodological disputes (see 3.3.1 and 3.3.2), Lukes and 
Dahl share common ground. Moreover and crucially for the present purpose, this limits 
their explanatory power. Foucault’s notion of power is useful to cast light on modes of 
influence that are inaccessible to Lukes and Dahl.
3 . 2.3 Conceptual features o f Foucault's notion of power
Without making a direct reference to the two other scholars, Foucault discourages 
approaching power in the way they have proposed. Summarizing his understanding of 
power he stipulates:
161 Crenson cited in Lukes (1974: 46).
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In short, it is a question of orienting ourselves to a conception of power 
which replaces the privilege of the law with the viewpoint of the 
objective, the privilege of prohibition with the viewpoint of tactical 
efficacy, the privilege of sovereignty with the analysis of a multiple and 
mobile field of force relations, wherein far-reaching but never completely 
stable, effects of domination are produced. The strategical model, rather 
than the model based on law (Foucault 1998: 102).
Dahl and Lukes’ idea that power has a source, a locus, is therefore mistaken, according 
to Foucault.162 Rather, we should appreciate that ‘power is everywhere; not because it 
embraces everything but because it comes ffom everywhere’, as Foucault (1998: 93) is 
widely cited for. This idea that nobody is in control does not exclude people and their 
activities as sources of power. On the contrary, people exercise power with, in 
Foucault’s (1998: 95) formulation, ‘a series of aims and objectives. But this does not 
mean that it [power] results ffom the choice or decisions of an individual subject; let us 
not look for the headquarters that presides over its rationality’. Thus, at the level of 
subjects, he subscribes to the intentional feature of power that Dahl promotes (see
3.2.1), but while Foucault regards subjects as having an impact also at the level of 
society, he does not attach particular intentions to influence at this level.
Foucault’s idea is that when people act they also create discursive effects. In a context, 
or realm, that he terms the ‘multiple and mobile field of force relations’ these effects 
meet the effects of innumerable other activities of people and discursive forces. Here the 
effects integrate in force relations that are transformed into broader discursive strategies, 
and at this stage ‘it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them [the
162 with a hint to Dahl Foucault (1998: 99) asserts: ‘We must not look for who has power. . .  ’ Nor is the 
question, as Lukes will have it, to find out ‘what over-all domination was served’ (Foucault 1998: 97).
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strategies], and few who can be said to have formulated them’ (Foucault 1998: 95). In 
other words, although power has a discursive form, it derives ffom and is changed by 
people’s actions but crucially with an effect that is not the intended result of any 
subjects in particular. Power takes the form of discursive strategies without strategists, 
as Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (1986: 109) remark.
Foucault highlights the positive and productive dimension of power, as a contrast to the
negative and prohibitory conception that Dahl and his followers emphasise. Therefore
Foucault (1979: 194) famously asserts:
We must cease once and for all to describe the effect of power in negative 
terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it 
‘conceals’. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces 
domains of objects and rituals of truth.
More generally, in his research on madness, crime and sexuality Foucault’s thesis has 
been that power-knowledge produces relations of domination and social hegemonies. 
More than that power-knowledge creates people as subjects. The state, for instance, is 
more adequately understood as a product of power-knowledge, than a producer of it. He 
shows how knowledge, meaning and norms are historical contingent. The terms along 
which we evaluate what qualifies as, for example, right or wrong, are historical 
constructs (Foucault 1998: 105).
This outlook deserves elaboration since it is particularly relevant in the broad context of 
this thesis. Foucault’s stand contradicts the normative assumption of Lukes’ conception. 
When meaning is historical contingent people cannot have the kind of real interests that 
Lukes seeks to reveal, since this would suppose that interests and truth have a core, an 
essence, that exists exterior to the social context. Foucault cannot accept this point of
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view. Rather, morality should be understood as a product of power-knowledge and
therefore as changing in time and space. He clarifies:
By truth I do not mean the ‘ensemble of truths which are to be discovered 
and accepted’ but rather ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the 
true and false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the 
true’, it being understood also that it’s not a matter of a battle ‘on behalf 
of the truth but a battle about the status of truth and the economic and 
political role it plays’.163
Although this quote has much broader application than truth in the sphere of interests, it 
conveys Foucault’s ontological position. Truth does not exist a priori, it is a social 
construction. Thus, he refuses to accept the positivist grounds upon which Dahl and 
Lukes theorise. It is from this perspective Foucault’s (1998: 93) well-known 
understanding of power should be comprehended: ‘One needs to be nominalistic, no 
doubt: power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we 
are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in 
a particular society’.
Further, Foucault cannot accept Dahl’s and Lukes’ possessional conceptions. Power 
cannot, to any significant extent, be possessed, because the dynamic forces in society 
are beyond the control of subjects -  beyond an A. Therefore Foucault (1979: 26) claims 
that ‘power is exercised rather than possessed’.
That view does not prevent him from sharing Dahl’s view that people exercise power in 
an intentional manner. According to Foucault (1998: 95) such tactics have a logic, and 
objectives can be identified. In a broader sense, however, Foucault’s notion of power is
163 Interview with Foucault in Gordon (1980: 132).
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better understood as discursive strategies. Rather than following Dahl’s lead, asking 
‘who has power?’ and proving who that ‘someone’ is, Foucault wants to understand 
how the power mechanisms operate (see 3.1.3).
It follows ffom this reasoning that Foucault is at odds with the causal relation between 
subjects which the two other scholars assume. Power is not a question about whether^ 
has power over B. It is a question of how discursive strategies influence A and B, how 
the two latter influence each other, and how that engagement in turn influences the 
discursive strategies. Influence is mutual. Power relations are reciprocal, as his example 
ffom a child’s upbringing illustrates (see 3.1.3).
In the context of the present study, it is particularly stimulating to draw attention to a
distinctive feature of power in Foucault’s’ theoretical universe, which becomes clearer
in his late explorations on the topic. This is a form of power which he refers to as
government and related terms like govern, governmentality, the art o f  government, and
government techniques (Foucault 1982; 1991).164 To apprehend his use of these terms it
is beneficial to quote him at length:
Government is defined as a right manner of disposing things so as to lead 
not to the form of the common good, as the jurists’ texts would have said, 
but to an end which is ‘convenient’ for each of the things that are to be 
governed. This implies a plurality of specific aims: for instance, 
government will have to ensure that the greatest possible quantity of 
wealth is produced, that the people are provided with sufficient means of
164 These terms are presented in italics to draw attention to Foucault’s distinctive use o f them. They do 
not refer to the conventional understanding o f the term ‘government’, which is a narrower notion 
referring to a state’s executive political branch. In the remainder of the text these terms will be used in the 
Foucauldian sense unless mention is made of the contrary.
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subsistence, that the population is enabled to multiply, etc. (Foucault 
1991:95).
Government has implication for his conception of power:
Basically power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the 
linking of one to the other than a question of government. This word must 
be allowed the very broad meaning which it had in the sixteenth century. 
‘Government’ did not refer only to political structures or to the 
management of states; rather, it designated the way in which the conduct 
of individuals or of groups might be directed: the government of children, 
of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick . . .  modes of actions . . .  
destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, 
in this sense, is to structure the possible field  o f action o f others (Foucault 
1982: 789-90. Italics added).
Further, government is ‘guiding the possibility o f  conduct and putting order in the 
possible outcome’ (Foucault 1982: 789. Italics added). The art of government is thus a 
question of how people are directed towards particular ends. With the Enlightenment a 
certain form of mentality developed in thoughts about how to govern, which eventually 
consolidated in what Foucault refers to with his new term govemmentality.
This emerging rationality of the state resulted in a variety of techniques and practices 
which Foucault (1991: 92) encapsulates in his particular use of the term police whose 
overall aim it was to make people content in order to strengthen the power of the state 
and its ability to exercise power.165 Such a form of power does not influence people’s 
behaviour by violent means of sanctions but by shaping and constructing people’s
165 Gordon (1991: 10) clarifies that this term should not be confused with its conventional use but refers 
to policy, or polizeiwissenschaft, which is a government technique particular to the state.
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rationality (Foucault 2000: 321-24). Government doesn’t only act on people; it also acts 
in them, and through them. It creates them as subjects (Foucault 1982: 781).
In the analysis, Foucault’s ideas -  that influence is mutual, that power has a discursive 
form and that it operates in the multiple and mobile field of force relations -  prove 
useful to advance our understanding of the context in which PI operates. Moreover, his 
positive approach to power allows us to see how PI influences its targets by producing 
meaning and norms that structure people’s possible field of action.
3.3 Methodological differences
The introduction established that the three notions of power fulfil criteria that make 
them potentially useful to the theoretical purpose of this thesis, that is, to enhance our 
understanding of Pi’s mode of operation to achieve NATO’s ends (see 1.4.2). Whether 
the notion’s methodological requirements can be met in an actual analysis is another 
matter, however. Or, to phrase it differently, it is still to be shown that the empirical 
findings can provide the kinds of warrant the concepts prescribe to characterise P i’s 
mode of operation as an exercise of power.
To permit such considerations in the analytical stage (ie 3.4), the last round of 
theoretical clarification aims to highlight the notions’ different methodological 
approaches to the study of social power. The presentation sheds light on the notions’ 
respective utilities and constraints as conceptual aids to improve our understanding of 
how PI may influence its targets, and indicates to which ends and in which ways PI is 
likely to be a useful means of power in military operations. Again, Dahl is first out.
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3.3.1 Dahl's methodological approach -  Behaviouralism
A cardinal concern in Dahl’s project is to develop a solid method that allows scholars to 
give evidence to claim that someone, in a given case, is the most powerful. His 
methodological approach is influenced by the methods of Behaviouralism, which was 
the dominant scientific approach in Political Science at the time he developed his 
concept.166 With direct reference to principles borrowed ffom the physicist Isaac 
Newton and the field of Economics, Dahl (1957: 205-09; 1968: 413-14) applies this 
positivistic approach to measure and compare actors’ compulsory power.
As mentioned, he conceives power as a causal relation between two actors (see 3.2.1). B 
is the dependent variable. A is the independent. These actors can be individuals, groups, 
governments (here in the conventional sense of the term), or other human aggregates 
(Dahl 1957: 203). In Who Governs? Dahl (1961) focuses on decisionmaking among a 
rather small group of influential individuals -  the political stratum -  in New Haven. He 
assumes that the actual power relations can be uncovered by analysing overt conflicts 
between these actors over important political issues. By identifying who made proposals 
for decisions, which of these proposals were adopted, and which were turned down,
Dahl (1961: 336) concludes: ‘The participants with the greatest proportion of successes 
out of the total number of successes were then considered to be the most influential’.
Nonetheless, Dahl (1961: 89) cautiously remarks: ‘to ignore indirect influence in 
analysis of the distribution of influence would be to exclude what might well prove to
166 Hollis and Smith’s (1990: 28-32) understanding of this methodological approach in International 
Relations, and more broadly in the social sciences, is adopted here.
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be a highly significant process of control in a pluralistic democracy’. Methodological 
concerns for empirical precision in measuring actors’ relative power spur him to reduce 
the amount of variables in play, however. He deliberately individualises power and 
excludes diffuse ties between the actors in question and the context in which they 
interact. Justifying this methodological prescription, Dahl (1957: 204) asserts: ‘there is 
no “action at a distance.” Unless there is some “connection” between^ and [5], then no 
power relation can be said to exist. . .  [this] enables one to screen out many possible 
relations quite early in an inquiry’ (italics in original). He deliberately leaves the term 
‘connection’ undefined, however.
The analysis on the CPIOs’ conception of power shall depart ffom the understanding 
that to qualify as a case of compulsory power there must be specific actors, overt 
conflicts of interests and an observable outcome (see 3.4.1).
3.3.2 Lukes’ methodological approach  -  Structuralism
Lukes accepts both Dahl’s assumptions that power should be conceived as causal 
relations between actors and that the research task is to find out who has power. Yet, by 
applying a theoretical outlook influenced by Structuralism, an influential approach in 
the social sciences of the 1970s, Lukes offers very different answers to Dahl’s question 
and expands the scope of power relations to be analysed. At a more profound level, 
however, this structural approach leads him to share with Dahl a positivistic ideal. In 
Cleeg’s (1989: 30) choice of words, Lukes strives to explain the phenomenon of power 
with ‘neat, tight and precise’ concepts that can incorporate empirically observable and 
measurable data to prove the existence of power relations.
Structuralism’s Marxist legacy inspires Lukes to exchange Dahl’s specific actors with 
more diffuse structural forces. Specific actors are not unimportant. Political systems,
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capitalist classes and air-polluted people are made up by individuals, but the power they 
exercise, or are influenced by, cannot be understood only by focusing on them as 
individual actors. Structural forces beyond their control are in play: ‘The bias of the 
system can be mobilised, recreated and reinforced in ways that are neither consciously 
chosen nor the intended result of particular individuals’ choices’ (Lukes 1974: 21). It is 
these power relations that Lukes’ notion directs itself to decipher. He is cautious not to 
expand structural power into structural determinism, because ‘within a system 
characterised by total structural determinism, there would be no place for power’ (Lukes 
1974: 54-5). He continues: ‘to identify a given process as an “exercise of power”, rather 
than as a case of structural determination, is to assume that it is in the exerciser ’s or 
exercisers ’power to act differently’ (Lukes 1974: 55, emphasis in original).
Lukes accepts Dahl’s assumption that power relations exist only where there are 
conflicts of interests, but disagrees with him that these conflicts need to be observable. 
In the same vein, Lukes takes issue with Bachrach and Baratz who sought to expand 
Dahl’s notion of observable conflicts to encompass not only overt but also covert 
conflicts: ‘To assume that the absence of grievance equals genuine consensus is simply 
to rule out the possibility of false or manipulated consensus by definitional flat’ (Lukes 
1974:24).
A may create false consensus when he succeeds in manipulating the ideas of B  against 
their real interests.167 It is such practice that Lukes denominates as an exercise of 
structural power and which creates latent conflicts of interests. But Lukes’
167 This is another central notion in Lukes’ methodological approach. When reference is made to false 
consensus it is therefore in his sense o f term it is used.
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methodological prescriptions to find evidence supporting a claim that B ’s real interests 
are thwarted are problematic. In fact, his most elaborated discussions concern how to 
establish an objective parameter, a baseline, against which the authencity of f?’s 
formulated interests can be measured. Lukes presents two major methods: critical cases 
and comparative studies, which are now presented.
Lukes’ technique to scrutinise critical cases implies that research focuses on rare
challenges to consensus on a specific issue or in a specific field; challenges that may
reveal issues that A hitherto has prevented from appearing on the political agenda. These
are the exceptions, the critical cases that may lead the attentive researcher to reveal
cases of false consensus. Lukes points to a study on the Indian caste system and argues
that what appears to be ‘genuine consensus over different values’ is in fact false
consensus imposed on the lower caste. Lukes (1974: 49) concludes:
The evidence suggests that there is a significant difference between the 
caste system as it exists in the ‘popular conception’ and as it actually 
operates. What to the outside observer may appear as a value consensus 
which sanctifies an extreme, elaborately precise and stable hierarchy 
actually conceals the fact that perceived opportunities of lower castes to 
rise within the system are very often, if not invariably, seized.
In other words, investigating what actors do when they find a way out of the grips of 
hegemonic control may reveal that structural power is at work. On this note, the 
following analysis will identify situations in which PI targets acted in defiance with the 
situation NATO have aimed to establish, and consider whether these are cases of PI 
thwarting real interests of the targets, the Bs (see 3.4.2).
Comparative studies is the other method he proposes to unlock evidence of structural 
power that ‘prevents people from doing, and sometimes even thinking’ (Lukes 1974:
48. See further 3.2.2). As an example of this method applied to a case Lukes points
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to Crenson’s briefly mentioned work The Un-Politics o f Air Pollution: a study o f  
non-decision making in the cities. Crenson wonders why two cities with comparable 
levels of air pollution have different policies on a major threat to public health and why 
in one city the problem is not even raised. Crenson presumes that air pollution cannot be 
in the real interests of the citizens, the 2Ts, since it reduces their life expectancy. Lukes 
(1974: 45) pointedly adds: ‘there is good reason to expect that, other things being equal, 
people would rather not be poisoned’. Aware that the notion of interests is highly 
normative, Lukes (1974: 46) argues that the moral and political dimensions involved 
becomes clear on an issue that shortens life.
Having established air pollution as not in B ’s real interest, the research task is to find an
A and explain how that A controls the political agenda. This is a challenge, for as Lukes
(1974: 38) ponders: ‘How can one study, let alone explain, what does not happen?’
Identifying latent conflicts involves the dubious effort to justify counterfactuals. Lukes
(1974: 41) acknowledges this but maintains that it can be done:
We must provide other, indirect, grounds for asserting that if  A had not 
acted (or failed to act) in a certain way . . .  then B would have thought and 
acted differently from the way he does actually think and ac t . . .  we need 
to justify our expectation that B would have thought or acted differently.
Crenson deals with this task by means of a comparative methodological approach. He 
compares the American cities Gary and East Chicago. In the former he finds that air 
pollution was not a political issue, while it was in the latter. He explains this by 
presenting evidence to argue that Gary’s political life was controlled by a strong 
industrial actor and party organisation in a manner and to an extent that prevented its 
citizens from voicing their interests. In contrast, East Chicago that made air pollution a 
political issue had several industrial actors and no strong party organisations. In this 
way a comparative study may challenge what at first glance appears to be
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commonly accepted -  in this case that air pollution is acceptable. Lukes (1974: 45) 
proposes this method to furnish the kind of counterfactual evidence he seeks. He 
asserts:
Hard evidence is given of the ways in which institutions, specifically US 
Steel, largely through inaction, prevented the citizens’ interest in not 
being poisoned ffom being acted on . . .  Thus both the relevant 
counterfactual and the identification of a power mechanism are justified.
From this perspective, structural power will have explanatory power for NATO PI 
activities, only if  the analysis can identify latent conflicts of interests. The analysis in 
T.4.2 shall follow Lukes’ prescriptions to identify critical and comparative cases in an 
effort to provide evidence to prove that PI thwarted its target groups’ real interests.
3.3.3 Foucault's methodological approach  -  Genealogy
Presenting Foucault’s methods to explore the phenomenon of power is no easy task.
One reason for this may be that power was an implicit feature of his work (see 1.4.2). In 
addition, he is less explicit in his definition and methodological prescriptions than are 
Dahl and Lukes. Foucault’s theoretical ideas are certainly not neat and tight, as the two 
other scholars’ approaches have been called (see 3.2.2). Nor does he seek to forward 
proof of the solid kind that Dahl and Lukes’ positivistic leanings aim for. Foucault’s 
scientific approach is generally described as post-positivistic, or post-structuralist, 
although he did not subscribe to the idea that such labels be attached to his work.168
168 See, for example, Cleeg (1989: 150-3), Milliken (1999), Hayward (2000: 5), Sandmo (1999: 83-4), 
Neumann (2001: 36), Lindgren (2003: 326), and Barnett and Duvall (2005: 48).
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True, his methodological approach, generally referred to as Genealogy, is thoroughly 
empirical, but he relates this to a discursive practice where reality is socially 
constructed, rather than a given as the positivists assume.169 It is ffom the latter 
perspective that Dahl and Lukes strive to establish general theories on power and 
elaborate at length on methodological considerations and obstacles to this end. Foucault 
has no such theoretical ambitions. Power, he holds, does not exist in a universal form on 
which one can theorise in general terms. Power exists in specific contexts and takes 
different forms in these, which is why he studies the phenomena in such concrete 
contexts. He provides an analytical perspective to, rather than a theory of, power 
(Foucault 1998: 82). Yet, his perspective appears like a continuous ‘work in progress’ 
and his methodological approach largely exists implicit in his historical analyses and 
metaphorical abstractions. This gives room for different interpretations -  a tendency that 
is reinforced by the fact that his theoretical elaborations are difficult to understand. 
Those who conduct case studies within Foucault’s scientific ideal are left with few 
explicit guidelines from his hand. They can interpret the methods implicitly applied in 
Foucault’s impressive production or rely on other’s interpretations of the same.
The few explicit directions Foucault offers for the conduct of research unfold most 
clearly in his four ‘cautionary prescriptions’, as he calls them, presented on a few pages 
in his central work on power (Foucault 1998: 92-102). He stresses, however, that these 
should not to be considered methodological imperatives. The prescriptions provide 
inspiration more than practical guidance. Still, they do give a sense of direction. To
169 Lindgren (2003: 338) describes Genealogy as a research method that elucidates relations between 
phenomena, their genesis and their transformations.
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remain close to the primary source, the present study will base itself on Foucault’s own 
accounts o f his method. The four prescriptions will therefore be addressed in turn.
It is in his first prescription ‘rules of immanence’ that he discourages any effort to look 
for the source of power (Foucault 1998: 98). Power should be regarded in discursive 
terms, as immanent in knowledge: ‘Between techniques of knowledge and strategies of 
power, there is no exteriority’ (Foucault 1998: 98). Power and knowledge are two sides 
of the same coin. This idea directs attention to how information, or rather subjects’ use 
of it, is deeply embedded in the domain of power. In this way Foucault moves the study 
of power ffom Dahl’s observable and primarily material context perceived in 
positivistic terms -  that in the latter’s own example can be a state’s war potential (see
3.2.1) -  to a normative and primarily discursive context perceived in post-positivistic 
terms. This is a methodological take that allows the study of power to become firmly 
embedded in the realm of perceptions.
In addition, this prescription suggests that power mechanisms should be examined in 
‘what might be called “local centers” of power-knowledge: for example, the relations 
that obtain between penitents and confessors’ (Foucault 1998: 98. Italics added). Thus, 
Foucault’s methodological approach is empirical. Although he conceives power in 
broader discursive terms he stresses that a study on discourse, its sources and effects, 
must depart ffom ‘the most immediate, the most local power relations at work’
(Foucault 1998: 97). His example with the child surrounded by a watch-crew illustrates 
this point (see 3.1.3).
In the second prescription, ‘rules o f continual variations’, Foucault’s post-positivist 
stand is illuminated. He directs research to uncover how the understanding of a specific 
field and the effects that follow ffom this have changed over time: ‘We must seek
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rather the pattern of the modifications which the relationships of force imply . . .  
Relations of power-knowledge are not static forms of distribution, they are “matrices of 
transformation”’ (Foucault 1998: 99). His explorations of the phenomena madness, 
crime and sexuality illustrate how a historical empirical method can highlight such 
‘matrices of transformation’ in different contexts. That is, how discursive strategies vary 
with time and space.
His third prescription is the ‘rule of double conditioning’, which concerns the relation 
between subjects and discourse. He recommends that we see the subjects in local 
centres of power-knowledge as part of an overall discursive strategy that is beyond the 
subjects’ direct influence. Their tactics, however, are neither subordinated to the 
strategy nor are they superior to it. Rather, we should see tactics from such local centres 
of power-knowledge and strategy as conditioning each other (Foucault 1998: 100). It is 
in this way that Foucault links the subjects and discourses. Their relation should be 
appreciated as reciprocal, as a relation of mutually constituting components. This 
intimacy allows the continual variations and matrices of transformation presented above 
as his second cautionary prescription.
The last precautionary prescription is the ‘rule of the tactical polyvalence of discourse’. 
He warns the researcher against understanding discourses in terms of dominant and 
subordinated discourses. Rather, we should conceive the multiple and mobile field of 
force relations as occupied by multiple discourses operating simultaneously in complex 
and fluid constellations. It is in this realm where force relations clash, change, and 
create synergies that the mechanisms of power operate. Power is the support these force 
relations find in each other by establishing chains or systems. Conversely, when force 
relations are separated and isolated, they lose power. ‘There can exist different and even 
contradictory discourses within the same strategy; they can, on the contrary,
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circulate without changing their form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy’ 
(Foucault 1998: 102). So discourse may sometimes support the reigning discursive 
strategies, sometimes undermine them.
Hence, Foucault’s notion of power can be applied in the present context if  his four 
cautionary prescriptions are compatible with P i’s mode of operation. In addition, this 
clarification of Foucault’s methodology has served to show that although different in 
most other respects, he shares Dahl’s insistence on empiricism and the focus on specific 
subjects. As the third prescription illustrates, Foucault’s analytical framework comprises 
both Dahl’s methodological concern to study power in the relation between specific 
actors, and also Lukes’ (1974: 21) focus on ‘the bias of the system’. This, as we shall 
see, is valuable for the present purpose.
This review of the three prominent faces of power has explicated their respective 
distinctions, commonalities and methodological requirements in the context of the 
present study. These features constitute the conceptual framework that shall now be 
applied to enhance our theoretical appreciation of the kinds of influence identified in the 
empirical chapter. The three notions of power will be instrumental as analytical tools to 
scrutinise and conceptualise the forms of influence that P i’s mode of operation sought 
to exert in order to achieve NATO’s political and military ends. In other words, the 
analysis will substantiate the theoretical thesis of this study (see 1.2.1).
3.4 Analysis
The analysis commences by considering whether the empirical findings are compatible 
with each of the scholars’ methodological approaches, as presented in 3.3. It is on this 
ground that Lukes’ concept is deemed inappropriate. P i’s endeavours do correspond
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with Dahl’s and Foucault’s respective theoretical outlooks, however. Hence, the two 
latter’s conceptual features (see 3.1 and 3.2) are used to guide the exploration of how PI 
may influence its targets to enhance public understanding of and support to NATO and 
to influence specific actions and general behaviour of people.
3.4.1 Dahl’s notion of power applied to NATO PI activities
The primary question of this chapter, which is also the overall theoretical question of 
this thesis (see 1.2.1), can now be directed to Dahl: how can compulsory power enhance 
our theoretical understanding of the way PI may exercise power to achieve NATO’s 
political and military ends? It shall be argued that his notion of power can clarify P i’s 
mode of operation to influence people’s specific actions.
Behaviouralism’s applicability
The utility of Dahl’s compulsory power in the present context is conditioned by its 
applicability to the form of influence PI strives to exert. To qualify as an exercise of 
power in Dahl’s conceptualisation of the term there must be a relation between specific 
actors, in a conflict of interest, where one imposes his will on others (see 3.3.1). Some 
Pi-target relations comply with these three methodological requirements. These will 
now be identified by consulting each of them in turn.
Specific actors
In the present context, NATO PI compares with Dahl’s A . On the other hand, the 
specificity with which actor B can be identified varies. Some Bs are as diffuse as the 
populations in NATO’s member states and even worldwide. If  Dahl were to accept any 
of this study’s Bs, it would be P i’s target groups in theatre, the observable groups at the 
tactical level, in the Balkans. Again, it varies how specific these target groups were.
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The most specific Bs are Serbia’s and Macedonia’s political authorities in case 4 and 6 
respectively. Rather specific are also the EAAGs in case 5. But the warring parties in 
cases 1 and 2 are less specific again. Here, PI and the stipulated targets in theatre are 
considered sufficiently specific to be considered as respectively A and B in Dahl’s 
theoretical framework.
Yet other PI targets fall outside Dahl’s conception of B . Those include the publics in 
NATO countries, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia that to different extents form part of 
the first five cases.
Overt conflicts
Dahl narrowed the scope of analysis to observable and overt conflicts, which limits its 
utility for the present analysis. Generally, the relations between PI and its targets 
identified in this study were distant and diffuse. Moreover, PI was often used as an 
outlet for a continuous flow of mission relevant information, rather than a party in 
‘overt conflicts’. Four situations stand out as potentially fulfilling Dahl’s criterion, 
however. When IFOR deployed to Bosnia PI made a particular effort to project the 
force as overwhelming and determined to respond to any challenges, in order to deter 
the warring parties from attacking the incoming IFOR troops (see case 1). In the same 
vein, IFOR deterred armed groups from obstructing the election process (see case 2). 
KFOR 1 deterred Serbian hardliners from reinvading Kosovo (see case 4) and KFOR 5 
coerced the EAAGs to leave the Presevo valley (see case 5). Other cases present 
different conflicts with no such compulsory element. Rather, they were about different 
perceptions of a political situation, as we shall return to in the sections of Lukes and 
Foucault (ie 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 respectively).
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It is stressed that the methodological approach of this thesis -  which focuses entirely on 
A ’s accounts (see 1.4.1) -  excludes B ’s intentions ffom the analysis. The study does not 
investigate whether Pi’s targets did ‘something that [they] would not otherwise do’ as 
Dahl’s definition demands. The analysis rests on A ’s claims that he achieved what he 
wanted. To be specific, we do not know whether Serbia intended to reinvade Kosovo in 
case 4, for instance. Crucially, however, in principle it would be possible to find out 
whether there was a conflict of interest.
Hence, Dahl’s notion is still useful even though such empirical evidence is not 
presented here. As will be recalled, the concern of this thesis is not to prove that PI 
influenced its targets but to throw light on the forms of influence PI directs itself to 
exercise. This refers to the CPIOs’ own understanding of their activities and whether 
that can be conceived in Dahl’s terms (see 1.4.2). In this context, it is therefore 
irrelevant what the intentions of P i’s targets might have been.
Decisionmaking
The last criterion to qualify for a case to be studied as a relation of power along Dahl’s 
prescriptions is that the connection must involve a choice. B  should be able to change 
his behaviour. The four Pi-target relations that fulfilled the two criteria above also 
comply with this last one. The warring parties could choose whether or not to obstruct 
IFOR’s arrival (see case 1) as well as Bosnia’s national election (see case 2). The 
Serbian authorities could choose whether or not to reinvade Kosovo (see case 4), and 
the EAAGs could choose whether or not to leave the Presevo valley without resistance 
(see case 5).
Consequently, Dahl’s notion of power can be used to further our understanding of the 
form of influence the CPIOs strove to exercise in the four just mentioned cases.
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Here, PI was used as a means to either deter or coerce its targets. It was used as a means 
of compulsory power. Against this background the next section aims to elaborate on the 
way PI influences its targets along Dahl’s notion.
Pi’s intentionality
Dahl’s conception of power as a capacity that is used intentionally and instrumentally 
(see 3.2.1) to achieve specific objectives appears particularly useful to illuminate some 
features that may sustain P i’s endeavours. Intentionality and instrumentality are closely 
related but where the former focuses on ends and the expediency with which actors plan 
to accomplish them, the latter emphasises how means are applied to achieve the ends. 
Therefore they will be addressed separately.
In a strict methodological sense, it would be necessary to look into only the four PI- 
target relations identified above. Nevertheless, the analysis will draw ffom a broader 
scope of relations since the issue at hand is relevant also in the context of Foucault’s 
notion of power (see 3.2.3). As the latter conception can encompass these other PI— 
target relations, they are included at this stage rather than repeated in section 3.4.3.
The intentional aspects of P i’s mode of operation highlight a strategic dimension that 
integrates PI in a broader plan; a dimension that can be found in all of the present cases, 
and that underpins various aspects of the function. At a general level, for example, both 
IFOR and KFOR were guided by a vision stipulating what they should achieve within 
several years. In the case of IFOR, its vision was to create a secure environment in 
Bosnia in which democratic institutions could arise. This overarching idea guided the 
mission and gave direction to its activities, including PI. To achieve the idea IFOR had 
goals, objectives, and tactics. The goals were more interim. They were milestones on 
the way to the vision. Subordinated to the goals were the objectives, again as more
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immediate milestones on the way to achieve the goals. The tactics would then describe 
the adequate type of activities to achieve the objectives. The idea was that the sum of 
these activities guided by this overall operational framework would lead the alliance to 
its vision. As the following paragraphs will show, ‘it all ties together in a very strategic 
plan’, as Van Dyke (13/4/2004) phrases it (see further ‘Operational plan’ in 2.2).
In this broad context, Pi’s specific mode of operation was strategic in two ways. It was 
included at the highest level of command and contributed to the shaping of approaches 
that were intended to allow the missions to achieve their ends. In addition, PI operated 
as a means -  as a line function -  to implement these strategies. PI assisted the 
Command Group in designing strategies that were to project the missions’ goals and 
objectives in the respective operations. They identified the audiences whose support 
they desired, and to this end the messages they wanted the audiences to accept, the 
media and other channels to reach these audiences, potential problems, and milestones 
along the way to achieve the overall strategic tasks. Their considerations were presented 
in the plan work that gave overall guidance as well as specific guidance to the short­
term operational activities (see 2.2.4).
The fifth case illustrates this point. PI was not simply informing the media about 
KFOR’s activities in the Presevo valley. From the early stage PI was involved in 
preparing the operation and discussing alternative ways to achieve the desired end-state. 
In addition, PI participated in the actual implementation and applied a variety of tactics 
to achieve the military objectives. One approach, for example, could be an interview to 
disseminate a specific message. This would be conducted to achieve a certain public 
understanding, which would then be an interim objective. This objective would then be 
a measure to enhance broader public understanding and support, which was the primary 
PI goal (see 2.2.1). In order to learn whether the tactics succeeded in achieving the
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objectives, PI had analysis units that scrutinised media reports. Based on these 
evaluations, the respective CPIO decided whether a new round of tactical endeavours 
was necessary to better establish the desired messages in the media (Idsoe 26/3/2004).
Another strategic characteristic of NATO’s mode of operation is the way its missions 
divide operational activities in phases. All mission functions adapted their posture to 
achieve the objectives of each phase. For instance, PI and Operations followed identical 
timetables to project different force postures as the implementation proceeded. This may 
be done at the level of an entire mission, as case 1 shows, or in short-term operations as 
the one of case 5. In the latter example, the objective of the first phase was to prepare 
the target groups as to why and how COMKFOR 5 was going to facilitate Serbia’s re­
entry into the Presevo valley. P i’s task was to ensure the dissemination of that message. 
So as KFOR’s engineers set up reception camps and prisons for the armed groups 
residing in the valley, PI explained reporters why the facilities were being established 
and communicated COMKFOR’s offer to the EAAGs. As the operation moved to its 
second phase, PI showed how COMKFOR kept his promise to permit the EAAGs to 
leave as free, yet demobilised, men. And the third phase concluded with stories of rebels 
giving themselves in and images of their burning weapons portraying a successful end 
to KFOR’s undertaking. P i’s mode of operation was strategic because it underscored 
COMKFOR’s efforts in each of the phases allowing him to attain the operational 
objective (Idsoe 18/3/2004).
An additional strategic dimension was the synchronisation of NATO’s functions to 
create synergy effects. All cases show how PI was closely co-ordinated with other
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functions to achieve NATO’s visions. This mode of operation, here referred to as unity 
o f effort (see 2.2.4) served to multiply the tactical effects created by, among others, 
NATO’s traditional line functions. In this context, PI acted as a force multiplier.110 To 
this end, PI participated in various coordinating fora to synchronise with other NATO 
assets and external organisations. Tailored for each major operational activity, PI did 
matrix planning with other functions to co-ordinate who was to do what, when and with 
what desired effect.
The last intentional aspect of P i’s mode of operation to be mentioned here is the 
proactive PI policy (see 2.2.2). According to Van Dyke (30/3/04) this policy entailed 
that ‘we were trying to set a certain agenda. We wanted the media to focus on our key 
strategic messages and themes. As, again, part of a strategy to help the overall operation 
to succeed.’ Idsoe (26/3/2004) and Clifford (27/4/2004) concur. A diversity of actors 
had expectations to the missions but with limited resources and, in the case of IFOR, 
only a year to achieve these goals, PI selectively promoted the key issues identified by 
the North Atlantic Council. In this way PI applied itself to mobilise general attention 
and support to NATO’s key concerns in order to avoid having the media divert attention 
to a host of other topics. The assumption was that a focus on NATO’s messages would 
allow the force commanders to accomplish their mission’s objectives. Hence, it was a 
strategic feature of P i’s mode of operation to keep the media focused on what NATO 
considered to be the pertinent issues in the peace processes.
170 The term force multiplier is commonly used. See, for instance, Avruch et al. (1999: 11), the UN 
(2000: 25), Taylor (2002: 314), and Armistead (2004: 232).
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Pi’s instrumentality
Likewise, Dahl’s instrumental conception of power forms part of Pi’s mode of 
operation. PI was generally used as a means of power in the sense that it offered 
NATO’s political and military leaders a non-lethal enforcement measure to promote 
stability and resolve conflicts. It was considered an operational asset readily available to 
the commanders to deal with upcoming tasks and conflicts of interests. Moreover, PI 
was often the force commanders’ preferred instrument to achieve their objectives.
Again, to forestall repetition of the instrumental dimension of Pi’s endeavours in 
Foucault’s part of the analysis it is helpful in this section to go beyond the four PI- 
target relations categorised as compulsory power. All six cases furnish examples that 
can bolster an instrumental understanding of P i’s mode of operation. In the first case PI 
was used as a means to expose IFOR’s capacity to move Bosnia from a situation of war 
to one of peace. This included efforts to have media attention directed towards IFOR 
dismantling infamous checkpoints and reorganising feared police forces, for instance. In 
the second case PI was instrumentally used to spread a sense of safety among the 
Bosnians, it undertook a variety of carefully planned activities to reassure the 
electorates that they could vote without fearing for their safety and to deter any warring 
parties from obstructing the elections. In the third case PI was tasked to establish the 
general understanding that ‘KFOR is in control’ as it entered Kosovo. In the fourth case 
PI was used to communicate deterrence to Serbia and reassurance to Kosovars. In the 
fifth case COMKFOR 5 used PI as his primary means to coerce the EAAGs to leave the 
Presevo valley. Finally, in case 6 PI was applied as a means to change Macedonia’s 
understanding of KFOR’s border control.
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All the CPIOs conceive of PI in instrumental terms and refer to it as a ‘tool’ in the 
hands of the force commander (see 2.4). Van Dyke (17/3/04) elaborates: ‘It wasn’t just 
PI. It was PI in concert with the [other functions] working at the same time . . .  this 
threat of the use of military force communicated through PI became an effective means 
for achieving our goals’.
The CPIOs describe P i’s mode of operation as what Dahl defines as a means of power 
in the sense of being a mediating activity. This is thus different from his term base, 
which in the present case ultimately refers to NATO’s lethal force (see 3.2.1). Idsoe 
(26/3/2004) makes this point when he presents PI as an integral part of the military, 
political and economic means of power available to political and military 
decisionmakers. From this perspective, PI is adequately understood as a means of 
compulsory power. PI can be regarded as an operational asset to achieve force 
commanders’ objectives, an asset that referred to the base but was applied to avoid 
activating it.
This aspect of P i’s mode of operation may be entitled a megaphone function.171 This to 
convey that PI informed targets about NATO’s intentions and resolve to use, if 
necessary, the base of compulsory power to carry through the intentions irrespective of 
the targets’ interests. Case 2 illustrates this feature. Here, PI communicated 
COMIFOR’s intention to permit safe electoral participation in the national elections and 
his resolve to suppress with military means any attempt to interfere with this democratic 
process. PI also operated as a megaphone to communicate COMKFOR’s intention and
171 This term is taken from Towle (2000).
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resolve to prevent Serbia from re-entering Kosovo with the ‘You are safe’-message to 
the Kosovars and the ‘Don’t do it’-message to the Serbian authorities (see case 4).
A related instrumental dimension of P i’s mode of operation has been called a force 
multiplier and encapsulates P i’s activities to multiply the targets’ perception of NATO’s 
physical force, o f its base in Dahl’s mode of expression. So, while the megaphone 
feature deals with perceptions of NATO’s will, the force multiplier feature directs itself 
to influence perceptions of NATO’s capacities. This ability of PI presents itself in the 
just mentioned cases. Prior to the Bosnian election PI invited the media to cover, for 
instance, robust IFOR troops patrolling the roads, transporting ballot boxes, and 
manning traffic checkpoints (see case 2). In the same vein, PI invited the media to cover 
robust KFOR-exercises involving fighter jets, tanks and considerable troops along the 
Kosovo side of the boundary line to Serbia. The idea was that images from these 
undertakings would convince the Serbian authorities that, in Clifford’s (27/4/2004) 
style: ‘[KFOR] got more tanks, better tanks up here that you know what to do with, and 
you will face a tough fight. So don’t do it’ (see case 4). In this way PI deterred its 
targets by multiplying NATO’s capabilities in the minds of its targets. Others may 
characterise the same endeavour as an effort to remind the Serbs about NATO’s 
capabilities.
All three force commanders exploited this instrumental feature of PI because it held the 
advantage that they could enforce stability and regulate their targets’ actions without 
having to apply physical force. The utility of PI in peace support operations, as 
compared to traditional wars, is that the former are likely to be conducted under tighter 
political control with rules of engagement that restrict the force commanders’ use of 
their lethal operational capabilities (see also 1.1). Impeded from such direct approaches, 
both COMIFOR and COMKFOR turned towards more indirect approaches,
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particularly the use of information as a tool to shape the operational environment (see 
2.2.4). Van Dyke (17/03/04) clarifies that since IFOR’s mission was to facilitate a peace 
process COMIFOR did not want to use physical force unless absolutely necessary. 
Rather, he wanted to deter violence by demonstrating IFOR’s military capabilities and 
its willingness to use them, if necessary.
PI as compulsory power -  a summary
Compulsory power can elucidate P i’s mode of operation to exert influence in four of the 
14 Pi-target relations identified above (see 2.4); that is, when PI was used to make its 
targets ‘do something that B  [the targets] would not otherwise do’ (Dahl 1957: 202-03).
Dahl’s Behaviouralist approach identifies P i’s endeavours to influence specific and 
relatively proximate targets, where their relation is direct and causal. That is, where PI 
seeks to influence the targets in an almost mechanistic, stimulus-response, ‘get B to 
do’-manner. In addition, his emphasis on the intentional feature of power clarifies the 
strategic dimension in P i’s mode of operation that exists not only in the message 
strategy and unity of effort but also in the operational plan to implement NATO’s vision 
in the Balkans and in the West. The use of operational phases, the functional 
synchronisation that created synergetic effects, and the active PI policy also underline 
the strategic dimension of P i’s mode of operation. Moreover, Dahl’s conception of 
power, as a capacity that the powerful possess and can use to sanction undesired 
behaviour among the powerless, compares to NATO’s use of PI as an enforcement 
measure. That is, when PI was applied to limit the room of manoeuvre of specific 
parties or people in general.
Dahl’s notion of power can conceptualise Pi’s mode of operation when it functions as a 
mediating activity between NATO’s conventional line functions such as air, land,
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and sea power to coerce and deter NATO’s targets. In this function, PI features as, what 
may be termed, a megaphone that communicated the Force Commanders’ intentions 
and resolve to armed groups and the local populations. PI also operated as a force 
multiplier, that is, it strove to multiply, or at least clarify, NATO’s capacity to project 
lethal force in the minds of target groups. In this way, PI provided the Force 
Commanders with a non-lethal enforcement measure to achieve their tasks.
All three Force Commanders exploited this dimension of PI because it held the 
advantage of being able to enforce stability and regulate their targets’ actions without 
having to apply brute force. This contradicts conventional military logic along which 
the application of the base of compulsory power is the principal military means to 
achieve the strategic objective apprehended as a ‘decisive military victory’ (see 1.1).
The conventional logic was not compatible with NATO’s objectives in the peace 
support operations, however, since these were to support peace and reconciliation 
efforts under the auspices of the UN. Although the Force Commanders had to undertake 
conventional military tasks, such as coercion and deterrence, they operated in a political 
context and with objectives that were different from conventional war. Had the Force 
Commanders applied compulsory power in the conventional manner they had probably 
gained territorial control but at the cost of death and destruction. This would most likely 
create antagonism to NATO’s role in the Balkans and possibly undermine the broader 
peace processes. Hence, conventional military thinking risked being counterproductive 
to NATO’s political objective in the peace support operation. Along such lines of 
reasoning, the missions’ rules of engagement were based on the principle to use 
minimum necessary force (see footnote 24 and section 2.2).
Used as compulsory power, PI contributed to the mission’s most immediate task in the 
peace support operations, which was to enforce law and order. PI operated as an
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instrument for a Hobbesian Leviathan with power over its subjects in the sense that it 
could sanction those who broke the law; a power applied to create a security situation in 
which the peace and reconciliation process could move forward. It created a physical 
space in which a non-violent struggle to shape the future could take place. PI was a 
means of the monopoly of violence to deter others from undercutting these political 
processes with violent means. Hence, Dahl’s notion of power can clarify P i’s mode of 
operation to influence people’s specific actions.
3.4.2 Lukes’ notion of power applied to NATO PI activities
It remains unclear, however, which forms of influence PI exercises to achieve its 1st 
goal, that is, to enhance public understanding and support. This section will examine 
whether Lukes’ notion of power can further our theoretical understanding to this end. 
The thesis is that structural power cannot.
To start with the most promising aspect of Lukes’ conception of power, his endeavours 
to incorporate diffuse and distant Bs in the analysis seem to facilitate the study of Pi’s 
influence on its general PI targets like the publics in NATO member countries. In 
addition, his attention to ‘the bias of the system . . . ’ and the ‘mundane forms [of 
influence], through the control of information, through the mass media and through the 
processes of socialisation’ appears valuable to account for the indirect power relations 
between PI and its targets.172
From the perspective of efficiency, one should imagine that the ideal for the CPIOs, and 
any one else involved in creating favourable public relations, is to be able to exercise
172 The quotations derive from respectively Lukes (1974: 21, 23).
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the kind of power that Lukes (1974: 23) describes as thought control. That is, the ability 
to manipulate a target group’s interests. Indeed such a ‘supreme exercise of power’, as 
Lukes (1974: 23) calls it, would be expedient to any PI staff tasked with establishing 
perceptions conducive to one’s organisation in the minds of an important audience. 
Inspired by Lukes’ definition of power one is inclined to ask whether it is not in fact the 
CPIOs’ primary task to make the public ‘want’ NATO.
The CPIOs themselves to not perceive their activities as manipulation (see 2.2.4 and 
3.4.3). They characterise their enterprise as efforts to influence. The CPIOs assist 
NATO in achieving its objectives but they insist that they do not mislead or deceive 
their targets; that they do not exercise thought control.
Nonetheless, there are grounds for arguing that the CPIOs’ own understanding of their 
ability to influence public imagination resembles that of structural power. For instance, 
what is the difference between Lukes’ manipulative notion and Van Dyke’s (2003: 8) 
explicit statement that ‘NATO created the image of IFOR largely through a carefully 
coordinated strategic information plan’. An image which he, referring to NATO’s plan 
work, describes as ‘professional, properly equipped, prepared and trained’ and which 
shall be created to bolster ‘national and local support and acceptance’ (Van Dyke 2003:
16). Clifford goes further in that direction when he argues that a military information 
campaign, in which he comprises PI, is ‘an all pervasive and major lever which can be 
used to shape the environment, perceptions and opinion’ (Clifford and Wilton 2000:
17). Moreover, he dubs such endeavours in IFOR perception operations (see 2.2.4). 
These views clearly carry associations to manipulation.
At first glance this manipulative dimension of structural power appears capable of 
explaining the way PI in ten instances sought to change people’s perceptions about
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the existent state of affairs. Specifically, PI strove to convince local and international 
targets that the situation in Bosnia was peaceful rather than conflict-ridden (see case 1), 
that it was safe to vote (see case 2), that Serbia posed no danger (see case 4) and that 
KFOR’s border controls were efficient (see case 6). Structural power may also have 
been at work when the CPIOs persuaded their targets, either in theatre or at home, to 
support IFOR and KFOR (see case 1, 3 and 5) and more generally NATO (see case 1).
Comparing these Pi-target relations with those sustained by compulsory power (see
3.4.1) illustrates how PI sought to influence its targets in different ways. PI exercised 
different forms of power. It applied Dahl’s notion of power, when it communicated 
‘carrot and sticks’, in the respective form of amnesty and imprisonment, to the EAAGs 
in the Presevo valley, for example. But PI could not coerce Macedonia’s population to 
think that KFOR controlled their border. In this case, PI used a different mode of power 
that resembled the one Lukes proposes. PI strove to alter its target group’s perception of 
a situation. It sought, some may argue, to manipulate their thoughts. Either way, 
structural power appears a plausible candidate to explain how PI may achieve its 1st 
goal.
There are, however, reasons to devalue Lukes notion’s explanatory power in this 
context. Beside the CPIOs’ insistence that they do not manipulate their targets, there are 
also methodological reasons to question whether structural power is applicable not only 
in the present context but also more generally. The considerations that follow question 
whether Lukes’ notion is, in fact, flawed. His methodological prescriptions to identify 
his definitional relations where ‘A affects Z?’ and the ethical assumptions underlying his 
notion of real interests are not, I shall argue, tenable. Consequently, Lukes’ notion of 
power cannot account for the form of influence that PI aimed to exert in order to 
enhance public understanding and support.
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Structuralism’s inapplicability
The methodological difficulties are primarily related to Lukes’ prescription that research 
shall reveal latent conflicts of interest between PI and their targets to identity cases of 
structural power. Hence, this aspect shall be thoroughly discussed.
Not all the just mentioned efforts to enhance public understanding appear to be cases of 
latent conflicts. To take one example, IFOR’s PI assistance to the US and German 
political authorities vis-a-vis their respective populations is a case of overtly conflictual 
Pi-target relations (see case 1). Allegedly, these administrations had difficulties in 
convincing their electorates that sending contingents to IFOR was in their interest, and 
the CPIO in charge believed that NATO contributed to change that public attitude. He 
stresses that PI was not manipulating the information: ‘We are being honest. We are not 
spinning the news. We are not doing PsyOps on people. We are saying: “This is a 
humanitarian effort of enormous proportions, and we need to deploy these troops to 
secure the peace and prevent further civilian casualties’” (Van Dyke 13/4/2004).
Arguably, most relations between PI and its targets appear non-conflictual, however, 
and not cases of structural power. In several situations PI and its targets presumably 
agreed on how the situation ought to be, while their disagreement concerned its current 
nature. Since such disagreements involved different perceptions of reality, rather than 
different interests, logically these were not conflicts of interest. Pi-target relations that 
fall into this category include, for instance, P i’s undertakings to persuade the Bosnians 
that peace was returning to their country (see case 1). Based on the assumption that this 
was in the majority’s interest PI did not exercise structural power. The election case can 
be conceived along the same line of reasoning (see case 2). Here, the media projected 
anxiety as to whether it was safe for Bosnians to go to the ballot boxes. PI, on the
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other hand, widely declared that the electorates could safely go to the same boxes. 
Presumably, the vast majority of the local population had no grievances with elections 
being successfully conducted. In other words, this disagreement concerned whether or 
not it was safe to vote. In the same vein, it can be argued that KFOR 1 ’s reassurance to 
anxious Kosovars, that they were safe despite Serbian ‘sable-rattling’ in the summer of 
1999, is not a case of structural power (see case 4). Further, when Macedonia’s 
authorities and public harshly criticised KFOR’s border control and PI projected the 
same controls as efficient, this was not a result of conflicting interests. It had to do with 
different perceptions as to how far these interests were safeguarded (see case 6).
Along similar lines of reasoning one may exclude a number of additional PI activities as 
instances where structural power was exercised. This includes P i’s efforts to convince 
the distant and diffuse targets that ‘KFOR is in control’ (see case 3), and Pi’s indirect 
confirmation to the local and international audiences that KFOR 5 continued to provide 
stability in the Balkans (see case 5). Presumably PI and its targets had the same 
objectives. Although in the latter case some Kosovars may have supported the EAAGs, 
it could still be argued that stability was in their overall interest. From this point of 
view, these relations were not cases of different interests, not even of different 
perceptions. Rather, P i’s relations to its targets present themselves as a general effort to 
make it clear for everyone, to reassure P i’s targets, that NATO’s involvement in the 
Balkans was in the interests of all who valued peace.
For this reason, Lukes’ delimitation of power to a phenomenon that occurs only in latent 
conflicts of interest reduces it utility in the present study. It seems to eliminate its 
relevance as a concept to explain any of the ten identified PI undertakings to influence 
its targets’ perceptions (see the previous section).
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Real interests and false consensus
Lukes would not applaud such haste in narrowing the scope of power relations. He 
would explore indications that relations portrayed as non-conflictual above were in fact 
cases of latent conflicts. If this can be proved, P i’s relations to its targets would indeed 
be cases of structural power.
The methodological difficulties become apparent when the analysis is conducted on that 
note. As the difficulties begin, the validity of Lukes’ notion increasingly comes in for 
questioning. Lukes is certainly aware of the problematic aspects of his three- 
dimensional view on power and devotes relatively much space to elaborating on how 
these obstacles should be dealt with (see 3.3.2). Nevertheless, his advice to overcome 
them is not convincing. He has not solved the problems that occur when his concept is 
applied on the present Pi-target relations. In order to sustain this argument, this section 
shall apply Lukes’ methodological prescriptions to sketch out avenues for studying the 
present concern and to demonstrate the difficulties such research is likely to confront.
Explorations of whether PI exercised structural power on its targets have to commence 
at the mission level since PI was merely an instrument to promote IFOR and KFOR’s 
objectives. Along Lukes’ methodological reasoning the relevant question then becomes: 
is there evidence to suggest that IFOR and KFOR’s overall roles in Bosnia and Kosovo 
were not in the real interests of P i’s targets? Or, more simply: is NATO’s presence in 
the Balkans against these peoples’ real interests? It is beyond the scope of this study to 
answer this question (see 1.4.3). Still, in order to scrutinise the utility of the concept of 
structural power in the present context, we may note that it is reasonable to assume that 
the large majority of people surviving in a context of gross violation of human rights 
would welcome a peace support operation of the kind IFOR and KFOR provided (see
236
2). Certainly such an international force will create manifest or latent conflicts with 
some of the armed groups.173 But to the large majority of Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s 
population, and to Western public, one may expect that NATO’s presence was not 
against the PI targets’ real interests. From Lukes’ perspective, therefore, the missions 
cannot be characterised as cases of false consensus, and therefore cannot be regarded as 
cases of latent conflicts. Against this conclusion, it may be argued that this position 
amounts to little more than assumptions. This spurs the question of which analytical 
routes exist to establish potential affirmative answers to the question of whether NATO 
exercises structural power. Lukes suggests two such routes: critical cases and 
comparative studies (see 3.3.2). These shall now be considered.
Critical cases
According to Lukes, cases of latent conflicts can be revealed by exploring what happens 
when actors see an opportunity to follow their real interests rather than those imposed 
by the powerful. Such opportunities may be found in what NATO termed incidents.
Incidents unfolded on the periphery of NATO’s sphere of control. In KFOR it involved, 
among other things, ‘hit and run’-operations such as masked men beating up a Kosovo 
Serb couple (NATO 7/7/1999); people being killed by snipers; and explosive attacks on 
Kosovo Serb monasteries (NATO 5/7/1999). The research question becomes whether 
such examples challenge the position that NATO’s presence is in the Kosovars’ real 
interest? Methodologically, these acts compare to the opportunities seized by lower
173 Stedman (1997), Berdal (2000: 9-14), Wheeler (2000: 189-99), and Smith (2005: 340-44, 350-52), 
among many others, elaborate on such violent resistance (see also 1.1).
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castes, in the sense that masked men also challenge ‘what to the outside observer may 
appear as a value consensus’ (Lukes 1974: 49).
Peace and stability may be seen as values that are generally held in high esteem. These 
values can also be found in the peace agreements legitimising NATO’s presence in the 
Balkans (see 2). Yet, in principle an analyst could by means of a case study find that 
people have different conceptions of peace, or rather of the terms on which a specific 
peace shall be built. While KFOR, for example, promoted peace based on the respect of 
the principles on human rights, the incidents could be interpreted as efforts to achieve a 
peace based on the contradicting policy of ethnic cleansing.174 That is, peace obtained 
by a policy excluding the Kosovo Serb minority; a Kosovo for the Kosovo Albanians. 
The cases mentioned here, and many other observable and also overtly formulated 
grievances, could be presented as evidence for such conclusions.
Moreover, Lukes is not explicit on how large a proportion of the population has to be 
manipulated in order for a political community to qualify as a case of structural power. 
A democratic principle could suggest that the majority, or at least a substantial amount, 
o f the population should have its real interests thwarted for Lukes’ notion to apply. 
Along such considerations, one research task would be to find out how representative 
such incidents are for the values of the population at large. A possible conclusion is that 
a policy of ethnic cleansing enjoyed only marginal support. In this case, it is difficult to 
provide convincing evidence that this is a case of a general latent conflict. Even if  the 
policy enjoyed broad public support, it is still questionable whether this qualifies as
174 On this policy see Kaldor (1999: 84-9).
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evidence that excluding the Kosovo Serb minority was indeed in the majority’s real 
interests.
The issues comprise obvious ethical aspects. An affirmative answer implicitly accepts 
violations of human rights and arguably condones stability. On the other hand, a 
negative answer would share the moral ground upon which NATO’s CPIOs operate. 
That is, the idea that peace and respect for human rights is desirable. The above 
mentioned assumption that PI, as a means of KFOR, did not impose a false consensus 
over the large majority of Kosovars should thus be considered biased towards NATO’s 
moral stand, rather than towards those segments of the population that continued to 
conduct ethnic cleansing. Thus, analytical efforts to find out whether NATO thwarted 
the Bosnians’ and Kosovars’ real interests are problematic. It arrives at conclusions 
determined by the underlying values of the analysis.
Lukes’ (1974: 46) stand on this methodological obstacle was that such conclusions 
ultimately rest on ‘the opinion of the observer concerning the value of human life’ (see
3.2.2). Following this prescription Lukes’ ethical leaning would bias research to 
conclude that promoting human rights was indeed in the real interests of Bosnians and 
Kosovars and possibly present NATO as a suitable guarantor for the protection of such 
norms.
For this reason, studies of such critical cases are likely to conclude that NATO does not 
thwart the local populations’ real interests. Along this line of reasoning PI does not 
exercise structural power. This, however, would be a conclusion based on moral 
imperatives rather than those of a positivistic scientific ideal, which Lukes also, 
although less explicitly, subscribes to (see 3.3.2). As the first analytical route is
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unsuitable to reveal cases of latent conflicts in the present context, we shall turn to 
Lukes’ second methodological proposal.
Comparative studies
Lukes suggests that a study may also reveal real interests by comparing one’s primary 
case with other cases. Following this methodological piece of advice, therefore, we 
should identify comparative cases to those studied here.
Above it was assumed that the large majority of people in Bosnia and Kosovo 
welcomed IFOR and KFOR. This may, however, be a result of a successful PI exercise 
of structural power. Thus, the research task becomes to find out whether, for example, 
citizens in similar situations, but where NATO has not intervened, ‘thought or acted 
differently’, as Lukes formulation goes, from people in the present cases. In other 
words, the study should analyse a case comparable to that of Bosnia prior to NATO’s 
deployment; a case where citizens should have experienced three and a half years of 
civil war in which as a result 260,000 people had died and two-thirds of the population 
had been displaced.175 It appears unlikely that such a study could provide convincing 
evidence, as Lukes (1974: 41) calls for, to ‘justify our expectation that B  [a war-torn 
population] would have thought or acted differently’ from Bosnians had they had a 
chance. Nonetheless, we would have to present such cases to conclude that NATO PI 
exerted structural power.
In addition, a comparative study would have to deal convincingly with the question of 
proportionality. Among other considerations, how large a segment of the population did
175 These figures derive from Kaldor (1999: 31).
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actually suffer in the conflicts? Further, how large a proportion of the population 
thought they would be better off with an international presence? In principle, a study 
may provide such figures at least to some extent. Still, Lukes’ ethical stand would 
oppose a conclusion that violation of a minority’s human rights was in the majority’s 
interests (see 3.3.2).
Thus, Pi-target relations in theatre cannot be characterised as latent conflicts of interest. 
NATO’s presence, it is assumed, was generally in the interest of the Bosnians and 
Kosovars. In other words, considerations as to how Lukes’ second methodological 
proposal can be applied in the present context lead to the same conclusion as those on 
his first proposal. Convincing evidence cannot be compiled that PI exercised structural 
power over the populations in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Attention may now turn to NATO’s public, whom PI also targeted. Can a study by 
means of comparative cases afford proof of latent conflicts in these relations? 
Answering that question along Lukes’ prescriptions could be done, for example, by 
identifying a comparative case of humanitarian disaster where NATO or NATO 
member states considered, or were involved in, implementing a UN Security Council 
resolution but were prevented by their electorates. Somalia after 1993 and Rwanda after 
the 1994 genocide are both potential cases. This begs another question about whether in 
these cases electorates actually influenced their political leadership or, conversely, were 
influenced? Such reflections hinge on a broad academic discussion, often termed the 
CNN-effect, that is beyond the present scope (see footnote 9).
Moreover, regardless of the conclusions that may be drawn from such empirical 
analyses, would they provide what Lukes (1974: 41) terms ‘indirect grounds for 
asserting that’ deploying to IFOR and KFOR was not in the real interests of
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NATO’s public? This is certainly debatable and fraught with ethical dilemmas. A major 
research problem involved is to deal with potentially contradicting values such as 
communitarian versus cosmopolitan values.176 But this time the conclusions do not boil 
down as easily to ‘the opinion of the observer concerning the value of human life’, upon 
which Lukes’ (1974: 46) analytical approach is founded (see 3.2.2). There is also a 
question of ‘whose life?’ The lives of the targets’ compatriots within a national 
community, or those of their fellows in a broader universal community of mankind? In 
the present context, these considerations suffice to emphasise that identifying latent 
conflicts by means of comparative studies is controversial.
Structural power’s inapplicability -  a summary
In the Political Science debate on power Lukes is regarded as the foremost 
representative of the third of its four faces (see 1.4.2). At first glance his wide-ranging 
concept appeared useful to account for relations between PI and its targets that Dahl’s 
compulsory power could not explain. While structural power directs attention to 
propaganda -  an area of concern beyond the scope of this thesis (see 1.3) -  its utility in 
the present context has been considered in technical, theoretical terms.
While the CPIOs reject the idea that they manipulate or propagandise their targets, they 
acknowledge that they apply PI to influence the perceptions and attitudes of the publics 
in the Balkans and in the West. Structural power holds promise to account for such 
indirect and subtle influence on targets that are diffuse and distant, because Lukes 
extends Dahl’s research agenda in three important ways. First, where Dahl focuses on
176 The debate on these normative terms is thoroughly elaborated on in Brown (1992).
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relations between specific actors, Lukes extends the scope to include relations between 
broader societal groups, such as classes. Second, where Dahl focuses on overt 
observable conflicts, Lukes extends the scope to include latent conflicts. Third, where 
Dahl focuses on concrete outcomes of conflicts, Lukes extends the scope to include 
control over the political agenda.
Chapter 2 described 14 situations in which PI aimed to influence its targets (see 2.4). At 
first glance structural power appeared capable of explaining the dynamics that could 
substantiate P i’s endeavours in the majority of these relations. Yet, Lukes’ definition 
and methodological requirements exclude these from the scope o f structural power.
One reason for this is that many Pi-target relations are better understood as conflicts of 
perceptions rather than, as the definition of structural power requires, latent conflicts of 
interests (see cases 2, 3, 4, and 6). Moreover, denominating any of the Pi-target 
relations as cases of structural power would involve methodological assumptions that 
are untenable in this study. Lukes’ notion takes for granted that people have real 
interests and establishes human rights as an ethical ground from which such interests 
can be measured. But such normative grounds cannot provide the kind of solid 
empirical evidence Lukes calls for. His two methodological suggestions to overcome 
this obstacle do not carry conviction. They imply, among others, explicit normative 
judgements regarding both different actors’ real interests, myopic versus long-term 
interests, and communitarian versus cosmopolitan values. It is a form of analysis that 
raises more questions than it answers. Conclusions based on Lukes’ methodological 
prescriptions would reflect political judgements rather than the ‘objective’ analytical 
findings that he aims to present.
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Structural power is inapplicable in the present context because any conclusion would be 
more controversial than it would be convincing. Lukes’ positivistic approach to the 
normative realm of perceptions does not work. These critical observations would appear 
to apply also to cases other than the present one and therefore question the general 
validity of the concept. Against this background, I conclude that Lukes’ notion of power 
cannot account for P i’s mode of operation to influence its target groups.
3.4.3 Foucault's notion of power applied to NATO PI activities
Attention shall now be directed to explore how a very different notion of power can 
further our theoretical understanding of the way PI may achieve NATO’s political and 
military ends. This section will show that Foucault’s notion (see 3.1.3 and 3.2.3) can 
conceptualise the type of influence P i’s mode of operation seeks to exert in order to 
enhance public understanding and support and to influence the general behaviour of the 
public. This is a dimension of P i’s task that escapes Dahl’s notion of power and that 
Lukes’ notion has just failed to explain convincingly.
Productive power’s ability to do this derives from Foucault’s radically different 
assumptions about the social phenomenon of power and how it may be studied. Like 
Lukes, Foucault extends the scope of subjects -  the Bs as Lukes and Dahl call them -  
that may be influenced. Foucault also extends the analytical considerations to include 
indirect power relations and to include perceptions as the kind of effects power may 
have. More important, Foucault conceives power from an ontological and 
epistemological perspective that is different from both of the two other scholars. His 
post-positivistic position does not expect research to forward the kind of evidence that 
Dahl’s and Lukes’ positivistic ideal demands. Instead, Foucault offers an alternative
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analytical framework based on which scholars can interpret power relations (see 3.3.3).
The present conception of Foucault’s analytics of power has already been clarified but 
shall be further elucidated, in order to elaborate on an analytical framework that others 
may find useful in their research and to facilitate criticism of this same framework. 
Nonetheless, this very effort to explicate and adapt his analytical framework and then 
apply it in an analysis may come across as an undue demand for precision and clarity 
from a perspective that has no such scientific aspirations. It must therefore be stressed 
that Foucault’s appreciation of power is broader and much more ambiguous than the 
one presented here. Still, it is the contention of this study that the present adaptation and 
use of Foucault’s theoretical work is valid and a useful approach to explore power 
relations from the perspective of a subject.
Two notes of clarification
Before embarking on the main argument of this sub-chapter it is important to clarify 
how the discussions involve two related yet different notions of power within 
Foucault’s analytical approach. Moreover, it is necessary to clarify how this study 
comprehends the relation between Foucault’s local centres and discourses. These two 
features are addressed in each of the two subsequent sections respectively.
Productive power and government
Foucault’s understanding of power is broad and evolves throughout his production. He 
adds new terms, not replacing earlier concepts but developing them within the same 
general analytical approach to the social phenomenon. In The Will to Knowledge 
Foucault (1998) primarily explores these social dynamics through the application of the 
term power-knowledge, and his primary concern is to study how non-subjective
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discursive strategies produce reality and, among other things, create people as subjects. 
At the same time, he conceives these strategies as being produced and reproduced by 
subjects’ acts. Increasingly in his later writings, power is treated as government. Both 
approaches to power are relevant to answer the question of this thesis, thus the first 
understanding will dominate the first part of this analysis, while the latter understanding 
of power shall guide the last part.
Foucault’s analytics of power does not explicate how subjects exert influence and needs 
adaptation to suit the present purpose. The reason these adaptations are only introduced 
at this stage in the thesis is to avoid unnecessarily confusing the present use of 
Foucault’s approach to power, as encapsulated by the term productive power, with his 
broader analytical framework presented in 3.1.3, 3.2.3, and 3.3.3.
As a result of these adaptations his conception of power will be portrayed in more 
unambiguous terms than his own approach purports to do. While Foucault aims to study 
specific situations to identify how subjects are produced by and reproduce discursive 
strategies, the present concern is different. It examines how a subject influences other 
subjects by, as I shall argue, means of discourses.
Applying Foucault’s analytics of power in this manner involves the risk that NATO 
comes across as a pre-social subject that can influence discourses, and thereby its 
targets, to further the alliance’s political and military ends. This would be a gross 
misinterpretation of the present adaptation of his perspective. Rather, Foucault spurs 
one to apprehend NATO itself as a product of power, with an identity and political 
impact determined by the dominant discursive strategies. Thus, NATO emerges from 
and exists within a discursive context it cannot control; a context that produces NATO’s 
objectives and the conditions under which its staffs must try to fulfil them.
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Yet, this is the present analysis’ theoretical point of departure. Conceiving discursive 
dynamics from within these contextual features this study seeks to understand how a 
subject may exploit these conditions in order to influence others as well as the 
discursive context in which we live. To be more specific, it seeks to examine whether 
Foucault’s analytics of power can further our understanding of how PI may directly and 
indirectly influence public perception about NATO’s role in the Balkans. Due to this 
particular use of Foucault, the present study applies the term productive power, 
suggested by Barnett and Duval (2005), as a form of Foucauldian power which is 
different from but not incompatible with his own analytical perspective (see also 3.1.3).
Against this background, we should conceive productive power not as a capacity in the 
material sense, not as a capacity that someone possesses like a Dahlian base of power 
(see 3.2.1). The term shall be seen as an ability subjects exercise from local centres of 
power-knowledge by exploiting reigning discursive strategies to win tactical 
engagements and create effects that influence discursive strategies.
Thus, while Foucault’s approach is broader and encompasses discursive dynamics with 
potentially broad societal impact, the present study applies a narrower definition to 
clarify a form of influence that can be identified in the practice of PI from the analytical 
perspective Foucault provides. It elucidates the PIOs’ ability to influence the knowledge 
dimension of their targets, wherever they may engage them, to NATO’s advantage. That 
is, their ability to define reality for others, to establish what counts as valid knowledge, 
as common sense.
Another important Foucauldian term in this context is government (see 3.2.3). This 
forms part of this analysis because PI aims to influence targets beyond its local centres 
through what is here entitled the discursive battlefield (see the section below). To
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understand this dynamic, his analytical framework in The Will to Knowledge is of little 
avail and actually opposes the idea that actors can influence this realm in a subjective 
manner. His later writings more explicitly explore the way the state has held a 
privileged, though not a hegemonic, position by giving effect to and shaping discursive 
strategies. The analysis along the concept of government will further our understanding 
of the indirect forms of influence PI applied on its ultimate targets -  people in NATO 
member states (see the section ‘Enhancing public understanding and support by 
government’ below).
Local and discursive realms of power
Further, it is conducive to the present argument to clarify how a central feature of 
Foucault’s analytical framework will be apprehended here. It rarely follows from the 
elaborations in his major works, Discipline and Punish and The Will to Knowledge, in 
which context he scrutinises power relations. At times he is excessively empirical 
analysing ‘the most immediate, the most local power relations at work’ (Foucault 1998: 
97) as dialogues with and about a child between relatives and professionals (Foucault 
1998) and as specific methods to discipline prisoners (Foucault 1979). At other times he 
presents power as a ‘complex strategical situation in a particular society’ (Foucault 
1998: 93) and power relations as non-subjective mechanisms with ‘wide-ranging effects 
of cleavage that run through the social body as a whole’ (Foucault 1998: 94).
It is useful to distinguish between Foucault’s understanding of power in empirical terms 
and in analytical terms. In empirical terms there is no separation between subjects and 
discourses. Subjects are discursively produced. There are no pre-social subjects. Yet in 
analytical terms he operates with two different contexts. For the sake of clarity, we shall 
make a distinction between these since the mechanisms of power are different in the
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two.
In the local context subjects act. For example, relatives and professionals discuss the 
child’s behaviour and routines discipline the prisoner. In the discursive context there are 
no subjects, only their effects along with other non-subjective discursive forces. While 
Foucault does not define his use of the term ‘force’, he explains that discourses 
comprise power and knowledge and that they are ‘tactical elements or blocks’ linked 
together in ‘chains or systems’ establishing discursive strategies (respectively Foucault 
1998: 101, 92). I conceive discursive forces as the components that constitute such 
discourses; they make up the tactical elements. These discursive blocks relate to each 
other in complex and fluid relations and may sometimes support and sometimes oppose 
the same strategy.
Foucault shifts easily from one context to the other, arguing that they should be seen as
closely integrated, yet somehow separated from each other. The relation between the
two remains ambiguous, however. The most clarifying paragraph on this matter presents
itself in the rule of double conditioning where Foucault (1998: 99-100) stipulates:
No ‘local center,’ no ‘pattern of transformation’ could function i f . . .  it 
did not eventually enter into an over-all strategy . . .  There is no 
discontinuity between them, as if one were dealing with two different 
levels (one microscopic and the other macroscopic); but neither is there 
homogeneity (as if  the one were only the enlarged projection or the 
miniaturization of the other); rather, one must conceive of the double 
conditioning of a strategy by the specificity of possible tactics, and of 
tactics by the strategic envelope that makes them work.
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Still, he leaves room for uncertainty, for example when only two pages further he 
operates with two such levels.177 Leaving this ambiguity unattended would pose 
difficulties when his notion is later applied to the present case. To avoid this, it will be 
clarified how the present analysis aims to apply Foucault’s analytics of power as 
operating with two related, yet separate, realms. Using his terminology, these may well 
be labelled respectively the local and the discursive realms.
It is in the local realm that subjects act influenced by and influencing, among others, 
discursive strategies. Discursive forces reside in the discursive realm, or what Foucault 
sometimes refers to as the sphere of force relations and sometimes as the multiple and 
mobile field of force relations (respectively Foucault 1998: 97, 102). Here, subjects 
have only an indirect influence, however, through the discursive effects of their acts in 
the local realms.
The present differentiation between a local and a discursive realm has parallels to the 
understanding o f ‘two different levels (one microscopic and the other macroscopic)’ 
from which he distances himself in the quote above. Still, the two realms can be 
conceived in a manner that is congruent with his primary point in that same paragraph, 
which is that we should consider the ‘local’ and the ‘overall [discursive] strategy’ in 
somehow separate yet mutually constituting terms. In analytical terms the mechanisms 
of power are different in the two realms. Distinguishing between them allows us to
177 To be specific, Foucault (1998: 102) points out: ‘We must question them [the discourses on sex] on 
the two levels of their tactical productivity (what reciprocal effects o f power and knowledge they ensure) 
and their strategical integration (what conjunction and what force relationship make their utilization 
necessary in a given episode of the various confrontations that occur)’.
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elaborate on the mechanisms in a separate and therefore more consistent manner before 
we consider how the effects from one realm have implications on the other.
This distinction is compatible with Foucault’s analytical framework. Although he does 
not explicitly establish a similar distinction, a large part of his scholarly project has been 
to show how generally accepted knowledge shapes the way people go on living. He 
presents knowledge as historically contingent conceptions of reality -  the above 
mentioned patterns of transformation -  produced by scientific discourses that manifest 
themselves in terms of positive knowledge, as in scientia sexualis (Foucault 1998: 51- 
73) or criminology (Foucault 1979: 135-228). This knowledge, which constitutes one 
part of the power-knowledge nexus, exists within historical periods and operates in a 
different, but crucially not separate, realm from the child or the prisoner in the examples 
above.
It is due to the cardinal importance Foucault attaches to knowledge that the term 
discursive realm is applied in this study. The term local realm derives more directly 
from his idea of local centres of power-knowledge (Foucault 1998: 98).
Based on this distinction, it is further prudent to clarify the present use of the terms 
tactics and strategy in Foucault’s analytical framework. To him tactics are at work in 
both realms while strategy, although having effects in the local realm, belongs to and 
takes its form in the discursive realm (Foucault 1998: 95-7). To avoid 
misunderstandings, in the conduct of analysis within Foucault’s frame of reference the 
use of the term tactics shall be restricted to the local realm and strategy to the discursive 
realm.
With these conceptual clarifications the analysis can proceed. First, we shall examine,
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however, whether Foucault’s methodological approach is applicable in the context of 
this thesis.
Genealogy’s applicability
This section shall argue that P i’s mode of operation can be studied within Foucault’s 
analytical framework as presented in his four cautionary prescriptions (see 3.3.3). The 
intention is not to prepare the ground for a full-fledged analysis along the lines of 
Genealogy but rather to consider whether his approach is compatible with the main 
concern of this thesis. In addition, these methodological considerations sketch out 
analytical lines of investigations to ameliorate our conceptualisation of how PI may 
enhance public understanding and support. The applicability of each of the four 
prescriptions shall now be considered in turn.
Foucault’s first cautionary prescription, rules of immanence, is particularly relevant to 
the present study. It allows us to conceive P i’s activities in discursive rather than in 
material terms and to regard PI -  along with the force commander’s two other primary 
means of communication (see 2.2.4) -  as operating in a battlefield with discursive 
features that is very different from the traditional battlefield. In the remainder of this 
analysis, this perspective shall be utilised to further the understanding of this context 
and the kind of influence PI may exercise within it.
Moreover, inscribing knowledge, and thereby social communication, in the dynamics of 
power Foucault provides a view to appreciate P i’s mode of operation as an exercise of 
power that does not ultimately rest on physical force, as does Dahl’s notion (see 3.2.1). 
Productive power provides PI with a normative brand of power, which in some respects 
makes its influence autonomous from NATO’s traditional military capability. From this 
perspective productive power can elucidate P i’s mode of operation to influence its
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targets during the day-to-day dissemination of information. PI may influence its targets’ 
understanding and gain their support simply by informing them. This may at first glance 
be a relatively immediate and superficial influence of specific targets like many other 
kinds of engagements between subjects in local centres of power-knowledge. Below, 
this theoretical insight is used to further the understanding of P i’s mode of operation in 
the local realm.
Beyond such influence, however, the first prescription is primarily directed to the more 
stable forms of knowledge; the legitimate knowledge inscribed in the discursive realm 
that conditions subjects’ activities in the local realm. We shall use Foucault’s term 
government to consider whether and how Pi’s mode of operation may engage and 
influence these discursive strategies, since this would allow PI to meet its 1st goal (see
2.2.1) at a much more profound level, indirectly influencing not only specific but also 
more diffuse targets (see the section ‘Enhancing public understanding and support by 
government’ below).
The discourses that are relevant to the present study are influenced by the effects from 
innumerous local centres, but few other activities in the local realm aim at the 
knowledge dimension of power-knowledge so deliberately and expediently as PI (see 
the section ‘Tactical efficacy in local centres of power-knowledge’ below). P i’s primary 
task is to communicate with targets to influence their understanding and thus directly 
aims to produce the kinds of knowledge effects in the local realm that Foucault (1998: 
140), although from a much more general perspective, holds have been a cardinal 
component of the 19th century’s power mechanisms (see 3.1.3). So the first 
methodological prescription is not only compatible with P i’s mode of operation, it 
makes the latter appear highly relevant to the exercise of productive power and 
government.
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Foucault’s idea that subjects produce effects with implications beyond the local realm is 
particularly relevant to the present study because it lifts the social phenomenon of 
concern above the subjects. There need not be, as Dahl insists, a social proximity 
between A and B  to qualify as a relation o f power (see 3.3.1). Subjects need not be in 
direct contact to influence each other. To Foucault such a relation may well be indirect 
and distant. Subjects are in direct contact in the local centres of power-knowledge but 
indirect relations between subjects are also in play through the discursive realm in 
which these local centres are embedded. Productive power establishes a theoretical 
relation between PI and all its targets, including more diffuse targets such as the 
electorates of NATO’s member countries.
In the first cautionary prescription Foucault also advises students of power to scrutinise 
the content of power-knowledge discourses in local centres. Since this does not serve 
the present purpose, this advice will not be pursued further. Still, it is important to note 
that it could be done. A study could, for example, interpret the content of human rights 
discourses by investigating how they are reflected when PI meets the press in the local 
centres. So Foucault’s first methodological prescription can be applied in this context.
The present study will use such local centres differently, however. They shall be used as 
points of departure to explore how PI may have influenced reporters and how this 
NATO function exploited the existing power-knowledge discourse to this end. Such PI— 
target relations are dubbed tactical engagements. Along this line of reasoning, tactical 
victory shall refer to situations where media reports projected NATO’s version of events 
as a result of tactical engagements. This use of the terms local centres, tactical 
engagement and tactical victory is not incongruous with Foucault’s analytical 
framework.
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In the same vein, his three remaining methodological prescriptions are compatible with, 
although not directly applicable to, the present study. His second prescription -  rules of 
continual variations -  directs research to map out discursive matrices of transformation 
over several centuries. The thesis at hand covers a very brief historical period with no 
regard to broader discursive alterations. The empirical findings match Foucault’s 
theoretical concern, however. To use the same example as above, they could be used in 
a broader historical study to identify transformations in the discourses on human rights 
as these unfold in military campaigns throughout different historical periods.
The third prescription -  the rule of double conditioning -  is important, since it gives PI 
access to the discursive realm and thus opens for the possibility that PI may influence its 
targets in an indirect but much more profound way than through the immediate 
information to its targets that occurs primarily in the local realm. The prescription 
relates to Foucault’s view that power is decentred, which is applied in the proceeding 
section. This is also the case with his last prescription.
It is in this rule of the tactical polyvalence of discourse that Foucault recommends 
scholars to conceive the discursive realm as a complex and fluid constellations of force 
relations, where discourses are elements that can form part of different strategies. This 
spurs us to conceive developments in the social field as indeterminate, driven by 
mechanisms primarily, but not exclusively, in the discursive realm, and is a cautious 
note against exaggerating the influence of subjects in this realm.
These methodological considerations along Foucault’s four prescriptions have served to 
show that P i’s mode of operation is in accord with important features of Foucault’s 
analytics of power and to indicate in which ways his perspective can further our 
understanding of the context and ways in which PI influenced its targets. Against
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this background, his theoretical outlook will now be used to describe the discursive 
context in which PI operates; thereafter to refine the understanding of how P i’s mode of 
operation may influence reporters in the local realm; and finally to regard Pi’s mode of 
operation as a government technique to fulfil the 1st PI goal, that is to enhance public 
understanding and support.
The discursive battlefield
As briefly suggested above, it is informative to apply Foucault’s perspective on the 
context in which PI operates, since his analytics of power highlights dynamics that 
cannot be identified with Dahl’s and Lukes’ approaches. It proposes that the field in 
which PI operates is conceived in discursive terms. We may call it the discursive 
battlefield. 178 Here, physical force is of limited utility -  and potentially counter­
productive (see the section ‘Engaging discourses’ below). PI, on the other hand, appears 
useful to reach NATO’s political and military ends in this context. It is a kind of 
battlefield that cannot be controlled and where Foucault, as mentioned, advises us to
1781 coin the term ‘discursive battlefield’ inspired by Foucault’s (1998: 101-02) term ‘the field of force 
relations’ in which the latter is discursive. The term discursive battlefield is different from what elsewhere 
in the text is referred to simply as ‘the battlefield’ by which is meant the combat zone as that term has 
generally been conceived during the era o f industrial wars (see intro 1.1). Shea (2001: 213), makes an 
apparently related distinction when he differentiates between ‘the virtual’ and ‘the real’ war. In the same 
vein Taylor (2000b: 184) differentiates between ‘real war’ and ‘media war’, while Herd (2000: 59) 
separates ‘the actual military campaign’ from ‘the information war’. Other scholars support the idea that 
information operates in a separate realm from physical force and apply a variety of labels to specify this 
different sphere: The term ‘information war’ is widely used (see 1.5.2), Ignatieff (2000: 161-75) 
elaborates on ‘virtual war’, and Thompson (1999) uses ‘media war’. Other terms that aim to encapsulate 
some of the same phenomena include ‘noosphere’ (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999; Purcell 2005), 
‘informational battle-space’ (Brown 2002b: 44), ‘information space’ (Denning 1999: 101; Dearth 2000a) 
and ‘media space’ (Price and Thompson 2002). This variety o f notions serves to illustrate that many 
scholars refer to such normative realms, as distinct from material realms. Yet little substantive work exists 
on the theoretical features of these normative realms. Rather than adopting any of the terms mentioned 
above and trying to adapt them to Foucault’s theoretical approach, it is here deemed prudent to establish a 
new term firmly rooted in his terminology and analytical framework.
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approach the idea of influence not from ‘the privilege of prohibition’ but from ‘the 
viewpoint of tactical efficacy’ (Foucault 1998: 102).
This perspective is particularly relevant in peace support operations, such as IFOR and 
KFOR. These are different from combat operations in several aspects. In a combat 
operation, in the industrial war sense of the term, a military contingent has an enemy it 
shall defeat. But IFOR, as a third party between the former warring Bosnian parties, did 
not consider the latter such enemies. IFOR’s military task was to establish a non-violent 
situation. It should avoid armed clashes between the parties and to de-escalate situations 
that could result in violence. Nor did KFOR perceive the parties as enemies. KFOR 
should ensure respect for the agreements upon which its presence was based and 
maintain stability in Kosovo.
Moreover, in peace support operations the struggle is primarily political, since the 
parties are no longer willing or able to use physical force as a means to achieve their 
objectives. Their struggle has changed from a violent to a perceptional conflict. It has 
become a conflict about different political projects, different visions for the future.179 
The advantage of PI in this context is that it specifically deals with perceptions.
Using Foucault’s theoretical frame of reference to further our understanding of the 
discursive battlefield in which for instance IFOR operated, it may be noted that 
alterations occurred in discursive strategies of relevance to the conflicts in the Balkans 
throughout 1995. As a result, the international approach to Bosnia changed from
179 See for example Siegel (1998: 1-7), Avruch et al. (1999: 14-15), Curtis (2000), M. Taylor (2000), 
Kiehl (2001: 143-44), Marston (2002), Des Forges (2002), and Wimhurst (2002).
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peacekeeping to peace enforcement.180 The effect in Bosnia was that in contrast to 
conditions reigning in the previous discursive situation, now the use of lethal military 
power resources became an increasingly counterproductive currency. Leaders of former 
warring factions who sought international acceptance could not use physical force 
without putting whatever international support they enjoyed in jeopardy. In the same 
vein, NATO commanders tasked to support the internationally assisted peacebuilding 
effort in Bosnia used military force primarily for deterrence purposes while their 
ordinary activities were based on the principle to use minimum necessary force. Thus, 
by late 1995 discursive strategies were transformed from a situation where the parties 
would use lethal violence as a means to reach objectives, to a situation where they 
would not.
In Bosnia, these discursive strategies oriented mindsets away from war and towards 
peace, transforming the conflict from a military setting to a political one. The conflict 
IFOR was tasked to deal with became, in Van Dyke’s (17/3/2004) formulation, ‘more a 
war of words than words of war. Battlefields were replaced by confrontations over 
freedom of movement, civil unrest, resettlement of refugees, installation of governments 
and, of course, persons indicted for war crimes’.181 It had become a struggle fought by 
political means, although the latent risk that a party should relapse to pursuing its 
objectives by use of violence was certainly present.
In this political conflict, the discursive strategy promoted by the international 
community was always challenged by other discursive forces. Nonetheless, the major
180 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace's use o f these terms is applied here (UN 1995).
181 In this quotation the term government should be conceived in its conventional use.
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discursive alteration spurred people to orient themselves in directions beyond mere 
survival and towards different visions for the future, different political projects. In this 
context a major mission task became to reassure people that they should not fear a 
resumption of war. The conflict increasingly became perceptional and as such well- 
suited to interpretation within Foucault’s analytical framework of power.
Foucault’s (1998: 93) stand that power comes from everywhere and three of his 
cautionary methodological prescriptions suggest that PI operated in a context it did not 
control. At first glance, this view may appear to contradict the thesis that NATO PI was 
a means of power. Crucially, this does not imply that PI assumed that it controlled 
events, however. Even though the 1st PI goal may be seen to suggest that P i’s mode of 
operation was partly based on an idea of social causation, one may well perceive this as 
an objective rather than an assumption.
True, when the CPIOs in more abstract terms present their relation to targets, they 
sometimes do so with a logic based on social causation (see 2.2.1). This is a form of 
influence that Foucault does not pay much attention to but presumably would restrict to 
local centres.
Generally, however the CPIOs do not present their relation to targets as if  they had 
power over the latter. The empirical findings provide more evidence to sustain 
Foucault’s theoretical idea that power comes from everywhere. For one, PI engaged 
with a host of other actors and dynamics when it tried to influence its targets’ ideas and 
behaviour. Sometimes the CPIOs felt they failed, as in case 3. From the first day PI was 
tasked to convey the message ‘KFOR is in control’. The Russian obstruction of 
COMKFOR’s first press briefing inside Kosovo initially undermined the credibility of 
that message, however. The Kosovo Albanian refugees also returned home rather
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immediately after the Serbian withdrawal despite P i’s advice that they wait a few days 
(Clifford 27/4/2004). In the same vein, Pi’s initial engagements with Macedonia’s press 
corps allegedly failed to change its negative KFOR-bias (see case 6). On the other hand, 
in the same case PI apparently succeeded after a few weeks of operation. Although it 
does not form part of this thesis to learn whether PI actually influenced its targets (see
1.2.1), we can nevertheless take notice of the CPIOs’ own accounts. They experienced 
that they generally succeeded in influencing the media reports in a desired direction (see 
2.1 and 2.4).
This does not imply, however, that the CPIOs perceive NATO as a locus of power. On 
the contrary, their mode of operation was based on the understanding that the reporters 
-  that is, Pi’s almost exclusive channel to its targets -  could produce stories based on a 
host of non-NATO sources, be that the reporters’ firsthand experiences, other 
international actors, the local parties, interest groups, or ordinary people (see 2.2.2). 
Often, these sources had objectives contradicting those of NATO. Against this 
background, P i’s mode of operation to maintain credible relations with the press (see 
2.2.5) may be seen as an acknowledgement that PI operated in a discursive battlefield it 
could not control, and as a conscious effort to mitigate the consequences of this 
situation.
An additional decentred feature of the discursive battlefield is that the relations between 
PI and its targets were reciprocal. The relations cannot be captured by a one-way 
conception of influence flowing from a Dahlian AXo&B.  Influence went both ways 
since the targets could always choose to, and did, reject NATO’s information. PI 
adjusted the messages accordingly (Idsoe 26/3/2004). Van Dyke also perceives P i’s 
relation to its targets in such reciprocal terms in which meaning was negotiated. More 
specifically, when the operational commanders planned a particular undertaking,
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Pi’s task was not only to suggest how the specific objectives could be achieved and how 
PI could contribute to that. The task was also to consider public reaction to NATO’s 
undertaking. ‘The organisation must consider in fact what the consequences of this 
operation are on its publics. And we must consider how the public might influence the 
operation, and then make strategic decisions based on that’ (Van Dyke 30/3/04).
Moreover, power was decentred within P i’s own ranks. The CPIOs had no authority to 
instruct NATO PI staff up the chain of communication, but more surprisingly, all three 
CPIOs experienced limited authority to instruct PIOs down the chain as well. In 
addition, PI often found itself at odds with PI personnel outside NATO’s chain of 
command (see 2.2.4).
Having made the point that power relations in the discursive battlefield were decentred, 
it is emphasised that the CPIOs do not conceive of NATO as a victim of arbitrary 
discursive forces. The CPIOs were certainly aware of dynamics that were critical or 
directly hostile to NATO, as illustrated particularly in case 2 and 6, and fought what 
may be termed discursive battles to consolidate the credibility of NATO’s version of 
events. PI did not take NATO-positive media bias for granted, and worked explicitly to 
gain general acceptance of NATO’s views. This was a continual struggle. PI could not 
control the messages neither in the media nor in the minds of its targets. Instead PI 
applied a strategic mode of operation to convince reporters that the information they 
received from NATO was valuable and reliable (see 3.4.1).
Thus, PI was engaged in perceptional conflicts that could not be won by compulsory 
power and decisive victories as in conventional wars in geographical battlefields. 
Foucault’s approach to power spurs us to perceive the conflicts in discursive terms and 
allows us to see P i’s mode of operation as an effort to achieve tactical efficacy in a
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discursive battlefield where control was an impossibility. The battle was fought 
indirectly with a host of diffuse actors where P i’s efficacy may be appreciated in terms 
of its ability to define in public imagination an understanding of the situation in the 
Balkans that was congruent with NATO’s messages. This is a political conflict indeed.
Tactical efficacy in local centres of power-knowledge
With these clarifications of and adaptations to Foucault’s theoretical perspective, the 
primary question of this sub-chapter can now be addressed: how can Foucault’s notion 
of power enhance our theoretical understanding of the way PI may exercise power to 
achieve NATO’s political and military ends?
It follows from the above that this question should be addressed in what Foucault calls 
local centres of power-knowledge (see the section ‘Genealogy’s applicability’ above). 
Doing this requires some methodological considerations, to establish which of P i’s 
relations qualify as a local centre. The two most likely candidates are P i’s relations to 
its targets and to the press. Hence, each of these will be briefly considered for their 
appropriateness to the present purpose.
The 1st PI goal identifies the public as P i’s target and refers primarily to the public in 
NATO member countries but also in theatre (see 2.2.1). Such relations are not ‘the most 
immediate, the most local power relations at work’ (Foucault 1998: 97), however, and 
cannot therefore be considered a local centre in Foucault’s analytical framework.
More compatible with Foucault’s conception of local centres is P i’s relations with 
reporters, as illustrated in the CPIOs’ idea of social causation. It was with reporters that 
PIOs had direct contact. Reporters were the P i’s channel to influence public opinion 
that influences political will to sustain a NATO mission (see 2.2.1,2.2.2, and 2.2.5).
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This suggests that the analysis be limited to such Pl-reporter engagements. The 
inadequateness of that approach is that in practice the CPIOs do not distinguish between 
their relations to the media and those to the public (see 2.1.1-2.1.6). A too strict 
interpretation of what qualifies as relevant information, in the sense of referring 
specifically to PI- reporter relations, would therefore exclude much relevant 
information. Based on these considerations, the analysis explores the main question 
departing from Pl-reporter relations but allows the CPIOs’ elaborations about their 
relations to targets to form part of the analysis.
Productive power in Pl-reporter relations
It is at this point, that the notion of productive power will be applied as an interpretation 
of Foucault’s notion of power, which is different from but compatible with his concept 
of power-knowledge (see 3.1.3). As will be recalled, productive power refers to a 
subject’s ability to exploit discursive strategies to win tactical engagements in local 
centres of power-knowledge and create effects that influence discursive strategies (see 
the section ‘Productive power and government’ above). From this theoretical point of 
view, P i’s ability to disseminate, through the media, NATO’s messages worldwide 
within hours is extra-ordinary compared to the options o f ordinary people. In Foucault’s 
(1998: 94) early works, however, he holds that the discursive effects are non-subjective. 
In other words, they are beyond the control of subjects, which in the present context 
means beyond the control of PI.
In spite of Foucault’s reservations, the first task of this analysis is to show how it is 
possible to conceive P i’s mode of operation as an exercise of productive power in local 
centres to win tactical engagements; that is, to have the media project NATO’s 
messages. Like Foucault’s description of subjects’ tactics, P i’s mode of operation is
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also intentional, exercised in pursuance o f ‘a series of aims and objectives’ (Foucault 
1998: 94-5). This expedient dimension of P i’s mode of operation is important but shall 
not be reconsidered here, since it has already been elaborated on (see 3.4.1).
Instead, attention is directed to exploring how PI seeks to influence reporters in what 
qualifies as local centres. Some commonly applied methods PI used to engage reporters 
have already been presented in the empirical chapter (see 2.2.5). These methods shall 
now be revisited from the analytical view of productive power to advance our 
understanding of the way PI sought to convince reporters that NATO’s views were 
credible and reasonable.
The four methods are meeting points, media opportunities, press availabilities and 
background briefings. The next sections review each of these in turn before showing 
how PI exploited discursive strategies to win such tactical engagements.
Meeting points
A prominent method in P i’s mode of operation was the installation of meeting points 
with the press, the so-called PICs and CPICs, from which journalists could inquire 
information and where PI disseminated information in a written or oral form during, for 
instance, regular press briefings. Foucault’s perspective inspires one to comprehend Pi’s 
use of these meeting points as an exercise of productive power because PI intentionally 
employed information to establish and maintain among reporters a common 
understanding of the situation in the Balkans conducive to NATO’s ends. That entailed 
convincing reporters about what was, and what was not, a fact, the issues, the 
challenges and NATO’s reasons and intentions.
Journalists arriving in the Balkans could come to such meeting points and be introduced
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to the peacebuilding efforts and NATO’s contribution to those. This was largely a 
pedagogical task but well suited to influence reporters’ understanding of NATO’s 
version of specific incidents as well as of more general issues involved. From the 
perspective of productive power such tactical engagements appear opportune to 
influence the information projected in the immediate media reports that follow. 
Moreover, educating uninformed reporters may also have a deeper and formative impact 
on their fundamental understanding of the issues at stake and of NATO’s role in the 
conflicts. This is an impact that is likely to bias not only a particular media report but 
many subsequent reports from the journalists in question. Such basic introductions to 
the theatre may thus have prepared the ground for future tactical victories in the 
discursive battlefield.
The press briefings were another meeting point. One of their purposes was to inform 
reporters about recent incidents. From Foucault’s perspective, this would mean to 
establish NATO’s version of facts on the ground and their significance as valid 
knowledge, thereby reducing the impact of other versions, such as those the CPIOs 
denounce as ‘rumours’ or ‘disinformation’. In this way press briefings purported to 
establish the facts and their meaning.182
Case 3, for example, shows how PI disseminated information widely in order to 
establish as common sense that ‘KFOR is in control’. Already on KFOR’s third day in
182 Pi’s attention to this matter is illustrated in Campbell’s (1999: 34) reflections: ‘Facts do not always 
speak for themselves. What is an interesting “fact” in the morning gets analysed to death on live TV, and 
so has to become something different on the evening’s bulletins, and in the next day’s paper, by a press 
bored with a “fact” already subject to so much commentary’. Further, with regard to NATO fighter 
planes’ fatal attack on a Kosovo Albanian refugee convoy in Djakovica on 14 April 1999, he reasons: 
‘The problem with the convoy accident was not that it happened but that different things were said in 
different parts o f the operation, as we speculated and thought aloud before the facts were known. The 
resulting confusion was damaging’ (Campbell 1999: 33).
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Kosovo NATO Spokesman, Shea, portrayed the situation as generally under control
when he sent a deterrence message in the daily press briefing:
As you know, there were a number of incidents that took place yesterday, 
unfortunate incidents but incidents nonetheless . . .  But the very robust 
way in which the Kfor forces have responded immediately to anybody 
threatening their lives, according to their rules of engagement, is I hope a 
signal which will be heeded very clearly by any other armed assailants on 
the ground who may adopt any kind of threatening behaviour (NATO 
14/6/1999).
This may be seen as an effort to exercise productive power since it aims to convince
reporters of a NATO message’s credibility. Clifford’s belief, that this message did not
carry conviction in the very first days, may be seen as the result of engagements in other
local centres -  particularly the Russian arrival to Pristina Airport a day prior to KFOR.
The message soon became more credible and attention focused on relatively minor
issues. For instance, three weeks later a journalist questioned KFOR’s ability to prevent
incidents of burning houses. The PI briefer, Major Joonsten, responded:
We of course condemn any criminal acts. If investigations point to arson 
then we will do our best to apprehend the culprits. However, not all fires 
are houses, and not all hoarse fires are suspicious. Unfortunately, as in all 
countries, there are sometimes fires resulting from accidents or acts of 
God. In Orahovac 3 houses were set alight by lightening hitting a power 
line (NATO 2/7/1999).
Here Major Joonsten gets across that generally speaking ‘KFOR is in control’, and 
hence sustains the message. Moreover, he also offers an alternative and less 
confrontational interpretation of the facts on the ground.
It could be questioned whether the two PI briefers in this way manipulate reporters’ 
understanding of the situation in Kosovo. The CPIOs’ answer to such allegations is, as
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already mentioned, that PI was factual and always truthful (see 2.2.1 and 2.2.4). Yet,
Clifford clarifies that one can be this in different ways and as a PIO he would always try
to put in the best of light a military campaign’s role and achievements. On the ‘KFOR is
in control’ message he elaborates:
Now there will be occasions in small isolated incidents where we are not 
[in control], because we just simply don’t have the troops to go 
everywhere. Now what I really do is either report if  we have the 
information before the journalists have got it, or discuss and admit if  the 
case is correct and there has been an incident. There has happened so and 
so. And yes, that is damaging. But the point is that overall we are in firm 
control of the security situation. We have troops. We can’t be everywhere 
all over the place. We have to expect a certain amount of willingness on 
behalf of the Kosovo Albanians and the Kosovo Serbs to try to live 
together in peace. We know there is going to be difficulties. It is early 
days. Now that is putting a positive spin on a particular incident. Is that 
propaganda? . . .  Is that PsyOps? It is a standard way every press officer is 
taught how to answer a question (Clifford 27/4/2004).
In other words, PI adds meaning to facts on the ground by putting them in a context 
where they promote, or do the least damage to, NATO’s messages. From Lukes’ 
perspective this may be described as manipulation, while from the point of view of 
productive power it presents itself as an effort to link facts on the ground to discursive 
strategies that allows the facts to be ‘correctly’ understood -  or rather, what NATO 
finds to be an accurate interpretation of facts in a given situation. To the extent PI 
succeeded in persuading reporters that ‘KFOR is in control’, PI exercised productive 
power.
Another purpose of the press briefings was to inform reporters about NATO’s policy 
and intentions in the conflicts. This may be seen as an employment of productive power 
to establish a frame of reference that would influence reporters’ interpretation of
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future facts on the ground. While this clearly aimed to have intentional effects beyond a 
particular local centre, PI first had to operate with tactical efficacy to create the effect 
from such local centres.
Having the media portray NATO’s version of events was among other things important 
to improve the local targets’ understanding of the general situation and gain their 
support. Although not NATO’s public, and therefore not P i’s strategic targets, the local 
population could create situations that might undermine NATO’s strategic effort. 
Foucault inspires us to see this as a potential the local targets held to create effects in 
other local centres that could spill over into the discursive battlefield and here 
undermine strategies favourable to NATO.
Case 1, to take an example, illustrates how PI operated to avoid this. Here, IFOR 
informed reporters about the Dayton Peace Accord. This formed a legal frame of 
reference for the country’s political reconstruction. Yet, it was only when this 
agreement was properly understood and generally accepted by the civilians and the 
former warring parties in Bosnia that NATO could exploit this peace settlement to 
legitimise its operational activities (Van Dyke 13/4/2004). An IFOR spokesman’s 
statement shows how PI strove to achieve this. During an early press briefing Lt.Col. 
Rayner informs:
NATO is doing all it is supposed to be doing under the peace agreement.
NATO is removing all military threat from this country, and that is going 
extremely well. NATO is providing the overall security in areas like 
Mostar where civilian authorities can undertake their obligations to which 
they have fully signed up under the peace agreement. That’s what NATO 
is doing (NATO 8/1/1996).
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This may be seen as an application of productive power to establish among reporters the 
idea that the war is over, that a new code of conduct reigns in Bosnia, and more 
generally the value and utility of NATO’s presence in Bosnia.
Media opportunities
Media opportunities were another much used PI method. It may be seen as an exercise 
of productive power because this mode of operation aspires to establish in the minds of 
reporters an understanding of the situation in theatre that is congruent with NATO’s 
messages. The main difference between this method and meeting points is the means. 
With the latter method, PI operated by means of words to convince reporters. In the 
former method, PI primarily facilitated that reporters gained firsthand experiences and 
emotional impressions. Through images, sounds and smells in a Pi-selected context 
reporters received NATO’s messages in a subliminal manner that allegedly is more 
persuasive than words (see 2.2.5).
In the first phase of case 5, for instance, PI invited reporters to the boundary line in the 
Presevo valley. Here, they should see for themselves the reception centres that KFOR 
had constructed to receive the EAAGs who wanted amnesty and the prisons for those 
who did not. P i’s intention was to convey to reporters COMKFOR 5’s resolve to 
remove the EAAGs from the valley. In the second phase, PI organised a new round of 
media opportunities to allow reporters to cover the arrival of the EAAGs to the 
reception centre. The messages aimed at the EAAGs still in the sector and the Kosovars 
in general to convince them that COMKFOR kept his promises, also with respect to the 
amnesty. As the deadline arrived reporters were informed that all EAAGs, except one, 
had left peacefully. Reporters saw EAAGs giving themselves in and Serbian forces 
enter the valley as planned. So to the extent these firsthand experiences carried
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conviction, PI exerted productive power gaining acceptance for the idea that KFOR 
remained determined to and capable of promoting peace and reconciliation in Kosovo 
and in the region as a whole.
Along the same line of reasoning, productive power may also be seen to form part of 
media opportunities in all the other cases. For instance, when PI invited the press to 
cover how IFOR physically destroyed the former warring parties’ symbols o f power 
such as checkpoints, it contributed to convincing reporters, and eventually a broader 
audience, that facts on the ground were changing from war to peace (see case 1). Note 
also case 4, where PI organised a series of media opportunities on NATO’s side o f the 
boundary line to let journalists experience for themselves a show of physical force 
where KFOR’s fighter jets were in the air in a joint exercise with its tanks and troops 
manoeuvring on the ground. Drawing reporters’ attention to such facts on the ground 
aimed not only to send a deterrence message to the Serbs but also to reassure Kosovars 
that they were safe from Serbian forces. Again, PI employed productive power.
Finally, productive power also formed part of media opportunities organised to 
convince critical reporters that NATO’s version of facts on the ground was trustworthy. 
The uncertainty about and critique of KFOR’s function along the border between 
Macedonia and Kosovo illustrates this point (see case 6). According to the CPIO in 
charge, reporters’ firsthand experiences with KFOR’s border control increased the 
credibility of NATO’s message among the press corps and changed Macedonia’s media 
bias in favour of KFOR.
Press-availabilities and background briefings
A third major method in Pi’s mode of operation was the press availabilities (see 2.2.5). 
This method can be seen as an attempt to employ productive power because it aims
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to influence journalists’ knowledge about the peacebuilding endeavours and NATO’s 
part in them. That entails primarily gaining and maintaining acceptance among the press 
corps of NATO’s understanding of what facts on the ground signify, how important 
they are, and why NATO’s approach to a particular situation is reasonable and 
legitimate. To accomplish this, P i’s method was to familiarise journalists with high- 
level commanders’ reasoning about, for instance, the peace processes and the tasks at 
hand, thus giving them deeper insights into and supposedly more convincing 
explanations for NATO’s policies than they would receive in ordinary press briefing.
A commonly used variant of such press availabilities was the background briefing. 
Productive power clearly sustains this mode of operation because background briefings 
normally aimed to prepare reporters to portray a future operational undertaking in a 
manner conducive to NATO’s ends. To achieve this, the briefings aimed to persuade 
reporters to understand a particular situation and the necessity to deal with it in the same 
way as the forCe commanders did. Foucault allows us to apprehend this method as a 
way of establishing a frame of reference in the minds of reporters, in an effort to 
influence, as events unfold, reporters’ perceptions of the missions’ handling of the 
situation in a manner advantageous to NATO’s end.
The transformation of the KLA into the Kosovo Protection Corps provides a showpiece 
of how productive power underlies this PI method. It was an event to which NATO had 
attached great importance as it signified that KFOR would be the only security presence 
in Kosovo. According to Clifford, Kosovo Albanian sources had for some time been 
providing journalists with ‘rumours’ undermining NATO’s messages. As a result the 
media covered the undertaking in a manner that disturbed NATO’s political authorities 
and international organisations. PI engaged the discursive battle to change the content of 
media reports in NATO’s favour. To this end, Clifford conducted a series of detailed
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background briefings to get NATO’s version of events across to three key journalists
(see 2.2.5). He explained to them what NATO was trying to achieve, what KFOR would
do and how it would do it. All of which was very sensitive at that particular time:
They wrote the story, but they wrote it from a position of knowledge 
rather than from a position of ignorance. And because they were the three 
key opinion formers in Britain, the US and France, the other journalists 
followed suit. So we started now to have a shift in the way it [the 
transformation of the KLA] was being reported. We got much more back 
to our message now. You can argue whether that is underhand or 
overhand but people give background briefings to journalists every day of 
the week. And that worked (Clifford 27/4/2004).
In sum, PI activities conducted by means of meeting points, media opportunities, press 
availabilities and background briefings can be conceived as exercises of productive 
power simply because PIOs acted in such local centres. In addition, this mode of 
operation appears particularly relevant as a means of productive power because it 
specifically addressed the knowledge dimension in Foucault’s analytical framework. 
The methods did so because they were directed towards influencing reporters’ 
perceptions in the productive sense of shaping their understanding about the situation in 
and future scenarios for the Balkans. To achieve this, PI often linked information to 
discursive strategies to add meaning to it, to have reporters understand facts on the 
ground, NATO’s policy, and scenarios for the future from the alliance’s perspective. PI 
applied itself to create and maintain among reporters a common understanding 
conducive to NATO’s ends. In short, to define the content of common sense.
Engaging discourses
Pi’s use of discursive strategies to convince reporters that NATO’s role and activities in 
the Balkans was legitimate and desirable may be seen as discursive battles. To enhance
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its credibility, and thereby its tactical efficacy, PI presented facts and policies in a 
context that reporters already supported. Foucault allows us to comprehend this context 
as consisting of discursive strategies. It may be seen as a frame of reference PI could 
profit from by adding meaning to facts. In this way, PI sought to have reporters 
understand a situation in the same way as NATO did.
This dimension of PFs mode of operation was ensured by the message strategy. The
latter incorporated broad discursive strategies such as the notions of peace, human rights
and prosperity, as reflected, for example, in one of IFOR’s master messages stipulating:
‘IFOR is the right instrument to support the Bosnian peace process’ (see 2.2.3). The
same discursive strategies were reflected in KFOR’s messages, as illustrated during one
of the first KFOR press briefings when the CPIO, Lt.Col. Clifford, informed reporters:
And this is what KFOR is about. It is an international security force with 
a single effective command structure that will establish and maintain 
peace and stability for all people of Kosovo, and I will stress once again 
we mean all peoples of Kosovo -  the Serbs, Albanians, Muslims and 
Christians. KFOR is here to look after everybody (NATO 19/6/1999).
At the same time, discursive strategies also limited NATO’s military room of 
manoeuvre. Foucault’s theoretical outlook spurs us to see, for instance, NATO’s 
reluctance to use physical force as a result of what may be specified as a ‘non-use of 
force’-discourse. This reluctance is at odds with the conventional military mind that 
regards physical force as NATO’s foremost advantage. Yet, had NATO used its lethal 
capabilities to stabilise the conventional battlefield in the Balkans it may well had 
achieved that, at least for some time. The likely cost, however, would have been to 
undermine its struggle in the discursive battlefield. Had NATO lost the latter battle, it 
would had lost the support of its member states’ electorates and possibly been instructed
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to withdraw from the Balkans. From this understanding, political restrictions on the use 
of physical force make sense (see also 1.1 and 2.2.4).
We may thus consider this discursive opposition to the use of physical force a major 
reason the Force Commanders in IFOR and KFOR applied alternative means to achieve 
their political and military ends. Among other things, the ‘non-use of force’-discourse 
turned PI into a particularly useful operational function since this could apply 
compulsory power in a non-lethal manner that often sufficed to achieve mission 
objectives (see 3.4.1). PI exploited the same discourse when it exercised productive 
power to establish a common understanding among the Bosnians and Kosovars that 
NATO’s presence in the region was in their interest; it was a presence they ought to 
support. The Force Commanders did not abolish the use of physical force, however, but 
saved it as a means of last resort. The impact of a ‘non-use of force’-discourse in a local 
centre is reflected during an IFOR press briefing. When journalists warranted a more 
robust IFOR response to violent episodes, the IFOR Spokesman, Lt.Col. Rayner, 
answered:
The ability exist still and it’s developing all the time to respond more than 
that but if  it’s not appropriate to do so then it shouldn’t be done. I mean 
it’s there, and will be used if appropriate. We don’t want to have to shoot 
to people. We’ve come here to help bring peace to this place which you 
don’t do overreacting and shooting if it’s not necessary. The capability is 
there if we need it. We hope we don’t have to use it (NATO 7/1/1996).
Pi’s sensitivity to the advantages provided and restrictions imposed by discursive 
strategies can also be found in its strategic mode of operation (see 3.4.1). More 
specifically, when the operational commanders planned a particular undertaking, PI did 
not assume that influence went one way only -  from NATO to targets. Van Dyke 
(30/4/2004) clarifies:
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We should also inform operational commanders about what is happening 
within the environment that we operate in, address the strategic goals of 
the organisations, how PI can influence the public, and how the public 
can influence the organisation. It should be two way. It shouldn’t just be 
one way. And the organisation must consider in fact the consequences of 
this operation on its publics. And we must consider how the public might 
influence the operation, and then make strategic decisions based on that.
Thus, it was equally important to anticipate how the publics might interpret the 
operational activities; in Foucault’s terms, how discursive strategies would shape public 
understanding of NATO’s actions.
None of the examples above, which all address how PI influenced reporters’ 
understanding of the situation in the Balkans and NATO’s contribution to this, would 
qualify as an exercise of power in Dahl’s conception. Yet, in Foucault’s analytical 
framework these Pl-reporter engagements are indeed relations of power. From his 
perspective Pi’s activities formed part of the dynamics of power simply because PI 
interacted with other subjects in local centres and as such created effects with discursive 
implications. Beyond this, however, the examples illustrate the way PI sought to 
exploit, and NATO acted in accordance with, existing discursive strategies to operate 
with tactical efficacy in discursive battles. That means to have media reports if  not 
convey NATO’s stories, then at least include the alliance’s version of events. This 
dimension of P i’s mode of operation is elaborated on below as a government technique.
From this we infer that productive power can elucidate P i’s mode of operation to 
influence specific reporters in local centres. It is still unclear, however, how PI may 
have influenced its ultimate and more diffuse targets which comprise both the public in 
theatre, and the public in NATO member states, the latter being P i’s strategic targets.
To this end, Foucault’s (1998) conception of power-knowledge as it appears in The
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Will to Knowledge is of limited avail. Suggesting a causal relation between two local 
centres from PI to reporters and from reporters to P i’s ultimate targets is hardly 
satisfactory. It is at this stage the later Foucault’s elaboration on his analytical 
framework is useful.
Enhancing public understanding and support by government
We shall return to the primary question of this chapter but treat it from the theoretical 
perspective Foucault constructs with the term government (see 3.2.3 and the section 
‘Productive power and government’ above). Conceiving P i’s direct and indirect 
influence on specific and diffuse targets as a government technique provides an 
understanding of how PI may have achieved its 1st goal.
In a brief recapitulation, Foucault’s (1982: 789-90) concept of government should be 
understood as ‘guiding the possibility of conduct’, as ‘putting order in the possible 
outcome’, and as a technique ‘to structure the possible field of action of others’. In other 
words, government refers to the dynamics that use and shape discursive strategies to 
direct people’s minds and delimit their behaviour; that is use and shape normative 
boundaries to frame how people think and behave by encouraging some actions while 
discouraging others. From this perspective, power is exercised as an ‘action upon an 
action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future’ 
(Foucault 1982: 789).
His reference to future effects of actions clearly shows that government is situated in the 
discursive realm and resembles his earlier definition of power as a complex strategical 
situation in a particular society (Foucault 1998: 93). In 1982, however, this ‘situation’ 
has become more subjective than he previously allowed for. With reference to the
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present case, government may have a much deeper impact on people, than the 
individual media reports people receive from the Balkans.
As mentioned, the term government is not subjective to the extent of it denoting ‘the 
headquarters’ of power (see 3.2.3). It is broader. A host of actors can govern in a variety 
of contexts. The state apparatus nevertheless holds a cardinal position in the term, not 
because all other power relations should be seen as subordinated to it but because they 
increasingly refer to this central authority when they govern. NATO PI can be seen as a 
function of such a central political authority, of the primary executive political branch, 
with regard to Pi’s targets in Bosnia, Kosovo and NATO member states. The alliance 
was the primary security provider of the, for all practical purposes, two international 
protectorates in the Balkans (see 2). Hence, from Foucault’s perspective PI arguably 
held a privileged position with regard to the discursive realms of relevance to the local 
targets -  the Bosnians and the Kosovars. This is not to suggest that NATO controlled 
these discursive realms. Rather, it is to suggest that NATO had relatively much 
influence on discursive strategies on the Balkans compared to that of most other actors, 
be they armed groups or human rights organisations. In the same vein, PI can be 
regarded as affiliated to the allied states’ political authorities and therefore relatively 
influential in discursive realms of relevance to its strategic targets -  people in NATO 
member states.
Understanding P i’s mode of operation to achieve the 1st PI goal from the perspective of 
government implies that PI should be seen as a technique to direct people, not primarily 
by instrumental violence but by govemmentality. That is, PI should be seen as 
structuring the possible field of action of others by shaping and exploiting discursive 
strategies to induce a particular form of rationality, of mentality, among its targets; a 
mentality that makes the governed accept to be governed. To the extent PI achieved
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this, it has govemmentalised power relations by gaining popular acceptance of existent 
institutions, objectives, means and systems of differentiations (Foucault 1982: 792).
Unfortunately, Foucault only presents his idea of government techniques in general 
terms. His primary concern is to uncover the history of govemmentality and part of this 
entails the study of how the techniques differ in time and space. He does present them, 
however, as composed of ‘power relations, relationships of communication, and 
objective capacities’ (Foucault 1982: 786). Although in his late writings Foucault rarely 
uses the term power-knowledge, it is compatible with the overlapping and reciprocal 
relation he describes between ‘power relations’ and ‘relationship of communication’. 
Compared to his earlier works ‘objective capacities’ takes a more prominent role at this 
stage, a component described in terms that compare with what Dahl denotes the base of 
power (see 3.2.1). As the latter’s relation to PI has already been scmtinised in 3.4.1 and 
since it only indirectly forms part of P i’s mode of operation, the next section will 
therefore not elaborated further on this component but rather focus on knowledge.
P I as a government technique
Pi’s mode of operation appears suitable as a technique of government because 
knowledge is a cardinal and intentionally applied component in both. The major 
difference is that while government rests on a regime de savoir (Foucault 1982: 780- 
81), P i’s task with respect to the local targets was largely to establish such a regime. 
IFOR and KFOR entered the theatres after the termination of wars and were tasked to 
contribute to peacebuilding efforts towards creating new political structures. In other 
words, PI should establish NATO’s understanding of the issues involved as generally 
accepted knowledge, as common sense among the Bosnians and Kosovars.
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From this scene, all above-mentioned methods in PPs mode of operation to achieve 
tactical victories in the local centres of power-knowledge may be seen as forming part 
of NATO’s government techniques. Notably Pi’s use of a message strategy, which 
linked multiple messages in a manner that supported a few master messages, seems 
helpful to define and defend what counts as knowledge. Although PI continuously 
engaged reporters from multiple outlets and with a variety of methods message 
strategies were used in an effort to portray the situations, NATO’s role, and the issues at 
stake in a uniform and unequivocal manner. This is not to suggest that PI manipulated 
information, as already addressed (see 2.2.4 and 3.4.3). The intention is rather to draw 
attention to P i’s struggle to establish and maintain in the minds of reporters one 
common understanding of NATO’s rationale for being involved in the Balkans and to 
present facts on the ground from that perspective; an effort to have the media convey 
worldwide NATO’s version of what was, and what was not, ‘facts’, ‘desirable’, and 
‘feasible’.
This mode of operation may serve to govern Pi’s targets by means of dividing practices 
that produce reality, establish normative boundaries and spur people to be on the 
generally accepted side, thereby guiding the possibility of conduct and putting order in 
the possible outcome of the targets’ way of life. It is enlightening to consider P i’s mode 
of operation in more detail from these three considerations.
Pi’s message strategy may be interpreted as a government technique to influence the 
discursive strategies that produce reality; as a means to direct all PI activities to induce 
NATO’s bias on existing discursive strategies, in other words to maintain or alter 
established knowledge on a particular topic in order to enhance public understanding 
and support to NATO’s ends (see the section ‘Engaging discourses’ above). Should we 
then allow ourselves to be inspired by Clausewitz’ (1976: 204-09) widely cited
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principle of ‘concentration of force’ on the battlefield and appreciate P i’s government 
technique as oriented towards a concentration o f  knowledge in the discursive 
battlefield?
Such a principle may be found, for instance, in P i’s above presented efforts to operate 
with tactical efficacy to send one message to targets, for example, ‘don’t do it’ to the 
Serbs in case 4. Case 1, 2, 5, and 6 represent similar co-ordinated efforts between PI and 
traditional operational capabilities to unify NATO’s messages.
It is interesting to see the application of the principle of concentration of knowledge in a 
broader context. We may find it, for example, in Van Dyke’s proposition that IFOR’s 
three master messages -  found in the content analysis (see 2.3.1) -  were directed to 
transform NATO’s identity to suit the post-Cold War era (see case 1).
At the risk of being too repetitive but in the interest of reviewing the message-strategy 
(see 2.2.3) from the point of view of this principle, IFOR’s first message aimed to 
overcome historical and contextual barriers both with respect to the international and the 
Bosnian public. People worldwide should understand that NATO had adapted to the 
new international security context; in Van Dyke’s words, that IFOR had become ‘the 
political personification of “NATO’s new attributes’” and that NATO was working with 
new ‘partners for noble ends’ (Van Dyke 2003: 18).
Second, the PI campaign presented IFOR as ‘the right instrument’ for giving the peace 
process a chance. The PI challenge upon deploying to Bosnia was to stand out as very 
different from UNPROFOR (see case 1). Thus, PI strove to create an identity for IFOR, 
preferably as a peacekeeper, but as a warrior if need be; a white knight that entered the 
conflict and stopped the fight.
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Third, PI should project IFOR as a helper and a leader. It should help the parties 
establish a democratic state and it should lead when they failed. Through these three 
master messages, topping a message strategy that co-ordinated a myriad of messages 
and talking points, PI sought to concentrate knowledge about NATO’s adaptation to and 
utility in the post-Cold War era. We may say that PI strove to give NATO a useful and 
worthy role in the new regime de savoir being produced in the field of international 
security throughout the 1990s.
From Foucault’s outlook, this concentration of knowledge may thus be seen as a 
government technique to engage the dynamic forces in the discursive battlefield in an 
expedient manner. This perspective can advance our theoretical understanding of the 
way Pi’s mode of operation may influence public understanding and support to 
NATO’s policy. As briefly summarised above, power-knowledge produces reality by 
dividing knowledge in terms of binary oppositions. It establishes power relations by 
dividing, for example, the legal from the illegal, thereby exercising power because some 
activities are labelled valuable and others valueless (see 3.1.3).
It is interesting to note that Pi’s formulation of messages is compatible with this 
discursive dynamic. The just mentioned key messages illustrate this point. Van Dyke 
puts forward that to establish the first message, that is to portray NATO as working with 
new partners for noble ends, PI had to engage the concept -  the brand, in Foucault’s 
mode of expression -  of ‘military bureaucracy’. This was a brand that, according to Van 
Dyke, generally was perceived as authoritarian, averse to publicity, and untrustworthy.
It may be added that the brand ‘military’ can be conceived in binary discursive 
opposition to the brand ‘civilian’. This brand and this binary division posed an obstacle 
for NATO’s participation in the peacebuilding process, so ‘NATO sought to construct 
the image of a large military force that would cooperate with civilian institutions,
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allow their activities to be seen and reported publicly, and strive to earn public trust and 
confidence’ (Van Dyke 2003: 17).
Arguably KFOR was portrayed in a similar manner. For instance, during an early 
KFOR Press Conference in the Prisitina CPIC NATO’s Secretary General, Mr Javier 
Solana, stated:
Now KFOR’s role is to create a secure environment for the rebuilding of 
Kosovo, for the re-establishment of law and order, for the safe return of 
all refugees to their homes, for social and economic reconstruction and 
for the full investigation of all war crimes and atrocities. The 
representatives from the United Nations, the OSCE, the Non- 
Governmental Organisations, have inclusive responsibility and NATO 
will do all it can to support them (NATO 24/6/1999).
This suggests that, NATO dealt with this potentially problematic discursive division 
between the terms military and civilian by subordinating NATO to the international 
civilian authority, as Clifford (27/4/2004) stipulates, although this point is not supported 
by the content analysis (see 2.3.2). He adds that the message aimed to project the 
subliminal message that in a democracy the military is subordinated to civilian 
authority; in other words, that NATO served the generally accepted side of the binary 
division. After the brief entry phase had concluded, both IFOR and KFOR conveyed 
that message, among others, in a visual manner by giving the chair of the joint press 
briefings to the civilian organisation (see case 1 and 3).
The same quote also communicates the ‘noble’ aspects o f NATO’s involvements in the 
Balkans by exploiting binary brandings to situate NATO’s function on the ‘right’ side 
of dominant discursive divisions. KFOR created a ‘secure’ environment, with a 
subliminal reference to the binary contrast of the ‘insecure’ environment that 
characterised the situation six months earlier. Moreover, KFOR re-established the
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rule of ‘law’ (thus preventing a contrasting rule of ‘physical force’) and promoted 
‘human rights’ (thus preventing ‘atrocities’).
This mode of operation may be interpreted as a government technique to exploit 
existent discursive strategies, not only to enhance public understanding of NATO’s role 
in the Balkans but to gain public support by presenting NATO as desirable and efficient. 
It may be seen as an effort to govemmentalise power relations. By broadcasting a 
particular and delimited understanding of NATO in opposition to, and as a bulwark 
against, unacceptable norms, PI portrayed NATO as generally desirable with the 
expectation that this would enhance its public support. The same exercise of power is 
reflected with respect to the PI campaign’s second message.
PI did not use Foucault’s terminology but operated with comparable conceptual pairs to 
portray IFOR as ‘the right instrument’ (see case 1 and 2.3.1). This included pairs such 
as ‘war’ versus ‘peace’, ‘lethal’ versus ‘non-violent’, and ‘warriors’ versus 
‘peacekeepers’. The importance PI put on the ‘non-use of force’-discourse may be 
interpreted as a reflection of NATO member states’ fear that their electorates would 
oppose the first concept in these pairs, for instance ‘war’, while they would support the 
second, here ‘peace’. Force, here in its physical sense, connotes war, lethal and warriors 
-  all arguably on the illegitimate side of the dominant dividing normative lines in the 
1990s. From this perspective the incorporation of, for instance, the principle of 
minimum necessary force in IFOR’s and KFOR’s rules of engagement (see 2.2 and 
2.2.4) can be interpreted as an effort to distance these missions from such unpopular 
terms and to situate IFOR within generally supported normative boundaries (see 1.1).
In 1995, NATO’s problem was that its member states’ electorates generally perceived 
the alliance in terms of war, lethal, and warrior, hence P i’s task became to transform
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NATO's identity in the eyes of the public. Van Dyke (2003: 18) argues that to this end, 
PI had to build ‘rhetorical bridges’ between the two concepts in each of the pairs, in 
order to allow NATO to cross over in the public imagination, for example, from being 
usefiil in war to being useful also in peace. In order to gain public support, PI also had 
to strike the right balance between the brands ‘lethal’ and ‘non-violent’ -  or as Clifford 
terms them with respect to KFOR ‘militarily capable’ and ‘non-offensive’ (see 2.2.3) -  
when it portrayed the military missions. It had to be ‘militarily capable’ to deter the 
warring parties and ‘non-offensive’ to be seen as legitimate by NATO members’ 
electorates. To achieve this, PI had to give NATO room of manoeuvre to operate on 
both sides of the normative boundaries. Consequently, PI framed NATO’s activities 
with expedient discursive strategies according to the objectives they aimed to achieve.
In this way Foucault’s notion of power allows us to understand P i’s mode of operation 
as a concentration of knowledge to produce reality by exploiting dividing normative 
lines in the discursive battlefield.
In addition, Foucault’s work may further our conception of how PI tried to govern its 
targets, not by physical sanctions, but by inducing a particular form of rationality in 
them. That is, a govemmentality that by means of normative pressures spurs people to 
think and behave in desirable ways and within certain normative boundaries (see 3.2.3). 
A few examples illustrate these endeavours.
To reduce the level of unauthorised shooting, for instance, PI strove to legitimise 
IFOR’s stand on this topic by linking it to the ‘non-use of force’-discourse. Determined 
to strengthen discursive strategies that structure the possible field of actions of others,
PI sought to promote the idea and consolidate the norm that unauthorised use of 
physical force was not desirable. Such efforts can be found in Brig. Cumming’s 
statement opening an IFOR press briefing three weeks after deployment:
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Over the last few days there has been a reduction of the incidents of firing 
at aircraft. I know we went through last weekend the Serbian ChristmaS 
and indeed I suppose we have to be aware that tonight is their New Year’s 
eve but nevertheless in the intervening period there has been a 
considerable reduction in the number of incidents. That has to a very large 
extent been because of the pressure applied at the number of levels to the 
people to advise them that we do not considerate it celebratory, we 
considerate it undisciplined and we are trying to persuade them to see it as 
undisciplined as well (NATO 13/1/1996).
P i’s endeavours to exploit and support discursive strategies to guide its targets’
‘possibility of conduct’, in Foucault’s (1982: 789) formulation, can also be found in
IFOR’s resolution to encourage the local targets to solve their differences by political
means and denying them to use their armed force. Again, a statement from a press
briefing illustrates this point. Just over a month into IFOR’s existence spokesman
Lt.Col. Rayner opens the proceedings:
Another very quiet day in which IFOR Experienced no obstruction of 
freedom of movement. The presence of IFOR Troops over the last month 
has resulted in the separation of military forces along the former front 
lines. No tanks, heavy guns or advancing troops threaten the peace that 
began with last year’s cease-fire. The way is now clear for the political 
leaders of all 3 parties to engage in serious negotiations and move the 
peace process ahead by diplomacy and compromise (NATO 24/1/1996).
By such techniques PI may have transformed the Bosnians’ and Kosovars’ mindsets 
from war to peace; and thus, Foucault suggests, changed them as subjects in a manner 
furthering their support to NATO. Moreover, this would have facilitated that they
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reoriented their daily activities in a manner contributing to the reconstructing of 
peaceful communities.183
With these examples of how PI sought to govern the Balkan publics, we shall now 
direct attention to how PI operated to influence its strategic targets’ understanding of the 
situation in the Balkans. With reference to the issues just elaborated on in the case 
above, P i’s efforts to establish NATO’s version of its achievements in media reports 
may have influenced discursive strategies that could influence the publics in NATO 
member countries. In IFOR’s early days, PI assisted national capitals to mobilise their 
electorates’ support to the idea that NATO should deploy in a peace support operation 
‘out-of-area’ by linking the mission to human rights discourses. Moreover, when PI 
appealed to people’s moral duty to escalate with military means their assistance to other 
people in urgent need (see case 1), it revived a fading ‘use of force’-discourse by linking 
it with the human rights discourses.
More generally, P i’s mode of operation can be seen as an effort to govemmentalise 
these power relations between NATO and its strategic targets. Foucault’s perspective 
induces us to speculate that this may have established a strategic situation in the 
discursive battlefield that gave the alliance, along with other international actors, a 
necessary and legitimate role as custodians of the newly won peace in Bosnia and
183 Indeed, the three CPIOs themselves arrive at this empirical conclusion about the effects o f their PI 
activities, as the presentation of the cases reflects (see 2.1.1 -  2.1.6 and 2.4). The validity of their impact 
on the Bosnians is supported by Siegel (1998: 143-51), Avruch et al. (1999: 42), and Coward (2000), and 
on the general improvements in Bosnia after the Dayton Peace Accord by Hudson and Stanier (1999:
298) and Sandberg and Windmar (1998). Thompson and de Luce (2002: 206-08) are more critical, not to 
the general political achievements, however, but to IFOR’s unwillingness to marginalise Bosnian leaders 
who sought to undermine this peace agreement. In addition but in a different context, positive experiences 
with the UN’s information achievements in its peacekeeping operation in Cambodia 1992-93 have been 
provided by Heininger (1994), Lehmann (1999: 51-83), Marston (2002), and Lindley (2004: 608-11).
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Kosovo. In other words, P i’s mode of operation may be seen as an exercise of power to 
create a political situation in the Balkans and beyond where NATO’s presence and 
policy in that region was generally desired.
It may have changed the understanding of electorates in NATO member states about the
field o f international affairs and their sense of contributing to global stability. It may
have transformed their mindsets away from an idea that had reigned during the Cold
War and to a new rationale for the use of armed forces, extending the idea that the most
relevant purpose of armed force is national defence and arriving at the idea that armed
force could and should be used in defence of human rights at a global scale as well.184 It
may have induced in them a new sense of the ‘white man’s burden’. NATO’s Secretary
General, Mr Javier Solana, strikes this cord in a KFOR Press Conference during his
early visit to Kosovo:
Let me tell you the operation on the ground has already been a 
tremendous success. NATO’s member countries have responded to the 
challenge to bring peace and stability to Kosovo by deploying already 
30,000 troops in a fully integrated and effective peace keeping force. This 
reflects NATO’s shared determination to uphold the values which our 
Alliance has successfully defended for 50 years - democracy, individual 
liberty and the rule of law (NATO 24/6/1999).
Such messages could have discursive effects beyond the region, since the international 
endeavours to manage the Bosnian and Kosovo crisis were examples of a kind of global
184 Senghaas (1993) and Wheeler (2000). Coker (2001: 12) presents these normative developments as a 
revaluation of war: ‘We have not, of course, gone out of the business of war. Instead, we have been 
forced to re-market it, to fight in a different fashion. We now fight humanitarian wars, and we try to fight 
them more humanely.’ See also Shaw (1996), Taylor, P (2000a: 294), and Thussu (2000a; 2000b). An 
empirical account o f how the Western regime de savoir has changed with respect to the notion o f war 
throughout the 20th century can be found in Coker (1994) that from a different methodological approach 
identifies alterations in Western literature’s depiction o f the phenomenon.
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order envisioned in NATO’s strategic concepts of 1991 and 1999, where countries in 
the Euro-Atlantic region take measure to protect their stability from risks that may come 
from the periphery. In this way the strategic concepts establish binary brands -  the 
‘Euro-Atlantic region’ versus the ‘periphery’, and ‘stability’ versus ‘risks’ -  that create 
dividing normative lines.185 Thus, Foucault’s notion of govemmentality is clearly 
relevant not only at the level of the state, which was his focus, but also at the global 
level (see also 1.5.3).
From this perspective, P i’s mode of operation may have contributed, as Van Dyke
(2003) holds, to give NATO a new identity and to establish the alliance as the West’s
foremost and legitimate instrument to preserve international peace and security. Indeed,
NATO’s Secretary General, Mr Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, uses IFOR to portray NATO’s
role in current history in such terms. On 11 November 2004, in a speech to the UN
Security Council he stipulates:
This decision to go ‘out of area’ in the Balkans was a historical decision 
for the Alliance . . .  it represented the birth of UN-NATO cooperation . . .
NATO is now playing a major role, under the Security Council mandate, 
in Afghanistan . . .  In Iraq, under the terms of the United Nations’
Security Council resolution 1546 . . .  NATO is providing assistance and 
training and equipping the Iraqi security forces’ (NATO 2004).
To the extent this version of the past becomes common sense, Foucault would suggest 
that it changes the identities of people in NATO member states from potential victims in 
a nuclear holocaust to guardians of a global peace.
185 See NATO (1991: paragraph 11; 1999: 3,20). Empirical evidence and implications o f such discursive 
effects are presented in Myers et al. (1996) and Carruthers (2000: 45).
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PI as productive power -  a summary
The theoretical speculations about P i’s discursive effects make no claim to being 
empirically valid. They serve to demonstrate, however, that productive power and 
government can conceptualise the kind of influence Pi’s mode of operation seeks to 
exert in order to achieve the alliance’s political and military ends. Foucault’s conception 
of power can improve our understanding of how PI may enhance public understanding 
and support and influence the general behaviour of the public, in reciprocal Pi-target 
relations that are direct or indirect, and towards targets that are specific or diffuse.
Before summarising the value of Foucault’s analytics of power in the present context, it 
is timely to reiterate his reservations against subjective influence in the discursive 
realm: power comes from everywhere; no one is in control (see 3.2.3). Although he 
moderates this view in his later writings, Foucault also stresses that the ability to govern 
does not reside in the state apparatus. This cautious note warns us against exaggerating 
the impact of P i’s activities and encourages us to regard P i’s influence in the context of 
and in the engagement with a host of other effects, a tendency that is reinforced by the 
politico-military context in which NATO operated. Although part of an embryonic 
central authority in the two theatres, NATO’s relations with the local populations were 
not fully govemmentalised. Rather, PI formed part of a broader discursive battle and 
was up against not only other subjects but also multiple and powerful discourses.
In addition, Foucault does not provide a theory that can prove, in positivistic terms, the 
existence of power relations, but an analytical perspective from which the phenomenon 
of power can be interpreted. He moves the object of study from Dahl’s and Lukes’ 
material realm to one that is discursive. This frame of reference does not present PI as 
primarily a means of power that mediated between NATO’s traditional military
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capabilities and its targets’ responses, as Dahl permits us to see. Foucault suggests that 
PI exercised power by referring to and influencing the knowledge of its targets. Power- 
knowledge forms people’s perceptions and opinions, and thereby their behaviour.
Foucault’s perspective discloses PI as a means NATO used to govern people indirectly. 
PI sought to influence its final targets through reporters who had an extraordinarily 
broad and quick access to the publics worldwide. Each PI engagement with reporters 
may be seen as a local centre where the former by use of a variety of techniques, such as 
meeting points, media opportunities, press availabilities and background briefings, 
strove to establish NATO’s version of the situation in the Balkans in media reports.
Foucault’s analytical framework inspires us to conceive PI as operating in a discursive 
battlefield it could not control. The latter point is important because it underlines why 
Foucault’s notion of power cannot sustain ideas of cunning propaganda endeavours that 
manipulate entire societies. Having stressed this, it is equally important to emphasise 
that PI strove to influence the dynamics in this discursive battle. PI acted in an 
expedient manner to influence its targets’ understanding of facts on the ground and the 
meaning of such facts, to clear up confusion, to counter disinformation, and to convey 
NATO’s policy and intentions in a convincing manner. It was, according to Van Dyke 
(17/3/2004) and Idsoe (26/3/2004), a war of words, a broad perceptional conflict in 
which PI engaged multiple and powerful actors and discourses to produce reality. PI 
could not, and did not, expect to have a desired impact but struggled to influence the 
content of common sense by winning as many discursive battles as possible. Its mode of 
operation was to engage reporters from a variety of outlets, potentially as broad as the 
PI personnel in all allied capitals at the top and down the level of command to NATO’s 
platoons. Crucially, P i’s mode of operation was based on the idea that NATO troops 
and political authorities promoted the same few messages.
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In this strategic manner PI strove to establish and maintain in the minds of reporters one 
common understanding of NATO’s rationale for being involved in the Balkans and to 
present facts on the ground within that discursive frame of reference. This as an effort to 
have the media convey NATO’s version of what was ‘facts’, ‘true’, ‘acceptable’ and 
‘desirable’.
From Foucault’s perspective, P i’s mode of operation cannot be depicted simply as a 
measure to inform the publics about the situation in the Balkans. PI exerted power. 
Potentially, the function influenced its targets in a profound and penetrating manner. 
Notably, P i’s message strategy and unity of effort can be seen as an effort to concentrate 
knowledge to operate with tactical efficacy in and influence the discursive battlefield. 
This mode of operation appears particularly suited to influence the regime de savoir that 
conditions govemmentality; that governs people and makes governance acceptable to 
people.
In this light, P i’s mode of operation presents itself as a government technique that 
engaged the discursive strategies which produced reality and established normative 
boundaries with regard to the Balkans. P i’s messages were formulated in a manner 
compatible with the binary brands and divisions that structure Foucault’s discursive 
strategies and were deliberately aimed to situate NATO on the generally accepted side 
of these normative boundaries. The purpose was to portray NATO as desirable and 
efficient with the expectation that this would enhance its public support.
More generally, P i’s endeavours may be seen as en effort to govemmentalise power 
relations making NATO’s goals legitimate and generally desired. PI linked facts on the 
ground, NATO’s policy, and future political scenarios to discursive strategies in ways 
compatible with Foucault’s government techniques that spur people to think and
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behave in a desirable manner and within normative boundaries. In this universe of 
discourse, PI governed by ‘guiding the possibility of conduct and putting order in the 
possible outcome’ of the targets’ way of living (Foucault 1982: 789). To the extent PI 
actually succeeded in this endeavour, it may not only have de-escalated what to the 
conventional military mind is the conflict but also exercised what Foucault terms the art 
of government.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
How, and for what purposes, has NATO used its Press and Information function in its 
peace support operations in the Balkans? This was the empirical question this study set 
out to answer. The question is important. It addresses a general activity that is arguably 
a precondition for reaching Western strategic objectives in contemporary armed 
conflicts. Nonetheless, how armed forces actually conduct such tasks has received 
limited scholarly attention. Though interest in the topic has increased in recent years it 
has primarily been in the general sense of how the media is used to influence 
international affairs.
Before reaching a conclusion on this thesis it is prudent to return to some 
methodological limitations upon which these findings are based. Then follows 
considerations on the relation between Dahl and Foucault’s respective notions of power. 
Finally, the broader implication of the present findings in the field of international 
politics and war will be reflected upon.
The validity of the findings rests on a set of assumptions already presented in the 
methodological chapter. These shall not be re-elaborated on here but I want to draw 
attention to them as a cautionary note. Three crucial limitations of this study demand a 
brief repetition, however.
First, the thesis makes no claim that it has general validity in terms of how NATO 
applies PI. The object of study is NATO’s institutionalised ideas about the practice of PI 
as expressed by three centrally placed PI officers. The thesis does not even hold that
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the empirical findings are supported by all other NATO PI staff in the six illustrative 
cases. These findings are primarily based on three individuals’ accounts, although their 
validity is checked against other sources and a content analysis of relevant NATO press 
briefings. The study does not provide evidence to verify whether the CPIOs’ ideas 
correspond to NATO PI policy and doctrines, however, since such information is 
largely classified. Moreover, even if it were permitted to present these documents such a 
method would reflect only policy but not the ideas that informed the actual 
implementation of policy in the cases. It is the latter, the practice of PI, which is the 
present topic of concern. As a consequence, how representative the study is for NATO’s 
general PI activity rests largely on the CPIOs’ competence and honesty.
Second, notwithstanding the CPIOs’ own accounts, this thesis does not claim that PI 
actually influenced their target groups. This has not been the present purpose. Rather, 
this study aims to conceptualise the forms of influence NATO Pi’s mode of operation 
seeks to exert in order to influence its target groups. In other words, the theoretical 
elaborations do not try to prove relations of power between PI and their targets, but 
rather to elucidate P i’s assumptions about those relations.
Third, the broader context in which this study is presented -  that war is changing, the 
utility of physical force is declining, and the use of the media is becoming increasingly 
important -  rests primarily on the authority of five authors, although reference is made 
to sources that elaborate on related issues. While this has no significant effect on the 
validity of the thesis it is important for the wider implications of the findings. The value 
of the subsequent speculations about what the present findings may signify in the field 
of International Relations depends, among others, on how well-founded the five 
authors’ analyses are.
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4.1 Empirical thesis
Within the methodological limitations of this study (see 1 .4), it may be concluded that 
NATO used PI as a means of power to achieve political and military ends. P i’s mode of 
operation was guided by a PI policy, stipulating goals and intentions, and based on three 
components: a message strategy, a unity of effort and a resolution to maintain credible 
relations with the press.
NATO’s political and military leaders applied PI to enhance member countries’ public 
support to the alliance’s raison d ’etre as well as its presence and use of physical force in 
the Balkans. Further, NATO used PI to achieve military objectives in the Balkans, 
particularly to influence the parties’ and people’s general behaviour and specific 
actions. PI offered NATO a non-lethal means to promote stability, deter crises and 
resolve conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Pi’s mode of operation was strategic. It was guided by a policy framework. The 1st goal 
stipulated that PI should enhance public understanding and support. To this end, PI 
operated to influence the media’s projections of the alliance and its activities. As the 
content analyses point out, PI projected NATO’s presence and activities in the Balkans 
in a few master messages. These were sustained by a message strategy. In addition, PI 
strove to achieve a unity of effort. It co-ordinated vertically, up and down a chain of 
communication between NATO PI staff. At the various levels in the ordinary chain of 
command PI co-ordinated horizontally with the other NATO functions. At the missions’ 
command levels the CPIOs assisted in identifying appropriate responses to up-coming 
tasks and, at times, PI was used as a non-lethal compulsory measure to implement the 
same plans. In this function PI served along with traditional operational functions, such 
as air power and artillery. PI operated as a megaphone function disseminating the
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force commanders’ intentions and stressing their resolve to carry them out. PI also 
operated as a force multiplier amplifying public imagination of a force commanders’ 
military capacity to apply lethal sanctions.
These empirical findings offer new perspectives on the question: what are the 
capabilities of the warring parties? This is a key questions in the field of International 
Relations as initially observed (see 1.2.1). The study casts light on the functions and 
methods of military operational means that are different from and often more expedient 
than conventional armed force to reach contemporary strategic objectives.
4.2 Theoretical thesis
The theoretical dimension of this study is to conceptualise an implicit assumption in the 
empirical findings, namely the forms of influence that PI may exercise. Based on three 
seminal theoretical perspectives on power, the research question was: How can Robert 
A. Dahl’s, Steven Lukes’, and Michel Foucault’s respective notions of power enhance 
our theoretical understanding of the way NATO’s PI function may exercise power to 
achieve political and military ends?
At first sight Lukes’ far-reaching notion of structural power appeared useful to consider 
whether PI manipulated the minds of the publics in the Balkans and in NATO member 
countries. Further investigations concluded, however, that the concept is based on 
assumptions that make it inapplicable to the present study. Notably, the exercise of 
structural power is conditioned by latent conflicts in which a powerful actor succeeds in 
thwarting the real interests of, and impose false consensus on, the less powerful. 
Analytical considerations along Lukes’ methodological prescriptions led to the 
conclusion that it would not be possible to provide convincing evidence to sustain a
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claim that PI had manipulated their targets’ interests and imposed false consensus upon 
them.
It is timely to question the value of presenting and elaborating on a theoretical concept 
only to diminish it. The reason the analytical discussion of structural power remains in 
this final version is that it questions cardinal assumptions of the idea that manipulating 
others against their real interests is a major feature in the field of international security. 
This is important for three reasons. The present study provides a critical case that 
questions the validity of Lukes’ concept of power. Second, the study does not, nor did it 
ever aim to, invalidate criticism that NATO has used PI as a means to mislead others 
(see 1.3). Nonetheless, structural power’s inapplicability in the present analysis 
questions the assumptions on which such criticism is based. Third, Lukes’ 
understanding of power forms part of a generally accepted way to conceptualise the 
power of social communication in the field of International Relations -  that is, Nye’s 
notion of soft power (see 1.4.2). For this reason, the critique of Lukes also applies to 
Nye.
In contrast, Dahl’s notion of power proved useful to further our theoretical 
understanding of how PI may influence the specific actions of the parties and people in 
the Balkans. PI operated as a means of compulsory power when intentionally used to 
make its targets ‘do something that B [ie the targets] would not otherwise do’, as Dahl’s 
seminal definition goes.
In military campaigns compulsory power has arguably been conceived in terms of 
physical force. This idea can be found, for example, in NATO’s deterrence logic during 
the Cold War, which spurred strategists to think of influence in terms of the potential to 
apply lethal force (see 1.1). The present study shows that the ability to coerce and
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deter opponents also resides in PI -  not in PI alone but when used in close coordination 
with conventional operational functions. PI was used as a megaphone and force 
multiplier to mediate between NATO’s lethal capacity and the targets’ responses. All 
three force commanders exploited this dimension of PI because it held the advantage of 
allowing them to enforce stability and regulate their targets’ actions without having to 
employ their lethal capacity. Using PI as a non-lethal enforcement measure dramatically 
reduced the political risks involved in traditional means of compulsion.
On the other hand, Dahl’s compulsory conception of power cannot explain P i’s mode of 
operation to enhance public understanding and support. This was the 1st PI goal and 
compatible with what is arguably the strategic objective in contemporary conflicts: to 
win the will o f the people (see 1.1). To this end Foucault’s notion is useful. Conveying 
the conceptual difference in broad-sweeping terms, we may say that where Dahl regards 
power as physical force, Foucault conceives knowledge as power. More correctly, the 
Foucauldian notion of productive power operates in a discursive realm in which 
techniques of knowledge and strategies of power are intimately linked.
Before continuing, it is prudent to recall how the term productive power is applied in 
the context of this thesis. Where Foucault (1976: 93) conceives power in discursive 
terms and defines it as ‘the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in 
a particular society’, the present study applies the more delimited term productive 
power. This notion is based on his analytical framework and refers to subjects’ ability to 
exploit a given discursive situation to their own advantage in their relations with others 
(see 3.4.3).
When PI informed its targets about NATO’s policies and intentions, and about facts on 
the ground, it disseminated information which to varying degrees influenced
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people’s knowledge. Crucially, this process can be appreciated as an exercise of 
productive power. It corresponds to a dynamic which Foucault refers to as power- 
knowledge. NATO influenced others simply because it engaged in social 
communication.
Beyond this, P i’s activity had discursive effects that to some extent, and according to 
Foucault in uncertain ways, will have influenced the discursive patterns of domination. 
These patterns have a much deeper impact on people since they establish binary- 
normative categories for information like war/peace, abnormal/normal, and bad/good. 
Such categories shape the regime de savoir that envelopes human societies and defines 
social interaction. This is a regime that organises people’s reception of information 
about reality by organising knowledge and therefore their perception of reality; that 
defines what counts as facts and what they signify; that forms people’s understanding of 
what is, and what is not, peace, normal and good; and that moulds the content of 
common sense. This in turn influences what people will render their support to and 
disciplines their general behaviour.
From this perspective, productive power refers to the PIOs’ ability to influence the 
knowledge dimension of their targets, wherever they may engage them, to NATO’s 
advantage. That is, their ability to define reality for others; to establish what counts as 
valid knowledge. Productive power is a competence soldiers may use to exploit the 
discursive context in which they fight; the context in which their targets make sense of 
their situation and that of international affairs. It is the competence to use, make and 
disseminate information in order to gain targets’ support to one’s visions for the future; 
the ability to present facts on the ground by relating them to existing discourses in a 
way that puts one’s endeavours in the best possible light; and as such a competence 
subjects may possess to a larger or lesser degree.
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Along Foucault’s conception of power, therefore, when in the present study PI operated 
to have the media project NATO’s version of facts on the ground or the terms of a peace 
agreement, PI engaged with multiple actors and powerful discourses in a perceptional 
conflict. The objective was to influence the regime de savoir in the Balkans -  the local 
peoples’ perception of reality.
In this context, a primary PI objective was to change the populations’ mindsets from 
war to peace. To the extent that PI succeeded, it contributed to changing people’s 
general behaviour and to bringing peace and stability to the Balkans. It governed, in 
Foucault’s (1982: 789) use of the term, the targets’ way of living by guiding the 
possibility of conduct and putting order in the possible outcome. PI established order in 
the way its targets made sense of their situation. PI aimed to influence if not the features 
of the dividing normative boundaries, then on which side of the boundaries NATO was 
positioned in public imagination and how NATO was portrayed to its targets within the 
dominant regime de savoir. To the extent that NATO’s goals became generally accepted 
among the various peoples in the Balkans, PI participated in govemmentalising power 
relations in the region. In addition, NATO’s achievements to this end will in turn have 
influenced a broader international regime de savoir about, for example, the alliance’s 
utility in the Balkans.
In the same vein, PI exercised productive power, and potentially governed, when it set 
out to directly inform distant and diffuse targets such as NATO’s public. In these 
undertakings, PI engaged a broader scope of -  possibly more powerful -  actors. Here, 
P i’s objective was to convince its targets about NATO’s version, not only of facts on 
the ground in the Balkans and the meaning of such facts, but of the broader state of 
international affairs, of NATO’s role, and indeed its value in this wider context. Again, 
to the extent PI succeeded it will have affected discourses and thereby a more global
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regime de savoir in a way that turned out favourable to NATO. This will have 
influenced common sense among NATO’s targets and may have contributed to the 
transformation of Western mindsets from a concern about, for instance, defending our 
Euro-Atlantic region to guarding international peace and security. NATO’s primary PI 
goal, which was to enhance public understanding and support, may be considered as 
fulfilled once power relations were govemmentalised in NATO’s favour.
To these theoretical considerations, Foucault would insist that discursive effects are 
beyond the control of subjects. Discourses are non-intentional. PI cannot control the 
discursive battlefield. It cannot exercise power in an expedient manner above the, in a 
theoretical sense, tactical level. Yet, Foucault’s empirical claim is contrasted by the 
CPIOs’ actual experiences. Although the validity of their conviction has not been 
assessed in this study, it is observed that the CPIOs insist that they influenced their 
targets. Among others things, they support their claims by pointing to the findings from 
their permanent teams that evaluated the daily content of media reports186.
Thus, a difference of understanding exists between Foucault’s position and the CPIOs’ 
own idea about the expediency with which they can influence their targets. This does 
not invalidate the applicability of Foucault’s notion of power in this context, however. 
He would accept the possibility that the CPIOs influence their targets. What he would 
question is the efficiency with which they can do it.
It follows that this thesis potentially offers a critical case that could challenge the 
limited influence Foucault ascribes to subjects. It is possible that further research could
186 See 2.1 and 2.4. In the case of IFOR, this view is supported by Siegel (1998: 144) and Badsey (2000b: 
xx v).
301
show that PI has exercised intentional discursive effect. A study might evaluate whether 
a PI campaign was efficient. It could simply compare, for example, P i’s objectives in a 
specific situation with opinion polls and media content analysis prior to and after the 
campaign. Extending the period of analysis would increase the value of such findings.
Beyond these theoretical findings, Foucault’s notion o f power spurs us to understand 
NATO’s PI function -  along with other assets in states’ ‘communications armoury’ (see
1.5.2) -  as operating in a battlefield that is different from the one used by the alliance’s 
traditional operational assets. It is a battlefield defined by discourses rather than, as in 
industrial wars, by mountains and oceans. It is a battlefield crowded with allied and 
rivalling ideas rather than armed forces. It is an immaterial, non-spatial battlefield rather 
than a material and geographical one.
This discursive battlefield, as it has been termed here, is constituted by knowledge (see
3.4.3). It is shaped by the way information is organised in binary-normative categories 
that produce meaning and define reality for subjects. There are no subjects in the 
discursive battlefield, only discursive formations created by the discursive effects that 
subjects produce.
Normally, the discursive battlefield is dominated by a regime de savoir defined by the 
content of its discursive strategies. These lay down dividing normative boundaries that 
spur people to think and behave within certain codes of conduct. In other words, 
discursive strategies govern. Crucially, however, it is a battlefield that no one controls. 
Power comes from everywhere. The discursive battlefield is decentred, because it is 
constituted by never-stable chains of discursive elements that form discursive strategies. 
These are perpetually challenged by other discursive forces. Ideas can be suppressed but
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never eliminated. There is always a possibility for marginalised discursive elements to 
gain momentum and challenge the existing, but always fluid, regime de savoir.
From NATO’s point of view the interesting question is how the strategic situation, the 
regime, in the discursive battlefield may be exploited, or maybe even changed, to the 
alliance’s advantage. Although Foucault, as noted, would oppose the idea that any 
subject could influence this realm in an intentional manner, not to mention control it, he 
does perceive discursive strategies as being produced and reproduced by discursive 
effects created by subjects in local centres. This provides NATO’s PI function with a 
theoretical opening, with an immaterial entry point into the discursive battlefield, an 
entry that takes the form of the discursive effects PI may induce into this realm.
Understanding P i’s mode of operation in this light is clarifying. It may be seen as an 
endeavour to create effects in the discursive battlefield that would shape relevant 
discursive strategies to NATO’s advantage. It is interesting to note that NATO 
approached its task in the Balkans with implicit acceptance of the defining conditions of 
the discursive battlefield; for example, that it could not be controlled. For instance, in 
the interest of establishing and maintaining public support, NATO’s political authorities 
provided its force commanders with rules of engagement that significantly reduced the 
option to apply physical force. To the conventional military mind, this must appear an 
odd limitation imposed on a military commander, but in the post-Cold War’s discursive 
battlefield it makes good sense. The Force Commanders’ sensitivity to the discursive 
effects of their activities is also reflected in their integration of PI in the Command 
Group. Among other things, PI was here tasked to judge which alternative ways of 
solving operational tasks would come across most advantageously in the eyes of people.
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Moreover, PI operated in a manner that conforms to Foucault’s (1976: 102) 
understanding of power that ‘replaces the privilege of the law with the viewpoint of the 
objective, the privilege of prohibition with the viewpoint of tactical efficacy’. For 
instance, PI made no effort to deny the media access to NATO’s activities, nor to censor 
media products (see 4th, 5th, and 6th PI goal in 2.2.1). PI operated on the understanding 
that reporters were its primary channel to the discursive battlefield; that they produced 
stories based on a host of non-NATO sources, most of which had interests different 
from NATO’s; and that efforts to censor the media would most likely be 
counterproductive. Nor did PI try to force its messages upon its target groups. It did not, 
in Foucault’s terms, impose law. Rather, PI made every effort to operate with tactical 
efficacy to persuade them to accept NATO’s objectives in the Balkans. In addition, the 
reciprocal relation the CPIO’s experienced with its targets can be seen as a logical 
consequence of the discursive battlefield’s decentred features.
Under such conditions, PI participated in a discursive battle that produced reality. P i’s 
task was to establish a situation in the discursive battlefield conducive to NATO’s ends, 
to establish a general understanding and support among people of NATO’s role in the 
Balkans. In other words, it was tasked with convincing its target groups that NATO’s 
involvement was desirable and efficient.
P i’s mode of operation may be seen as a deliberate effort to have a desired impact in the 
discursive battlefield. It is illuminating to conceive P i’s activities as guided by a 
principle of concentration of knowledge. The three primary components of P i’s mode of 
operation -  message strategy, unity of effort and the resolve to maintain credible 
relations with the press -  can be interpreted as a conscious effort to induce the same set 
of coherent discursive effects from multiple local centres into the discursive battlefield. 
PI directed itself to access this realm’s immaterial entry points by repeating the
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same coherent messages from many sources in a manner people would believe. All 
tactical PI engagements in a wide spectrum of local centres aimed to disseminate, with 
one voice, NATO’s version of facts on the ground and of the issues involved. Accepting 
that PI could not directly mould the constellation of discursive strategies, one may 
suspect, however, that a concerted effort conducted along the principle of concentration 
of knowledge to influence such strategies may be more expedient than a diffuse one. Put 
bluntly, it is likely that few ideas from many people will have greater impact on public 
imagination than many ideas from few people.
P i’s mode of operation to concentrate knowledge focused on reporters. It was primarily 
their ideas about the current situation in and future scenarios for the Balkans that were 
widely disseminated in the discursive battlefield. To this end, PI applied a number of 
methods, among others establishing well-known meeting points with reporters, creating 
opportunities for the media to get interesting stories, making commanders available for 
the press, and giving reporters detailed background briefings about up-coming 
operational undertakings. PI strove to influence reporters in the productive sense of 
shaping their understanding of facts on the ground and the meaning of such facts, in 
order to clear up confusion, counter disinformation, and convey NATO’s policy and 
intentions in a convincing manner. To this end PI exploited the reigning regime de 
savoir to add meaning to NATO’s messages, to put them in a beneficial light. In other 
words, PI strove to establish NATO’s version of the situation in the Balkans as common 
sense among the press corps, hoping that this would bias public understanding and 
mobilise support for NATO.
Given the features of the discursive battlefield, PI did not expect to have a desired, and 
certainly not a lasting, impact but continuously struggled to influence the content of 
media reports by winning as many discursive battles as possible. Decisive victories
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belonged to a different battlefield, in the discursive one PI could only strive to operate 
with tactical efficacy.
Thus, understanding the power of NATO’s PI function from the perspectives of Dahl’s 
and Foucault’s theoretical work has been clarifying. Foucault’s notion of power can 
conceptualise the type of influence NATO Pi’s mode of operation seeks to exert in 
order to enhance public understanding and support and to influence the general 
behaviour of the public. Dahl’s notion of power can elucidate P i’s mode of operation to 
influence people’s specific actions.
In order to facilitate reading in the remainder of the thesis, I shall henceforth use the 
term productive power in a broad sense that comprises government. Against this 
background the notions of compulsory and productive power appear useful to the 
broader academic debate presented in the introduction about how we can conceptualise 
the influence of states’ efforts to pursue their interest in the post-Cold War era by means 
of social communication. Together these two notions constitute a conceptual framework 
that allows us to understand why the way armed forces use the media is now ’the other 
manner in which we fight’, as Smith (2005: 284) asserts.
Productive power may also be useful in other ways: It can add credibility to Cooper’s 
(2004: 115-16) central claim that words are superior to physical force in the postmodern 
world; and it points to dynamics political leaders might engage with to rally people 
under a ‘powerful idea’, which van Creveld (1991: 214) finds crucially important in his 
low-intensity conflicts. Productive power also seems to be required both to mobilise 
domestic support to policing war, which Mueller (2004: 149-55) identifies as a major 
impediment to his project, and to create a cosmopolitan community sufficiently 
powerful to uphold cosmopolitan law-enforcement mechanisms world wide, as
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Kaldor (1999: 114) calls for (see 1.1). It is beyond the present scope to show how 
Foucault’s analytical framework could be useful to further research on these issues. We 
shall rest on the observation that it appears a promising avenue.
4.3 The relation between compulsory power and 
productive power
Dahl’s and Foucault’s respective notions of power can conceptualise different types of 
influence the NATO PI function seeks to exert. The former elucidates how PI may 
influence people’s actions to ends that compare to those armed forces have traditionally 
pursued, yet that PI may achieve short of the actual application of physical force. 
Foucault’s notion can primarily further our appreciation of how PI may enhance public 
understanding and support, which is essentially a political task. In other words, the 
study clarifies that PI deals with two different, yet obviously connected, conflicts: one 
military and one political. In empirical terms this distinction has become increasingly 
untenable. Still, it is useful to maintain it for analytical purposes to refine the 
apprehension of how these two struggles relate. Are they contradictory? Mutually 
reinforcing? Where are the pitfalls and synergies in their relations? Should one be 
subordinated to the other? Answers to these questions lie implicitly in the analytical 
parts of the thesis. They shall now be made explicit.187
The basis for understanding the relations between Dahl’s and Foucault’s notions of 
power is that they dominate different realms. Compulsory power and productive power
187 Others, notably Weber (1978) and Arendt (1979), have elaborated on the basic thoughts put forward 
here. They do so from different approaches to the phenomenon of social power, however.
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both co-exist in local centres, to use Foucault’s parlance, or in the material space, to use 
a more commonly used term (see 3.4.3), but here compulsory power can trump 
productive power. Foucault excludes productive power from the realm of war -  in the 
sense of what here is termed industrial war.188 When compulsory power takes its 
extreme form on the battlefield, productive power ceases to operate.
In addition, productive power operates in the discursive space. Here, dynamics are 
partly influenced by effects created in local centres by subjects in tactical engagements, 
and partly by internal clashes among discourses in their exclusive space. Crucially, a 
feed-back system exists whereby discursive patterns of domination return to the 
material world by influencing people’s perceptions of reality.
The productive power dimension of P i’s mode of operation offers NATO a possibility 
to influence the human dimension in international peacebuilding efforts in a 
psychological manner and on a geographical scope that NATO’s compulsory power, 
that is its conventional capability, cannot hope to reach. This does not imply that 
NATO’s productive power is superior to its compulsory power, only that its influence 
on targets is different. The relation between the two forms of power is best understood 
as interdependent.
While compulsory power dominates on the traditional battlefield, the importance of 
productive power increases between such wars. Then, productive power operates on the 
discursive battlefield, whose defining features are largely defined by the outcome of the 
last conventional battle. In the absence of full-fledged industrial wars, however,
188 Cited in Bertani et al. eds. 2003: 16.
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productive power can undermine compulsory power’s political efficiency, since the 
former validates the latter. Productive power provides the normative foundation upon 
which the legitimacy to apply compulsory power is based.
In a peace support operation, the strategic objective is public support to a particular 
vision of the future -  not armies defeated, as in industrial wars. In the former context, 
compulsory power can enforce sanctions, as for instance in case 3 against the EAAGs, 
but the broader impact of such activities depends on the legitimacy that the application 
of this compulsory power enjoys. With reference to the same case, the fact that 
Kosovo’s population did not revolt against KFOR when the latter coerced the EAAGs 
to leave the Presevo valley may be seen as a reflection of KFOR’s productive power to 
mobilise general public support and to bias public understanding in NATO’s favour on 
this particular conflict. This suggests that NATO had govemmentalised power relations 
in Kosovo. Moreover, NATO’s own publics also supported KFOR’s enforcement 
measures. Had they not done so, but rather questioned KFOR’s activities or even its 
very presence in Kosovo, it is likely that this would have created a political situation 
that reduced the effect of KFOR’s compulsory power vis-a-vis the parties. It might even 
have instigated the withdrawal of the force. This basic idea informed the rationale upon 
which P i’s mode of operation was based in the Balkans, and it appears, continues to do 
so in Afghanistan as I shall briefly return to.
From this perspective, for NATO’s capacity to apply compulsory power one of the most 
important values of the alliance’s productive power assets is that they may influence the 
regime de savoir that defines what is and what is not legitimate targets; in other words, 
whether a person subjected to NATO’s compulsory power is generally seen as an 
‘innocent victim’ or an ‘adversary’. In the present context, to the extent the discursive 
battlefield is biased in favour of NATO, those who threaten the discursive strategies
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automatically turn themselves into adversaries and thus legitimate targets. Armed 
groups and states that oppose NATO, and who depends on popular support to achieve 
their goals, would first have to succeed in the discursive battlefield before any of their 
endeavours to project compulsory power would be likely to have the desired political 
effects.189
This points to intimate bonds between compulsory and productive power. In a peace 
support operation -  conducted in situations short of industrial war -  the discursive battle 
defines the political effect of compulsory power. In other words, states’ employment of 
compulsory power will be politically opportune with respect to their electorates only if  
the legitimacy to use it is already established by productive power. Conversely, 
illegitimate use of compulsory power may lead to defeat in the discursive battlefield. In 
this light NATO’s reluctance to use physical force unless absolutely necessary, which in 
the introduction was presented as the principle of minimum necessary force (see 1.2), 
makes good sense.
Along this line of reasoning political authorities’ ability to influence international 
security is determined not on traditional geographical battlefields but in the discursive 
battlefield, not by facts on the ground but by the effects such facts create in the 
discursive space and the feedback effects they produce in terms of meaning in the next 
round of tactical engagements. This does not reduce the value of compulsory power but 
it spurs one to consider its utility in a different way from the predominant role it plays in 
industrial wars (see 1.1). In line with Smith’s (2005) idea about the utility of armed
189 This phenomenon has been studied in much academic work but is largely assessed on empirical 
grounds (see footnote 17 and section 1.5.2).
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force in contemporary war amongst the people, these theoretical considerations suggest 
that compulsory power’s expediency is determined in the discursive battlefield; that is, 
by the discourses NATO uses its PI function to shape.
To decipher this point, it is useful to return to case 5. KFOR’s productive power alone 
was unlikely to convince the EAAGs to lay down arms and leave the Presevo valley. 
Left unattended, the EAAGs could have destabilised the region, which might have 
changed people’s understanding of the situation in the Balkans, of NATO’s role in the 
region, and of the alliance’s more general utility in the post-Cold War era. In the 
discursive battlefield such developments would have altered the patterns of domination 
with the possible outcome that public support to NATO would have been hampered in 
the Balkans and at home.
To avoid such developments, KFOR first used productive power to shape the discursive 
battlefield in NATO’s favour. Once that was achieved, it used compulsory power to 
coerce the EAAGs to vacate the Presevo valley. As a result, NATO achieved not only 
its military operational objective but -  more importantly -  furthered the strategic 
political goal of reinforcing existing discursive patterns of domination. Thus, NATO 
used compulsory power in a discursive battle to enhance the already existing public 
understanding that NATO ensured stability in the Balkans. It follows from this 
reasoning that the utility of compulsory power in Foucault’s treatment of power is to put 
into practice in local centres the discursive patterns of domination that productive power 
seeks to consolidate.
In addition, when COMKFOR used PI to spearhead his compulsory power in the same 
case, he achieved the desired ‘end-state’ of the operation in a non-lethal manner. This 
clearly indicates that KFOR had govemmentalised power relations in Kosovo.
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Moreover, the approach sustained NATO’s political efforts to reduce the use of violence 
to accomplish its goals in the Balkans, and as such reinforced the broader peace and 
reconciliation endeavour. In a discursive sense, this policy may have reinforced the 
norm of seeking peaceful solutions to political differences, hence increasing both 
NATO’s legitimacy and the moral and political costs for those who might consider 
deviating from this norm. Again, compulsory power reinforced the patterns of 
domination NATO aimed to establish in the discursive battlefield.
It is interesting briefly to compare these findings with NATO’s use of compulsory and 
productive power in Afghanistan. Here, PI still aims to enhance public support in 
NATO member countries. Vis-a-vis the local audiences, however, NATO has chosen to 
exert productive power by means of its PsyOps rather than its PI function, primarily to 
safeguard the latter’s credibility. Moreover, compared with NATO in the Balkans, the 
International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) productive power seems to be 
relatively weak. It has not been able to influence the discursive patterns of domination 
in Afghan societies to NATO’s advantage. Instead, this military mission, compared to 
IFOR and KFOR, relies relatively much on compulsory power to survive and maintain 
some sort o f order, mainly in the capital and its surroundings areas.
The broader academic debate about the increasing role of the media as a means of 
power in the conduct of politics, diplomacy and war is not new (see 1.5). Within this 
largely empirical debate, however, there is only limited theoretical considerations as to 
how we may conceptualise the dynamics of power at work. Since the late 1990s, 
scholars have increasingly engaged in this debate and primarily along Nye’s (1990) 
notions of hard and soft power (see 1.4.2). The present findings generally question the 
theoretical validity of the latter term. It is diffuse and rests on two notions of power -  
Bachrach and Baratz’ and Lukes’ -  that are respectively of little relevance in the
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present context and untenable. Instead, this thesis holds that Dahl’s and Foucault’s 
respective notions of power offer coherent concepts to account for the dynamics at the 
heart of these scholarly exchanges of views.
The conceptual framework developed here provides a useful analytical tool with which 
to examine the compulsory and normative processes that influence the kind of wars 
Western armed forces primarily have been tasked to deal with in the post-Cold War era 
and more broadly states’ influence in international affairs. Today, where physical force 
appears insufficient to pursue aims of national policy, the framework is more relevant 
than during the Cold War. In the latter era states’ monopoly of violence, their trademark 
throughout the modem era, still defined the realm of international politics, as suggested 
by Realists’ control of the high-ground in the academic debate on international affairs. 
Within this school of thought key figures assumed a conception of power that compares 
to Dahl’s compulsory notion.
The normative dimensions of international politics, with which this thesis is primarily 
concerned, have been extensively studied by Liberal scholars. They have done so 
primarily at a general or structural level, however. This study argues that Foucault’s 
theoretical approach, which accommodates the normative concern, can provide the 
analytical means to appreciate how subjects actually use social communication as a 
means of power in their conduct of foreign policy. The theoretical findings address a 
shortcoming that has been observed within the field of discourse theory (see 1.5.3). 
While scholars have elaborated on how discourses produce common sense ‘exploration 
of the production of common sense has been relatively limited’ (Milliken 1999: 238). 
P i’s mode of operation along a principle of concentration of knowledge appears as one 
way such common sense may be produced. This is an understanding of power that
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escapes Dahl’s notion, and also seminal Realist scholars’ understanding of how national 
interests are efficiently pursued.
If the strategic objective of our times is, as Smith’s and others have argued, to win the 
will of the people, then the present study would suggest that we appreciate the dynamic 
forces in international security primarily as productive power. Or, in Foucault’s 
language, less in terms of Right of Death and more as Power over Life.
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Final thoughts
It is not difficult to sympathise with Oscar Wilde’s statement that he could resist 
anything but temptations. As my work progressed it was tempting, at times, to change 
the course of research to a broader reconsideration of the phenomenon of war from the 
perspective of productive power. I resisted. Having completed the thesis I can no longer 
resist but shall present some considerations in the form of hypothetical propositions. To 
this end, Foucault offers a suitable spring-board when he twists Clausewitz’s 
catchphrase and stipulates ‘that politics is the continuation of war by other means’.190
It is quite obvious that conventional conceptions of war assume an understanding of its 
dynamic forces that is compatible with compulsory power. Where Clausewitz (1976:
75) describes war as ‘an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will’, Dahl’s (1957: 
202-03) notion comprises this understanding when he defines power as ‘A has power 
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B  would not otherwise do’.
On the remaining pages, I shall therefore term such Clausewitzian wars compulsory 
war. This concept would include what in this thesis is referred to as industrial war.
If we accept the introductory claim that the strategic objective in contemporary wars is 
to win the will of the people and the present argument that productive power is better 
suited than compulsory power to conceptualise the dynamics leading to the fulfilment of 
such objectives, then we may further term contemporary wars productive war. The latter 
notion aims to seize the dynamics comprised in the Foucauldian notion productive
190 Cited in Bertani et al. eds. 2003: 15.
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power to describe the form of confrontations and conflicts, which arguably dominate the 
post-Cold War era (see 1.1).
Indeed, this gambit with two uncommon terms may appear odd since it leaves 
unattended their relation to more ordinary conceptual pairs in the field such as ‘wars of 
necessity’ versus ‘wars of choice’, ‘high-intensity wars’ versus ‘low-intensity wars’, or 
simply ‘wars’ versus ‘operations other than war’.191 Yet, the temptation spurring these 
final thoughts is to continue the line of reasoning from Dahl’s and Foucault’s notions of 
power and see where that takes our understanding of the phenomenon of war.
Imagine a war fought by means of productive power, what would that imply for the way 
actors pursue their ends in the field of international affairs? The theoretical dimension 
of this study suggests that productive war would be radically different from war as we 
know it, ie from compulsory war. But how? What could the term productive war mean? 
How would it affect the armed forces’ mode of operation? It seems worthwhile to 
reflect on the contours of a productive war.
We should commence by comprehending productive war as primarily political 
struggles; struggles unworthy of the term war, to the conventional military mind grown 
up with Clausewitz’ (1976: 149) idea that ‘war is a clash between major interests, which 
is resolved by bloodshed’ and that this is ‘the only way in which it [war] differs from 
other conflicts’. On the contrary, productive war is fought in ordinary social relations 
and may well, but not necessarily, involve military, economic, and other conflicts. The 
latter will, however, always be subordinated to political concerns. Productive war is a
191 In fact, I am not aware of others who have proposed the term productive war.
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de-securitised form of war, often politicised but most pervasive when conducted at the 
non-politicised level.192 While the logic of productive power should make it applicable 
to practically all sectors of human societies, as diverse as agricultural techniques and 
international security, it shall in the context of the present speculations be delimited to 
the latter and based on the assumption that the state plays a cardinal role in the field.
The battlefield of productive war is discursive and driven by social communication, 
rather than material and conducted by means of violence as in compulsory war. Where 
the latter have often been contained in the spatial sense and seek end-states in the form 
of decisive victories, productive war blurs such approaches to time and space. 
Conventional terms like war, crisis and peace make no sense in productive war, which ' 
is a more permanent state of affairs. Further, productive war is influenced by the 
discursive effects of wars fought several centuries ago. This point was illustrated in the 
winter of 2003, for instance, when the discursive effects of the religious wars in the 16th 
and 17th century, notably the principle of non-intervention as inscribed in public 
international law, influenced the productive war about whether or not it was right to 
intervene in Iraq.193 Further, its discursive character makes productive war omnipresent. 
At a macro level, it is fought in what Smith (2005: 289) calls the ‘global theatre of war’ 
and at the micro-level it emerges within a person as a question of which side he is on.
Productive war primarily affects people’s minds, and their bodies only through their 
minds, or through the minds and consequent acts of others. Where the immediate effects 
of compulsory war are death and destruction, in productive war they are knowledge;
192 Waever’s (1995) definition of these terms used here.
193 On the function of this legal principle in the field of international affairs see Bull (1977).
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that is, the meaning of information accumulated from a wide range of acts conducted in 
the material world. Productive war organises the way we perceive reality. They 
determine what counts as facts, what the facts signify, whether that is a desirable state 
of affairs, and how we shall proceed to defend, or counter, current developments. So, 
productive war is not fought to control territory but to establish systems of legitimate 
knowledge. They do not primarily aim to control others’ behaviour but to define the 
‘others’ -  and therefore ‘ourselves’.
Because knowledge shapes our perceptions of reality, and therefore reality as it exists in 
social contexts, productive war determines reality. Discourses establish normative 
structures by dividing reality into a system of binary conceptual relations. The general 
reference to the majority of states by terms such as ‘developing countries’ or ‘third 
world’ are cases in point, and establishes them as inferior to the ‘developed countries’ 
and ‘first world’. Binary conceptual relations distinguish ‘them’ from ‘us’, ‘friend’ from 
‘foe’, the ‘free world’ from ‘communist regimes’ during the Cold War, the ‘civilised’ 
from ‘terrorists’ today. Such normative divisions influence subjects’ understanding and 
produce social hegemonies, they govern by structuring the possible field of actions of 
others, as Foucault (1982: 790) would say. Productive war spurs people to get on the 
‘right’ side o f dividing normative boundaries. The ‘will to knowledge’ influences the 
‘will of the people’. The US President’s announcement of the Gulf War in 1991 
illustrates this point. In a TV-transmitted speech President Bush Sr. declared: ‘We’re 
called upon to define who we are and what we believe’.194
194 Cited in Gray (1997: 47).
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Although productive war is fought in a discursive realm, the war is not alien to the 
material world. On the contrary, it is deeply embedded in the material world. Productive 
war influences and is influenced by people’s acts. Productive war legitimises social 
hegemonies, with their political institutions, procedures and enforcement measures. 
Moreover, productive war defines which acts of death and destruction are legitimate and 
which are not.
Victory, in conventional parlance, may be described as defeating the enemy’s armed 
forces in a decisive battle after a long military campaign.195 In contrast, victory in 
productive war happens all the time and takes the form of discursive patterns of 
domination that are relatively stable but always in flux.196 It may materialise in a local 
centre such as, for instance, the existing state of affairs in the Balkans or in international 
society.
Accordingly, and in contrast to compulsory war, productive war creates win-win 
situations, where normative pressures induce subjects to join the victorious hegemony 
and act within the limits of its ordering normative boundaries. The losers are those who 
feel uncomfortable within or marginalised from extant patterns of domination. They are 
subjects who feel excluded from society by the way dividing normative lines either 
ignore them or turn them into legitimate targets for sanctions.
Often, such subjects have a standing invitation to join the hegemonic structures. The 
West’s invitation to former Warsaw Pact states to join Western organisations such as
195 See, for example, Clausewitz (1976: 194-95,204).
196 Others have argued that victory as we know it from WW II and the 1991 Gulf War can no longer be 
expected in contemporary wars, eg Coker (2005:17-19) and Spiller (2005:357).
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the EU and NATO is a case in point. Provided that certain criteria are met in, among 
others, the field of political constitutions, democratic control, and economic structures, 
Eastern European states have been invited to join Western structures. Their citizens 
have been free to go to West Europe, even to settle and make a living. That is, if  they 
could adapt. Given their history within the last decade, Serbia’s recent efforts to become 
a member of NATO, is a striking example of the same dynamic. In this sense, 
productive war matches Cooper’s (2004: 70-79) postmodern societies’ multi-sectoral 
endeavours to create voluntary empires. Victory in productive war is thus very different 
from the win-lose situations compulsory power aims for; less noisy; hardly noticed.
Soldiers fight compulsory war, but who fights productive war? If we follow Foucault’s 
idea that subjects’ access is limited to the tactical levels of productive power, then 
discourses fight the wars at the strategic level. Non-subjective and therefore non- 
intentional discourses reign the discursive battlefield but always influencing and 
influenced by subjects’ manoeuvres in the tactical realm. Subjects partake in the battle 
but never control it.
If we confine ourselves to the scope of subjects, then all who produce information used 
in social communication are to be considered soldiers in productive war. But clearly 
some produce more influential information than others. How some subjects manage to 
achieve such comparative advantages in the battle is an interesting question. Should we 
see the ‘heavy weapons’ in the discursive battlefield as subjects who speak from the 
high grounds of authority? Such high grounds would be the result o f an earlier 
productive war. They could be seen as high grounds that, once conquered, provide 
subjects with an authority that gives them a relatively widely-noticed and influential 
voice, and thus endows them with more productive power.
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‘Head of state’ constitutes one such privileged position. Heads of states exercise more 
productive power than ordinary citizens, not only because they possess the compulsory 
power to enforce their ideas but also because they represent larger human collectives. 
Some may support their ideas, others may oppose them, but few can ignore them. Other 
examples of potent, yet very different, soldiers in productive war would be experts in 
the field o f international security. These are soldiers who depart from a higher ground in 
the public debate within their field of expertise and may increase their productive power 
to the extent people consider them competent and credible; soldiers who by means of 
auxiliary concepts may succeed in defining what counts as legitimate knowledge in the 
discursive field. Such fixation of meaning will express itself in new normative lines of 
division, as for instance NATO’s 1991 strategic concept where risks replaced threats as 
the binary opposition to stability, or in the idea that culture has replaced ideology as the 
dominant source of violent conflicts (Huntington 1993).
Powerful or not, no one escapes productive war, and this irrespective of whether or not 
we are aware of it. We all engage in social communication. We are all combatants and 
as such both targets and targeters. We wage ‘war by other means’, in Foucault’s 
coinage, pursuing our ends by means primarily of words, rather than swords. These 
means are congruent with those in Cooper’s (2004: 116-26) postmodern foreign policy 
carried out by persuasion rather than bribing or coercion.
Strategic thinking in productive war is different from that in compulsory war. Where in 
the latter strategies are made by military planners, in the former they are the result of 
clashes and relations between discursive forces in the discursive battlefield. Since 
subjects exercise no intentional influence at this level, the ‘fog of war’ is even thicker 
here than in compulsory war. Therefore, strategic thinking in productive war is not a 
question of planning the road to victory like in compulsory war. The former boils
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down to the formulation and dissemination of a purpose or vision most people will 
support.
The mode of operation for implementing the strategies may in compulsory war be 
described as centrally controlled with industrial organisation and efficiency, a 
tremendous war-machine, hierarchically driven with superiors pushing subordinates to 
achieve objectives along the lines of detailed military plans. The productive war’s mode 
of operation is also centralised, but primarily at the level of ideas. It is most efficiently 
fought along a principle of concentration of knowledge. That is, when a party in the 
confrontation shares a relatively common purpose, which differentiates them from other 
parties, and a common set of assumptions about the dynamics of productive power to 
fulfil the group’s purposes. At the level of implementation, however, combatants in 
productive war need not operate in a centralised manner. They need not be conceived as 
subordinates awaiting their superior’s command. Often, they are better understood as 
salesmen on the marketplace of values and visions, self-propelled and driven by 
conviction, trying to win other people over to their side in the struggle.
Within this mode of operation the role of leaders changes. Direct command as in 
compulsory war is no longer expedient. Leaders in productive war are the patterns of 
dominations’ representation in the material world; the personification of a discursive 
strategy. They are icons of an idea, of a common purpose. Al-Qaeda’s leader Bin Laden, 
the Zapatista’s Subcomandante Marcos, and in some respects the current President Bush 
would be cases in point. Promoting a similar view Kaldor (1999: 73-4) compares 
leaders in her concept of new wars with executives of large corporations, who driven by 
expediency no longer direct their industries by means of direct control, but by inspiring 
and facilitating the work of their employees.
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Productive war is fought at the tactical level, in a theoretical sense of the term, of 
productive power. Here, combatants may reach their objectives by efficiently targeting 
the meaning dimension in politics and war. True, this competence is put in practice on 
an ethically slippery slope that commences by informing and goes through convincing 
and persuading to misleading targets. This clearly carries associations to tainted notions 
of propaganda, which political and military establishments want to eschew (see 1.3).
Yet it is equally clear that this is the skill applied in time-honoured human activities by 
politicians, diplomats, businessmen, and other successful communicators. Where the 
line is and should be drawn between legitimate and illegitimate techniques of social 
communication is debatable -  and always somehow defined by productive war.
If productive war is fought by means familiar from the field of diplomacy and business, 
where does that leave the military? Is there a role for the armed forces to play in 
productive war? How would they operate differently from the way they proceed in 
compulsory war?
Armed forces do play an important role in productive war. But it is a role that is 
primarily political. Since productive war is essentially a politicised form of war, armed 
forces are further integrated into the political realm than is the case with compulsory 
war. In productive war the armed forces are an integral part o f the political realm and 
are used as political instruments delivering political results. In other words, compared to 
compulsory war productive war stresses the political dimension for which wars are 
fought. Bluntly put, when the West considered how to deal with Iraq in 1991 and Serbia 
in 1999, the logic of compulsory war would direct military strategists to plan for the 
most efficient way to defeat the adversary’s armed forces. The logic of productive war, 
however, would spur the same people to achieve similar objectives but guided by an
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overall concern for how their military campaigns would affect public support and 
ultimately the legitimacy of Western hegemony in the post-Cold War era.
In addition, Jominian ‘levels of war’ collapse in productive war. Military debates on this 
topic often centres around the notion of the ‘strategic corporal’ and deals with when and 
to what extent the lowest level of command holds a potentially strategic impact. The 
political effect of the images showing US troops sexually harassing Iraqi inmates in the 
Abu Ghraib prisons in the autumn of 2003 and the corpse of a US Ranger being pulled 
through the streets of Mogadishu on 3 October 1993 are both cases in point. Nations 
unprepared for productive war are particularly vulnerable to such information. Yet, only 
the conventional military mind will share Adams’ (1996: 110) astonishment when he 
comments on the US withdrawal from Somalia in the following manner: ‘That the 
world’s single most important military and political power should have its foreign 
policy dictated by a television image of a single dead American is extraordinary’.
In productive war armed forces operate on the assumption that military campaigns and 
tactics are politicised, that the battle space is discursive, worldwide and that the 
objective is to enhance public understanding and support. Adopting the armed forces’ 
mode of operation to the logic of productive war addresses fundamental questions and 
involves several pitfalls. I shall address a few.
When physical force is trumped by meaning as the primary dynamic in war, how should 
armed forces apply the skill that has been their raison d'etre for centuries, the capability 
around which their entire organisation centres, and which distinguishes them from all 
other social institutions -  that is, the capability to apply physical force?
The application of armed force remains useful also in productive war but only to the 
extent it sustains political rather than conventional military objectives. The
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immediate targets of such force remain by necessity material but the objectives must be 
expedient discursive effects. Tactical results are useful beyond their immediate 
consequences only to the extent that they create discursive effects and maybe even 
manage to influence discursive patterns of domination. In other words, compulsory 
power has to be applied within the logic of productive war. Moreover, armed forces can 
play a more symbolic role in productive war. They are useful also short of employment 
of physical force. Non-lethal acts, such as the mere mentioning of deploying forces, 
actual deployment, and relief work, all in their own way produce discursive effects that 
may result in normative biases conducive to foreign policy goals.
It is timely to consider how the application of physical force may change when used 
primarily to create discursive, rather than material, effects. In the latter situation, 
physical force may be used to deter a military invasion. In the former, compulsory 
power may for all practical purposes be applied in much the same way. Crucially, 
however, the primary purpose would be to send messages. With examples from the 
present study, when KFOR deters Serbia (case 4) with the message ‘Don’t do it’, they 
simultaneously reassure Kosovars that they are safe. The discursive effect o f such use of 
compulsory power is to reinforce the idea that KFOR promotes stability in the Balkans, 
that its deployed forces are a bulwark against aggression.
In addition, the priority of sending messages may equally spur armed forces to operate 
in a manner different from the logic of compulsory war. For example, when Russians 
were about to take control over Pristina Airport one day prior to the arrival of KFOR, 
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe ordered KFOR to block the runways, that is, to 
use compulsory power, in an effort to prevent possible Russian planes from using the 
airport. COMKFOR strongly disagreed to escalate the confrontation and opted for a 
diplomatic approach to the conflict (Clark 2001: 390-94). In this heated situation,
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not only politically but also weather-wise with temperatures going up to 37 degrees 
Celsius, PI disseminated information that KFOR troops provided the Russians with 
16,000 litres of freshwater (NATO 16/6/1999). This may be seen as a military tactical 
manoeuvre that does not deserve this name from the perspective of compulsory war but 
which is expedient from the perspective of productive war. Maybe it was a coincidence. 
In any case the manoeuvre to give water to the antagonist of the day, and who only a 
decade earlier had been the primary Cold-War adversary, sent a strong message of 
peace and reconciliation, a message that was congruent with NATO’s political objective 
in the Balkans and which may be seen as a small contribution to a broader effort to 
establish a particular social hegemony in the region.
In the same vein, Lt.Col. Stech argues that US forces should develop CNN tactics. By 
that he means tactics in the conflict zone which produce images and stories for the 
media to disseminate worldwide. He reasons: ‘if our policies fail to reflect a human 
face, if  the cold calculations of our leaders envision no compelling stories of human 
values, then in a world of CNN war the force of public support. . .  for those policies 
will be questionable at best’ (Stech 1994: 10). Obviously, there is a fine line delimiting 
such productive war tactics from manipulation.
Further, the logic of productive war suggests that the organisation of armed forces 
should be adapted to the general decentralised mode of operation sketched out above in 
such wars. The incentive to do this must be balanced, however, with the need to avoid 
the pitfall of undermining one’s legitimacy. Since credibility, and therefore legitimacy, 
is essential to pursue political goals in productive war, and since the use of physical 
force compared to most other means holds significant potential to undermine this 
legitimacy, good political reasons remain to maintain central control over armed forces. 
The fact that members of armed forces both possess significant compulsory power
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and represent their states, involves a risk that their use of such power may have negative 
consequences for their states’ reputations. It is likely that this risk will increase if armed 
forces operate as decentralised as other combatants engaged in productive wars. From 
this point of view central control over states’ means of violence appears sensible.
Conducting efficient military campaigns is not easy in compulsory war and the stakes 
are high. Yet proper conduct of productive war appears more complicated although the 
effects generally come across as less dramatic. Not only need armed forces balance a 
variety of concerns, for example, between operational efficiency in the material world 
and discursive constraints, but they operate in a discursive battlefield defined by 
conflicting discourses in pursuance of potentially conflicting political objectives, and 
with uncontrollable discursive effects. Expediency is difficult to plan for, but the 
accumulated effects of a massive amount of successful tactical engagements conducted 
along a principle of concentration of knowledge appear to be the best recipe to achieve 
the desired strategic situation in the discursive battlefield and therefore in the material 
world.
I do not launch the notion of productive war to devalue compulsory war altogether. The 
latter’s strategic thinking remains vital in armed conflicts that involve the question of 
national survival. As Freedman (1998: 764) inveighs against proponents of the 
‘declining utility of force’-thesis, to act as if physical force has no role to play in politics 
is to live at the mercy of those who believe it has. Countering a conventional military 
invasion with productive power alone is unlikely to succeed.
Still, the concept of productive war appears useful to confine the logic of compulsory 
war to a context in which it is arguably most useful, that is to symmetrical wars fought 
by compulsory power. This would allow the logic of productive war to take a more
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prominent role in conflicts where this would be beneficial, for instance, in asymmetrical 
wars or symmetric wars fought by productive power.197
The utility of distinguishing between compulsory war and productive war appears when 
we apply the terms on the so-called ‘War on Terror’. This is a war in which the West’s 
adversaries have insignificant compulsory power, at least compared to that of our 
primary adversary during the Cold War. Still terrorists -  to use the term by which they 
are defined and commonly referred to in Western discourse -  possess significant 
productive power. If we conceive this war as a productive war, then the battle space -  
the place where victory is determined -  is discursive. The discursive effects o f the 
terrorists’ tactical engagements with the West, however limited in the material sense, 
have partly been to arouse significant fear in Western societies and to spread a sense of 
insecurity to the point where citizens have begun to question the value of their 
Hobbesian contract with their political authorities. An additional effect has been to 
mobilise understanding for and sometimes support among large segments of the world’s 
population to counter Western influence in international affairs.
From this perspective, the strategic use of information and the ability to concentrate 
knowledge -  in short, productive power -  can be seen as the terrorists’ foremost weapon 
to undermine the political expediency of the West’s overwhelming compulsory power. 
The productive war is asymmetrical, however, only to the extent the West operates 
within the logic of compulsory war. Those who chose to rely on the latter are likely to 
fight a losing battle, since they will have random, and most likely limited, productive
197 Freedman’s (2001: 64-65) definition of the terms symmetrical and asymmetrical wars is used here. 
From this understanding, had the ‘Cold’ War turned ‘hot’ it would have been a symmetric war, while an 
example o f an asymmetrical war could be the War on Terror.
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effect in the discursive battlefield that defines the political effect of their war efforts. It 
may even undermine electorates’ support to their political leaderships’ foreign policy.
The notion of productive war suggests that terrorists’ ability to win tactical 
engagements, in the discursive sense of the term, will be reduced if  the West meet them 
with a form of power that matches their, that is, with productive power. Western 
endeavours in the field of public diplomacy, trade, development assistance and the like 
can be seen as such efforts. If, on the other hand, we approach the War on Terror from 
the logic of compulsory war we risk confronting the same difficulties as Callwell 
identified in the British Empire’s endeavours to use compulsory power in their small 
wars: where do you direct your troops ‘when there is no king to conquer, no capital to 
seize, no organized army to overthrow, and when there are no celebrated strongholds to 
capture . . .  ?’198 Compulsory power is surely useful to limit terrorists’ physical room of 
manoeuvre but they do not suffice to reduce terrorists’ ability to excite some and 
frighten others.
Compulsory war and productive war do not denote new forms of warfare. The examples 
used to clarify the arguments above clearly illustrate this point. What these hypothetical 
propositions offer, however, is a conceptualisation of such forms of warfare, initial 
considerations as to the function of armed forces in productive war, and a glimpse of the 
utility and pitfalls of physical force in this context. This may be useful.
If we choose to approach international affairs from the perspective of compulsory war, 
we conceive the field primarily from Foucault’s (1998) Right of Death-perspective and
198 Cited in Frantzen (2005: 24).
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our task is to maximise the kind of power that allow us to say ‘No’. The thesis at hand 
argues that such power will not deliver what presumably is the strategic objective of our 
time. Moreover, a focus on compulsory war, rather than productive war, will hamper the 
opportunities of productive power to reach the objectives. We will fail to understand the 
dynamics of our most manifest conflicts. We will lose of sight the opportunities 
inherent in McLuhan’s (2001) ‘age of information’ and the utility of adapting the 
conduct of foreign policy and military campaigns to this strategic environment. We will 
not consider improving international forms of government, in Foucault’s sense of the 
term, that may help us desecuritising international confrontations. Most importantly, we 
may lose an opportunity to engage consciously and expediently with the dynamics to 
exert Power over Life -  in this case international life.
Closing these speculations and with them the present study, I should like to address a 
final question: what is productive war not?
The ubiquitous character of productive war in time, space and even in the realm of 
discourses runs the risk of Je-conceptualising, rather than re-conceptualising, the 
phenomenon of war. In the opening paragraphs of these final thoughts, compulsory war 
was confined to the application of lethal compulsory power in inter-state relations. This 
definition delimits the phenomenon from other social relations where there is no major 
Clausewitzian ‘clash’ between states or where such clashes and other confrontations 
between peoples are solved short of using physical force. A political situation often 
referred to by the broad term ‘peace’.
Along this line of reasoning, coming to terms with the meaning of peace in productive 
war may be a way to delimit the latter notion. This raises another question: what would 
peace mean from the perspective of productive war? The non-application of
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knowledge in international affairs, is hardly a satisfactory answer. Foucault offers a 
better answer when he argues that productive power ceases to exist in Clausewitzian 
wars.199 We may then conceive productive war as any relation between major actors 
short of compulsory war, in other words, as what in the logic of the latter is called 
peace.
So, where do all these conceptual explorations lead? Do they add a new meaning to 
Orwell’s newspeak that ‘war is peace’?
199 Cited in Bertani et al. eds. 2003: 16.
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